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models traditionally used to assess economic transactions and socioeconomic conditions in this region,
and assess the role that Roman/Herodian state institutions as well as Jewish religious institutions would
have played in shaping the contours of economic decision-making within this system. In particular, it
explores the ways that travel, cult obligations at the Jerusalem Temple, and agricultural laws defined the
parameters of economic necessities, structured incentives for economic behavior, and defined a
“bounded” economic rationality for Galilean Jews. This dissertation draws on a combination of literary
sources—especially the writings of Josephus, the New Testament gospels, and the Mishnah—and
archaeological evidence from recent excavations in Galilee. New Institutional Economics is deployed as a
framework for analyzing the role of socially-constructed institutions in defining the incentives, costs, and
bounds of the environment in which people make their economic decisions. Insights are also drawn from
the social sciences on norm creation and enforcement and on emergent group behavior to consider how
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in shaping the economy in Early Roman Galilee is misplaced, and instead argues that religious institutions
played a more formative role in shaping economic behavior. Galilean Jews primarily interacted with other
Jews in Galilee, forming a relatively closed and insular economy characterized by high levels of
interconnectivity between settlements that may be described as a “small world” network and that created
ideal conditions for strong norm enforcement. Adherence to the statutes of the Torah would have created
an economic system temporally structured around the three annual pilgrimage festivals and the
sabbatical cycle, and obligations in the Torah constrained the timing and manner of production,
consumption, and exchange of agricultural products that constituted the bulk of economic transactions.
By highlighting the role of religion in shaping the traditionally compartmentalized sphere of economy, this
study indicates the value of integrating analysis of religion and economy not only for Early Roman Galilee,
but also for ancient Mediterranean history and for Religious Studies more broadly.
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ABSTRACT
TORAH, TEMPLE, AND TRANSACTION: J EWISH RELIGIOUS INSTITUTIONS
AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR IN EARLY ROMAN GALILEE
Alexander J. Ramos
Annette Yoshiko Reed
This dissertation examines the regional economy of Galilee in the Early Roman
period. It re-evaluates models traditionally used to assess economic transactions and
socioeconomic conditions in this region, and assess the role that Roman/Herodian
state institutions as well as Jewish religious institutions would have played in sh aping
the contours of economic decision-making within this system. In particular, it
explores the ways that travel, cult obligations at the Jerusalem Temple, and agricul tural laws defined the parameters of economic necessities, structured incentives for
economic behavior, and defined a “bounded” economic rationality for Galilean Jews.
This dissertation draws on a combination of literary sources—especially the writings
of Josephus, the New Testament gospels, and the Mishnah—and archaeological
evidence from recent excavations in Galilee. New Institutional Economics is deployed
as a framework for analyzing the role of socially-constructed institutions in defining
the incentives, costs, and bounds of the environment in which people make their
economic decisions. Insights are also drawn from the social sciences on norm creation
and enforcement and on emergent group behavior to consider how social forces factor
into economic decisions. This dissertation argues that the focus on state institutions in
shaping the economy in Early Roman Galilee is misplaced, and instead argues that
religious institutions played a more formative role in shaping economic behavior.
Galilean Jews primarily interacted with other Jews in Galilee, forming a relatively
closed and insular economy characterized by high levels of interconnectivity between
settlements that may be described as a “small world” network and that created ideal
conditions for strong norm enforcement. Adherence to the statutes of the Torah would
have created an economic system temporally structured around the three annual
pilgrimage festivals and the sabbatical cycle, and obligations in the Torah constrained
the timing and manner of production, consumption, and exchange of agricultural
products that constituted the bulk of economic transactions. By highlighting the role
of religion in shaping the traditionally compartmentalized sphere of economy, this
study indicates the value of integrating analysis of religion and economy not only for
Early Roman Galilee, but also for ancient Mediterranean history and for Religious
Studies more broadly.
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INTRODUCTION—TORAH, TEMPLE, AND TRANSACTION
The first century CE is a crucial period in the history of ancient Judaism and early
Christianity. It was a major period of transformation for Palestine; 1 after nearly a
century of relative independence as the Hasmonaean kingdom, the region was again
subjected to an imperial power—Rome. Our major source for Palestine in this period,
the Jewish historian Josephus, describes this first century of Roman domination as
tumultuous, full of political restructuring, insurrections, and messianic/revolutionary
figures. The First Jewish Revolt against Rome, the climax of Judaean political unrest
leading to the destruction of Jerusalem and the Temple in 70 CE, stands out as one of
the most formative events in Jewish history and is also crucial in the history of the
wider Roman Empire. In addition, the region of Galilee in northern Palestine is
important and much-studied as the setting of the historical Jesus’ ministry and as the
crucible for Christian origins.
Past research on the history of first-century Palestine has largely followed the
lead of Josephus and the New Testament Gospels, which frame their narratives of
events in terms of political and religious concerns. Economic factors were long
neglected by comparison. Since the 1970s and 1980s, however, there has been growth
in research on economy in Early Roman Galilee,2 inspired largely by Moses I.
Finley’s The Ancient Economy, published in 1973.3 Finley presented a model of the
1

I recognize the anachronism in deploying a politico-geographic term from the post-70 era and
its fraught entanglement in the modern geopolitical situation of contemporary Israel. However, I use it
as an expedient solution to the problem that “Judaea” is a term used in the ancien t sources for a
specific region around Jerusalem as well as for a province or kingdom (of various configurations).
Rather than deploying alternatives like “Greater Judaea” or “Iudaea” for the latter, and thereby risking
confusion, I have opted for the distinct though problematic “Palestine.”
2
For a good overview of this turn toward economy, see Philip A. Harland, “The Economy of
First-Century Palestine: State of the Scholarly Discussion,” in Handbook of Early Christianity: Social
Science Approaches, ed. Anthony J. Blasi, Jean Duhaime, and Paul-André Turcotte (Walnut Creek,
CA: AltaMira, 2002), 511–27. In addition to Finley, several early works related to agrarian life and
economy by scholars from the interwar period continued to influence the depiction of e conomic realities in Roman Palestine: F. C. Grant, The Economic Background of the Gospels (London: Oxford
University Press, 1926); Joseph Klausner, “The Economy of Judea in the Period of the Second
Temple,” in The World History of the Jewish People, vol. 7: The Herodian Period, ed. M. Avi-Yonah
(New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1975 [1930]), 180–205; Joachim Jeremias, Jerusalem in
the Time of Jesus: An Investigation into Economic and Social Conditions during the New Testament
Period, trans. F. H. Cave and C. H. Cave (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1969 [1933]).
3
Moses I. Finley, The Ancient Economy (2nd rev. ed.; Berkeley: University of California Press,
1999 [1973]). It is to Finley that we owe the popularization of this position, though we can find ant ecedents to it already in the work of A. H. M. Jones; see his posthumously published Studies in Ancient
Economic and Administrative History, ed. P. A. Brunt (Oxford: Blackwell, 1974). Finley’s model
stands in contrast to Mikhail Ivanovitch Rostovtzeff’s e arlier propositions about the economy of the
Hellenistic and Roman empires; see The Social and Economic History of the Roman Empire, trans. O.
M. Fraser (2 vols.; Oxford: Clarendon, 1957 [1926]); The Social and Economic History of the Hellen-

2
economy for ancient Greece and Rome that minimized the role and extent of trade,
emphasized the subsistence orientation of peasant agrarian producers, and characterized the relationship of cities to the countryside as extractive and exploitative.
Finley’s model became the dominant paradigm in the study of the ancient Mediterra nean economy, and to this day one can hardly talk about the ancient economy without
reference to his work. Though Finley himself eschewed discussion of the Near East in
his analysis, treating it as an altogether different system, scholars of Early Roman
Galilee from the 1980s onward, such as Seán Freyne, Richard Horsley, Douglas E.
Oakman, have embraced Finley’s model as a means to evaluate the socioeconomic
conditions that undergirded Jesus’ ministry and the Jewish Revolt. 4
The study of economy in ancient Galilee, however, has stalled on Finley. While
the importance of Finley’s groundbreaking contribution cannot be understated,
scholarship on the ancient economy over the following decades has challenged many
aspects of the model and its underlying assumptions. 5 Specialist research on Galilee
has not yet adequately grappled with the critiques of his model and continues to
perpetuate some of its most problematic assumptions and foci. Archaeologists exca vating sites in Galilee over the last few decades have yielded important data for
understanding economic activity in the first century, 6 and they have pushed back
against the view that trade was limited and that urban–rural relations were unidirec-

istic World (3 vols.; Oxford: Clarendon, 1941). Finley and Rostovtzeff are often identified with oppo site poles in the primitivist–modernist debate respectively.
4
See, e.g., Seán Freyne, Galilee from Alexander the Great to Hadrian, 323 BCE to 135 CE: A
Study of Second Temple Judaism (Wilmington, DE: Michael Glazier, 1980); Freyne, Galilee, Jesus,
and the Gospels: Literary Approaches and Historical Investigations (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1988);
Richard A. Horsley with John S. Hanson, Bandits, Prophets, and Messiahs: Popular Movements in the
Time of Jesus (Harrisburg: Trinity Press International, 1985); Horsley, Jesus and the Spiral of
Violence: Popular Jewish Resistance in Roman Palestine (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1987);
Douglas E. Oakman, Jesus and the Economic Questions of His Day (Lewiston, NY: Mellen, 1986).
5
For evaluations of the scholarship on the ancient Mediterranean economy subsequent to Finley,
noting the shifts in the types of evidence and modeling deployed and the questions guiding research,
see Jean Andreau, “Twenty Years after Moses I. Finley’s The Ancient Economy,” trans. Antonia
Nevill, in The Ancient Economy, ed. Walter Scheidel and Sitta von Reden (New York: Routledge,
2002), 33–49. On the afterlife of Finley in the context of the primitivst –modernist and substantivist–
formalist debates, see Paul Cartledge, “The Economy (Economies) of Ancient Greece,” in Scheidel
and von Reden, The Ancient Economy, 11–32; Richard Saller, “Framing the Debate over Growth in
the Ancient Economy,” in Scheidel and von Reden, The Ancient Economy, 251–69.
6
For a sampling of recent studies of the archaeological data from Galilee directed toward
economic questions, see the contributions in David A. Fiensy and James Riley Strange, eds., Galilee
in the Late Second Temple and Mishnaic Periods, vol. 2: The Archaeological Record From Cities,
Towns, and Villages (Minneapolis: Fortress, 2015); Douglas R. Edwards and C. Thomas McCollough,
eds., Archaeology and the Galilee: Texts and Contexts in the Graeco-Roman and Byzantine Periods
(Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1997); Edwards, ed., Religion and Society in Roman Palestine: Old Questions, New Approaches (New York: Routledge, 2004). For a useful socioeconomic analysis of a few
select but important settlements in Galilee, as well as the coinage found there, see Martin Hørning
Jensen, Herod Antipas in Galilee: The Literary and Archaeological Sources on the Reign of Herod
Antipas and Its Socio-economic Impact on Galilee (WUNT 215; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2006).

3
tional and exploitative. 7 But even so, much of the conversation remains trapped in the
bounds of the Finleyan paradigm, with literary scholars and archaeologists at an
impasse.8 It is an opportune time to forge a new path by appealing to alternative
models for thinking about the economic system in which Galileans operated.
In this dissertation, I attempt to formulate an alternative framework for understanding the Galilean economy in the Early Roman period (63 BCE–70 CE).9 The
center–periphery model that emphasizes the relationship between city and satellite
country settlements defies the settlement patterns revealed by archaeological surveys
and excavations of Galilee. Instead, I suggest that a “small world” network is a more
appropriate model for the landscape of Early Roman Galilee, a model that exhibits
high levels of inter-settlement connectivity not necessarily based around urban hubs.
This interpretation redirects the debate from whether or not cities were exploitative to
a question of how different settlements and their inhabitants interacted with one
another to meet their needs.
In recent years, it has also become clear that more integrative approaches to
ancient Jewish history are needed. Across the field of Religious Studies, scholars have
demonstrated the artificiality of the modern distinction between religious, political,
and economic spheres; especially in antiquity (but even today) they were inextricable
and intertwined with one another. 10 Perhaps unexpectedly, scholarship on the
7

See, e.g., Douglas R. Edwards, “The Socio-Economic and Cultural Ethos of the Lower Galilee
in the First Century: Implications for the Nascent Jesus Movement,” in The Galilee in Late Antiquity,
ed. Lee I. Levine (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992), 53–74; Edwards, “Identity and
Social Location in Roman Galilean Villages,” in Religion, Ethnicity, and Identity in Ancient Galilee:
A Region in Transition (WUNT 210; Tübingen: Mohr Seibeck, 2007), 357–74; Dennis E. Groh, “The
Clash Between Literary and Archaeological Models of Provincial Palestine,” in Edwards and
McCollough, Archaeology and the Galilee, 29–37.
8
See the back-and-forth between Richard A. Horsley and Eric M. Meyers in BASOR 297 (1995):
Horsley, “Archaeology and the Villages of Upper Galilee: A Dialogue with Archaeologists,” 5–16;
Meyers, “An Archaeological Response to a New Testament Scholar,” 17–26; Horsley, “Response,”
27–28; cf. scholarly overviews in Groh, “The Clash Between Literary and Archaeological Models of
Provincial Palestine”; Mark Rapinchuk, “The Galilee and Jesus in Recent Research,” Currents of
Biblical Research 2 (2004): 197–222.
9
This designation, from Pompey to the destruction of the Temple, is conventional but not ubiqui tous. Uzi Leibner, for instance, designates 50 BCE to 135 CE as Early Roman period; Settlement and
History in Hellenistic, Roman, and Byzantine Galilee (TSAJ 127; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2009). I
will also occasionally refer to the Second Temple period, by which I mean 538 BCE to 70 CE, and to
the late Second Temple Period, by which I mean the period after the Maccabean Revolt (167 BCE–70
CE).
10
The argument for the embeddedness of religion is based in the recognition that religion only
emerged as an analytical category in modernity and does not reflect the terms with which the ancie nts
represented their world. William Cantwell Smith first argued that religion was a modern reification
and absent in the terminology of the premodern world; The Meaning and End of Religion (New York:
Macmillan, 1963). Several monographs in the 1990s and 2000s developed this idea and convincing
demonstrated that the conception of religion as a distinct and separable aspect of the social world is a
modern invention deeply entangled in European identity construction, colonialism, and secularization;
see David Chidester, Savage Systems: Colonialism and Comparative Religion in Southern Africa
(Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 1996); Talal Asad, Formations of the Secular: Christi-

4
economy in Early Roman Galilee has largely overlooked the role that religious
practices and institutions played in shaping the contours of economic behavior and
interaction. In part, this is a failing of the larger scholarly discourse on economy in
the ancient world, in which religion and economy have typically been treated in
isolation as distinct spheres. Yet we may gain considerable insight about both
economic behavior and religious practice in first-century Palestine by bringing
research on the ancient economy into conversation with the study of Second Temple
Judaism. This dissertation does so by examining the vital role that religious
institutions, namely the rules of the Torah that govern cult practice at the Jerusalem
Temple, pilgrimage for the festivals, and assorted aspects of agricultural production
and consumption, could play in defining the networks and temporal rhythms of
economic activity. My hope is that this approach can contribute not only to
scholarship on Early Roman Galilee, ancient Judaism, and early Christianity but also
to the study of the ancient Mediterranean economy more broadly.
Because economy and religion have been analyzed separately, scholars have
tended to conceptualize the agrarian base of Galilee as a peasantry whose economic
rationality was narrowly focused on subsistence, defined as meeting the basic needs
of food and shelter. As a result, some have expressed doubt as to whether most Jews
even followed the obligations of the Torah when they made demands on economic
resources or placed constraints on production and labor. They have thereby neglected
the very real and serious role that Galilean Jews may have allotted to religion and
piety in defining just what economic subsistence entails or how one may appropri ately meet those needs. My dissertation challenges the flattening “peasant model” of
subsistence orientation by suggesting that Jews—as did others—employed a more
complex notion of economic rationality to define needs and strategically allocate
resources to accomplish them. 11 By assuming that most Galileans internalized the
anity, Islam, Modernity (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003); Tomoko Masuzawa, The Invention of World Religions: Or, How European Universalism Was Preserved in the Language of
Pluralism (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005).
In referencing “religion,” I keep in mind Russell T. McCutcheon’s strong exhortation to eschew
analysis of religion as an ontologically distinct category, treating it instead as a second-order,
redescriptive category; Manufacturing Religion: The Discourse of Sui Generis Religion and the
Politics of Nostalgia (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997); cf. Brent Nongbri, Before Religion: A
History of a Modern Concept (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2013). Ironically, it remains diffi cult to argue for the entanglement and inseparability of religion from other aspects of the social world
without taking a rhetorical standpoint that continues to speak of it as a distinctive analytic category.
11
The scholarship on and notion of a distinct peasant mode of existence goes back to the work of
the early twentieth-century Russian Marxist economist A. V. Chayanov, as well as the work of Robert
Redfield in the 1950s, who adopted and adapted his work; Daniel Thorner, Basile Kerblay, and R. E.
F. Smith, eds., A. V. Chayanov on The Theory of Peasant Economy (Madison: University of Wisconsin
Press, 1986); Redfield, Peasant Society and Culture (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1956). Most
of the scholarship on ancient Galilee has engaged the concept of peasantry mostly as it has been
filtered through the work of James C. Scott The Moral Economy of the Peasant: Rebellion and
Subsistence in Southeast Asia (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1976); cf. Scott, Weapons of the
Weak: Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1986). For critique
of this “peasant model,” see n. 15.
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Mosaic commandments as imperative obligations rather than treating them as dispen sable luxuries, we may explore the practical effects of adherence to the Law on
economic behavior and the tactics that might have been available to them to meet or
mitigate these expenses.
This study focuses on the region of Galilee in particular rather than on Palestine
as a whole. By doing so, we will be able to explore with more granularity the
dynamics of socioeconomic interactions at a regional level. There is a growing
consensus among archaeologists working in Galilee that the region exhibits a material
culture distinct from that of its neighbors on all sides, and thus signals that Galilee
can be treated as a coherent and discreet economic unit. 12 And owing to the location
of the Temple city of Jerusalem in Judaea, we can expect that the two regions would
have exhibited considerable differences in economic activity, and it would require an
onerous expansion of this project to do justice to both of them. Unlike Galilee, Judaea
was a consistent center of political power and governing aristocracy, its settlement
landscape featured a large metropolis, a far greater proportion of its resources were
directed toward the “temple economy,” and its inhabitants did not face considerable
outlays in resources and time to participate in the Temple cult. Furthermore, the
literary sources are quite favorable to a focus on Galilee—Josephus provides firsthand
accounts of his time in Galilee in Life and books 2–4 of Jewish War; the New Testament gospels reflect on life in Galilee in both the narratives and parables; and the
tannaitic rabbinic sources were written in and presume life in Galilee of a slightly
later period. There has been an abundance of archaeological research conducted in
Galilee, and many of the excavations have made economic matters a central research
question.
This study will focus primarily on the production, consumption, and trade of
agricultural and manufactured goods within the region of the Galilee. As such, this
project does not constitute a comprehensive study of all aspects of economy. I will
engage with other factors that may be considered economic, such as land tenure,
monetization, and debit and credit, only insofar as necessary for my tasks of modeling
exchange and assessing the effects of religious institutions. In my view, the focus on
trade and movement provides an interesting avenue for connecting the study of
economy to religion—that is, by exploring the ways production and consumption of
goods were shaped by concerns over ritual purity, requirements for sacrificial offer12

See, e.g., Mordechai Aviam, “Distribution Maps of Archaeological Data from the Galilee: An
Attempt to Establish Zones Indicative of Ethnicity and Religious Affiliation,” in Zangenberg,
Attridge, and Martin, Religion, Ethnicity, and Identity in Ancient Galilee, 115–32; Mark A. Chancey,
“Archaeology, Ethnicity, and First Century CE Galilee: The Limits of the Evidence,” in A Wandering
Galilean: Essays in Honour of Seán Freyne, ed. Zuleika Rodgers, 
Margaret Daly-Denton, and 
Anne
Fitzpatrick Mckinley (JSJSup 132; Leiden Brill, 2009), 205–18; Rafael Frankel et al., Settlement
Dynamics and Regional Diversity in Ancient Upper Galilee: Archaeological Survey of Upper Galilee
(IAA Reports 14; Jerusalem: Israel Antiquities Authority, 2001); see also Dina Avshalom-Gorni and
Nimrod Getzov, “Phoenicians and Jews: A Ceramic Case-Study,” in The First Jewish Revolt: Archaeology, History, and Ideology, ed. Andrea M. Berlin and J. Andrew Overman (London: Routledge,
2002), 74–83.
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ings, Torah constraints on usage, rhythms of pilgrimage, and the differential preference for goods from the holy city.

Relationship to Past Research
This dissertation builds on four areas of prior scholarship. First, it builds on specialist
studies on the Galilee. One of my primary interlocutors in Galilean studies is Richard
A. Horsley, who has been one of the most vocal advocates of a political-economic
approach to study of the Galilee. Using sociological models to interpret the literary
sources, Horsley depicts the socioeconomic climate of the first century as one of
exploitation and piqued animosity between rural peasantry and urban elite. 13 Though I
find myself at odds with many of his conclusions, I embrace his combined use of
literary, sociological, and archaeological approaches. Douglas E. Oakman follows a
similar approach, drawing explicitly on cross-cultural peasant studies to interpret and
model agrarian life in Galilee. 14 I recognize the value in his use of “economic
anthropology” for making sense of our often-limited evidence, but I follow Sharon
Lea Mattila in questioning the particularly flat notion of a cross-culturally consistent
notion of “peasantry”15 and am cautious about treating modern comparanda as simple
proxy data. Another scholar whose regional focus on Galilee has proved valuable in
formulating this project is Seán Freyne. 16 He has attempted to demonstrate that the
relationship between city and countryside in Galilee was less exploitative than
Horsley and Oakman have suggested, and that despite economic pressure, the “peas-

13

Horsley has repeatedly and consistently argued that economic exploitation of the rural peas antry by wealthy, urban landlords and imperial taxation played a fundamental role in fomenting
popular resistance movements in the first century and driving peasants to “social banditry” as a mode
of resistance. See Horsley and Hanson, Bandits, Prophets, and Messiahs; Horsley, Jesus and the
Spiral of Violence; Horsley, “Ancient Jewish Banditry and the Revolt against Rome,” JSJ 10 (1979):
37–63; Horsley, “The Sicarii: Ancient Jewish ‘Terrorists,’” Journal of Religion 59 (1979): 435–58;
Horsley, “The Zealots: Their Origin, Relationships and Importance in the Jewish Revolt,” NovT 28
(1986): 159–92.
14
See Oakman, Jesus and the Economic Questions of His Day; Oakman, Jesus and the Peasants
(Eugene, OR: Cascade, 2008); Oakman, “Execrating? Or Execrable Peasants!,” in The Galilean
Economy in the Time of Jesus, ed. David A. Fiensy and Ralph K. Hawkins (Early Christianity and Its
Literature 11; Atlanta: SBL, 2013), 139–64; and most recently Oakman, “Late Second Temple
Galilee: Socio-Archaeology and Dimensions of Exploitation in First-Century Palestine,” in Galilee in
the Late Second Temple and Mishnaic Periods, vol. 1: Life, Culture, and Society, ed. David A. Fiensy
and James Riley Strange (Minneapolis: Fortress, 2014), 346–65.
15
Sharon Lea Mattila, “Jesus and the ‘Middle Peasants’? Problematizing a Social -Scientific
Concept,” CBQ 72 (2010): 291–313; cf. Mattila, “They were Not Mainly ‘Peasants’: Towards and
Alternative View of Village Life in Greco-Roman Palestine and Egypt,” ASORBlog,
http://asorblog.org/2015/08/25/they-were-not-mainly-peasants/. See also Cam Grey’s attempt to
approach “peasantry” in a more nuanced and complicated way; Constructing Communities in the Late
Roman Countryside (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 26–33.
16
See esp. Freyne, Galilee from Alexander the Great to Hadrian.

7
antry” was able to cope through reliance on intra-village networks of exchange. 17 I
also heed his suggestion to approach Galilee from a regional perspective, as distinct
from Judaea.18
Second, I build on the work of archaeologists of the Galilee. As noted above, the
ability to construct economic models of trade and commerce has been improved by
the surge in archaeological work conducted in Galilee in the last two decades, much
of which has explicitly grappled with economic questions. Enough excavations and
surveys have been conducted in the region to get a good sense of the pattern of
settlement distribution and the relative size of these settlements, which will be crucial
data for evaluating the plausible utility of different models of economic interaction to
the Galilean landscape. 19 The discoveries of production sites in the Galilee for
ceramic wares (e.g., Kefar Ḥananiah, and more recently Shikhin and Yodefat) and
limestone vessel (e.g., Kefar Reina, Bethlehem, and Khirbet Qana) have provided
important evidence for economy beyond agriculture and, to some extent, trade in the
region.20
I draw inspiration from Douglas R. Edwards in particular. He has convincingly
demonstrated that economic exchange in the region was complex and that towns and
villages—not solely the cities—served as hubs of economic activity and exchange. 21
David Adan-Bayewitz’s pioneering work introducing compositional analysis of
ceramics to Galilean archaeology is also useful for my goal of identifying patterns of
exchange. His study on the pottery workshops of Kefar Ḥananiah has enabled us to
identify ceramic finds with specific production sites and to map distribution of

17

Seán Freyne, “Jesus and the Urban Culture of Galilee,” in Texts and Contexts: Biblical Texts in
Their Textual and Situational Contexts, Essays in Honor of Lars Hartman, ed. Tord Fornberg and
David Hellholm (Oslo: Scandinavian University Press, 1995), 597 –622.
18
Seán Freyne, “The Revolt from a Regional Perspective,” in Berlin and Overman, The First
Jewish Revolt, 43–55. See also Douglas R. Edwards, who affirms the utility of a similar regional
approach in “Constructing the World of Roman Palestine,” in Edwards, Religion and Society in
Roman Palestine, 1–6.
19
See n. 6 above.
20
On the identification of ceramic production sites, see esp. David Adan-Bayewitz, Common
Pottery in Roman Galilee: A Study of Local Trade (Jerusalem: Dar-Noy, 1993); Adan-Bayewitz, “A
Lamp Mould from Sepphoris and the Location of Workshops for Lamp and Common Pottery Manufacture in Northern Palestine,” in The Roman and Byzantine Near East: Some Recent Archaeological
Research, ed. John H. Humphrey (3 vols.; Ann Arbor: JRA, 1995–2002), 1:177–82; and AdanBayewitz, “The Pottery of the Galilee in the Roman Period: Production Locations, Specialization, and
Ceramic Ecology” [Hebrew], in Mehkerei Galil [Galilee Research], ed. Zeʼev Safrai (Ramat-Gan:
Bar-Ilan University, 2009), 78–100. On stone vessels, see Yitzhak Magen, The Stone Vessel Industry
in the Second Temple Period: Excavations at Ḥizma and the Jerusalem Temple Mount, ed. Levana
Tsfania (Jerusalem: Israel Exploration Society, 2002); Aviam, “Distribution Maps of Archaeological
Data from the Galilee,” 199.
21
See Douglas R. Edwards, “First Century Urban/Rural Relations in Lower Galilee: Exploring
the Archaeological and Literary Evidence,” in Society of Biblical Literature 1988 Seminar Papers, ed.
Eugene H. Lovering (Atlanta: Scholars Press, 2000), 169–82; Edwards, “Identity and Social Location
in Roman Galilean Villages.”
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coursewares produced and consumed locally. 22 The current excavators of the village
of Shikhin—Mordechai Aviam and James Riley Strange—are conducting similar
analysis of the ceramics manufacturing operation discovered there, adding each year
to the data for identifying and modeling patterns of exchange. 23 I also follow the
example of Martin Hørning Jensen, whose recent monograph Herod Antipas in
Galilee integrates both literary and archaeological data. 24 I build off his demonstration
that, on the one hand, the cities in Galilee were quite modest and, on the other hand,
villages and towns were not undifferentiated peasant communities but were internally
stratified and engaged. His findings suggest to me that the dominant assumptions of a
dichotomized model of antagonistic urban–rural relations should be discarded and
networks of interaction should be reconsidered without the fixation on dominating
centers.
Third, I draw on the now-vast scholarship on the economy of the ancient Mediterranean world. Since Finley’s The Ancient Economy, there have been several edited
volumes dedicated to re-evaluating and voicing alternatives to many of his models
and propositions.25 Scholars have offered alternative models for comprehending the
relationship between cities and small settlements in their vicinity that may prove
helpful in considering alternate models we could invoke to comprehend the economy
in Galilee.26 On agricultural production, I look to the work of scholars such as Dennis
P. Kehoe and Paul Halstead, who have expanded our understanding of agricultural
strategy to account for the array of tactics that agriculturalists could deploy to protect
22

For the landmark study, see Adan-Bayewitz, Common Pottery in Roman Galilee; on lamp
distribution, see Adan-Bayewitz, “A Lamp Mould from Sepphoris.”
23
On the identification of the site as a ceramic production center, see James F. Strange, Dennis
E. Groh, and Thomas R. W. Longstaff, “Excavations at Sepphoris: The Location and Identification of
Shikhin: Part I,” IEJ 44 (1994): 216–27; Strange, Groh, and Longstaff, “Excavations at Sepphoris:
The Location and Identification of Shikhin: Part II,” IEJ 45 (1995): 171–87.
24
Jensen, Herod Antipas in Galilee.
25
Peter F. Bang, Mamoru Ikeguchi, and Harmut G. Ziche, eds., Ancient Economies, Modern
Methodologies: Archaeology, Comparative History, Models and Institutions (Bari, Italy: Edipuglia,
2006); Joseph G. Manning and Ian Morris, eds., The Ancient Economy: Evidence and Models
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005); Scheidel and von Reden, The Ancient Economy; David J.
Mattingly and John Salmon, eds., Economies beyond Agriculture in the Ancient World (New York:
Routledge, 2001).
26
See the attempts to offer alternative models in David J. Mattingly et al., “Leptiminus (Tunisia):
A ‘Producer’ City?,” in Mattingly and Salmon, Economies beyond Agriculture in the Ancient World,
66–89; Paul Erdkamp, “Beyond the Limits of the ‘Consumer City’: A Model of the Urban and Rural
Economy in the Roman World,” Historia 50 (2001): 332–56; Chris R. Whittaker, “The Consumer City
Revisited: The Vicus and the City,” JRA 3 (1990): 110–18; Robert E. Witcher, “The Extended
Metropolis: Urbs, Suburbium, and Population,” JRA 18 (2005): 120–38. See also the articles in Alan
K. Bowman and Andrew Wilson, eds., Settlement, Urbanization, and Population (Oxford Studies on
the Roman Economy; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011); esp. Neville Morley, “Cities and
Economic Development in the Roman Empire,” 143–60; Andrew Wilson, “City Sizes and Urbanization in the Roman Empire,” 161–95; Annalisa Marzano, “Rank-Size Analysis and the Roman Cities of
the Iberian Peninsula and Britain: Some Considerations,” 196–228; J. W. Hanson, “The Urban System
of Roman Asia Minor and Wider Urban Connectivity,” 229–75; Simon Keay and Graeme Earl,
“Towns and Territories in Roman Baetica,” 276–316.
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against risk and efficiently use their labor and resources. 27 Many scholars have pushed
back against Finley’s limited view of trade in antiquity. 28 Keith Hopkins authored an
influential “tax and trade” model for the Roman economy, arguing for considerable
aggregate trade through a highly integrated and monetized economy. 29 Peregrine
Horden and Nicholas Purcell argue in their monumental work The Corrupting Sea
that trade was as much a byproduct of Mediterranean ecology; owing to the volatility
of agriculture in the Mediterranean region from year to year and from microregion to
microregion, small- and medium-distance, trade was a practical necessity. 30 I also
draw considerable inspiration from Neville Morley’s brief Trade in Classical
Antiquity, in which he considers a number of social and institutional factors that
define trade goods and affect transactions. 31
Fourth, I draw on insights from scholarship on Late Antiquity that has
emphasized agency among the disenfranchised in relations of economic or power
disparity in order to develop a multi-directional (rather than top-down) approach to
interaction. The works of David Frankfurter and Cam Grey have been instructive in
formulating this project, highlighting potential alternatives to the centric focus of
previous work in Galilee. Frankfurter’s Religion in Roman Egypt concentrates on
micro-localities within the Egyptian landscape, assessing their engagement with the
larger regional institutions but especially indicating the continued importance of
translocal (yet non-dominant) traditions, relations, and identities. 32 A more specifi27

Dennis P. Kehoe, Management and Investment on Estates in Roman Egypt during the Early
Empire (Bonn: R. Habelt, 1992); Paul Halstead, Two Oxen Ahead: Pre-Mechanized Farming in the
Mediterranean (Malden: Blackwell, 2014); Halstead, “Traditional and Ancient Rural Economy in
Mediterranean Europe: Plus ça change?,” in Scheidel and von Reden, The Ancient Economy, 53–70;
see also Lin Foxhall, “The Dependent Tenant: Land Leasing and Labour in Italy and Greece,” JRS 80
(1990): 97–114; Geoffrey Kron, “Roman Ley-Farming,” JRA 13 (2000): 277–87.
28
In addition to those explicitly mentioned below, see the following on market locations: Luuk
de Ligt, “The Roman Peasantry: Demand, Supply, and Distribution between Town and Countryside,
Part 1,” Münsterische Beiträge zur antiken Handelsgeschichte 9 (1991): 24–56; de Ligt, “The Roman
Peasantry: Demand, Supply, and Distribution between Town and Countryside, Part 2,” Münsterische
Beiträge zur antiken Handelsgeschichte 10 (1992): 33–77; Joan M. Frayn, Markets and Fairs in
Roman Italy: Their Social and Economic Importance from the Second Century BC to the Third Century
AD (Oxford: Clarendon, 1993).
29
Keith Hopkins, “Taxes and Trade in the Roman Empire (200 BC– AD 400),” JRS 70 (1980):
101–25.
30
Peregrine Horden and Nicholas Purcell, The Corrupting Sea: A Study of Mediterranean History
(Malden: Blackwell, 2000).
31
Neville Morley, Trade in Classical Antiquity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007).
32
David Frankfurter, Religion in Roman Egypt: Assimilation and Resistance (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1998). Translocal identities in Galilee too may have played an important
role in determining patterns of interactivity, both within the region and with neighboring areas.
Several studies on ethnic identity and its impact on the distinctive material culture of the region
provide a starting point: Jonathan L. Reed, Archaeology and the Galilean Jesus: A Re-examination of
the Evidence (Harrisburg: Trinity International Press, 2000), 23–61; Avshalom-Gorni and Getzov,
“Phoenicians and Jews”; Aviam, “Distribution Maps of Archaeological Data from the Galilee.” On
regional differences—though limited—between Judaea and Galilee, see Martin Goodman, “Galilean
Judaism and Judaean Judaism,” in The Cambridge History of Judaism, vol. 3: The Early Roman
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cally socioeconomic exemplum is Cam Grey’s Constructing Communities in the Late
Roman Countryside, which emphasizes the role of strategy and the variety of relationships used to cope with pressures and risk. 33 I also find valuable his recognition of the
reciprocal potential and mutual benefit in these relationships, however asymmetrical
their statuses.
With regard to the strategies and tactics available to the subjects of imperial and
economic pressures, I draw more broadly on some of the concepts developed by Homi
K. Bhabha, Dipesh Chakrabarty, and James C. Scott. 34 All three have indicated
important ways that misunderstanding and ambiguity at the interface of the
dominating/imperial and the dominated/colonial facilitate certain modes of resisting,
subverting, or inverting domination. I follow the implications of these studies in
recognizing the capacity of the “non-powerful” to act upon the dominant class and to
foster interactions among themselves that bypass and elude the imperial gaze. I like wise draw from Michel de Certeau, who argues against the notion that individuals are
ever wholly dominated by systems of domination and control, but may find ways of
creatively working within the space of those parameters imposed from above through
“tactics” to adapt those constraints to their own ends. I will deploy the terminology of
“tactic” throughout the dissertation to refer to such methods of working within the
constraints of a system to achieve goals that may not neatly fit within it.

Sources
This project will marshal data from both literary and archaeological sources. The
main literary sources that this study will engage with are the writings of Josephus
(esp. Jewish Antiquities, Jewish War, and Life) and the New Testament gospels, all in
Greek. These sources are by no means objective and comprehensive accounts of the
history of their contemporary Galilee; as all texts, they are selective in the material
that they present and deploy this material to particular narrative ends. Despite the fact
that they are rarely explicitly concerned with economic matters, these sources nonetheless provide valuable evidence in brief, scattered, and often oblique references to
Period, ed. William Horbury, W. D. Davies, and John Sturdy (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1999), 596–617; Freyne, “The Revolt from a Regional Perspective.”
33
Grey, Constructing Communities in the Late Roman Countryside; see also Thomas W. Gallant,
Risk and Survival in Ancient Greece: Reconstructing the Rural Domestic Economy (Stanford: Stanford
University Press, 1991). To my knowledge, potential for reciprocality and mutual advantage in tenant
relations has not been introduced to studies of the economy of Early Roman Palestine. Nor, it seems,
have the complexities of family and communal relations and the role of such relations in mitigating
the risks of a dynamic agrarian system been extensively integrated in Galilean studies. Most engage ment with risk management has focused on static assessments of needs for consumption and taxation
and the ability to achieve them at a household level.
34
Homi K. Bhabha, The Location of Culture (London: Routledge, 1994); Dipesh Chakrabarty,
Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 2000); Scott, Weapons of the Weak; Scott, Domination and the Arts of Resistance:
Hidden Transcripts (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990).
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production, consumption, and trade. Of course, as highly constructed literary crea tions, none of these texts can be simply read as a guide to religious practices or a map
of social interactions. Nevertheless, in their representation of life in Galilee and in the
assumptions that underlie the narratives that they present, these texts suggest
important information that can be used to create a portrait of movement and economic
interaction. When considering the evidence from the textual sources, I have tried to
consider the impact of the literary context on the ways that these texts represent
aspects of economic life. On occasion, I will make use of other Second Temple
Jewish sources such as Jubilees and the Dead Sea Scrolls as well. These offer
valuable insight into religious practices (and more rarely, into economic issues) in
Palestine, even though they sometimes lie outside our temporal and geographical
focus and may reflect sectarian positions not held by many (or any) Galileans. We
may consider them as indications of the range of possible interpretations of the
Torah’s obligations and use them to corroborate practices reflected in our main
sources.35
I also turn to the Mishnah as another literary source for thinking about the ancient
economy of Galilee. Because of its later date and particular concerns, I recognize that
it is a difficult—if not impossible—source to use for historical data about the Second
Temple period, but I believe that it can be used responsibly to gauge the range of the
possible. Since there is significant discussion in certain tractates about economic
transactions and especially economic activity as it relates to religious concerns, the
Mishnah may be useful for suggesting scenarios that Jews concerned with adherence
to the commandments may have had to consider in conducting their economic affairs.
Of course, these issues are framed in accordance with the halakhah of the rabbis, who
did not represent the views of the majority, and we must always keep in mind that
their concerns were not widely shared. 36 In many cases, however, the Mishnah seems
to have co-opted or plugged the rabbis’ discussion into actual practices and norms of
their contemporary Galilee, rather than simply reflecting the rabbis’ imagination and
exegesis.37 If we acknowledge that indeed the rabbis did not invent this material and
35

I find inspiration here in Cam Grey’s “constellation of the possible,” derived from a combina tion of the motivations suggested from literary sources and from comparative litera ture to produce a
series of “plausible and suggestive alternatives to existing analyses of the peasantry” that “allows us to
move beyond the scant evidence for the mechanics of decision-making, socioeconomic differentiation,
and interpersonal relations within rural communities in the late Roman world”; Constructing Communities in the Late Roman Countryside, 24.
36
On the limitations of Rabbis as authoritative figures in Galilee in the Middle to Late Roman
periods, see Hayim Lapin, Rabbis as Romans: The Rabbinic Movement in Palestine, 100–400 CE
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012); Martin Goodman, State and Society in Roman Galilee, AD
132–212 (2nd ed.; London: Vallentine Mitchel, 2000), 93–118; Seth Schwartz, Imperialism and
Jewish Society, 200 BCE to 640 CE (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001), 103–28; Shaye J. D.
Cohen, “The Place of the Rabbis in Jewish Society of the Second Century,” in Levine, The Galilee in
Late Antiquity, 153–73, esp. 158–69; Catherine Hezser, The Social Structure of the Rabbinic Movement in Roman Palestine (TSAJ 66; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1997).
37
“The belief that the rabbinic texts are completely divorced from social practicalities is not
tenable: the very success of rabbis in spreading the appeal of their artificial wo rld to nonrabbinic Gali-
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were instead usurping it, we may presume that the assumed positions from which they
worked had been long-established regional norms, especially on topics such as agriculture that did not typically experience rapid change in pre-industrial societies.
Whereas most scholarship on the Mishnah has taken this observation and carried it
forward, asking what this can tell us about how the early rabbis engaged with and
shaped their world in an attempt to position themselves as authorities, we can take it
in the other direction and ask what this observation can tell us about Galilee prior to
this act of co-opting.38
Documentary texts, where available, provide glimpses into interactions that are
rarely if ever discernible in literary texts. The climate of Galilee, unfortunately, is not
conducive to the preservation of papyri and other writing materials. We will make
occasional use of documentary texts found elsewhere when useful. Aside from the
Dead Sea Scrolls, the major papyri finds from Roman Palestine are the Aramaic Bar
Kokhba letters and the Greek and Aramaic Babatha archive, both collections discovered in the Judaean desert and containing documents dated to the period around the
two Jewish revolts. 39 These documents indicate something about the role played by
specifically Jewish cultural and religious institutions, sometimes in connection wit h
economic decision-making. We may also draw insights from the abundant
papyrological evidence from Egypt, which, despite some regional peculiarities, may
be aptly considered more representative than anomalous within the Roman Empire. 40
These documentary papyri suggest the variety of modes of exchange, the roles played
by family and other social networks in the movement of goods and information, and
the array of possibilities for land tenure and deployment of labor.
As noted above, archaeological evidence from Galilee will play a significant role
in this project. The major excavations at Sepphoris and now Magdala provide us with
ample evidence of large settlements with urban characteristics that—at least in part—
date back to the Early Roman period. But in contrast to other regions, where cities are
lean Jews … indicates that their map was seen to correspond in some way to Galilean society itself”;
Goodman, State and Society in Roman Galilee, 113, cf. 112–14. Lawrence H. Schiffman has noted
that “Rabbinic sources codified the practices in customary use in this domain of life, so that the usages
in evidence in our documents generated the rabbinic rulings in question. … Parallels, therefore, show
that the tannaim and amoraim adapted to and lived with this system which combined ele ments of
Jewish law with the legal formulary of the ancient Near Eastern and Greco -Roman world”; “Reflections on the Deeds of Sale from the Judaean Desert in Light of Rabbinic Literature,” in Law in the
Documents of the Judaean Desert, ed. Ranon Katzoff and David Schaps (JSJSup 96; Leiden: Brill,
2005), 185–203 at 186.
38
I thank Annette Yoshiko Reed for this methodological insight into how the Mishnah may be
profitably used to get at norms and practices of earlier Galilee.
39
Hanan Eshel, Magen Broshi, and Timothy A. J. Jull argue for the redating of some of these
papyri to the period of the First Jewish Revolt, rather than the Bar Kokhba Revolt as originally dated;
“Four Murabbaʽat Papyri and the Alleged Capture of Jerusalem by Bar Kokhba,” in Katzoff and
Schaps, Law in the Documents of the Judaean Desert, 45–50.
40
Roger S. Bagnall, “Evidence and Models for the Economy of Roman Egypt,” in Manning and
Morris, The Ancient Economy: Evidence and Models, 187–204; cf. Dominic Rathbone, “The Ancient
Economy and Graeco-Roman Egypt,” in Scheidel and von Reden, The Ancient Economy, 155–69.
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still often the privileged targets of archaeological research, a great many villages and
even non-domestic sites have been the subject of excavations in Galilee. I had the
privilege of participating in excavations of one such village, Shikhin, for four seasons
as an area supervisor under the tutelage of James Riley Strange and Mordechai
Aviam. I have tried to access the excavation reports for Galilean sites where avail able, but in many cases the excavations are ongoing or the final reports have not yet
been published. For ongoing projects and salvage excavations, archaeological data
and summaries of findings can be found in the publications ʽAtiqot, Ḥadashot
Arkheologiyot/Excavations and Surveys in Israel, and Qadmoniot (in both English
and Hebrew). In many cases, the excavators have made preliminary findings acces sible through articles, and most recently in volume 2 of Galilee in the Late Second
Temple and Mishnaic Periods, which gathers in one place summary reports of the
most important archaeological sites in Galilee for our period. 41 The archaeological
excavations in Galilee have provided ample evidence for production and processing
of agricultural goods (such as grinders and oil and wine presses) as well as non-agricultural goods (such as pottery, stone vessels, and lamps). We must assess consump tion primarily in terms of non-organic products or proxy evidence (such as discarded
storage vessels), but as we will discuss, this is somewhat tricky and uncertain. Likewise, for distribution and movement of goods, we must focus on the data from
durable objects like ceramics, drawing especially on the work of David AdanBayewitz.42 These archaeological data, in conjunction with other lines of evidence,
can be used to suggest the extent and patterns of trade within Galilee and with nearby
regions.

41

See full citation in n. 6.
Adan-Bayewitz, Common Pottery. We could also look at numismatic evidence to assess trade,
though it is difficult to interpret. Hasmonaean and Herodian coins make up the bulk of coin finds at
most sites well into later contexts, indicating that they stayed in circulation for a long time in Galilee.
Tyrian coins also circulated, though they also seem to have had a special role in the economy as the
currency of the Temple, such that it is difficult to tell to what extent we are seeing evidence of direct
trade with the region of Tyre rather than evidence of monetary infrastructure for religious practice.
See esp. Danny Syon, “Tyre and Gamla: A Study in the Monetary Influence of Southern Phoenicia on
Galilee and the Golan in the Hellenistic and Roman Periods” (PhD diss., Hebrew University, 2004).
On the distinctive coin profile of Galilee in comparison to the surrounding regions inhabited chiefly
by gentiles and Samaritans, see Martin Hørning Jensen, “Message and Minting,” in Zangenberg,
Attridge, and Martin, Religion, Ethnicity, and Identity in Ancient Galilee, 295–302; Marcus
Sigismund, “Coins and Weights as a Mirror of Ethnic, Religious, and Political Identity in First and
Second Century CE Tiberias,” in Zangenberg, Attridge, and Martin, Religion, Ethnicity, and Identity in
Ancient Galilee, 315–66.
42
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New Institutional Economics and the Social Sciences
Recent scholarship on ancient Mediterranean economic history has made a turn
toward New Institutional Economics (NIE) as a lens for analysis. 43 Especially influential has been the work of Nobel laureate Douglass C. North, whose formulation of
NIE emphasizes the role of manmade institutions in shaping how humans make
economic decisions in contexts of imperfect information and uncertainty. 44 Despite
NIE’s wide application to study of the ancient Mediterranean economy in the last
decade, scholars have deployed it for political and legal institutions but have engaged
very little with religious institutions and norms. 45 To the extent that religious institutions have been studies in connection with the economy, it has primarily been within
the frame of “temple economies” that inquires how temples acquired the resources
they required from their periphery, rather than how these institutions affected
economic behavior beyond the context of temple cult itself. 46
43
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The framework of NIE has not, to my knowledge, been explicitly deployed in
study of Roman Palestine, and this study is an attempt to illuminate the profitability
of applying principles learned from NIE to analysis of the economy in Early Roman
Galilee. NIE would suggest, however, that institutions such as temples, synagogues,
tithes, and pilgrimage had a significant role in shaping economic relationships and
decision-making more broadly. 47 Given the strength of Jewish and early Christian
textual sources on these very elements, a study of economy in Galilee that integrates
religious institutions alongside political and legal ones has the potential to serve as
beacon for those working in other regions of the Roman world.
At its heart, NIE proposes the intrinsic integrality of the social world with the
economy, since it grants so much latitude to the role of socially constructed institutions in defining the incentives, costs, and bounds that make up the environment in
which people make their economic decisions, rather than assuming a sort of natural
and universal incentive structure as in Neoclassical Economics. In this way, NIE
embraces the notion pioneered by Karl Polanyi, and adopted by the “substantivist”
camp, that economic exchanges are
embedded and enmeshed in institutions, economic and non-economic. The inclusion
of the non-economic is vital. For religion or government may be as important for the
structure and functioning of the economy as monetary institutions or the availability
of tools and machines themselves that lighten the labor. 48

NIE goes beyond the important observation that economic transactions are conducted
along lines of social interactions to consider also how all sorts of economic decisions
are made in the context of a social environment that sets limits and constraints on
certain modes of acting while facilitating and incentivizing others. 49
Institutions, in NIE parlance, refer to the rules that humans construct to define the
acceptable parameters of behavior, together with their mechanisms of enforcement.
47
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Institutions in NIE can be divided into two broad classes. Formal institutions are
explicitly crafted rules such as laws, constitutions, and treaties that are drafted by
organizations—groups bound by some common purpose, such as governments or
guilds. Informal institutions are constraints that are often unwritten and arise through
less deliberative means, such as norms and conventions, but nevertheless define the
parameters of acceptable behavior in a given social context. Formal and informal
institutions alike are only important to the extent that there are apt mechanisms for
enforcing the rules. Enforcement can be effected by official mechanisms of policing
and punishment, by social pressure and sanctioning by societal peers, or by one’s own
conscience if the rules are internalized and/or moralized. It is helpful to think of
institutions in terms of the metaphor North uses: they constitute the “rules of the
game.” Formal institutions are those rules one would find in the rulebook, explicitly
stated and clearly defined to all. Informal institutions are the usually unwritten rules
that govern fair play, such as a prohibition on flipping the game board or cheating.
These rules can be enforced by an individual designated to oversee adherence, or by
the reprimand of fellow players or refusal to play with the defector again.
NIE grants considerable latitude for the role of norms in determining individual
and group behavior. 50 To expand upon North’s discussion of norms, I turn to sociologists such as James S. Coleman who have studied the topic at length. Religious norms
will play an important role in our discussion of the formal institution of the divine
Laws inscribed in the Torah, since details necessary to implement them are often
missing from the written, codified form, and would have required the emergence of
normative interpretation or norms of execution to effectively follow them. Coleman
suggests that closed networks are especially fertile territory for the development of
strong norms and for effective policing by peers. Because such networks are
characterized by high levels of interconnectivity and few avenues for acting outside
the system, they are ideal for producing consensus norms of behavior and make it
easy for peers to sanction defectors from those norms. 51
NIE dispenses with the assumption of perfect information, instead lending
significance to the barriers that lack of information or asymmetrical information (i.e.,
one party has information the other lacks) impose on the initiation and/or execution of
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economic interactions. 52 Rather than assuming order as the default condition, North
argues that “non-ergodic” conditions of uncertainty and unpredictability predominated for most people over most of history. It is in light of pervasive uncertainty that
human societies develop institutions and norms that serve to mitigate uncertainty by
defining rules that serve to normalize the conditions for economic interaction. 53 NIE
also dispenses with the assumption of frictionless transactions, addressing the variety
of barriers that must be overcome in order to enact a transaction under the collective
designation of “transaction costs.”54 These include such issues as confirming accuracy
of weight and measures, comparing prices and quality against other available options,
and ensuring enforcement of the agreed transaction. It even dispenses with the notion
that humans are inherently rational in their decision-making, at least as classically
defined. Drawing on findings from social psychology, North suggests that because
agents are imperfectly informed, they often make decisions on the basis of their own
past choices, the choices of peers, and other pattern-based modes of decision-making.
In distinction to neoclassical “rational choice theory,” North deploys a concept of
“bounded rationality,” defining rational behavior according to the constraints and
incentives that a given social environment imposes on those acting within it. 55 Behaviors that may seem irrational or counterintuitive according to the modern, western,
secular calibration of Neoclassical Economics may in fact seem perfectly rational
given a different set of values, ideas, and conditions are assumed. 56 The work of
Duncan J. Watts serves as a helpful point of entry to a wide array of pertinent
phenomena that shape how humans as individuals and as groups make decisions,
some of which are explicitly integrated into North’s version of NIE. Watts’ book Six
Degrees lays out the basics of network theory and the groundwork for considering
how emergent behaviors arise from groups that may not necessarily be predicted from
individual behavior. 57 In Everything is Obvious, he identifies a number of other
phenomena that guide human decision-making in unexpected ways. 58 Path dependency describes the tendency of individuals to make future decisions on the basis of
past choices, incentivizing iteration of the familiar and disincentivizing novel choices
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because of higher risks and barriers to entry. 59 Information cascade describes the
tendency of individuals to follow the course of action observed in others. Related to
this is the idea of cumulative advantage, a phenomenon by which an initially small
edge precipitates greater and greater gains, without necessary regard to merit over
other potential choices. Watts also describes the halo effect as the tendency to
attribute a host of traits to an individual or item on the basis of unrelated characteristics, such as associating beauty with success. Together, these phenomena demonstrate
the limits of “rational choice” even in a bounded sense. But they also suggest some of
the mechanisms by which norms may emerge, spread, and perpetuate through a
system—especially a dense, closed one.
I also draw insight from Pierre Bourdieu to comprehend how a given social envi ronment can shape the behavior of individuals in that system. 60 Particularly instructive are his conceptualizations of social capital, habitus, and doxa. Social capital
refers to the access to resources enabled by one’s interpersonal network connections;
we may think of it as an extension of one’s wealth through one’s associates, often in
the form of stored debt, favors, and obligation produced through past interactions.
The accrual and expenditure of social capital affects one’s ability to make use of a
social network to fulfill one’s goals. Habitus is the “system of internalized structures,
schemes of perception, conception, and action” that invisibly shapes individual
behavior without conscious deliberation. 61 Those habitualized actions shape the
default parameters of action, guiding people through a combination of path depend ence and peer conformity. Habitus is a useful way to think about how Jews may come
to act in accordance with emergent societal norms often at a less-than-conscious level.
Doxa is useful for thinking about the bounds between conscious and unconscious
realms of decision-making. Doxa refers to those aspects of behavior that are so
normative and unquestioned that they operate in the background, shaping behavior
without explicit consideration. Once certain issues are questioned and move into the
realm of public disagreement, debate, and difference, then we may describe different
positions as orthodox or heterodox, labeled according to one’s positionality. The latter
two concepts are especially useful for considering norms, since norms are often
unspoken but widely held and followed, and their very normativity is only explicitly
recognized when called into question by defectors from those norms.

The Jewish Law and Its Observance
For North, beliefs are important in determining the choices that individuals make, and
those choices themselves accrete into structures that define the parameters of action in
the human landscape. The second part of this statement is important. “Much of what
59
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passes for rational choice is not so much individual cogitation as the embeddedness of
the thought process in the larger social and institutional context.”62 In this dissertation, we consider the effects of the religious institutions that were especially
important in defining that human landscape in Jewish Palestine. It is worth noting at
the outset the approach I take concerning the nature of Judaism in Second Templeperiod Galilee and observance of the Torah laws.
In some respects, I follow in the footsteps of Sanders, who assumed that the Jews
of Palestine generally “wanted to obey the Law and that they considered how best to
do so.”63 Sanders appealed to a lowest common denominator form of Judaism that he
called “common Judaism,” characterized by the centrality of the Torah and Temple.
The Torah was taken by most Second Temple Jews to represent a normative and
prescriptive view of the proper conduct of religious observation, and most Jews
attempted to live their lives in accordance with its statutes as they understood them.
The Temple was understood by most as the sole legitimate cult site and the object of
annual pilgrimage from all around the country. Another way to understand Sanders’
project was an attempt to argue for the inherent possibility of following the Jewish
Law in a world where the Temple still stood.
But as Lee I. Levine rightly notes, general agreement on a common Judaism
“does not mean that there were no differences of opinion among individuals and
groups on how to interpret these beliefs and apply the commandments.”64 The Torah
may have been normative, but its prescriptions were not always clear. In fact, the
descriptions of festivals and other ritual obligations are often opaque, lacunose, or
even contradictory. 65 Our textual evidence from the Second Temple period indicates
that Jewish writers attempted in different ways to harmonize these inconsistencies and
establish clearer interpretations of the Torah laws. These texts themselves exhibit
considerable variation, however, disagreeing on issues so fundamentally important to
the operation of the cult as the calendrical system, the dating of particular festivals,
and which consecrated items belonged to the priest and which to the offerer.
Some scholars have expressed doubt about the extent to which Jews actually
followed the statutes of the Torah, particular those that have been viewed as economi cally burdensome, such as the tithes or the Sabbatical Year fallow.66 Behind this
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evaluation we can see the assumed pertinence of a neoclassical definition of economic
rationality, defined along fairly narrow and secular standards and oriented toward
evaluating profit. Following this neoclassical perspective of rational self-interest, it
makes some sense to view piety as a luxury afforded to those who were relatively
secure in their economic resources, while the rest strove primarily to meet food needs
with a comfortable margin of safety and relegated religious duties to a second tier of
priority. In this dissertation, I take a different tack by flipping this key assumption.
Instead of a narrowly defined rationality, I instead offer an analysis on the assumption
that adherence to religious obligations and constraints were of comparable importance
to Galilean Jews and were a fundamental rather than secondary consideration in
formulating strategies of “making ends meet.” I take a more expansive view of the
context in which people make their decisions, drawing on research in social sciences
and social psychology that indicates that people make decisions within a social envi ronment that guides and pressures individuals to behave in certain ways. These forces
lead people to act in ways that may seem to us irrational and counterintuitive.
I do not pretend that the evidence is sufficient to prove this outright. The
evidence from our written and material sources often do not give us the data that
would be most helpful for understanding economic behavior. Due in part to the
commonality and banality of agricultural production, consumption, and exchange, the
literary sources often have little to say aside from passing references and/or
presupposed context for a particular episode. Broad statements are few and far
between, and it is sometimes difficult to tell when they are prescriptive and when they
are descriptive in producing generalized statements. (Indeed, one can argue that even
ostensibly descriptive passages are being prescriptive in their elision of deviant or
minority practices and in other manners by which they are selectively presenting these
descriptions.) For the most part, any assessment of economy in ancient Palestine is
attempting to flesh out a picture from scattered bits—drawing inferences from comparable evidence from elsewhere, and making assumptions that guide the process of
extrapolating the rest.
This dissertation attempts to explore the rippling effects that this fundamental
shift in assumption creates. These effects may not all be correct, and one may reasonably quibble with any given point. We grant that, for instance, not all Galilean Jews
may have observed the Torah’s constraints on agriculture, or that not all may have
attended all of the festivals every year. Within a given set of culturally constructed
constraints, there will always remain variability and outliers. But it is worth consid ering the sorts of effects that result from taking seriously the notion that religious
institutions and norms were an important factor in shaping the tendencies of the
system or network. There is heuristic value in setting aside the prevailing assumptions
about how economic decisions were made by the agrarian base in antiquity, even if
the resulting image is itself an idealized form. The reality may be somewhere in the
middle, or an overlap of the two, but we cannot ably move toward this middle without
Oxford Handbook of Jewish Daily Life in Roman Palestine, ed. Catherine Hezser (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2010), 246–63 at 260.
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an exploration of the other end of the spectrum. It is to that end that I consider this
attempt to map out the potential effects of adherence to the rules laid out in the Torah
as an advancement in our understanding of the ancient Galilean economy. Once we
observe that changing the parameters of the human environment in which economic
decisions are made could have real effects on the system, we can move on to
adjusting any given parameter with closer scrutiny.
I also take some inspiration from Robert A. Orsi’s sociological study of contem porary catholic practitioners. 67 Two points in particular are, I believe, important and
pertinent to my understanding of Galilean Jews in antiquity. First, Orsi argues that we
ought to take seriously the fact that the practitioners understand their relationships
with supernatural beings and forces quite real. They perceive themselves as engaged
in interpersonal relationships with these beings that, while perhaps qualitatively
different from interaction with other human beings, are just as important to foster and
maintain. To treat religious practitioners’ behavior solely in terms of social function
or signaling to others risks missing the important impact that religious convictions
can have on behavior. Moreover, Orsi notes that these relationships between super natural beings and humans are not inherently positive, bringing calm and comfort and
hope. To the contrary; these relationships can be a source of considerable discomfort
and anxiety.
It is worth keeping these insights in mind when conceiving of the social world of
Early Roman Galilee. Although sociologists typically think of social networks solely
in terms of human agents, connections to supernatural agents could be just as
important to understanding the effects of personal relationships on the calculus of
social behavior. God, in this network, was not simply another peer to interact with. He
would have been the most highly interconnected—conceived of as having a relation to
each and every individual. Due to his omniscience or near-omniscience, he would
have greater access to information than any other agent, and his great power would
have made him a useful ally to be able to call upon or a formidable enemy if crossed.
As Sanders has noted, Jewish literature from the Second Temple period suggests
that “covenantal nomism”—the belief that one’s standing with God is determined by
one’s obedience to the terms of the Mosaic covenant, and that one may be rewarded
or punished on that basis—was a widely held theology. 68 To most Jews, we may
suggest, God was thought to be an active agent in the world, one who brought about
the bounties of harvest and prosperity to those who acted according to his will, and
punishment of disease, famine, and war to those who spurned it. This would have
placed great incentive for individuals in the network to act in accordance with those
rules that God put in place, because in addition to any peer pressure to do so, it was
67
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nigh impossible for transgressions to escape notice of God, and his ability to punish
defectors was unparalleled. We may imagine that, as a result, the relationship with
God could be a source of great strength if one was confident in their adherence to the
divine Law, but a source of great anxiety, too, if one unwittingly broke the Law or
was not sure if they had, or if one knew friends or family who had done so. We shall
argue that, in general, the Jews’ belief that God was an active agent in the world who
concerned himself with his chosen nation’s obedience to his covenant was a consider able incentive for Jews’ voluntary adherence to the strictures of that covenant, even
when it might require behavior that seems “irrational” within the bounds of a social
network composed of human actors alone.

Outline of Chapters
In chapter 1, we shall consider the nature of the state—the political structure and
governmental institutions—that presided over Galilee in the Early Roman period. We
begin here because many past assessments of the economy in Palestine—and, indeed,
of the economy of the ancient Mediterranean more broadly—have placed
considerable emphasis on the effects of the state on the economic conditions in a
given locality. I argue, however, that the role of the state has been overemphasized, at
least when it comes to Galilee. In line with the assessment of Andrew Lintott, I argue
that the Roman administrative apparatus was quite small and lacking in extensive
policing mechanisms, and that the Roman government, moreover, was usually uninterested in getting too involved in provincial matters except when sedition or pressing
financial need required it. 69 The provincial government was generally quite weak and
circumscribed, and did not exert much influence in shaping the social environment in
which economic transactions were conducted. We will see that the political admin istration and political geography of the region changed quite often over the course of
the Early Roman period, but I argue that, due to the weak state institutions and
Galilee’s positions as a relative backwater, these changes did little to disrupt the
social world in which Galileans operated. The kingdom of Antipas may be somewhat
exceptional in this regard, since Galilee was transformed for a few decades from an
unimportant rural district to the center of a vassal’s domain, and we will address some
of the effects of his city-building projects in the following chapter. Having dismantled
in this chapter the notion that the state was a major source of institutional structuring
in Early Roman Galilee, we shift to consider what other sorts of institutions and
norms could have played a more defining role in this society, and what non-state
mechanisms of enforcement could account for general adherence to them.
In chapter 2, we turn to the Galilean economy more specifically. Drawing on both
archaeological and literary evidence, I shall argue that the prevailing urban –rural
framework through which scholars have tended to analyze the economic system of
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Galilee is flawed, and offer an alternative view. Instead of asking whether or not rela tions between city and countryside were exploitative and parasitic or reciprocal and
beneficial, I argue that the role of the cities has been overstated. I suggest instead that
the Galilean economic network is more aptly viewed as a “small world” network—a
dense web of interconnected settlements. To support this model, I draw on the
archaeological evidence for Galilean settlements that suggests settlements in this
period were fairly small but numerous and close to one another, and that wealth was
not solely concentrated in urban hubs. I also draw on literary descriptions of move ment through the region to support the contention that travel within Galilee was both
easy and commonplace, and that it was conducted between villages, not just to and
from the city. I also assess the evidence for trade within Galilee, especially in ceramic
and stone products that are abundantly attested in the archaeological record, to
suggest the scope and pattern of trade in Galilee. In arguing for such a network, I not
only make the case for ample exchange of resources within and between settlements
in Galilee through various trade mechanisms, but I also argue that the ease of movement and communication through the region has implications for how we understand
the development and proliferation of social norms. This will become important espe cially for chapters 3 and 4, where we turn more explicitly to the effects of religious
institutions on economic decision-making.
In chapter 3, we examine some of the laws from the Torah that pertain to the
production and consumption of agricultural goods. Certain laws set constraints on the
timeframe in which agricultural production—and other occupations as well—could be
conducted. Sabbaths, festivals, and Sabbatical Years featured periodic abstention
from labor as a requirement. Other laws, such as the prohibition on mixing species
and the prohibition on fourth-year produce from fruit trees, set constraints on the
mode of agricultural production. Other commandments limited the amount of produce
that could be used by the household, or constrained the manner and timing in which it
could be used. We look in particular at the Sabbatical Year fallow, tithes, firstfruit
offerings, and obligatory leavings for the poor. While this chapter is not a thorough
examination of the manifold ways that the Torah’s strictures could and would have
shaped the manner in which agricultural pursuits were conducted, this sampling highlights some of the more explicit and interesting cases. Through examination of the
implications of following these laws within the Galilean economy, we seek to demon strate how religious institutions could play a fundamental role in shaping the social
environment and bounding the acceptable parameters of behavior by which
individuals strove to meet their economic needs.
In chapter 4, we shift our focus southward to consider the effects of periodic
travel to Jerusalem on Galilean household economics. Our primary focus will be on
the three annual pilgrimage festivals, which the Torah obliges male Jews to attend.
We will consider the choices involved in how Galileans proceeded on the journey,
and consider the economic implications on management of resources for the journey
and conducting agricultural work back home. Once in Jerusalem, pilgrims also had to
account for their food needs and the materials required to participate in the sacrificial
cult. We will also consider how the timing of pilgrimage shaped the timing of other
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agricultural activities, placing constraints on the timing of labor and preparation of
the harvest. Related to this, we will consider how the timing of the festivals likely
incentivized performance of other religious duties in Jerusalem—such as consumption
of the Second Tithe or giving firstfruit offerings—at festival time, with implications
for timing and profit. This chapter serves to connect the Galilean regional economy,
in which most everyday transactions were local, to a broader Jewish Palestinian
economic network on a periodic basis.
Through this dissertation, I aim to contribute to several areas of scholarly
research. Most obviously, it contributes to the historiography of ancient Judaism and
early Christianity in defining the shape of the Galilean socioeconomic world in which
the unrest and uprisings in the first century occurred and in which the Jesus move ment emerged, and evaluating the extent to which economic considerations help to
explain them. It also fits into the larger discourse surrounding the ancient economy of
the Roman Mediterranean, drawing on the tools and questions deployed for other
areas of the empire to a region still often bypassed and implicitly marginalized as
distinct from the Mediterranean. To this end, the project speaks at least implicitly to
recent concern for a broader concept of “Mediterraneanism.”70 However, by focusing
analysis on a particular region, the dissertation contributes to the current interest in
regional studies, and shifts the discussion away from evaluations of imperialism or
economy on a macro-scale that often blurs important and interesting differences
within the empire.71 But most importantly, the dissertation seeks to reorient the
prevailing center-fixation of analyses of imperialism and economic determination in
Palestine and beyond, simultaneously giving due weigh to the role of central, formal
institutions and to the role of decentralized informal institutions and translocal
networks of interactivity in bounding economic decision-making.
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CHAPTER 1—THE OVERSTATED ECONOMY
Calibrating the Importance of Institutions of Administration and Taxation
in Early Roman Palestine
Studies on the economy of Roman Palestine have often emphasized the importance of
the state72 in their evaluation of economic conditions under Roman and Herodian
rule—focused especially on taxes, property rights, and law. 73 In so doing, these
studies follow a long tradition in scholarship on the ancient Mediterranean economy
of focusing on the role of the state in shaping the economic systems of individual
polities and the Mediterranean region as a whole. Mikhail I. Rostovtzeff’s study on
the economy of Ptolemaic Egypt, for instance, depicts a command economy enabled
by a highly developed bureaucracy. 74 Keith Hopkins’ “tax and trade” model for the
Roman economy depends on motors of state taxation and monetization. 75 The most
recent turn in study of the ancient Mediterranean economy toward New Institutional
Economics (NIE) has likewise emphasized the role of the state in structuring the
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Manning and Ian Morris (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005), 127–56; Paul Cartledge, “The
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economic system, albeit in a more sophisticated way. 76 Although NIE posits that
institutions of various kinds shape the incentive structures according to which
economic actors interact and deploy their resources, scholars deploying NIE for analysis of the Roman world have focused primarily on the Roman state’s administrative,
fiscal, and legal institutions. 77
The very notion that the state can be examined as a force that shaped the econ omy from the top down presumes that we can speak of Rome as having a coherent
and strong state. But the Roman Empire was hardly a homogenous and centralized
entity, especially in our period of investigation. The relationship between Rome and
the various regions that were subject to it took on a wide array of different configurations: from provinces governed directly by Roman administrators, to “free cities” and
petty kingdoms overseen by Roman governors, to allied kings installed by but largely
independent of Rome. Even when Rome instituted direct Roman rule, it often coopted established native institutions of administration, taxation, and law 78 to meet the
needs of governance rather than imposing a wholly new and characteristically Roman
administrative order on the province. 79 The political bureaucracy in most provinces

76

See also Ian Morris, Richard P. Saller, and Walter Scheidel, “Introduction,” in The Cambridge
Economic History of the Greco-Roman World, ed. Morris, Saller, and Scheidel (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2007), 1–12; Bruce W. Frier and Dennis P. Kehoe, “Law and Economic
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seems to have been relatively small and underdeveloped, hindering the state’s ability
to collect vital information and to enforce compliance. But even areas where state
bureaucracy and infrastructure seems to have been strong and localized, the government imparted considerable power to lowly recruited officials who had considerable
decision-making authority given the asymmetry in information available to the ruler
versus the populace. 80
Michael Mann provides a helpful way to think about this configuration of Roman
state power. Most ancient agrarian empires were despotically strong—meaning they
were able to act unilaterally and without routine, institutionalized negotiation with
locals. But they were infrastructurally weak—meaning they lacked the capacity to
penetrative civil society and implement their political decisions broadly. 81 As we will
suggest in this chapter, these are apt descriptors for the Early Roman Empire and its
administration of its eastern subject territories. The Roman state could rely on military force to carry out the senate’s or emperor’s orders in a targeted fashion without
local cooperation, but the Roman administration was not sufficiently developed to
ensure full, widespread compliance over a long term. From what we know of Early
Roman Palestine, the Romans were generally satisfied to remain aloof “silent partners” in governance so long as regional stability was maintained and/or a revenue
stream from tribute was uninterrupted.
Early Roman Palestine exemplifies well the problems with envisioning state
institutions—especially Roman state institutions—playing a powerful role in defining
the parameters of economic activity at the provincial level. The political relationship
between Rome and Palestine in this period was reconfigured many times: it was
administered sometimes directly by Roman officials, sometimes by quasi-independent
kings, and sometimes a murky admixture of the two. The political boundaries (or
“political geography”) were adjusted time and again as territories were added and
removed, divided and recombined. These diachronic changes, especially when they
occurred rapidly, undermine claims that Rome’s hegemonic power was the most
important factor structuring the economy of Early Roman Palestine. Especially during
the first couple decades, conditions on the ground can even be described as chaotic, as
political instability cast doubts on who held legitimate authority and hindered imple mentation of law. Later Roman governors over Galilee were unpredictable in the
length or quality of their tenure. Often the administrative system was murky, and
there could be utter confusion on the ground as to who was ultimately in charge and
what administrative institutions one needed to engage for matters of political or judicial dispute. Conditions on the ground were not always conducive to effective tax
istration of the Provinces,” 179–80; Hopkins, “Taxes and Trade in the Roman Empire,” 101–25, esp.
120–21.
80
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the Ptolemaic Economy,” in The Economies of Hellenistic Societies, Third to First Centuries BC, ed.
Zofia H. Archibald, John K. Davies, and Vincent Gabrielsen (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011),
296–323 at 306–9.
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collection, and an underdeveloped bureaucracy further weakened the effectiveness of
the state’s financial institutions. The general infrastructural weakness suggests that
the Roman state was like a patina encrusted atop the existing local systems of inter action, rather than the fundamental force shaping its guiding incentives.
This is not to say that state or its institutions were wholly unimportant in defining
the parameters of the economy in which Galilean Jews participated. The stability or
instability of the state could itself have an effect on the economic calculus Galileans
employed in determining how to allocate their resources. But for much of the period
in question, these institutions would not have penetrated very deeply into Galilean
society and would have played a relatively minor role in defining the economic “rules
of the game” or the day-to-day decision-making of Jewish households. This is especially so for Galilee, which for much of this period was a backwater far from the
centers of administration and only occasionally affected by its institutional organs.
We will therefore suggests that a state-centered approach emphasizing the top-down
structuring of economic incentives and systems is not ideal for considering the econ omy in Early Roman Galilee.
Once the weakness and in some cases irrelevance of the formal institutions of the
state is sufficiently demonstrated, we may ask what other institutions may have
played a more profound and sustained role in shaping the economic behavior of
Galilee’s general population. I will suggest that religious institutions could have been
quite important in defining the parameters of economic interaction in Palestine. In
contrast to the evanescent political configuration of Palestine and the weakness of
Roman power in penetrating society, many of these Jewish religious institutions had
been subject to less substantial change over the centuries, and Jews were mo re likely
to hold these institutions in high regard and take them into consideration in managing
their economic resources. Given the weakness of the state in enforcing its own insti tutions, we will need to consider the social forces that would have served to compel
compliance with these rules and thereby shaped the dynamics of economic behavior
(chapter 2).

The Changing Political Configurations of Early Roman Galilee
While there are good reasons to treat the Early Roman period (63 BCE—70 CE) as a
discrete historical era, homogeneity in the political structure under Rome is ironically
not one of them. Over the course of this timeframe, Roman dominion vacillated
between forms of so-called “direct rule,” in which a provincial governor oversaw
administration of the province in some capacity, and “indirect rule,” in which vassal
kings ruled with some amount of dependence on and deference toward Rome. These
shifts in government did not always occur to the same regions of Palestine at the same
time. The Romans repeatedly reconfigured the political geography of Palestine,
subdividing and recombining regions of the former Hasmonaean kingdom, and adding
and removing cities at their discretion. For Galilee, we can roughly break the Early
Roman period down into three eras based on the nature of political administration:
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(1) from 63 to 40 BCE, it was administered by a Roman governor as an annex to Syria,
but managed locally as part of a Jewish ethnarchy; (2) from 37 BCE to 44 CE it was
administered by three successive quasi-independent monarchs, and (3) from 44 CE to
the First Jewish Revolt it was administered by a Roman procurator as part of the
Roman province of Judaea. This schema will serve as a useful heuristic to investigate
the differences between so-called “direct” and “indirect” rule, but we will note that
these periods too were hardly homogenous.
Judaea as a Syrian Annex (63–40 BCE)
The first two decades under Roman rule were the most chaotic. Judaea became part of
the Roman Empire in 63 BCE, when Pompey intervened in the civil war between
Hyrcanus II and Aristobulus II, two Hasmonaean dynasts contending for the kingdom.
This intervention spelled the end for the Hasmonaean kingdom as a fully independent
government; Pompey reinstalled Hyrcanus as high priest but denied him the title
“king” (Ant. 14.78) and annexed Judaea to the newly-created Roman province of
Syria (War 1.157; cf. Ant. 14.79). This province was an amalgam of autonomous citystates and petty monarchies that had emerged in the wake of the gradual fragmentation and collapse of the Seleucid Empire over the preceding decades. 82 While the
governor of Syria presided over the province as a whole, it seems that much of the
regional administration was left in the hands of the rulers and municipal bodies that
had governed before Rome’s intervention in the East. 83 Hyrcanus in like fashion
remained the de facto political administrator of Judaea, wielding political authority as
ethnarch over the Jewish people. 84 Hyrcanus and his government were still subordinate to the Syrian governor, who could intervene politically or militarily as he saw fit,
82
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though usually in response to political unrest in
Plaestine or a pressing need for war resources.
The territory governed by Hyrcanus was considerably smaller than the Hasmonaean kingdom that had
preceded Roman intervention. When Pompey annexed
Palestine to Syria, he reduced Judaea “solely to its particular bounds” (μόνοις ... τοῖς ἰδίοις ὅροις περιέκλεισεν; War 1.155; cf. Ant. 14.74), or in other words,
to those regions that were chiefly inhabited by members of the Judaean ethnos. This left Hyrcanus in
control of the regions of Judaea and Peraea in the south
and Galilee in the north (see Figure 1).85 Pompey
removed the many cities that the Hasmonaean kings
had conquered and incorporated into the kingdom:
Hippos, Scythopolis, and Pella in Transjordan; the city
of Samaria in its eponymous region; Marissa in Figure 1. Approximate territory
Idumaea; and Ashdod, Jamnia, Arethusa, Gaza, Joppa, administered by Hyrcanus II as
part of Koile-Syria.
Dora, and Strato’s Tower on the coastal plain (Ant.
14.73; War 1.155–157). These cities were incorporated into the Syrian province as
autonomous polities. 86 Assuming that the removal of Samaria also entailed removing
the region around it 87—the domain of the Samaritans, which Pompey may have
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thereby judged as not the land of the Jews proper—the regions under Hyrcanus’
control were not geographically contiguous. There are no signs, however, that this
was itself a hindrance to transregional movement or administration between Jerusalem
and Galilee.
As part of the Syrian province, the ethnarchy of Judaea also owed annual tribute
to Rome. The details of this tribute payment from 63 to 47 BCE are murky—we do not
know how much was owed, 88 whether it was assessed as a fixed sum (stipendium) or a
proportional value (decumae), or whether it was paid in cash or paid as produce
rendered in kind (i.e., as produce). 89 Tribute in Asia Minor and the rest of Syria was
collected in this period by publicani, corporations of tax farmers who contracted from
the Senate the right to gather the provincial tax revenues, and Palestine was likely
subject to the same system. 90 This system ensured fixed revenues for Rome, since it
collected the contract fee up front and displaced the risks and logistical burden of tax
collection to the publicani. It also meant that the Roman state did not need to invest in
bureaucracy and other infrastructures for tax assessment and collection.
This system could lead to abuse of local populations and harsh exactions by tax
collectors looking to make a quick profit off their contract, 91 but publicani faced a
number of barriers. We know of no attempt to conduct a census in Palestine (prior to
6 CE; see below) that would give publicani the data necessary to make an informed
bid for the contract or to effectively extract those revenues once in the country. When
Crassus plundered Syria during his governorship, he reportedly had to reckon the
88
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revenues of cities himself, suggesting this information was not otherwise readily
available, as well as indicating that it was logistically preferable to raid cities than to
collect revenues from the villages and countryside (Ant. 14.105–109; War 1.180; cf.
Plutarch, Crassus 17.5, 9–10).92 Adding to the difficulty of tax collection was the
political chaos on the ground in Palestine at this time, as we shall relate. Political and
military revolt would have impeded bureaucratic assessment of taxable land and
physically collecting revenues would have required greater access to force than was
characteristic of publicani operating in the provinces. 93 We should therefore be wary
of imagining Palestine completely overrun with tax collectors extorting the populace;
at times, they would be lucky to make a return on their investment at all. And while
revolt and civil war may themselves have been a detriment to the ability of Jewish
farmers to produce and retain their foodstuffs, adding to the air of risk, 94 it also
hindered the operation of Roman agents in extracting material resources from their
land.
Despite the nominal Roman annexation and numerous attempts at reformulating
administration, Roman control over Palestine (and Syria more generally) was initially
very tenuous. Pompey’s military intervention had only really targeted Jerusalem, and
many in Judaea and Galilee continued to support the rival house of Aristobulus II. 95
While the first Syrian governors were busy quelling local insurrection and fighting off
Parthian incursions, 96 Aristobulus II’s son Alexander was able to lead a revolt against
Hyrcanus (Ant. 14.82; War 1.260). The new Syrian governor Gabinius succeeded in
putting down Alexander’s revolt in 57 BCE.
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In the aftermath of that revolt, Gabinius restructured the administration of Palestine, perhaps in part to prevent further insurgence by anti-Hyrcanus factions. Gabinius
left the Temple in the trust of Hyrcanus but divested him of political control over
Jerusalem or any of the territories, empowering instead aristocratic councils (Ant.
14.91; War 1.169). He divided the Jewish “people” (ἔθνος) into five regions, each
with its own council (συνέδρια, Ant. 14.91; συνόδους, War 1.170).97 The exact geography of this administrative redistricting is not clear; Josephus notes the “capitals” of
the districts—Jerusalem, Gadara, Amathus, Jericho, and Sepphoris—but not how the
surrounding territory was apportioned. (Figure 2 produces a highly tentative rendering
of the five districts.) It is also not clear whether this framework was intended to
incorporate more territory than Hyrcanus had presided over; the inclusion of Gadara
in particular is anomalous, since Gadara was removed
from his control by Pompey (Ant. 14.75–76; War 1.155–
156), and this district could perhaps have included other
proximate cities of the Decapolis. In addition to appeasing those hostile to Hyrcanus’ governance, the redistricting may have served a strategy of “divide and conquer,”
as E. Mary Smallwood has argued, granting the governor
greater control by decentralizing administrative authority
from the traditional capital of Jerusalem onto weaker
regional hubs.98
This new administrative system does not seem to
have endured long, if it took hold at all. Affairs in Judaea
were disrupted by two successive revolts during Gabinius’ tenure: the first spurred by Aristobulus II when he
escaped from Rome (Ant. 14.92–98; War 1.171–174), and Figure 2. Approximation of
the second by Alexander while Gabinius was engaged Gabinius’ five districts.
with Parthia (Ant. 14.100–102; War 1.176–178). After the revolts, Josephus says that
Gabinius “established the government according to the will of Antipater” (πρὸς τὸ
Ἀντιπάτρου βούλημα κατεστήσατο τὴν πολιτείαν; War 1.178; cf. Ant. 14.103), which
may indicate the re-establishment of consolidated political authority over Judaea in
the person of Antipater, Hyrcanus’ advisor and lieutenant, who takes a more prom inent position in the political narrative that follows. 99 We never hear of the five-district
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The settlements were: Jerusalem, serving the immediate area of Jerusalem; Gadara, serving the
northern parts of Trans-Jordan and perhaps the eastern Jezreel Valley; Amathounta probably in the
southern Trans-Jordan; Jericho, serving the Dead Sea region. and Sepphoris serving Galilee; cf. Ant.
14.91; War 1.169–170. Note the apparent absence of a synod in the region of Samaria, strongly
suggesting that the region was considered as attached to the city of Samaria (removed from Hyrcanus’
control under Pompey) and distinct from the Judaean regional administration.
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Smallwood, Jews under Roman Rule, 31.
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Smallwood notes that Antipater seems to bear the title “governor of the Jews” in 48 BCE,
implying unification had at least occurred by then. Furthermore, Caesar’s decree ( Ant. 14.202–210)
presumes the territories were all again governed by Hyrcanus from J erusalem in 45 BCE, and the fact
that Antipater appointed his sons as regional governors of Judaea and Galilee in 47 BCE (Ant. 14.158)
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system again. If the system had been an experiment in effecting peace and stability
through political restructuring, it failed miserably.
The next Syrian governors, Crassus and Cassius, were likewise unable to bring
about peace and stability in Palestine. Both were preoccupied with military conflict
against the Parthians. These governors turned to pillaging in order to fund their
campaigns to the east. Crassus raided the Temple, plundering money from the
treasury and other valuable artifacts (Ant. 14.105–109; War 1.179). Cassius in turn
sacked the town of Magdala and took its inhabitants as slaves (Ant. 14.120; War
1.180).100 That political instability and rebellion continued to be a problem is indicated by Crassus’ purported execution of a pro-Aristobulus seditionist, Pitholaus, and
Cassius’s need to make truce with Alexander once again (War 1.180–182; cf. Ant.
14.119–120, which omits Alexander).
Adding to the political confusion was the gradual shift of power from Hyrcanus
to Antipater. In Josephus’ narrative, it is around this time that Antipater seems to take
on a more prominent role in making and executing political decisions. During the
civil war between Pompey and Caesar, Antipater came to Caesar’s aid ostensibly on
orders of Hyrcanus (Ant. 14.127), but Antipater got all the credit: Caesar merely
confirmed Hyrcanus in the priesthood but granted Antipater governorship over Judaea
(ἐπίτροπον αὐτὸν ἀποδείκνυσιν τῆς Ἰουδαίας; Ant 14.143; cf. War 1.199). Antipater is
the one who ordered the rebuilding of Jerusalem’s wall and quieted growing sedition
(Ant. 14.156–157; War 1.201–202). Not long after, Antipater unilaterally decided to
delegate authority to his sons, appointing Phasaelus over Jerusalem and its environs —
Hyrcanus’ natural domain—and Herod over Galilee (Ant. 14.158; War 1.203). Yet
Hyrcanus had not been totally eclipsed; at the instigation of Jerusalem elites, he was
still able to compel Herod to answer charges leveled against him in court—though
Herod’s own display of military force upon arrival in Jerusalem publically contested
Hyrcanus’ authority (Ant. 14.163–184; War 1.208–215). And despite the receding
scope of Hyrcanus’ power, he continued to be the only figure named in Roman
decrees attributed to Caesar over this period (Ant. 14.190–212).101 The exact relationship between Antipater and the ethnarch Hyrcanus may have been just as difficult to
pin down in antiquity, leaving the general populace uncertain as to just who exactly
was in charge of which aspects of government at a given moment. 102 Other personalities, such as the military commanders Malichus and Helix (see below), who are o vershadowed in Josephus’ narrative by Antipater and his scions, probably contended for

likewise indicates unification at least within a decade of the reform. See also Smallwood, Jews under
Roman Rule, 35; Richardson, Herod: King of the Jews, 102–3.
100
Or a part thereof; given the difficulty of Josephus’ numbers, it is impossible to say whether
these thirty thousand are meant to represent all or only a portion of the inhabitants.
101
Hyrcanus is also the only official mentioned in the later letters by Marc Antony cited at Ant.
14.314–322.
102
On the difficulty of determining exactly what Antipater’s role was in this period, see
Richardson, Herod: King of the Jews, 105–8; Shatzman, The Armies of the Hasmonaeans and Herod,
138–40.
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administrative and/or military power as well, muddying further the understanding on
the ground of who held authority over what. 103
Caesar apparently intervened to make some changes in Palestine. Josephus cites a
senatus consultum confirming certain grants made by Caesar in 47 BCE (Ant. 14.202–
210)104 to the territory of Hyrcanus’ ethnarchy: the port city of Joppa (Ant. 14.205)
and the villages of the “Great Plain” (14.207) (see Figure 3).105 The decree also
granted the Jews some protection against potentially exploitative practices by tax
collectors and the military (Ant. 14.204; cf. 14.195). 106 This decree, along with several
others issued by Caesar, reiterates the right of Jews to operate according to their
“ancestral laws” (Ant. 14.208, cf. 14.194–195, 199), including the practices of
Levitical Tithe and Sabbatical Year fallow (Ant. 14.203). These confirm that during
Caesar’s control of the Roman state Jews in Palestine were largely permitted to
continue to govern themselves according to traditional and local institutions, even
when this meant depriving the Romans of valuable human and monetary resources.
This decree also gives us a rare glimpse at tribute under one permutation of the
relationship between Rome and the Judaean ethnarchy. The decree stipulates that the
tribute due was to be calculated at “one-fourth of what was sown” (τὸ τέταρτον τῶν
σπειρομένων; Ant. 14.203). This clearly indicates that the tribute was a tax assessed
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So Shatzman argues for Malichus and other unnamed epimeletai; The Armies of the
Hasmonaeans and Herod, 143–46. The identification of Helix, a military commander at Jerusalem, is
particularly problematic
104
The decree is dated to Caesar’s second imperatorship. For a detailed discussion of the dating
of this decree and its relationship to other documents cited by Josephus in this same section, see Udoh,
To Caesar What Is Caesar’s, 32–41; Miriam Pucci Ben Zeev, Jewish Rights in the Roman World: The
Greek and Roman Documents Quoted by Josephus Flavius (TSAJ 74; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1998),
1–11, 357–68. Though there are some inconsistencies and missing details in the documents that have
led some to declare these excerpted documents forgeries, I find convincing Pucci Ben Zeev’s argument that these are errors due to corruptions in antiquity, some from the rendering the senatus
consulta into Greek in the East (pp. 357–68).
105
I am convinced by Udoh’s identification of “the Great Plain” in this decree with the Sharon
valley rather than the traditional identification with the Jezreel; see To Caesar What Is Caesar’s, 61–
75. Others have argued for the Jezreel Valley: Shimon Applebaum, “Economic Life in Palestine,” in
The Jewish People in the First Century, vol. 2, ed. Shmuel Safrai and Menahem Stern (CRINT 1.2;
Assen: van Gorcum, 1974), 631–700 at 635–36; Smallwood, The Jews under Roman Rule, 40. Arguments for identifying it as the Jezreel Valley stem from the incorrect assumption that all references to
the Great Plain in Josephus are references to the Jezreel, and hence it should be the default. Udoh
shows quite clearly that Josephus applied the term to a number of distinct and disparate regions in
Palestine, including also the Jordan Valley (e.g., War 4.455) and the Plain of Asochis (e.g., War 3.59).
The grant of the Sharon Valley would make sense in that it added to Joppa (and Lydda; see 14.208)
control over a key portion of the coastal road as well. Moreover, the Sharon valley is the only Valley
that we know was removed by Pompey in 63 BCE (cf. Ant. 14.74–76).
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Namely, billeting Roman troops, conscription into the auxiliary ranks, and extortion of prop erty. Such impositions would have constituted unpredictable ad hoc economic burdens. It could also
create complications for Jews who feared that interaction with gentiles or impressments into military
service could compromise their adherence to the Mosaic Law (cf. Ant. 14.226–227). We will return in
following chapters to the issue of Jewish concerns about interactions with gentiles.
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on agricultural land 107 rather than a poll tax assessed
per capita, probably paid in kind rather than in coin. It
also makes very clear that the tribute was a
proportional tax (decumae) rather than a fixed-rate tax.
Proportional taxes are generally beneficial to the smallscale farmer, because they reduce the risks associated
with crop failure; if the yield is low, so is the net
amount owed as tribute.
This decree (and one shortly before it; see Ant.
14.201) also indicates that at least by 47 BCE the early
mechanism of tax farming had been replaced by a
system of tax collection coordinated from Jerusalem
(Ant. 14.203). The Jews were to send the tribute
payment to Sidon every other year 108 (with an
109
which suggests
Figure 3. Approximation of exemption for the Sabbatical Year),
Hyrcanus’ Judaea after Caesar’s that Roman agents were no longer entering Palestine to
decree of 47 BCE.
collect it themselves. Rather, Hyrcanus and his
delegates in Judaea—in all likelihood, native Jews—were responsible for the local
collection of taxes. 110 These agents likely had better access to information about the
107

And perhaps specifically grain land, rather than orchards or vineyards, since it speaks of land
as sown. I have read the term “σπειρομένων” as the yield at harvest from sown crops, but it could also
be read as the harvest anticipated based on land sown. The former seems most likely since it would
have been easier to measure and would require a minimal bureaucratic apparatus. Projecting a yield,
by contrast, would require a fairly accurate record of landholdings, cropping and fa llowing cycle, and
a stable and reliable seed-to-yield ratio. In both cases, we would be right to imagine a system that left
plenty of opportunity for farmers to mask the real sum total of their produce and mitigate their tax
burden. On the variability of seed-to-yield ratios depending on farming strategies, which would
complicate any system of predicting harvest beforehand, see Paul Halstead, “Traditional and Ancient
Rural Economies in Mediterranean Europe: Plus ça change?,” in Scheidel and von Reden, The Ancient
Economy, 53–70.
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The phrase τῷ δευτέρῳ ἐτεὶ has been a matter of some interpretive difficulty. See the review
of interpretations in Udoh, To Caesar What Is Caesar’s, 48–51. A. H. M. Jones took it to mean
payment in the second year of the five-year lustrum, the period he supposes for tax-farming contracts,
but he is at pains to coordinate this with the seven-year sabbatical cycle; review of Arnaldo
Momigliano, Ricerche sull’organizzazione della Giudea sotto il dominio romano , JRS 25 (1935): 228–
31 at 228–29; cf. Lintott, Imperium Romanum, 87–90. Gildas Hamel takes it to refer to the year after
the Sabbatical Year (and the following five years), though this does not account well for the isolated
reference to the “second year”; Poverty and Charity in Roman Palestine, First Three Centuries CE
(Near Eastern Studies 23; Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990), 146. Udoh follows Arnoldo
Momigliano’s interpretation—that it means every other year—as the simplest most sensible (see
Ricerche sull’organizzazione della Giudea sotto il dominio romano, 63 a.C.–70 d.C. [Bologna: Annali
della R. Scuola Normale Superiore di Pisa, 1934], 21–24). With the inclusion of the Sabbatical Year
remission, this would mean years two, four, and six of the seven-year cycle. I follow this interpretation. It remains an open question whether the tax was collected in Judaea annually or biennially.
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For more on the implications of the Sabbatical Year, see ch. 3.
110
From the time that Caesar ended the practice of selling tax farming contracts for the tribute
collection, the only tax collectors of any kind that we hear of in Palestine seem to be Jews: John the
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region than Roman publicani had, knowing the land and many settlements firsthand,
and having an established interpersonal network to tap for information, all of which
would have made assessing tax liability and extracting the tribute easier. Resident
Judaeans also had more incentive to treat their task with moderation. Roman
publicani were outsiders attempting to extract a profit on short-term contracts and
hence had every incentive to maximize the revenue they could collect (given their
limited information). Natives to the region, on the other hand, had concerns other than
profit to account for: their actions impacted their local reputation and hence t heir
interactions with other Jews of their community, and gross extortion could adversely
affect the stability and peace of the land in which they reside. 111 This system granted
considerable latitude to the local administration; there is no indication that R omans
had any oversight over the process in Palestine under this configuration, which
suggests a Roman empire less concerned with systematic maximization of tribute
extracted from the province than ensuring a constant and consistent revenue stream.
As with Gabinius’ administrative restructuring, the Caesarean reform also seems
to have been impeded by the political turmoil that resumed after a few years. Another
civil war embroiled Rome after the assassination of Caesar and rolled over into the
East. Cassius returned to the familiar territory of Syria and raised war funds by
exacting heavy taxes on the cities of Syria. He levied against Jerusalem a tax of seven
hundred talents, which Antipater and his sons were compelled to collect out of the
regions of the Jewish ethnarchy (Ant. 14.271–276; War 1.221–222). Internal conflicts
multiplied when Cassius left Syria to fight against Antony. The Jewish commander
Malichus took the opportunity to assassinate Antipater (Ant. 14.280; War 1.225–228).
Another military leader, Helix, used his soldiers stationed at Jerusalem to move
against the city’s governor Phasaelus and triggering the populace to take up arms as
well (Ant. 14.294; War 1.236–237). Antigonus son of Aristobulus raised a
revolutionary army and invaded Judaea, while his ally Marion of Tyre seized several
fortified settlements in Galilee and held them until Herod later recaptured them (Ant.
14.297–300; War 1.238–239). The end of the Roman civil war after the battle of
Philippi did not restore stability to the administrative landscape of Palestine. Against
the protest of a group of Jewish elites (Ἰουδαίων ἑκατὸν οἱ δυνατῶτατοι; Ant. 14.324;
tax collector in Caesarea in War 2.287, and Galilean collectors in Matt 9:9; 10:3; Mark 2:13–15; Luke
3:12; 5:27–29; 7:29; 18:10–14; 19:2. These instances are considerably later; but there is nothing to
suggest that, to the contrary, outsiders played a substantial role in the tax collecting apparatus of
Palestine in this period.
Following Momigliano (Ricerche sull’organizzazione della Giudea), scholars have generally
pinned the end of publicani-directed collection of tribute to the time of Gabinius, based on Cicero, De
provinciis consularibus 10. D. C. Braund has questioned this interpretation of the text, and suggests
instead that the end of this mode of tax collection came under Caesar and the reforms embodied in this
decree; see “Gabinius, Caesar, and the ‘Publicani’ of Judaea,” Klio 65 (1983): 241–44. I follow here
the more cautious interpretation of Braund.
111
On reputation as a social mechanism for shaping behavior, see below. The New Testament
references to tax collectors suggest they did not have a great reputation to begin with; see the numer ous references to them in association with sinners, prostitutes, gentiles, and other outsiders (Matt 5:46;
9:10–11; 11:19; 18:17; 21:31–32; Mark 2:15–16; Luke 3:12; 5:29–30; 7:29, 34; 18:9–13).
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War 1.244–245), Antony decided to install Herod and Phasaelus as tetrarchs over the
Jewish ethnarchy, in charge of its political affairs in place of the late Antipater.
Shortly thereafter, Antigonus again invaded Judaea, this time with the backing of
Parthians forces. He seized Jerusalem and a number of fortresses, took Hyrcanus and
Phasaelus prisoner; Hyrcanus was maimed, disqualifying him for the high priesthood,
and Phasaelus committed suicide (Ant. 14.330–369; War 1.250–273). With Herod
forced to flee, Rome effectively lost any semblance of control of Judaea in 40 BCE,
and Antigonus—now a vassal of Parthia—governed Judaea.
In the first twenty-three years after Pompey annexed Palestine, Roman control
over Palestine and Syria remained tenuous and its roots were shallow. The Syrian
governor had the authority to intervene in Judaean affairs, but more often regional
administration was left to local rulers—first Hyrcanus and later Antipater and his
sons. In Josephus’ narrative these early governors enter primarily to quell revolts or
raid the region for revenues, suggesting little more than a reactionary approach to
Roman governance. In lieu of effective top-down leadership from the Syrian
governors, local strong men played a more important role in determining the political
configuration of the region. Hyrcanus, then Antipater and his sons, seem to have had
considerable control over matters of day-to-day governance and justice.
But even local administration was complicated by the fairly frequent recurrence
of uprisings in support of the alternate Hasmonaean line of Aristobulus. The result is
that periods of peace were short. It is doubtful under such conditions that a stable
system of regional, let alone imperial, administration ever had much chance to be
effective. The combination of overlapping and contesting individuals that claimed
authority over this territory would have created an atmosphere of volatility, leaving
the average Jew uncertain about what state institutions would persists and what
political conditions would be like in subsequent years.
A combination of the minimalist Roman bureaucracy, the reliance on native
administration, and the endemic political conflict in Judaea make it unlikely that
tribute collection in this period was ever a very effective Roman state institution. The
lack of a state-directed census meant that publicani faced considerable logistical
obstacles in their task of collecting tax revenues from the region, and during times of
armed conflict the threat to life and limb was high. And after Caesar’s reformulation
of the tribute—however long we take that to have lasted—Rome left oversight of the
assessment and collection to local Jews, indicating they did not care about extracting
every bit they could out of the province. The brief periods of peace were hardly suffi cient for a regular, predictable tax cycle to take hold in Palestine, in any case. Jewish
revolts and excessive one-off exactions by governors created disruptions whose
timing and damage could not be anticipated. While this created conditions that could
facilitate strategies of tax avoidance, the unpredictability of taxation also created a
perpetual state of risk.
The Romans seem to have been concerned chiefly with two objectives in their
governance of Judaea as a Syrian annex—regional stability and a moderate revenue.
Given the conditions of the state in this period, we may propose that the most
important effect of the state on how people managed their economic resources lies not
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so much in the state institutions themselves but the uncertainty surrounding their form
and effectiveness. Under such conditions, two strategies—not mutually exclusive—
present themselves: (1) Galileans could treat state institutions as largely irrelevan t and
attempt to bypass them, appealing instead to highly local institutions (e.g., town
councils of elders) and granting greater importance to local rules and norms, or (2)
Galileans could executed conservative strategies of hoarding and hiding resources in
order to try to weather the unpredictability of the state’s effects.
Indirect Roman Rule—The Herodian Kingdoms
Judaea was outside the Roman sphere of control in 40 BCE, when the Roman Senate
declared Herod king of Judaea. In effect, they were outsourcing the task of retaking
the territory from their Parthian enemies by military force (Ant. 14.384–385; War
1.282–284).112 This war was one of the few times in the Early Roman period that
Galilee experienced direct military conflict; most of the early revolts—as with most
later uprisings—seem to have been centered to the south in Judaea. Herod’s forces
marched first through Galilee; Josephus claims that most of Galilee acquiesced to
Herod (Ant. 14.394; War 1.291), but he also mentions “places that were held by
Antigonus’ garrisons,” namely Sepphoris and the caves of Mt. Arbel (Ant. 14.413–14;
cf. War 1.304–307). The fighting itself seems to have been relatively isolated, and
there is little archaeological evidence left behind of the site’s utter destruction. 113 Yet
warfare still had negative effects for those not engaged in the fighting, in the form of
impositions on economic resources. Herod wintered his troops in those areas of
Galilee that he pacified (Ant. 14.417–419; War 1.308)—chiefly in Sepphoris but at
times imposing on villages (Ant. 14.453; War 1.330)—and possibly levied demands
on locals for foodstuffs and billeting troops.114 Both Herod’s and Antigonus’ forces
plundered the land for provisions (Ant. 14.418–419, 432, 448). Herod, the eventual
victor, imposed indemnities on some unspecified parts of Galilee for their support of
Antigonus (Ant. 14.433; War 1.316). After three years of warfare and facing much
resistance, Herod’s combined Jewish and Roman forces defeated Antigonus, who was
brought back to Rome for execution (Ant. 14.487–491; War 1.357), and Herod was
installed as king over Galilee, Peraea, Judaea, and Idumaea.
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Gilbert Labbé, L’Affirmation de la puissance romaine en Judée (63 a.C.–136 p.C.) (Études
anciennes 74; Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 2012), 503; Udoh, To Caesar What Is Caesar’s, 114–15.
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Eric Meyers notes that only one team found any evidence of destruction by fire dating to that
period, in “Sepphoris: City of Peace,” in The First Jewish Revolt: Archaeology, History, and Ideology,
ed. Andrea M. Berlin and Andrew J. Overman (London: Routledge, 2002), 112.
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It is also likely, though, that Herod used the former Antigonid garrison spaces, insofar as they
remained inhabitable and had sufficient room to accommodate his forces.
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Herod and his successors were undeniably
vassals or “client kings”115 dependent on Rome for
obtaining and maintaining power. 116 As we saw,
Herod came to power with the blessing and military
backing of the Romans. After Augustus defeated
Antony—whom Herod had supported in the civil
war—Herod rushed to Rome to petition the victor to
confirm him in his kingdom, lest Augustus decide to
depose him and grant the territory to someone else
(Ant. 15.183–201; War 1.386–400). When Herod
died, it was the Roman emperor Augustus who
ultimately decided how to allocate Herod’s territories
among his sons, rather than strictly following either
version of Herod’s will (Ant. 17.317–323; War 2.93–
100). And the Romans did not quibble with removing
Archelaus and Antipas from power for supposed
mismanagement of the territory, annexing Archelaus’
territory again to Syria (Ant. 17.342; War 2.111, 117)
and granting Antipas’ territory to another Herodian
ruler (Ant. 18.240–256; War 2.181–183).
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Figure 4. Herod’s kingdom (light
gray) after Antony grants Cleopatra territory from Judaea and
Syria (dark gray).

Scholars often label rulers such as Herod “client kings.” This term is based on a modern
scholarly analogy that conceives of these kings as bound to the Romans (the people, senate, or
powerful individuals) as clients were to their patrons. Erich S. Gruen, among others, has called into
question the utility of this terminology since the ancient literary and epigraphic sources do not use the
language of patronage but rather the language of “friends” (φίλοι, amici) and “allies” (σύμαχοι, socii);
The Hellenistic World and the Coming of Rome (2 vols.; Berkeley: University of California Press,
1984), 1:158–200; cf. Braund, Rome and the Friendly King, 5–7, 23–24; J.-L. Ferrary, “The Hellenistic World and Roman Political Patronage,” in Hellenistic Constructs: Essays in Culture, History,
and Historiography, ed. Paul Cartledge, Peter Garnsey, and Erich S. Gruen (Hellenistic Culture and
Society 26; Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997), 105–19. In general, these rulers occupied
an ambiguous state, neither clearly within nor outside of the bounds of the Roman Emp ire; see Millar,
“Government and Diplomacy in the Roman Empire,” 202; Millar, “Emperors, Kings, and Subjects:
The Politics of Two-Level Sovereignty,” in Cotton and Rogers, Rome, the Greek World, and the East,
vol. 2, 229–48. Rather than resolve the issue of terminology here, we can focus our attention on the
question of to what extent the Romans determined the administrative configurations that these quasi independent Herodian rulers deployed over their realms and the extent to which they could direct
these rulers to act according to Roman prerogatives.
116
As were other so-called “client kings” around the margins of Syria; see Sartre, Middle East
under Rome, 72–73. Change of ruler was sometimes precipitated by threats to the security of the
empire, in some cases through breakdown in relation between Rome and client king, or even as a
pretext for Roman expansionism; see David J. Mattingly, Imperialism, Power, and Identity: Experiencing the Roman Empire (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011), 75–93.
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The territory that the Romans allotted to Herod for
his kingdom was essentially the same as Hyrcanus’
ethnarchy earlier, including the omission of Samaria. 117
Roman rulers exercised the right to add territory to the
Herodian kingdoms (e.g., Ant. 18.255; 20.159; War
2.183, 252). But aside from deposing a ruler altogether,
the Romans rarely removed territories from these
vassals. The most prominent example of a removal
occurred early in Herod’s reign, when Marc Antony
transferred Jericho and the Levantine coast south of
Tyre to Cleopatra (Ant. 15.95–96; War 1.361) (see
Figure 4). When Augustus confirmed Herod in his
kingdom at the end of the civil war with Antony in 30
BCE, he restored the cities given to Cleopatra and added
also Samaria, the Decapolis cities of Gadara and
Hippos, and the coastal cities of Gaza, Anthedon, Figure 5. Herod’s kingdom at its
Joppa, and Strato’s Tower (Ant. 15.287; War 1.396). In maximal extent.
22 BCE, Augustus expanded the kingdom further (see
Figure 5) by adding “all the land between Trachonitis and Galilee (War 1.400).
Whether the Golan was an addition or already part of his territory is unclear, as
Josephus sometimes lumps Golan and Galilee together, and the parallel in Antiquities
(15.343) specifies Trachonitis, Batanaea, and Auranitis without mentioning it. 118
For the most part, though, the Romans meddled little in Herod’s affairs and both
he and his successors exercised considerable independence over their realms. These
117

That it was not part of Herod’s kingdom initially is demonstrated by the fact that the city of
Samaria was granted as an addition to Herod’s kingdom when Augustus confirmed him in his kingship
after Actium (Ant. 15.287; War 1.396). This may seem odd given that Samaria is a major region of
Herod’s military campaign during his war to conquer his kingdom from Antigonus (see Ant. 14.408,
412–413, 431–438, 456–461; War 1.297–302, 333–334). Presumably, Samaria was restored to its
status as a free city of Syria after the fighting, perhaps with the surrounding Samarian hill country.
118
Josephus generally uses Galilee as a synecdoche for both Galilee and Golan unless he needs to
distinguish Golan in particular. He refers to his own command as over Galilee, but clearl y it included
Golan in its purview, including Gamla: “Josephus son of Matthias was made commander [ ἡγεμὼν] of
both Galilees [Γαλιλαίας ἑκατέρας], and appended to this was Gamla, the strongest of the cities” (War
2.568). The list of towns he supposedly walled in (War 2.573–574; Life 187–188) includes Gaulanite
sites. While he identifies them as such, he also distinguishes the two Galilees here, indicating that the
conceptual division is not so much between Galilee and Golan as between subdivisions of a combined
Galilee–Golan. Others have also noted the conflation of Galilee in Golan in the nomenclature of Judas
of Gamla, variously called a Gaulanite (Ant. 18.4) and a Galilean (Ant. 18.23; 20.102; War 2.118; cf.
Acts 5:37); see discussion in Uriel Rappaport, “Who Were the Sicarii?,” in The Jewish Revolt against
Rome: Interdisciplinary Perspectives, ed. Mladen Popović (JSJSup 154; Leiden: Brill, 2011), 323–42
at 331. Chaim Ben David notes that tannaitic sources divide Israel into three parts —Judaea, Galilee,
Peraea—and fit Golan into Galilee (rather than Peraea) to do so; The Jewish Settlement on the Golan
in the Roman and Byzantine Period [Hebrew] (Qazrin: Golan Research Institute, 2005), 11–12. We
will see in ch. 2 that there is justification for considering Galilee and Golan as deeply linked and
distinct from the surrounding regions on the basis of their material culture as well.
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rulers felt free to engage in military conflicts with other regional potentates without
necessarily taking into consideration Rome’s interests. Antipas waged war against
Aretas, king of Arabia (Nabataea),119 ostensibly over a broken marital alliance (Ant.
18.109–114) but probably also over a long-running territorial dispute (Ant. 18.113).
Only after Antipas’ initial military defeat did Antipas bother to consult Rome,
appealing for help (Ant. 18.115). As further evidence that the so-called “client kings”
felt free to conduct “international” matters on their own, we may point to the council
of regional rulers called by Agrippa I—from Commalena, Emesa, Lesser Armenia,
Pontus, and Chalcis. But in this instance, the governor of Syria (encircled by these
petty kingdoms) considered the collaboration of so many quasi-independent kings
potential threat to Roman interests and intervened to disband the group (Ant. 19.338–
341). Clearly, these kings did not consider it necessary to preemptively inquire of
Rome on how to proceed in matters of “foreign policy”; they acted according to their
own aims and deferred to Rome only if one party in the dispute appealed for Roman
intervention or a Roman official intervened to protect Rome’s interests.120
From Josephus’ account, it seems that Herod was quite free to shape the admin istrative infrastructure of his kingdom as he saw fit. Unlike Hyrcanus and Antipater
before him, Herod was not directly subordinate to a Roman governor and ruled an
ostensibly separate state that was designated a “friend and ally” to Rome. It seems
from Josephus’ account that Herod attempted to concentrate civil power in the king
and away from alternative figures and institutions that could have rivaled his
authority. Josephus depicts Herod’s execution of Hyrcanus as a measure of power
consolidation; he purportedly feared that Augustus might elevate Hyrcanus as king
rather than confirm Herod at the conclusion of the war against Antony (Ant. 15.164,
179–182).121 He later subverted the power of the preeminent religious and political
position in Judaea, the high priest, by assuming the authority to appoint and depose
them at his discretion. He thereby transformed the high priesthood from a hereditary
office held for life to an appointed position held at the pleasure of the king and
subject to capricious change. 122 Herod tended to choose priests from more obscure
priestly families and even the diaspora—e.g., Ananel of Babylon (Ant. 15.22) and
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The Nabataean kingdom served as an additional buffer between the Parthian and Roman
empires. There is some evidence to suggest Aretas may have been in a similar position to Herod as a
vassal to Rome. The Roman reaction to his ascension to the throne without consultation of Rome
suggests that Rome at least viewed the position as one held at the pleasure of the emperor and senate.
Glen Bowersock also understands the kingdom as a “client” of Rome; Roman Arabia (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1983).
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See Millar, The Roman Near East, 60–61.
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The brief parallel account of Hyrcanus’ murder in War 1.431–434 does not impute to Herod
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wished to remove the possibility of Hyrcanus succeeding him.
122
On the political machinations surrounding Herod’s appointing and deposing of high priests,
see James C. VanderKam, From Joshua to Caiaphas: High Priests After the Exile (Minneapolis:
Fortress, 2004), 392–413.
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Jesus son of Phiabi (Ant. 15.322) possibly of Egypt 123—whose personal networks
were less entrenched in Judaean society and who thereby posed less a threat to the
king’s influence.
Herod also curtailed the authority of the major judicial body in Jerusalem known
as the Sanhedrin.124 Although he did not totally disband it, he had a number of its
members executed for attempting to prosecute him during his time as governor of
Galilee (Ant. 14.175), cowing those who survived the purge. 125 It is likely that Herod
repopulated the council with individuals who were sympathetic to Herodian policies if
not active supporters and courtiers. And since Herod now appointed the high priest,
the head of the council was under the king’s influence and his continued tenure
depended on appeasing him. 126 The only subsequent reference to the Sanhedrin under
Herod presents it as a sort of puppet institution. Herod presented to the council a letter
indicating Hyrcanus’ supposed treachery so that they would approve Herod’s decision
to summarily execute him (Ant. 15.173); given Herod’s proclivity to slay enemies
without the council’s approval, his appeal to the Sanhedrin would seem to be solely
out of concern for public image.
We do not have abundant details about the political administration of Herod’s
kingdom, but we have enough to flesh out some of the basics. Herod’s kingdom was
divided into a number of meridarchies, as indicated by his appointment of a meridarch
123

VanderKam argues an Egyptian connection based on the appearance of this patronym in an
inscription from Leontopolis, the location of the Egyptian Oniad temple; From Joshua to Caiaphas,
405–6.
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There has been considerable scholarly debate about the nature of this institution in Early
Roman Palestine; see the summary in Lester L. Grabbe, Judaism from Cyrus to Hadrian (2 vols.;
Minneapolis: Fortress, 1992), 2:389–95. Some authors have posited an important governing role for
the Sanhedrin as a local institution of Judaea; see Sarte, The Middle East under Rome, 105;
Smallwood, The Jews under Roman Rule, 149; Peter Schäfer, History of the Jews in the Greco-Roman
World (rev. ed.; London: Routledge, 1995 [1983]), 88–89, 132; Jonathan J. Price envisions the
Sanhedrin as a political organ of the revolutionary government, Jerusalem under Siege: The Collapse
of the Jewish State 66–70 CE (Brill’s Series in Jewish Studies 3; Leiden: Brill, 1992), 64–67. That
there was a legal institution in Jerusalem seems uncontestable, given the references to it in Josephus as
well as the New Testament gospels and Acts. But less clear is whether it was composed entirely of
priests and former high priests or whether lay elites were involved, whether it functioned t o try only
“religious” cases or also civic cases, whether its reach extended beyond Jerusalem and its environs or
not, and what sort of punishment it could mete out. I do not wish to get bogged down here in the
details of the institution; it suffices to note that its influence was severely curtailed under Herod, but
later under Roman direct rule it may have played a more substantial role as an independent legal
institution in Early Roman Jerusalem, though its reach into Galilee would still have been quite t enuous
at best.
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Josephus here claims that Herod slew all the members of the Sanhedrin except Sameas. This
may be hyperbolic. In Ant. 15.5, he is reported to have slain forty-five opponents accused of
supporting Antigonus, which seems to be indicated by the prefatory statement in Ant. 15.4. If the
traditional understanding of the Sanhedrin as a body of seventy is to be believed, this would represent
only a fraction of the judicial body. That number also accords with the size of the judicial council
prescribed in Josephus’ Mosaic discourse (Ant. 4.214–218) and the regional council that he established when he arrived in Galilee as general at the outset of the revolt ( War 2.569–571; Life 79).
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in Ant. 15.216. Meridarchies were larger districts that probably corresponded to the
major regional divisions—Judaea, Peraea, Samaria, Galilee, and another composed of
the territories northeast of Lake Kinneret that Augustus added to his kingdom in 22
127
BCE (Ant. 17.25; War 1.398).
These meridarchies were subdivided into a number of
toparchies. Josephus references two such toparchies—Batanaea and Trachonitis—
added to Herod’s kingdom in Ant. 17.25, without indicating a toparchic center. It
seems from references later in Josephus’ narrative that most the toparchies were
defined by a settlement—sometimes a city but often a moderate town or large
village—and the settlements in its vicinity. 128 Unfortunately, these references do not
indicate whether or not toparchies had any dedicated administrative staff like the
meridarchs. If the size of toparchic settlements and their territories from later periods
is any indication, it seems unlikely that there was more than a dedicated toparchic
scribe in many locales if any permanent staff at all. 129 In terms of personnel, Herod’s
127

Samuel Rocca understands Herod to have adapted the Hellenistic system of administrative
subdivision, though he is probably incorrect in identifying Auranitis, Batanaea, and Trachonitis as
separate meridarchies; Herod's Judaea: A Mediterranean State in the Classic World (TSAJ 122;
Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2008), 197–203; see also n. 128 below. Meridarchies were used as
administrative units under the Hellenistic rulers as well. Josephus references the meridarchy of
Samaria in the Seleucid period at Ant. 12.261, 264, 287. According to G. G. Aperghis, we may also
surmise a Seleucid meridarchy based in Idumaea, with Judaea as part of it (cf. 2 Macc 10:14; 12:32)
and possibly including the southern coastal plain around Jamnia (1 Macc 5:58–59; Ant. 12.351). He
believes it likely there were two more to the north, one for the upper coastal plain centered around
Kedesh in Upper Galilee, and one in southern Syria proper. See G. G. Aperghis, “Jewish Subjects and
Seleukid Kings: A Case Study of Economic Interaction,” in Archibald, Davies, and Gabrielsen, The
Economies of Hellenistic Societies, 22–24. Clearly this arrangement of meridarchies would not have
persisted intact into the Hasmonaean and then Early Roman period, since the t erritories and settlement
landscape changed significantly over the centuries. Merely the principle of organization persisted.
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There are many references to toparchies later in Josephus’ narrative, and especially during the
time of Judaea as a Roman procuratorial province. The list of eleven toparchies for Judaea is given in
full, with two nearby coastal cities appended: Jerusalem, Gophna, Acrabatene, Thamna, Lydda,
Emmaus, Pella, Idumaea, ʽEin Gedi, Herodion, and Jericho, plus Jamnia and Joppa (Ant. 18.31; War
3.54–55; cf. War 2.167, 235, 567, 652; 3.48; 4.444, 504, 511, 551). Abela and Julias are referenced as
toparchies in Peraea (War 2.252), the latter toparchy containing fourteen villages (Ant. 20.159). Both
Magdala and Tiberias are noted later as toparchies in eastern Galilee ( War 2.252; Ant. 20.159; see also
ch. 2 below). A certain Narbata was a toparchy on the coast adjacent to the toparchy of Caesarea ( War
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context to be in Idumaea (War 4.445). Auranitis, Batanaea, Trachonitis are probably all to be under stood as toparchies in War 1.398.
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William E. Arnal posits the existence of village scribes in Galilee and thinks such moderately
educated officials were the most likely original tradents of the Q source underlying Matthew and
Luke’s sayings material; Jesus and the Village Scribes: Galilean Conflicts and the Setting of Q
(Minneapolis: Fortress, 2001), 150–55. Such positions were common in the bureaucracy in Egypt, as
seen in the documentary papyri, and comparable figures may be the subject of a passing reference in
Josephus (κωμῶν γραμματτεῖς in War 1.479; κωμογραμματτεῖς in Ant. 16.203). The context does not
allow us to say much about their role, but if Arnal is correct, they would have been semi -literate
agents situated in some (not all) settlements capable of writing contra cts on behalf of locals and
performing other aspects of local bureaucracy on behalf of the state. Rocca also presumes the appoint ment of village scribes, perhaps more extensively than Arnal; Herod’s Judaea, 197–198. For a focused
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administration seems to have been fairly thin. His chief agents were personal connections—family and close associates appointed as regional governors (Ant. 15.216, 254,
362; 17.58–61, 17.270; War 2.55).130 The impression we get from Josephus’ narrative
is that power was brokered through the person of the king and these appointed
intermediaries, meaning appeal to the king on judicial or policy matters required
proximity to Jerusalem and personal connection to influential individuals. But the
average person was probably not engaged in the power politics that dominated the
court, or directly affected by it.
For Galileans in particular, the king must have seemed a far away entity. Despite
the fact that Herod had been the governor of Galilee during the time of Hyrcanus’
ethnarchy, Herod seems to have had little to do with the region once the war against
Antigonus was over and Herod was secure in his kingdom. Herod was an avid sponsor
of monumental building projects, both inside his kingdom and as benefactions to
foreign cities in Greece, Asia, and Syria, but none of them were situated in Galilee
itself.131 He founded a military colony for his veteran horsemen at Gaba, a site that
Josephus places in the Jezreel Valley and Galilee (Ant. 15.294–295), though it seems
to have been at the fringes of the country. Since Herod’s palaces were all located
either in the south (at Jerusalem, Jericho, Masada, and Herodion) or at Caesarea on
the Mediterranean coast, the king was for most Galileans more than a day’s journey
away. 132 Josephus’ narrative, at least, gives no indication that Herod regularly came
into Galilee or invested resources into it. As in the preceding period, Galilee was
something of a backwater, valued as a source of revenue but experiencing little of the
Herodian state on a day-to-day basis.
We know woefully little about the tax system of Herod’s administration. Herod
surely collected revenues for the purpose of his own local needs, as we must presume
earlier local administrators like Hyrcanus had done. But the full extent and burden of
this tax system cannot be determined from the evidence. The references are scattered
study on an Egyptian komogrammateus from the Ptolemaic period, see A. M. F. W. Verhoogt,
Menches, Komogrammateus of Kerkeosiris: The Doings and Dealings of a Village Scribe in the Late
Ptolemaic Period (120–110 BC) (Papyrologica Lugduno-Batava 29; Leiden: Brill, 1998). While Egyptian evidence sheds valuable light on aspects of life not available in other sources, many of which can
be aptly carried over to study of regions (see Roger S. Bagnall, “Evidence and Models for the
Economy of Roman Egypt,” in Manning and Morris, The Ancient Economy, 187–204), Egypt seems to
have had a more developed bureaucracy than most other regions of the Empire in this period.
130
On the close, interpersonal web of family and friends from which Herod drew his head
administrators and military commanders, plus other, less formally constituted roles, see Rocca,
Herod’s Judaea, 73–77, 85–87.
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On Herod’s building projects, especially those within Palestine, see Ehud Netzer, Architecture
of Herod, the Great Builder (TSAJ 117; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2006), 17–240. On Herod’s
euergetism to foreign cities and this as a long-standing characteristic of Hellenistic potentates, see
Rocca, Herod’s Judaea, 36–52.
132
On the various royal palaces—city palaces, winter palaces, and fortified palaces—see Rocca,
Herod’s Judaea, 96–102. Caesarea is the closest palace location to Galilee at about 50 km from the
westernmost settlements of Galilee, requiring about 10 hours on foot to traverse. Despite Herod’s
building projects at Sebaste, he seems not to have placed a palace in t hat city or elsewhere in Samaria.
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temporally and we cannot confirm that they remained homogenous throughout this
period. Even the revenue values that Josephus gives for the regions of Herod’s
kingdom (Ant. 17.318–319) do not tell us much since they do not break down how
much of the revenue came from royal properties rather than taxes, or the relative
proportions drawn from direct taxes and various indirect taxes.
It is clear that Herod drew some revenues from a direct tax. Land tax on agricultural land is suggested by Josephus’ statement that a drought one year threatened to
deprive the king of these revenues (Ant. 15.303).133 But this tax was variable and
malleable in how it was applied, as we may safely presume was the case for many
taxes.134 There are two occasions in Josephus’ narrative that depict Herod reducing the
tax assessment; once reducing the rate by one third for all subjects (Ant. 15.365) and
once remitting it for Jerusalemites and possibly Judaea (Ant. 16.65). We also know
that some individuals and even whole settlements could be exempted from the tax, as
was Bathyra in Batanaea (Ant. 17.28; War 1.428). We do not have direct evidence for
how this tax was collected, but we may reasonably surmise that in lieu of strong
bureaucratic recordkeeping, Herod would have employed agents to travel from village
to village assessing and collecting produce at harvest time. This may have been orga nized at the level of the toparchy, which in Egypt was the primary administrative unit
for assessment.135 But one episode suggests that Herod used his own slaves to make
collections (Ant. 17.308).
Much of Herod’s state revenue may have come from indirect taxes. 136 The most
important and regular such taxes would have come from portoria—tolls collected on
commercial goods crossing between administrative regions over land or sea. We
know some details about the imposition of portoria in other Roman provinces and
cities, especially first-century Asia and later Palmyra. These taxes certainly varied
geographically and temporally, so we cannot directly transpose data from one
provincial tax system to another, but in general we may presume that portoria func-
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Udoh, To Caesar What Is Caesar’s, 163–64, 171.
Udoh, To Caesar What Is Caesar’s, 61–62; P. A. Brunt, “The Revenues of Rome,” JRS 71
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Several scholars have pointed out that the revenue stream from indirect taxes could be
substantial, and thereby undermine the notion that Herod would have had to rely on oppressive rates
of direct taxes to meet his enormous spending needs. See, e.g., Rocca, Herod’s Judaea, 203–5; Udoh,
To Caesar What Is Caesar’s, 171–80.
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tioned in similar ways. 137 As a general value, the “internal” portoria between Roman
provinces and allied vassals were probably valued around 2.5 percent, and
considerably higher on goods transported beyond the Empire. 138 In Herod’s kingdom,
portoria would have been collected at port cities like Caesarea and Joppa 139 and at
provincial borders along the major trade routes—north–south up the Levantine coast
and west–east from Arabia to the coast. Josephus also references a sales tax (Ant.
17.205) and a house tax (Ant. 19.299). We do not know what goods were subject to
the sales tax, at what rate they were taxed, or at what locales. The housing tax seems
to have been restricted to Jerusalem and may have only been a temporary tax rather
than an annual revenue stream. 140 It is difficult to assess just what sort of impact these
and other indirect taxes unknown to us might have had on Galileans; given the relatively unimportance of settlements in Galilee as centers of transregional trade at this
time, Herod may not have paid much attention to sales tax in the region or may have
had collectors in operation only at the largest settlements, Sepphoris and Magdala. In
Galilee, portoria would have the greatest importance along the borders with the
Decapolis, since portoria seem to have often been collected at the bounds with “free
cities” as well.141
The end of Roman direct rule of Palestine also meant the end of tribute payments
to Rome. Some scholars have argued that Herod continued to pay tribute, but this case
is tenuously built on an argument from silence—Josephus makes no explicit reference
to an end to tribute—and the assumption that the relationship between Rome and
Herod was comparable to that between Rome and Hyrcanus II. 142 The silence,
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The Asian Customs Law seems to preserve a number of developments in the portoria from the
time of the Pergamene kings up through the reign of Nero. It also contains a number of conditions
peculiar to its geographic situation, especially regarding import and export throu gh the Bosporous,
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on (cf. Ant. 14.206). The grant came with the condition of an additional tax burden to Rome to offset
the portoria revenue lost to the Romans from gifting the port (Ant. 14.205–207).
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Momigliano argues that Herod paid an annual tribute to Rome out of Herod’s tax revenue on
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however, can be read the other direction—there is no indication that Herod or his
successors paid tribute to Rome aside from a late and unreliable reference in Appian
(Bellum civile 5.75).143 Nor is there positive evidence for tribute obligations imposed
on other “client kings” in a comparable relationship to Rome as Herod. 144 Herod made
occasional “contributions” of funds to Roman leaders (e.g., Ant. 15.110; War 1.365),
but without hint that these were regular or compulsory or that Herod necessarily
passed the burden onto the general populace.
If indeed Herod’s Judaea ceased the payments of tribute to Rome, this undermines the oft-proposed notion that taxation under the Herodians was overly burdensome and an increase compared to the prior period. 145 Many scholars have embraced
Josephus’ depiction of Herod’s reign as particularly burdensome on the finances of
the Jewish populace, in particular the popular call for tax relief following Herod’s
death (Ant. 17.205; War 2.4) and the complaints to the new emperor Tiberius of overbearing taxes in Judaea and Syria in 17 CE (Tacitus, Annales 2.42.5).146 But as Fabian
E. Udoh aptly notes, “Complaints about excessive taxation and economic maladministration are sometimes political, not economic, statements.”147 If such protest was
widespread, we could also interpret it as an attempt to take advantage of a power tran sition to renegotiate conditions, rather than a genuine complaint against the former
regime. Scholars have also pointed to the extensive Herodian building programs as a
financial strain,148 but we do not know to what extent Herod drew on indirect taxes or
other private revenue streams rather than the land tax that was probably the chief
economic burden incurred by Galilean agriculturalists. The end of tribute may not
have been a particularly significant change from the preceding era, if regular tribute
collection was disrupted as much as we have argued, but it also meant Galileans were
not balancing their resources against two state revenue demands. As Emilio Gabba
put it, “The often painted picture of a kingdom tragically oppressed by the double

Smallwood, The Jews under Roman Rule, 85. On the history of scholarship on Herodian tribute to
Rome, see Udoh, To Caesar What Is Caesar’s, 119–43.
143
Udoh, To Caesar What Is Caesar’s, 118–22, 137, 143–153. See also Braund, Rome and the
Friendly King, 63–64, who finds no conclusive indications that any of the client kings paid tribute.
Udoh also questions the ability to use terms such as φόρος, stipendium, and vectigal as technical terms
for tribute; in many cases they may refer to revenue and payments more generally. In fact, the interpretation of the Appian passage as indicating Herod’s payment of tribute depends on rendering φόρος
as tribute; To Caesar What Is Caesar’s, 42.
144
Lintott notes that the only “good evidence for regular taxation of a territory a kin to a kingdom
concerns Judea” (under Hyrcanus), indicating there is nothing comparable to Josephus’ references for
other regions under Roman dominion in the Early Roman period; Imperium Romanum, 35. The very
exceptionality of this reading, however, speaks against its likelihood.
145
Udoh, To Caesar What Is Caesar’s, 180.
146
E.g., Douglas E. Oakman, “Jesus and Agrarian Palestine: The Factor of Debt,” in Society of
Biblical Literature 1985 Seminar Papers, ed. Kent Harold Richards (Atlanta: Scholar Press, 1985),
62–64; Pastor, Land and Economy in Ancient Palestine, 106.
147
Udoh, To Caesar What Is Caesar’s, 204.
148
E.g., Horsley, Jesus and the Politics of Roman Palestine, 109.

49
weight of taxes due to the king and the tribute paid to
Rome, is tendentious in both of its elements.”149
After Herod’s death, Augustus divided Herod’s
kingdom into three dominions apportioned to sons of
Herod (Ant. 17.318–319; 18.106; War 2.95–97).150 Of
all the changes in political geography in the Early
Roman period, this territorial reallocation had the most
potential to produce real consequences on administrative structures, networks of power, and economic interactions in Galilee. Antipas received a tetrarchy
composed of Galilee and Peraea, 151 geographically
separated by Lake Kinneret and the territories of
Hippos, Gadara, and Scythopolis, which were annexed
again to Syria. 152 Archelaus received the lion’s share,
including Judaea, Samaria, and the coastal cities.
Philip received the territories north and northeast of
Lake Kinneret, including the Golan (Ant. 17.319;
18.106; War 2.95).153 The partition segmented a unified Figure 6. Herod’s kingdom dividand contiguous territory inhabited by Jews 154 into ed amongst Archelaus, Antipas,
regions governed by separate individuals and politi- Philip, and Salome.
cally dislodged Galilee from Jerusalem. This also meant that the alternative lines of
political authority in Jerusalem—especially the acting and former high priests—were
no longer part of the political power structure of the state presiding over Galilee, even
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Augustus also granted to Salome, Herod’s sister, the cities of Jamni a, Azotus, and Phasaelis,
and royal estates (τὰ βασιλεία) in Ashkelon (Ant. 17.321; 18.31; War 2.98). She later inherited a date
plantation in the Transjordan called Archelais (Ant. 18.31). Salome seems to have collected the
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151
Augustus removed the Decapolis cities of Hippos and Gadara, which he had once granted to
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(Ant. 14.75; War 1.156).
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though they continued to play an institutional role in shaping behavior as religious
authorities.
The partition of the kingdom compelled the tetrarchs Antipas and Philip to invest
resources into new areas, since regions like Galilee that were formerly backwaters
were now the center of the kingdom. And since Jerusalem—the traditional center of
political power—was now the seat of a rival ruler, they needed to create functional
capitals for their courts (Herod built in neither tetrarch’s territories), accomplished by
building up existing settlements or founding new throne cities de novo. In Galilee,
Antipas first developed the settlement of Sepphoris—the administrative center of the
Galilean meridarchy under Herod, 155 but damaged in the revolts that followed his
death156—into a new capital city and a royal seat. Around 14 CE, Antipas developed a
new city on the western lakeshore dubbed Tiberias, which displaced Sepphoris as the
regional capital of Galilee and shifted the political center—including the state
archives and bank—eastward to the lake region (Life 37–38). Tiberias, and perhaps
also Sepphoris, were founded with a set of administrative bodies to govern the city
itself: a council (βουλή) headed by a group of ten (δεκάπρωτοι) and other magistra cies (ἄρχων; ἀγορανόμος) (Life 64, 169, 279, 284, 296; War 2.639). The tetrarchs had
every incentive to build and spend money in their own relatively underdeveloped
territories to aggrandize them rather than siphoning resources to far-off cities as had
been the case under Herod.
While the renovation of Sepphoris as a capital probably did not have much effect
on the regional network—it was, after all, already a modest town and the capital of a
meridarchy—the construction of Tiberias reconfigured the administrative structure, at
least in the eastern part of Galilee. Before Tiberias’ founding, Magdala would have
been the primary (if not only) 157 toparchy of eastern Galilee. 158 In defining a toparchy
for Tiberias, Antipas would have partitioned the region that belonged to the political
district of Magdala, as both are later referred to as toparchies in Josephus (Ant.
20.159; War 2.252). There are also hints of rivalry between the two in the narrative of
Josephus’ Life (and less visibly in Jewish War) consistent with the displacement of
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stature and authority from Magdala. 159 But these were matters of city reputation; it is
unlikely that the redefining of toparchies had much effect on how the administration
was felt by people on the ground.
The period of Antipas’ tetrarchy was likely the era in which the political admin istration had the greatest structuring effects on Galilee. For the first time in Galilee’s
history as a Jewish territory, the ruler was a proximate figure, residing in the country
on a regular basis—alternately with his capital in Peraea. Because Antipas and his
court were located within a day’s travel from most settlements in Galilee, Galileans
would have had greater access to state agents to address matters of governance or
justice than had been the case under Herod or the Roman governors, who came into
Galilee rarely if at all. But an administration centered in Galilee would also have
made it somewhat harder for individuals to evade state control, since the network of
personnel was localized in Galilee rather than far-off Judaea. Since Antipas was also
more dependent on Galilee for revenues than Herod had been—lacking many other
productive lands and indirect tax revenue from coastal ports—he may have been more
scrupulous in tax collection from the region than his predecessor. The relocation of
the center of administration to Galilee and Peraea respectively probably had the effect
of producing greater state infrastructural power than was the case even under Herod
the Great, let alone under the ephemeral and perpetually weak period as a Syrian
annex.
We know less about taxation under Antipas than we do for Herod, but we can
make some presumptions. It was probably dependent on many of the same, relatively
weak bureaucratic apparatuses used by earlier administrations to register and track
agricultural landholdings to assess tax collection. However, he had a smaller area
from which to collect revenues and in which to deploy them. Unlike his half-brother
Archelaus to the south, Antipas’ domains lacked big cities with considerable interregional markets or imports on which to charge duties, and therefore a larger proportion
of tax revenue may have come from direct taxes than had been the case under
Herod.160 The lack of details makes it difficult to claim that Antipas’ tax regime was
particularly onerous, or that it was particularly light. But Antipas’ buildin g programs
were hardly of the same ambitious scope as Herod’s extensive monument-building
and benefaction. As we shall discuss in chapter 2, his expansion of Sepphoris seems
to have been fairly modest, and what little evidence we have for first-century Tiberias
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does not suggest a dramatically different pattern there. This may suggest that the
revenues Antipas collected remained fairly moderate rather than extortionate. These
building projects also suggest a further economic ramification of the centering of
Antipas’ kingdom in Galilee (and Peraea): rather than expending tax revenue in
faraway places—Jerusalem, the coastal cities, Athens, etc.—the tax money that was
collected was largely spent locally, on construction workers, craftsman, artisans, and
more, meaning that at least some of the money re-circulated into the population.
It is probably correct to assume that he too depended on some combination of
direct land taxes and indirect taxes (e.g., portoria, sales taxes) in order to run his
kingdom. The partitioning created new political boundaries that may have had an
effect on the movement of goods and individuals between these “client kingdoms,” as
import/export laws were imposed on the borderlands between them. Under Antipas,
Galilee was suddenly surrounded on all sides by administrative boundaries on which
Antipas might impose border taxes. This even partitioned the Golan, which was part
of Philip’s tetrarchy, from Galilee. The collection of portoria at ports in Galilee’s
lakeshore region may be inferred from the presence of toll collectors in the gospel
tradition (Matt 9:9; Mark 2:15; Luke 5:27). We may also surmise that taxes could be
effectively collected along the few major highways that seem to have cut through
Galilee in this period, where relatively high volumes of traffic could yield a significant return.161 It is doubtful that toll collectors would have made much of an effort to
police the many byways and footpaths that crossed the administrative borders, since
they were unlikely to yield sufficient profit, creating ample opportunity for tax
evasion off the major routes. 162
Both Herod and Antipas had fairly long and stable reigns—thirty-one163 and
forty-five years respectively. And aside from Herod’s initial war to retake the territory
and some brief spurts of violent revolution after his death, conditions in Galilee were
relatively placid. The figures that populate Josephus’ list of revolutionary and messi anic figures who emerged in the Early Roman period are situated primarily in Judaea
and Peraea (Ant. 17.273–284; 20.97–99, 101–102, 167–172, 188; War 2.57–65, 258–
263, 433–434), with the exception of Judas in Sepphoris between the two rulers (War
2.56). Christopher J. Fuhrmann has pointed out that insofar as official institutions for
policing existed in the Roman world, they were often secondary effects or duties of
military forces. 164 Herod’s establishment of a garrison on the fringes of Galilee at
161
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Gaba (Ant. 15.294; War 2.459; 3.36) may have contributed to the maintenance of
peace there, given that pockets of Galilee had previously shown themselves hotbeds
of support for the house of Aristobulus leading up to Herod’s conquest. 165 Antipas had
his own standing army, at least until it was obliterated by the Arabian king Aretas
(Ant. 18.112–114) and may at times have stationed them in Galilee itself: the gospels
situate a centurion—presumably of the royal army—in Capernaum (Matt 8:5–13;
Luke 7:1–10).166 If indeed Galilee was fairly tranquil in this period, this may have
been the first period since Pompey’s arrival in which state institutions had a chance to
develop and become entrenched, established enough to shape economic behavior in
the region. From what little we can tell, they were not overly intrusive, though the
mechanisms for tax collection were probably more efficient than under Early Roman
administration. A stable regime would have made it easier for Galilean households
over this period of nearly eighty years to account for the resource extractions from the
state, to know how to work with and around the mechanisms of resource extraction,
and to know what judicial and legal institutions they had recourse to at any particular
moment.
The political geography of Palestine changed fairly rapidly and dramatically
between 37 CE and 41 CE. In 37 CE, the emperor Caligula made Agrippa king over the
former tetrarchy of Philip (Ant. 18.237; War 2.181). In 39 CE, Caligula deposed
Antipas and added his tetrarchy to Agrippa’s kingdom (Ant. 18.252; War 2.183),
politically reuniting Galilee with Golan. By 41 CE, Agrippa controlled “all the country
over which Herod had reigned” with a few additional territories in the far north (Ant.
18.274–276; War 2.215). Within the span of a few years, Palestine was transformed
from a number of separate polities administered by Roman prefects and Herodian
tetrarchs to a territorially united kingdom.
Political unification required a restructuring of the administrative hierarchy, in all
likelihood a return to the meridarchy divisions under Herod the Great and the re centering of political administration at Jerusalem and Caesarea. Jerusalem was,
according to Josephus’ praise, his preferred abode (Ant. 19.331), and he was also
known to frequent Caesarea (see Ant. 19.332, 343–350; Acts 12:20–23) as the Roman
prefects over Judaea had in the preceding period.167 Tiberias remained a royal seat and
administrative center. It served as the site for Agrippa’s meeting with other regional
kings (Ant. 19.338–341), and Justus boasts that under Agrippa Tiberias “had not
banditry in his northeastern territories, see Shatzman, The Armies of the Hasmonaeans and Herod,
170–80.
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relinquished its primacy” in Galilee in the speech accorded to him in Josephus’ Life
(37).168 But it seems that Galilee had by and large receded from its place of prominence
as the heart of the kingdom and shifted to the periphery , leaving Galilee’s inhabitants with
limited access to the top tier of the power structure. Matters of political need or judicial redress to the king could require Galileans to travel to far-off Jerusalem and
Caesarea or else wait until Agrippa returned to Tiberias, if he did so regularly at all.
What little building Agrippa sponsored in his short reign seems to have been concentrated again in Jerusalem (see Ant. 19.326–327; War 2.218), meaning that once again
tax revenues collected from Galilee were directed elsewhere; in fact, he also revived
Herod’s proclivity for bestowing benefaction of foreign cities like Berytus (Ant.
19.335–337).169 But the new configuration of government was fleeting; Agrippa died
unexpectedly in 44 CE and his kingdom was transformed into a Roman province.
The most notable feature of this period of Herodian rulers is the peace it brought,
compared to the chaos of the previous two decades. The long duration of these reigns
created conditions conducive to the development of stable state institutions, which in
turn meant that the average Galilean could reasonably predict and adapt to the
demands of the state. Those state institutions of taxation, administration, and law that
existed were probably felt more strongly in Galilee under Antipas than in any period
prior, though it is not clear from our extant sources just how much infrastructural
reach they had or how positive or deleterious their effects were on local economy.
(We will return in the next chapter to the question of how Antipas’ developments of
Sepphoris and Tiberias may have affected economic networks in the region of
Galilee.) But there is no indication that state institutions were substantially more
developed under the Herodians than under Hyrcanus, with a thin bureaucracy and an
administration concentrated in interpersonal networks bound to the king and his court.
Direct Rule—Procuratorial Province of Judaea
In 44 CE, Galilee returned to direct Roman administration as a province of its own
under a Roman procurator. 170 By this point, Galilee had been under the monarchic
rule of Herodian monarchs for over eighty years, and no living Galilean would have
remembered being subject to Roman rulers and obliged to pay tribute to a foreign
power. Still, the annexation was remarkably quiet. There are no indications from
Josephus or other sources that Roman rule or obligation to pay tribute triggered revolt
at this time, though obviously the absence of evidence does not mean the whole
168
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population took the change lightly. 171 This stands in contrast to the tax resistance
movement spurred by Judah the Galilean following the annexation of Archelaus’
ethnarchy in 6 CE (perhaps more in opposition to the symbolic implications of paying
tribute than the economic burden); but this movement was quickly marginalized, as
the general populace acquiesced to the high priests’ pleas for compliance (Ant. 18.2–
5; War 2.117–118). That the annexation seemingly yielded no resistance is less
surprising in Judaea, since they been paying tribute to Rome for decades prior to the
brief kingship of Agrippa. But the silence in Galilee may indicate that Roman
management was anticipated to be an improvement over the kings or, more likely, to
have little tangible effect on their everyday lives. It also suggests that tribute was not
expected to be an excessive and intolerable burden that threatened Galileans’ ability
to meet their resource needs.
Most provinces under direct Roman administration had very thin staffs, with the
governor aided by a quaestor and sometimes legates, and assisted by a small entou rage of scribes, messengers, heralds, and other minor officials. Military officials took
on some important roles in policing the province and adjudicating disputes. 172 There
are no indications that conditions were any different in the province of Judaea. 173 The
governor was heavily reliant on local officials and institutions for administration,
legal cases, and tax collection. Local and community governmental structures, where
they exited, continued to function for adjudicating local disputes. Cities and toparchic
hubs were integral for the collection of tribute for Rome, since use of publicani for
tribute collection had long ago fallen by the wayside. 174
The governor and his officials were most often headquartered in Caesarea but
came often to Jerusalem, and especially during the festival season when the mass
influx of people raised Roman concerns for uprising or unrest. 175 While Asia and
perhaps other provinces had a system of assize districts through which the governor
would circulate to hear and address local complaints, 176 there is no direct evidence to
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indicate that the governors of Judaea made similar rounds. 177 It seems that Galileans
often remained at the periphery and aloof from the Roman administrators; their major
interactions with officials of the Roman state would occur only when in Jerusalem for
the festivals or as a deliberate journey to plead before the governor in Caesarea.
Roman governance in this period was considerably more stable than under the
Syrian governors that preceded Herod, but it still created problems. The East was not
embroiled in warfare between Rome and Parthia as it had been a century ago. And
while a number of figures arose who contested the authority of Rome as revolution aries or messianic claimants (Ant. 17.273–284; 20.97–99, 101–102, 167–72, 188; War
2.57–65, 258–263), none prior to the Jewish Revolt in 66 seems to have been
successful in bringing the Jews of Palestine into outright rebellion. With the exception
of Nero’s grant of four cities in Galilee and Peraea to Agrippa II (Ant. 20.159; War
2.252), the Romans did not tinker with the political geography of the new province or
attempt to dramatically reformulate its existing institutions.
The presence of Roman soldiers was a mechanism for keeping the peace but not a
wholly positive influence on conditions in the province. While the reduction of
thievery and pillaging removed some of the danger of travel through the country and
reduced the risk of losing one’s resources, overzealous execution of orders could lead
to calamity for innocent inhabitants. Josephus’ narrative is punctuated by episodes of
soldiers acting without tact (Ant. 20.105–112; War 2.223–227), abusing Jewish
subjects (Ant. 20.113–117; War 2.228–231), and using excessive violence (Ant.
20.177); Josephus even partly blames them at one point for spurring the First Jewish
Revolt (Ant. 19.366). But these troops were stationed in Caesarea and Sebaste and
seasonally in Jerusalem, and military activity was centered on Judaea proper and
occasionally spilled into Peraea and Samaria, while Galilee itself seems to have be en
largely spared of military presence or incursions until the outbreak of the revolt. 178
This meant both that gentile soldiers were not a source of conflict in the north, but
also that they were not available for policing purposes either, meaning Galileans had
to rely on more local and social mechanisms of policing in their communities.
The long-term stability of local institutions of administration was all the more
important for the brevity of governors’ tenures in Palestine. Most held the post for
only two years (Fadus, Alexander, Festus, Albinus, and Florus) before moving on or
being ousted by the emperor. Two held the governorship for longer periods—
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Cumanus for four years, Felix for eight—but they may simply have been renewed in
their posts at regular two-year intervals. This meant that the few Roman personnel
that composed the top tier of provincial administration were liable to change every
couple years and replacement with a whole new staff. The brevity of the gubernatorial
term could incentivize exploitative behavior, as exhibited by a number of the governors. Josephus accuses Albinus of burdening the population with excessive taxes and
tolls in order to financially exploit the province (War 2.273–275) and taking bribes
from criminals (Ant. 20.215), and he accuses Florus of pillaging the countryside for
plunder and revenues (Ant. 20.255–256; War 2.277–279). Even longer-serving
governors did not necessarily exhibit restraint in their treatment of provincial
subjects. According to Josephus, Cumanus brutally destroyed villages in punishment
for a suspected robbery (Ant. 20.113–114; War 2.228–231) and was susceptible to
bribery in adjudicating disputes (Ant. 20.119). The governor Felix supposedly
executed a political opponent by conscripting the Sicarii as assassins to kill the high
priest Jonathan (Ant. 20.161–162; War 2.256). Rather than arresting these criminals
and threats to the general peace in Jerusalem, he allegedly fomented the tense
violence in the atmosphere of Jerusalem in the 50s.
Because the administrators did not hail from the region they governed and did not
necessarily expect to stay there long, there was little to disincentivized harsh and
exploitative treatment of the populace so long as it was not sufficient to garner the
attention of the emperor. The short tenure incentivized extraction of greater wealth
and profit from the province, over and against considerations for its long-term health
and integrity. This sort of behavior is sometimes referred to as “rent-seeking,” an
attempt to accrue wealth by virtue of position and title, acting in self-interest to the
detriment of the rest of the society. 179 Moreover, the rapid turnover in governorship
could create incentives comparable to that of an unstable regime: the uncertainty of
the value of future revenues incentivizes the maximization of immediate extraction,
thereby deteriorating productive capability in the long-term.180 The paucity of Roman
administrators and the highly hierarchical and interpersonal nature of communication
and power gave provincials little recourse for ousting a mismanaging governor. In
order to seek the emperor’s intervention, Jews were largely reliant on the governor or
officials in adjacent provinces to get word on to the emperor at Rome, which
generally meant that a governor could not be prosecuted until the end of his term. 181
A few passages in Josephus give us some information about tribute collection and
payment at the time of the procurators. In response to Gaius’ plot to introduce his
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statue into the Jerusalem Temple, many Jews come to the Syrian legate Petronius at
Tiberias (we are not told whether they were from Galilee or points south) and entreat
him for forty days not to carry out the order. This also constitutes an effective agri cultural strike—whether consciously constructed as one or not—because in so
protesting they neglect their fields during the time of sowing and risk producing no
harvest whatsoever (Ant. 18.271–272; War 2.200). Petronius expresses concern that a
crop failure would leave the populace unable to pay their tribute (ἀδυναμίᾳ
καταβολῆς τῶν φόρων) and compel them to turn to banditry (Ant. 18.273–275). This
story indicates that the tribute at this time was levied as a fixed-rate tax rather than a
proportional tax (decumae), since it presumes that a crop failure would preclude them
from meeting a predetermined tribute obligation, while under a proportional tax
arrangement a failed harvest would have meant no tribute was owed. It also suggests
that the tribute burden was primarily laid upon agricultural production, as it had been
in earlier periods.182
Another tantalizing passage refers to tribute payment at the eve of the outbreak of
the First Jewish Revolt. Agrippa II, in his speech to the Jerusalemites, recommends
that they pay the tribute that they have neglected to render unto Rome and thereby
prevent a war before it started (War 2.204). Agents of the civil government (magistrates and council members; ἄρχοντες καὶ βουλευταὶ) then went out and collected
from the surrounding villages a total of forty talents (War 2.405). There are many
important details in here, though most of them are ambiguous. The amount of forty
talents is probably not the sum total of the tribute due, but only a fraction of it that
they had failed to pay (τοσοῦτον γὰρ ἔλειπεν; 2.405); yet the fact that failure to pay
would provoke war with Rome suggests either that this was a large portion of the total
due, or that Rome reacted harshly to even the slightest shortfall in revenue. It is not
quite clear whether we should understand the “forty talents” as an indication that
tribute was or could be paid in coin, or merely that the crops collected were nominally
valued at forty talents. 183 The former seems more likely, but the circumstances of this
collection were somewhat abnormal, since the revenues were assembled hastily and
late, and what was collected would seem to have come solely from the environs of
Jerusalem—either a measure of expediency or an indication that Judaea was primarily
responsible for the tax evasion.
This passage is also the most explicit reference to the method by which taxes
were collected in Roman Palestine. The implication of War 2.404–407 is that the
municipal authorities of the district went out to villages to collect the taxes, rather
182
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than agents from the village bringing them to the district center. Or, perhaps, slaves or
comparable agents working on behalf of these officials. For Judaea, because of the
considerable overlap between the priesthood and the civic officials of Jerusalem,
tribute collection may have piggybacked on the system for priestly collection of tithes
(see discussion in ch. 3). But in Galilee there were few priests, and if we understand
the system for collecting tribute to have been initially conducted at the level of the
toparchy or meridarchy, then taxes would have been collected by the lay civic officials of Sepphoris and/or Tiberias 184 and their delegates going town to town. There is
no indication of a return to tax collection by Roman agents not native to Judaea, no
publicani collecting tribute on contract. The only specific tax agents we hear of were
in fact Jewish personages, 185 though it seems likely that all were toll collectors—
collecting indirect taxes—rather than tribute collectors. Even after the Jews nearly
blew off the tribute obligation, the Roman governor continued to seek local magistrates and aristocrats (τοὺς μὲν ἄρχοντας αὐτῶν ἅμα τοῖς δυνατοῖς) rather than
bringing in agents from outside the province (War 2.407). This also suggests that
Judaea’s tribute collectors were appointed by the Roman governor, though this may
have typically been a mere rubber-stamping of selections made by the local
administration.
We may wonder once again to what extent the Roman administration had the
information necessary to make an accurate and systematic assessment of agricultural
production in Palestine by which to devise the amount of tribute. As Erich S. Gruen
observed, Early Roman imperial administration did not purposefully select governors
for their previous experience with or knowledge of the province charged to them, and
so we can hardly expect many of them to have had helpful firsthand knowledge.186 P.
A. Brunt argued that there was a census in Syria every twelve years, and Dominic
Rathbone has argued that Egypt had one every seven or fourteen years. But the
evidence for Syria is particularly problematic, and Rathbone believes Egypt’s regular
system was unique and probably intertwined with Egypt’s status as a major grain
provider to Rome.187 Outside Egypt, provincial censuses are chiefly attested at the
initial time of annexation or in times of emergency. 188 For pre-Revolt Judaea, the only
evidenced census was in 6 CE (Ant. 18.1), which probably took the form of a property
184
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Rathbone has argued for a regular cycle of censuses at seven- or fourteen-year intervals, but this was
restricted to Egypt rather than a characteristic of other provinces; “Egypt, Aug ustus, and Roman
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registration to assess the landholdings and their landholders for the purposes of
imposing tributum soli—direct tax levied on agricultural land and its produce. 189
But Galilee (along with Peraea, Golan, and regions to the northeast) was not
subject to Quirinius’ census in 6 CE since the region was not under Roman direct
rule, and there is no indication in the ancient sources of a comparable census when
Agrippa I’s kingdom was annexed. Since the amount of land in a province may
change over time (through changes in political geography or extending cultivation
into marginal lands) and land use may vary year to year through fallowing practices,
records needed to be kept up to date annually by other means to serve as anything
more useful than a rough approximation. One possibility was regional land survey
conducted by low level officials in the toparchy. This practice is evidenced in Egypt,
as village scribes were responsible for overseeing the periodic updating of land
records through survey. 190 But it is unlikely that Judaea replicated the complex
bureaucratic apparatus particular to Egypt’s Ptolemaic history and its importance to
Rome, and we should be wary of transposing this feature. 191 The other option for
keeping records up to date is voluntary declaration. We actually have documentary
evidence from the inter-revolt period (70–132 CE) for this sort of census updating (see
P. Yadin 16; Y. Hever 61–62). This technique had the advantage of requiring little
work on the part of the administration and little development of local bureaucracy.
But it is obvious that dependence on declarations for information provided considerable latitude for tax evasion and tax fraud, and precludes the notion that Rome was
particularly exacting in its taxation, squeezing as much as possible out of the prov ince. This is especially true insofar as the small cadre of Roman administrators relied
on local agents to manage such affairs. The Roman administration would likely have
determined the rate of tribute on inaccurate and probably underreported land data; but
189

Udoh, To Caesar What Is Caesar’s, 214–17, 221–39. Some scholars have also posited that the
Romans imposed a poll tax (tributum capitis) on Judaea, but as Udoh has shown, the grounds for this
argument are quite weak. In short, there are three lines of evidence used to adduce a capitation tax: (1)
a reference in Appian, Syriaca 11.8.50, (2) the “tribute” in Matt 22:15–22; Mark 12:13–17; Luke
20:21–26, (3) a reference in Ulpian, De censuses 3 apud Digest L.15.4. Appian’s reference is more
likely an anachronistic reference to the fiscus Iudaeaus, a tax levied on Jews after the First Jewish
Revolt. The gospel reference would be the sole indication of a denarius tax, and at a time when the
denarius was not even a common coin in circulation in the region. In Ulpian, it is unclear what time
period the capitation tax envisioned was levied on Judaea and Syria. Josephus, on the other hand, who
makes reference to capitation taxes often enough in other cases, fails to mention any imposed on
Judaea aside from the postwar fiscus Iudaeus and the Temple Tax from which it was converted.
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Some scholars have been wont to presume a lot of continuity in bureaucratic and tax structures
over Palestine from its time under Ptolemaic rule, through the Seleucids, the Hasmonaeans, and
Herodians, to the period of Roman direct rule; see, e.g., Pastor, Land and Economy in Ancient Palestine; Schäfer, History of the Jews in the Greco-Roman World; Rocca, Herod’s Judaea. See also n. 129.
Monson (From the Ptolemies to the Romans) has recently demonstrated some of the major effects that
the institutional shifts from the Ptolemaic to Roman period could have had even within Egypt,
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Taxation,” Cahiers du Centre Gustave Glotz 4 [1993]: 81–112 at 85).
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it seems once again that as far as the Roman state was concerned, an uninterrupted
flow of resources was more important than efficiently extracting as much as possible
from the province.

Non-State Institutions
Given the myopic focus on state institutions, scholars of the ancient economy have
rarely taken full advantage of the insights of New Institutional Economics. The
context in which economic actors make their decision is also structured by other
formal institutions, an array of informal institutions (i.e., norms and conventions), and
the availability and strength of mechanisms for ensuring adherence to the rules
defined by both kinds of institutions. 192 In fact, one of the characteristics that distinguishes NIE from other approaches to economics is that it brings into consideration
the ways that other aspects of the human environment, especially the constructed
social institutions of a given community, might shape the economic calculus of its
members, without denying rationality altogether.
If we are to look beyond the state for institutions that would have structured
economic behavior in Early Roman Galilee, the obvious place to start is with the
institutions of Second Temple Judaism. The laws of the Torah may be understood as a
formal institution, in that they are a codified set of rules. As with any other s et of
rules, they impose constraints on some behaviors and offer incentives for others.
Some laws pertain to practices generally included in the rubric of “religion,” such as
ritual sacrifice at the Temple cult and festivals, but the divine Law included a host of
commandments that broach such diverse topics as agricultural production, resource
allocation, interpersonal conduct, and much more. The covenant’s scope illustrates
how difficult it can be to disintegrate “the religious” from “the economic” in ancient
Jewish society, 193 and warrants seriously considering the ways that the divine Law
could have fundamentally shaped the calculus of economically “rational” behavior.
The rapid change in state institutions across the Early Roman period only adds to
the weighty importance of investigating the role of religious institutions in defining
the social context for economic behavior. Roman and Herodian state institutions were
sometimes unstable and often failed to produce institutional change that penetrated
society very widely or deeply, owing to a combination of infrastructural weaknesses
192

North, Understanding the Process of Economic Change, 11.
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(New Haven: Yale University Press, 2013); and further discussion in the Introduction, n. 10. James
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the Roman Empire (Malden, MA: Wiley Blackwell, 2006), 105–31.
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and many Jews’ understandable lack of desire to voluntarily comply with these
imposed powers (except, perhaps, when it could be gamed to their advantage). While
state institutions were somewhat ephemeral in this period, the religious institutions
defined by the Torah were considerably more established and entrenched in Pales tinian Jewish society by this point. By the Late Second Temple period, the Torah had
been written down for centuries and despite some continued variation in textual form,
had achieved a relatively stable state. 194 As Sanders has argued, the Law enshrined in
the Mosaic covenant had by this time become central to Jewish identity in Palestine,
so much so that it can be seen as one of the pillars of “common Judaism” in this
period.195 Even among the numerous “sects” and factions in late Second Temple
Palestine, it seems that they had a lot in common with one another and diverged only
on a relative few halakhic issues. 196 Furthermore, many understood the statutes of the
194

As the Dead Sea Scrolls have made plain, there existed several different “text types” (resem bling later Masoretic, Septuagint, and Samaritan texts) of the Torah in this period, even in use by one
and the same community; for a fairly standard summary, see James C. VanderKam, The Dead Sea
Scrolls Today (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1994), 121–26; see also David M. Carr, The Formation of
the Hebrew Bible: A New Reconstruction (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 153–79. Before
this, the Torah text also betrays signs of scribal attempts to rewrite and reformulate aspects of the Law
through various tactics, in what Levinson has labeled “inner-biblical exegesis”; see Bernard M.
Levinson, Legal Revision and Religious Renewal in Ancient Israel (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2008) and discussion later in ch. 3, p. 137.
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Bible, and History, ed. Louis H. Feldman and Gohei Hata (Leiden: Brill, 1989), 50–58. Even this list,
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“hymns and precepts.” Moreover, it is clear from Josephus’ writings and other sources from this
period that these texts did not comprise the sum total of books that were deemed authoritative, and
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of the City in the Second Temple Period (538 BCE–70 CE) (Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society,
2002), 388. With some qualifications, Seth Schwartz endorses a similarly widespread embrace of the
Torah among Palestinian Jews, modified in conjunction with additional traditions and local practices;
see Imperialism and Jewish Society, 200 BCE to 640 CE (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001),
49–66; “Law and Society in the Second Temple Period,” forthcoming.
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As Albert I. Baumgarten as argues, most of the “sects” were based in “covenantal nomism,”
so far as we can tell. Individuals were driven to join those communities less on the b asis of the issues
than on the basis of their interpersonal relationships and a combination of social norms, contingency,
and personal choice. See The Flourishing of Jewish Sects in the Maccabean Era: An Interpretation
(Leiden: Brill, 1997), esp. 1–80. That they diverged on a relative few issues is, of course, based on the
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Law as conditions of a binding contract, which Sanders calls “covenantal nomism,”
with punishment for transgressors and reward for the observant. 197 David M. Carr
helpfully encapsulates these two aspects of Second Temple Judaism in a pair of observations about the diverse corpus of texts from the later Second Temple period:
The first is the relatively consistent presupposition that the Torah of Moses should be
the orientation point for Jewish piety and observance. … The other main characteristic shared across many of these texts is emphasis on the idea that Yhwh can be
counted on to reward individuals who persist in their (Torah) obedience. 198

This of course need not mean total uniformity or agreement in how to comply,
and as Seth Schwartz has rightly noted, the vagaries of the Law often required or
allowed a prominent position to expert interpretation and local traditions. 199 These
differences in interpretation are attested by some Second Temple-period texts that
attempt to overwrite or modify the Torah (e.g., Jubilees or the Temple Scroll). 200 But
even in these cases, the texts often presume the authority of the Torah in attempting to
modify it or presume the reader’s intimate knowledge of its statutes. 201 And given the
limited role of the state in defining the rules of economic interaction, the Torah’s
commandments may have been all the more important for their role in perpetuating a
stable set of rules within which to operate.
Stability is a result of the seemingly inherent conservatism exhibited by established institutional frameworks. 202 North notes in his study of economic change that
standing and fulfillment of it,” participating in these limited Jewish halakhic debates while otherwise
bearing much in common with “common Judaism”; see Anthony J. Saldarini, Matthew’s ChristianJewish Community (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994), quote at 162.
197
E. P. Sanders, Paul and Palestinian Judaism: A Comparison of Patterns of Religion (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1977), 422–28. “Briefly put, covenantal nomism is the view that one’s place in God’s
plan is established on the basis of the covenant and that the covenant requires as the proper response
of man his obedience to the commandments, while providing means of atonement for transgressions”
(75). Not only does Sanders think this was a view held by many, but from the literary evidence, he
views it as by far the most dominant and pervasive theological formulation among Palestinian Jews
before 70 (and even as late as the second century CE) (426).
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David M. Carr, The Formation of the Hebrew Bible: A New Reconstruction (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2011), 202.
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traditions; The Invention of Judaism: Torah and Jewish Identity from Deuteronomy to Paul (Oakland:
University of California Press, 2017), 107–13.
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that both texts employ the strategy of tapping into the inherent authority of the Torah in order to lend
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Such conservatism has been noted by Horsley and others in their application of Robert
Redfield’s conception of “little traditions.” Redfield’s idea of peasant “little tradition” centered
around (1) values of reverence toward the land, (2) idealization of agric ultural labor, (3) and considering industry a virtue, i.e., orientation toward the immediate realities of everyday agrarian life, as
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institutions tend to transform gradually and incrementally, remaining fairly stable
even when the rules cease to be optimized for contemporary circumstances, with
occasional rapid changes akin to punctuated equilibrium. 203 This may in part be
explained by the human propensity to act within the constraints determined by their
own past actions and knowledge, known as “path dependence,” which can facilitate
the creation of enduring equilibria. 204 Once people habitualize and internalize modes
of acting shaped by institutions, those modes of acting perpetuate even as the human
environment incrementally changes, while the institutions themselves follow the
conservativism of human path dependence and thereby develop in a way “broadly
consistent with the existing institutional matrix.”205 Religious institutions that had
been established and followed long before the Roman conquest of Palestine, and t hat
the Romans did not directly meddle with, thus likely constituted a durable framework
for shaping human action in Palestine’s Jewish communities despite the changes in
the political superstructure.
Norms
In addition to the codified rules of formal institutions, norms play an important role in
shaping socioeconomic behavior.206 Norms are informally constituted and
opposed to the more urbane and abstract notions of the elite ruling class; Peasant Society and Culture:
An Anthropological Approach to Civilization (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956); cf.
Douglas E. Oakman, Jesus and the Economic Questions of His Day (Studies in the Bible and Early
Christianity 8; Lewiston: Edwin Mellen, 1986), 95–102. The impulse behind this notion may still be
valuable, though the contents of the “little traditions” may be questionable. Richard A. Horsley has
adopted the concept of “little traditions” to argue for the persistence of ideologies especially in rural
areas over long periods of time in contrast to the shifts in ideology among the elite and ruling class;
Jesus and the Politics of Roman Palestine (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 2014), 135–
36. This presumes, however, that the villages were not susceptible to change over time, which is
surely incorrect, and Horsley operates from a notion that Second Temple Galilean Jews were descend ants of Israelite populations established there since before the Assyrian conquest, which is also surely
false.
203
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Karl-Dieter Opp, “What We Have Learned?,” in Social Norms, ed. Michael Hechter and Karl-Dieter
Opp (New York: Russel Sage Foundation, 2001), 394–415 at 407–10.
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It should be noted that there is no consensus on how norms emerge in the first place. Christine
Horne delineates three models that have been used to depict norm emergence: (1) norms develop
gradually out of already regular behavior, due in part to human agents’ aversion to deviation from the
group and desire for predictability; (2) norms emerge where behaviors produce positive or negative
externalities—effects that benefit or harm third parties—in order to promote the positive and curb the
negative; (3) norms emerge as a necessary requirement to facilitating interaction, and a re formed in
the negotiation between individuals in the group; “Sociological Perspectives on the Emergence of
Social Norms,” in Hechter and Opp, Social Norms, 3–34 at 6–14. Each of these theories has benefits
and weaknesses, and we will not resolve this long-standing debate here. Surely, all three present
aspects that contribute to the emergence of norms—regularized behavior in a given social group
creates path dependence encouraging the continuation of those dispositions and practices, the positive
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communally constructed rules that define what constitutes correct and incorrect
behavior, and are essential to the self-governing mechanisms of a society. 207 They
often serve to fill in the gaps, establishing expectations for behavior in areas not
touched by codified rules. Some norms constitute necessary supplements essential to
the functioning of formal institutions, defining parameters not explicitly spelled out
but required for execution. Sometimes norms can even overpower codified laws,
when enforcement of those laws is lax and it becomes normative for a community to
ignore or modify them. Norms, though sometimes harder to get at, are equally if not
more important in understanding how the human social environment shapes decision making—economic or otherwise.
Norms, like formal institutions, can be quite slow to change once they emerge.
There are a number of forces that contribute to this. One is the tendency to follow the
behavior of other individuals in the group, on the assumption they are operating on
better knowledge (information cascade) or in order to avoid disapproval for being out
of step with the majority (reputation cascade), that serves to reinforce the normative
status quo. Another is the costliness of displacing internalized norms and replacing
the institutions that socialize people into those normative systems in the first place. It
can also be costly to move people away from a local optimum; in other words, if the
conditions that the norms establish provide sufficient stability, there may not be
enough incentive to move a critical mass to embrace new norms. 208
Norms are a property of the social system at the macrosocial level, which subsequently governs individual behavior at the microsocial level. 209 They are in effect an
emergent property of social interaction rather than the product of conscious and delib erate construction. 210 James S. Coleman argues that strong norms are most likely to
emerge and endure in social networks that exhibit “closure”—what in network theory
is called a “small world network,” one in which most nodes are redundantly
connected to most other nodes. Such networks create conditions highly conducive to
norm enforcement because information can flow quickly and broadly, and barriers are
high to accessing individuals outside the system. 211 In the next chapter, I will argue
that we should view Galilee as just such a small world network: close-knit, inwardlooking, and circumscribed. Adding to the likelihood that Galilean society was
conducive to strong norm-building is the fairly homogenous Jewish composition of
and negative effects of different behavior encourages peer reactions that incentivize or disincentivize
certain behaviors, and norms are certainly negotiated in the relations between individuals within a
social landscape. On the path dependence of norms, see Michael Hechter and Karl-Dieter Opp, “What
We Have Learned?,” in Hechter and Opp, Social Norms, 394–414 at 407–10.
207
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the region,212 which made it harder for people to “defect” from one set of norms to
participate in a network in which other norms prevailed.
In addition to the rules formally spelled out in the Torah, Galilean society surely
produced a host of norms that further spelled out proper and improper behaviors in
terms of piety and impiety. To some extent, the emergence of such norms would be
made necessary by the often vague, terse, and incomplete nature of many command ments. Such gaps left room for interpretation, and thus fertile soil for the cultivation
of norms. Norms thrive where formal institutions fail to define such parameters of
conduct, serving to decrease such barriers to interaction as uncertainty and incon gruity by encouraging conduct according to expected lines. This is especially true for
those commandments whose fulfillment requires some amount of agreement in detail
between two or more individuals. But the communal nature of the covenantal agree ment with God (see below) may have encouraged family and neighbors to keep a
watchful eye on the conduct of others even with regard to fulfillment of command ments that did not directly affect them.213
Many of the norms that agglomerated around the Law probably emerged
gradually and less deliberately, initially as ad hoc solutions to the interpretive prob lems that were subsequently regularized through repetition over time and transmitted
to other members of society through mimesis of peers and socialization of children.
Such norms would in effect constitute an important component of a Galilean habitus,
a system of motivating structures that orchestrate conduct and guide decisions that
produce regularity without necessarily deriving from conscious intentionality. 214
While there are certainly examples of deliberate attempts to clarify aspects in the Law
in Second Temple literature, 215 it is not clear even in such cases that the author origi212

On the ethnic composition of Galilee, inhabited primarily though not solely by Jews, see Mark
A. Chancey, “Archaeology, Ethnicity, and First Century CE Galilee: The Limits of the Evidence,” in A
Wandering Galilean: Essays in Honour of Seán Freyne, ed. Zuleika Rodgers, 
Margaret Daly-Denton,
and 
Anne Fitzpatrick Mckinley (JSJSup 132; Leiden Brill, 2009), 205–18; Chancey, The Myth of a
Gentile Galilee (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002); Mordechai Aviam, “Distribution
Maps of Archaeological Data from the Galilee: An Attempt to Establish Zones Indicative of Ethnicity
and Religious Affiliation,” in Religion, Ethnicity, and Identity in Ancient Galilee: A Region in Transition, ed. Jürgen Zangenberg, Harold W. Attridge, and Dale B. Martin (WUNT 210; Tübingen: Mohr
Siebeck, 2007), 115–32. Milton Moreland makes some valuable qualifications, especially about the
borderland of this region, in “The Inhabitants of Galilee in the Hellenistic and Early Roman Periods:
Probes into the Archaeological and Literary Evidence,” in Zangenberg, Attridge, and Martin, Religion,
Ethnicity, and Identity in Ancient Galilee, 133–59.
213
In a sense, Israel’s relationship with God constitutes a “public bad” problem, in which those
who do harm to the relationship by breaking the commandments simultaneously impose negative
effects (or externalities) on other members of the community. Thus even an individual’s lawbreaking
can be seen as having deleterious effects on others and encourage peer punishment. See more on
enforcement below.
214
Pierre Bourdieu, Outline of a Theory of Practice, trans. Richard Nice (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2005 [1972]), 72–78.
215
Sometimes by rewriting or supplementing the text (e.g., Jubilees and Damascus Document),
sometimes through other forms of exegetical writing (e.g., 4QMMT and, after the Second Temple
period, the Mishnah).
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nated the interpretation, rather than explicating what was already a norm held by a
community—even if only a marginal community.
Enforcement
Institutions—formal and informal alike—are only effective in shaping the contour of
economic behavior if the populace complies with them. Compliance to formal rules
may of course be coerced through official, institutional mechanisms of violence, such
as the use of the military by the Roman state to punish revolutionaries. As we noted
above, though, even the state’s policing mechanisms in Palestine were not designed or
deployed to enforce rules in a sustained and widespread fashion and lacked the infor mational infrastructure that would facilitate this. Jewish religious institutions in Pales tine were considerably weaker in their ability to coerce compliance through official
agents and threat of violence. 216 From what we can tell, the priests and other Temple
officials seem to have had little capacity to enforce compliance with the statutes of
the Torah, at least outside the Temple and Judaea, where most priests resided. 217 The
most coercion we see these agents engaging in is in the collection of tithes and the
Temple tax from villages; but as we discuss in chapter 4, even these collections may
have been largely voluntary and the agents may have lacked sufficient local data to
accurately extract these resources by force. It is also highly unlikely prima facie that
Temple agents ever kept official tallies of who made the obligatory pilgrimages or
sacrifices, who brought their Second Tithe to Jerusalem, who complied with the
dietary laws, etc. The Sanhedrin—insofar as such an entity existed to hear court cases
in Jerusalem at a given point in this period—could try cases brought to them, but this
depended on the voluntary reporting of violations by fellow Jews, and hardly constitutes a strong institutional mechanism for enforcing widespread compliance.
In lieu of official, institutionalized mechanism of enforcement, there are other
pressures that drive individuals into compliance. Individuals may sanction themselves
for failure to comply with rules and norms when they have come to internalize them.
Most norms are transmitted and engrained in processes of teaching and modeling we
may refer to as socialization, transmitting in deliberate and implicit ways the expecta216
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tions and responsibilities in a given social domain. 218 These norms in turn shape the
way that individuals see and operate within their social environment and form part of
what Bourdieu referred to as the habitus—the “system of internalized structures,
schemes of perception, conception, and action” that shape individuals’ strategic action
in society without being a product of conscious deliberation. 219 Once norms have been
thus habitualized, they may simply become unconscious bounds around the types of
behavior perceived of as possible within a social environment. But especially insofar
as norms are imbued with moral imperative—the sense that they ought to be followed,
not just that they are typical or regular modes of acting—internalization also entails
the development of “an internal sanctioning system” whereby individuals inflict
punishment on themselves for failing to act in accord with the norms. 220 These sanctions may take the form of feelings such as shame or guilt that dissuade one from
recommitting the violation in the future. 221 In some cases, internalization may result
not only in instilling a self-sanctioning mechanisms, but also producing “zeal” to
promote and enforce broad compliance with the rules and norms as a matter of public
good, even when that entails great personal costs to enact. 222
Compliance with the strictures of the Mosaic covenant may have been largely
voluntary. To some extent, Jews may have operated within the parameters of the Law
without much conscious thought, acting according to a Galilean Jewish habitus they
acquired through socialization. We may suppose, for instance, that the widespread
embrace of the dietary laws within Galilee made adherence to them a matter of habit
that did not require conscious thought, at least until the norm was raised to a level of
consciousness through confrontation with gentiles that did not share those norms. The
textual evidence also suggests that the religious rules and norms were internalized by
many, and some even clearly exhibited zeal—the sectarian enclave at Qumran
demanded strict adherence to their community’s normative rules (see, e.g., 1QS), and
other texts depict Jews willing to face death rather than violate the commandments
(see, e.g., Dan 3; 2 Macc 7; War 1.449–453). I believe there is warrant for presuming
a general disposition toward adherence as the rule, rather than the exception.
In addition to self-enforcement, obedience to Jewish religious institutions could
also be compelled through mechanisms of peer policing. Peer policing broadly
describes the array of tactics available to individuals in a community to compel their
peers into conformity with social norms. While we may suppose broad adherence to
the rules and norms around religious institutions in Galilee, we can hardly suppose
universal compliance. But those who embrace and internalize a community’s norms
218
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may disincentivize violation by punishing “defectors” in terms of social capital, the
access one is able to leverage through their network connections to achieve their
goals.223 This can involve tactics like reprimand (calling attention to an error,
privately or publically), shunning (refusing to engage an individual in social interac tions), boycott (refusal to exchange resources with an individual), or gossip (circulating information by word of mouth about one’s conduct). 224 And for our purposes,
such tactics are interesting because they can disrupt an individual’s ability to interact
with others and, concomitantly, to meet their economic needs with the help of others
in the community.
Sociologists have also found that people not directly affected by another’s defec tion from rules and norms are often willing to enact punishment, a phenomenon called
third-party or altruistic punishment. It turns out the people are willing to sanction
defectors regardless of whether they are familiars or strangers, or whether or not they
expect to ever encounter the defector again. People are even willing to inflict punish ment for breaking the rules when it costs the punishers to do so. In part, this phenomenon is explained by motivations of reciprocal fairness and aversion to inequality. But
punishing defectors also broadcasts to the community one’s own faithfulness to those
institutions, increasing one’s own social capital with other members of the network
that value the community’s norms. 225
One of the reasons for this focus on reputation and mechanisms of sanction that
specifically effect interpersonal relations is the fact that economic exchanges —especially those in antiquity—were highly dependent on interpersonal networks. 226 As
Stuart Plattner has noted, long-term relationships are useful strategies for mitigating
risk and information problems in economic exchange. 227 Most exchanges of resources
occurred face to face, or through a broker who personally knew both parties. And
agriculture, the primary occupation of most laborers, was at many junctures a cooper 223
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ative affair, dependent on paid or reciprocal labor agreements. One of the biggest
impediments to such interpersonal exchanges is the inherent uncertainty and risk that
comes from not knowing what the other party will do—will they faithfully act
according to the terms of the agreement? is there important information he is
neglecting to relate? Reputation is one of several tools that serve to ameliorate that
knowledge disparity—if imperfectly—because it allows one to extrapolate a likely
outcome and assess the riskiness of an interaction on the basis of purported past
behavior (true or otherwise). 228
In lieu of direct access to information, humans are dependent on the reports and
actions of others. In contemporary terms, we may think of the extent to which we are
reliant on customer reviews and the recommendations of our acquaintances in deter mining where to purchase a given item or which competing brand to chose. 229 The
circulation of favorable reports about a particular market vendor’s use of fair weights,
for instance, signals to potential clients that this vendor has a reputation for not
cheating his customers. However, if a client discovers that he has been cheated at the
market stall, he may publicly chastise the vendor for this injustice, and communicate
to the rest of his personal network that this vendor is not to be trusted. Reports
continue to pervade through the system through gossip to “third-tier hearsay network
members,” individuals who do not personally know anyone involved with the person
whose reputation is in question. 230
Reputation recurs as an important concept in social policing, with important ramifications for how people decide to interact with others in economic transactions.
While we tend to speak of a reputation as something one has, as if it were an individual property, reputation fundamentally resides in the flow of information between
members of a society and is hence a relational property. 231 Reputation manifests itself
as “the impressions, beliefs, and evaluations of all those who know the person.”232
Reputations may be based on firsthand interactions or observations—whether extrapolated from a singular incident or the accumulated assessment from repeated inter changes—or it can be based on gossip as individuals relate their impressions to other
members of their social network. 233 But reputations need not be wholly based on facts
228
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either; they can just as well be based on falsehoods developed intentionally as slander
or emerging out of misunderstanding or overgeneralization. And reputation can be
closely tied in with or affected by the mechanisms by which peers police each other in
society: adherence to the norms and proper obedience of the rules can garner a posi tive reputation that creates opportunities and increases social standing, and deviance
can just as easily garner a negative reputation that creates additional barriers to fu ture
peer interactions.
As we shall have occasion to explore in subsequent chapters, defectors could be
harmed by deliberate peer sanction, but individuals might inflict similar damages in
attempting to vigilantly adhere to the Law or religious norms themselves. Rather than
abet violation of a commandment or risk accidentally violating one, they may choose
to avoid such interactions. For instance, one hosting a feast might have trouble
attracting guests if he had a reputation for flaunting the dietary laws, since guests
risked unwittingly eating something forbidden. Likewise, trading with a produce
dealer deemed unscrupulous in his production of foodstuffs according to the
constraints of the Torah might also scare off potential customers who wanted to
ensure they did not violate the Law (or did not abet such behavior) and thereby harm
their own reputations. Fears of participating in violation of the religious institutions —
even if only guilt by association—may have been a significant disincentive to interacting with lawbreakers in a society where piety was valued. 234 Widespread sanctions
would constrain one’s ability to meet one’s social and economic needs through coop eration and interaction with peers in the community, impinging on their ability to
share meals together, arrange cooperation in agricultural or other types of labor, or
exchange necessary goods in the marketplace or between neighbors.
Up to this point, we have focused on the role of other human agents in enforcing
the religious laws, but we should not ignore the role of God in the system. Robert A.
Orsi has advocated for the need to take seriously the experience of religious partici pants.235 Ancient Jews, as with many contemporary religious practitioners, perceive
gods and other supernatural beings are very real actors in the world, with whom they
have very real interactions and complex relationships. There are limits to how accessible these relationships are to us, since we obviously cannot observe ancient Jews in
their everyday interactions with the divine, and all that is available to us is mediated
through textual and archaeological evidence. Even if we cannot get at the complex ities of their phenomenology, we can still say something about some of the expected
effects of a network in which God is an agent.
of multiple reports generally has a dampening effect on such outliers, and the c ombination of multiple
statements allow people to get a better overall picture of behavior on which to make decisions about
cooperation. See Ralf D. Sommerfeld, Hand-Jürgen Krambeck, and Manfred Milinski, “Multiple
Gossip Statements and Their Effect on Reputation and Trustworthiness,” Proceedings of the Royal
Society 275 (2008): 2529–36.
234
See, for instance, the verses cited in n. 111, where association with presumably impious
people is cited by Jesus’ opponents as evidence of Jesus’ own poor character and has become a part of
his reputation.
235
Robert A. Orsi, Between Heaven and Earth (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005).

72
The Torah defines a transactional relationship between God and the people of
Israel. On the condition that the people heed the statutes of the covenant handed down
to them at Sinai, God will protect and bless Israel with ample rain, produce, li vestock,
and offspring (Deut 28:1–14). But failure to adhere to the Law brings about God’s
curses on the people—a section much longer and more graphic than the blessings
(Deut 28:16–68)—that includes, among other things, bodily harm and the obliteration
of agricultural crops. The relationship between a Jew and God, under this conception
of “covenantal nomsim,” is fundamentally predicated on whether or not the former
has adhered to the rules. And maintaining this as a positive relationship, according to
those same conditions, is vital to ensuring one’s continued freedom from harm and
ability to produce the necessities of life through the all-important occupation of agriculture. The commandments concerning sacrificial offerings and festivals are even
more explicit in their transactionality, as Jews offer material resources to maintain the
goodwill relationship, to atone for some wrongdoing in order to repair the relation ship, or to ask for reciprocation for some more specific need. As with any social rela tionship, these sorts of interactions and exchanges are useful mechanisms for main taining the relationship and ensuring its durability so that one had the social capital
accrued to call upon God in times of need.
To return to the matter of policing the rules of the religious institution and norms,
God could obviously be considered the ultimate enforcer. Let alone the fact that he is
the agent of punishment or reward in the covenantal agreement, the fact that he is not
limited in knowledge, space, or power in the way that human agents are gives him a
privileged position to see and act upon infringements. One cannot hide one’s infringe ment from the watchful eye of God like one can from humans, and the imbalance of
power would dissuade all but the boldest believer from blatantly flouting the Law.
And above all, he is able to punish behavior through mechanisms unavailable to any
person, such as withholding the rain or imposing famine.
The strength of these social mechanisms of enforcement, which we shall return to
in subsequent chapters, is somewhat predicated on the composition of the community
in which they are deployed. As we noted earlier, closed social networks are most
conducive to strong norms and effective social enforcement due to the ease of
communication and the limitations to engaging individuals outside the circumscribed
system.236 Coleman notes that reputation can only really have a powerful effect under
such conditions, in which everyone knows everyone else and information travels
broadly and redundantly. 237 If Galilee was indeed a “small world” as I argue in the
next chapter, then it would have been difficult for defectors to find viable alternate
outlets for interaction and exchange if they find themselves shunned for flouting local
norms, making Galilee quite conducive to effective lateral, rather than top-down,
enforcement of religious institutions.
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Summary: Galilee’s Experience of Roman Administration
The above survey helps us to grasp the multitude of changes that the Roman admin istration of the region of Palestine underwent between the advent of and the eve of the
First Jewish Revolt in 66 CE. There can be no doubt that, unlike provinces such as
Egypt in the same period, there was frequent reconfiguration and reassignment of
territories that had important ramifications for the loci and range of authority held by
the various administrators.
How much was Galilee as a region affected by these changes? During the period
of Antipas’ reign over Galilee and Peraea as a separate kingdom, Galilee certainly
lied at the center of things, due to the local presence of the ruler and his court.
Sepphoris and then Tiberias became centers of political power at the highest tier of
administrative hierarchy. Yet for the rest of the Early Roman period, Galilee was a
relative backwater; it lied far from the centers of administration in Caesarea and
Jerusalem, and the Galilean cities functioned as second-rank cities. They may still
have been included in the circuit of the governor’s travels, but if so we hear nothing
of it. The greatest effect of the changes in the first century was the attachment and
detachment of the region to various neighbors, in terms of administrative districts; the
moving of provincial/client kingdom borders had ramifications for taxation and
therefore the movement of goods (see appendix below). But the Romans generally left
the region to manage its own affairs internally unless it reached a crisis point —and
this seems from the narrative of Josephus, at least, not to have happened nearly as
much in Galilee as in Judaea.
Our investigation of Roman administration and taxation of Palestine corroborates
Mann’s description of the Roman Empire as infrastructurally weak. At the beginning
of the Early Roman period, the Romans relied upon local officials for the administration of the region and directly intervened only on rare occasion. Insofar as Hyrcanus’
government was effective, it was largely left to its own devices. But the fact that the
Romans had never successfully quelled the internecine conflict between the
supporters of Hyrcanus and of Aristobulus led the region to repeatedly relapse into
civil war. Aside from a brief interlude in which Caesar affirmed Judaea’s internal
autonomy and systematized the tribute obligations, the situation was often chaot ic.
These conditions meant that Roman tax collection was fairly ineffective. While the
system of contracting tax collection to publicani guaranteed revenues to the state, the
ability of the tax farmer to profit hinged on their ability to extract payments i n excess
of the contract’s cost. The volatile political landscape, coupled with the quite limited
knowledge that these foreign publicani would have of the region and its productive
potential, made it difficult for these Roman officials to actually collect revenue efficiently and thoroughly. Roman power at this time was felt most strongly in its occa sional despotism, when particular governors or generals made sudden, excessive
demands of the population and threatened them with violence if they failed to co mply
in a timely manner.
Herodian rule over Palestine was also infrastructurally weak. Despite the greater
stability of the region, there is no indication that the administration actually endeav -
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ored to expand bureaucratic institutions that would have improved the capacity of the
king to enforce his will on the populace and extract resources from it efficiently. The
administration was small and held close to the chest, as Herod at least delegated his
authority to relatives, but the everyday activities of a Galilean were unlikely to
involve the administration at all outside the collection of taxes and tolls. And as
Joseph G. Manning has noted, even strong bureaucracies are no guarantee of effi ciency, since it allots to the bureaucrat considerable control given their positions as
brokers with asymmetrical information. 238 It was even more unlikely that Galileans
had much interaction with Roman agents at that time, since the kingdoms were inde pendent political entities and Roman officials played no role in managing the state,
intervening only occasionally during crises or a change in ruler.
When Palestine came under direct Roman rule again, provincial subjects might
occasional encounter the governor, his small staff, and the military, but much of the
day-to-day operation was still in the hands of the native elite and local administrators.
As much as possible, the Romans outsourced the administrative functions to the local
elite in their provinces. In the relative backwater of Galilee, we can detect no hint of
direct engagement with Roman officials; when the governor is depicted hearing cases,
he is always in Caesarea or Jerusalem. Most direct engagement with Romans occurred
in these two cities, and otherwise Roman authority was only felt through its expres sion in the form of local retainers. Though the province was again subjected to tribute
payments, the Romans did not attempt to reinstitute tax-farming as the mechanism for
tax collection, instead taking the path of least resistance: co-opting existing infrastructures for tax collection conducted by provincial administrators. Use of provin cials to collect tribute was a double-edged sword: outsourcing collection to natives
meant relying on agents with better access to information in a state with poor bureau cracy, but it also gave them considerable control in the flow of said information and
opportunities to mitigate the burden the Roman state could impose. 239 It seems again
that the Romans were more concerned with maintaining a regular and reliable flow of
revenues to the imperial coffers than they were concerned to milk the province for all
it was worth.
What should be clear from the above discussion is that Roman Imperial govern ance was in many cases experienced indirectly. Seth Schwartz was correct to question
the common characterization of Pompey’s Settlement of the East as a watershed—in
many ways, and for many areas, little about the state apparatus changed substantively
with the advent of Rome.240 As much as possible, the Romans preferred to leave the
region to local administration and interfere only when called upon to do so by the
population, as in adjudicating matters of dispute. Even Roman taxation, when it was
238
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effective, was conducted indirectly through Jewish tax collectors, customs agents, and
market officials like agoranomoi.241 The oscillation between client kingdom and province and between partitioned regions and united whole had important effects on the
ways that economic interactions unfolded by changing the nature of political and tax
barriers. But these boundaries did not wholly interrupt the patterns of movement
between Galilee and Judaea (see chapters 2 and 4) and their effect was often marginal
on the Galilean regional economy. For most of the Early Roman Period, and especially the period of direct rule, Galilee was a marginal region that saw little direct
interaction with the agents of the imperial government.
In this chapter, we also considered the potential role of non-state institutions—in
particular, religious institutions—in shaping the context in which Galilean Jews made
decisions about how to behave and how to manage their resources. While these insti tutions would still need to be considered in the case of a strong set of state institutions
over Galilee, the fact that the state seems to have been infrastructurally weak only
heightens the case for religious institutions playing a substantial role in bounding the
rationality of various economic choices. We will return to examine some Jewish reli gious institutions in detail in chapters 3 and 4. But before doing so, we will turn to
Galilee’s regional economy and the networks along which and within which economic
transactions were conducted. These networks will not only have implications for the
conduits of trade, but also for the formulation, spread, and enforcement of norms of
behavior important for our subsequent discussions of religious institutions in Galilee.

Appendix: Galilee’s Shifting Borders
As we have seen above, the border lines that separated the various administrative
regions within Palestine changed numerous times over the course of the Early Roman
period. For our study of Galilee, the following transformations are of note, especially
for considering the potential effects of portoria on the movement of resources in and
out of this region under different political geographies:
(1) It is not clear if Pompey’s reorganization of Syria would have
created new borderlines for the purposes of reckoning portoria, since
Judaea and the other territories were components of the same province,
Koile-Syria, despite the administrative subdivision. Accordingly, traffic
through the Levant would not have been impeded by tolls. However,
even within the province of Asia, autonomous “free cities” seem to
have collected portoria at their bounds. Removal of the cities from
Judaea certainly impoverished the resources of the Judaean administration since the revenues were no longer directed to the Jerusalem
regional government.
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(2) Under Herod’s kingdom, Judaea was detached from Syria, creating
new borders. This would likely have created new portoria collections
on the coastal road north of Caesarea and around the free cities of
Ascalon and Gaza, and perhaps along some routes between Galilee and
the cities nearest to it—Ptolemais, Tyre, Hippos, Gadara, and
Scythopolis. Caesar’s bestowal of Gaza, Gadara, and Hippos shifted
borders again, and for Galilee meant the removal of a financial barrier
to trade with Hippos and Gadara. The intervention of Scythopolis, a
Syrian Decapolis city, in the route through the Jordan disincentivized
that route for traffic to Peraea and the Dead Sea region. The addition of
territories northeast of Lake Kinneret expanded the toll-free zone
northeastward, but the degree of trade contact between this region and
Golan seems to have been minimal.
(3) The partition of Herod’s kingdom in 4 BCE was arguably the most
significant imposition of trade disincentives due to portoria. Carving
up the kingdom meant again imposing barriers between Galilee and
Judaea, as well as between Galilee and Golan. As a significant revenue
stream, we should suppose that each of the client rulers maintained
some sort of import/export tax. For Galilee, this probably meant the
introduction of customs posts on the major route through Samaria to
Jerusalem, as well as on the east–west road running along the northern
coast of Lake Kinneret between Upper Galilee and the Golan. Customs
posts were also likely located on the lakeshore (see, e.g., the toll booth
in Mark 2:14, seemingly at Capernaum) to collect dues on traffic to
Philip’s kingdom and the Decapolis cities, which were again annexed
to Syria. These borders remained largely the same from 4 BCE to 41 CE
despite changes in the administration elsewhere in Palestine.
(4) With the death of Philip in 34 CE, the tetrarchy was annexed to Syria
and thus the border between Golan and the Decapolis was erased.
(5) In 37 CE, Agrippa I inherited Philip’s tetrarchy as a kingdom,
cleaving it off from Syria once again, and reintroducing the potential
for toll collection on the north–south road on the east side of the lake.
With his inheritance of Antipas’ tetrarchy in 39 CE, the portoria
between Galilee and Golan would again be lifted, though the movement
of goods between Peraea and these regions were still interrupted by the
Decapolis cities and would entail border tolls. In 41 CE, Agrippa I’s
kingdom was expanded to encompass all of Herod’s kingdom (and
more), at long last removing the borders imposed in 4 BCE between the
Jewish-occupied regions and thus lessening the barriers to trade
between them. Moreover, the inclusion of Gadara and Hippos expanded
the bounds of the portoria-free zone around Lake Kinneret.
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(6) In 44 CE, the whole kingdom of Agrippa I was made a province,
meaning little change in the border (perhaps the removal of Hippos,
Gadara, and Gaza again).
(7) In 53 CE, the tetrarchy of Philip was split off from the province of
Judaea, re-imposing borders and portoria between Galilee and Golan.
In 55 CE, the toparchies of Tiberias and Magdala on the west side of the
lake were joined to Agrippa II’s kingdom, splitting them from the rest
of Galilee and creating new border crossings along the north–south
highway running beside the western lakeshore and the east–west
highway running from Ptolemais to Tiberias. Depending on the extent
of Magdala’s toparchy, it may have cut Galilee off from the lake altogether, with implications for trade to the Decapolis cities on the other
side—such a route may have required two portoria, crossing through
two borders.

78

CHAPTER 2—CAST THE NET AND YE SHALL FIND
Galilee’s Regional Economic Network
A major concern of specialist scholarship on the economy of Early Roman Galilee has
been how to assess the economic conditions experienced by the majority of Galilee’s
inhabitants, especially the agrarian base often referred to as “peasants.” Were these
people oppressed by an economic system of exploitation, in which a small, urban elite
controlled a disproportionate amount of wealth and extracted what they needed from a
countryside of insular, autarkic farmers who struggled to get by? Or were these peasants multi-faceted, engaged in a variety of productive activities, engaged in reciprocal
market exchange with other communities, and thriving despite tax burdens and envi ronmental uncertainty? To assess the economic conditions in Early Roman Galilee,
scholars of both views have attempted to frame the question in terms of so-called
“urban–rural relations.” Given that cities depended on the surrounding countryside for
their resource needs, the question goes, did cities obtain these resources through
extractive rents and taxes, or through trade exchanges that might be considered recip rocal (or at least not wholly parasitic)?
The “urban–rural” lens used to assess the economic conditions in Galilee is
fundamentally grounded in the conceptual framework of Moses Finley’s model of the
ancient Mediterranean economy. Setting aside the criticisms and developments of this
model in the four decades since he authored The Ancient Economy,242 the assumptions
on which the model is based accord poorly with what we know of the settlement
pattern in Early Roman Galilee. Finley’s model focused on parts of the ancient Greek
and Roman worlds where large cities with politically attached territories were
common, if not the norm, and were therefore a reasonable basis for analysis. Galilee
in the Early Roman period, as we shall see, looked quite different: it was a land of
villages and towns with a handful of relatively small cities, none of which were large
enough to warrant the assumption that they inherently commanded and overburdened
the surrounding settlements. Galilee did not contain a “primate city”—a single,
disproportionately large settlement that dominates the economic system and on which
the rest of its periphery depends—to serve as the urban pole in the urban–rural
dichotomy.243 While we cannot outright dismiss the value in assessing the relationship
of these cities to the smaller settlements, we need to recalibrate it for local conditions
in Galilee. Myopically focusing on the urban–rural axis overstates the cities’ role in
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determining the contours of the economic network and obscures the overall economic
system and its effects on the agrarian population.
In this chapter, I make the case for viewing Galilee through a different lens.
Rather than conceptualizing the economic network as a hub and spokes, in which the
primary connections are between a city and the surrounding villages, we do better to
visualize Galilee as a well-integrated web of villages and towns. Glimpses in the
literary sources of movement through the region suggest the ease of travel through the
region from settlement to settlement, making communication and trade easy at the
regional level. The material evidence from Galilee and Golan is distinctive when
compared against the largely gentile-populated cities and settlements that surround
them to the west, north, and east, and from Samaria to the south, and suggest a rela tively insular and circumscribed regional economy. This model has implications for
how we understand the configuration of social networks in Galilee and with it the
social mechanisms for enforcing religious institutions and norms there, topics we will
develop in chapters 3 and 4. I also propose that the evidence for economic stratifica tion in not just urban but even rural sites undermines the notion that Galilee was
composed of a homogeneous peasantry struggling to meet the bare minimum to
survive. Not only does this undermine notions of urban–rural economic conflict based
on polarized wealth disparity, but it also forces us to recognize that not all agriculturalists were struggling just to meet their food needs and many could produce sufficient
resources to allow them to fulfill the religious obligations of the Torah.
By looking at Galilee through a different lens, one that allocates a more modest
and, I believe, accurate place to the cities in this economic network, we can bypass
the ongoing debate about whether rural relations with the cities were positive or
negative. This approach also allows us to mitigate the importance that scholars have
granted to the political and economic elite (i.e., the urban elite) in determining how
economic interactions were conducted and how peasants managed their resources. In
so doing, we may shift our focus to considering the role that social forces and religious institutions played in configuring the economic system in which Galilean Jews
participated. By denying the absolute position of the city and its power to extract
resources, command the markets, and keep the villages powerless under their thumbs,
we also free ourselves to look at the rest of the population as active players, making
their own strategic decisions, acting in ways that resist, subvert, or evade the power
wielded by those with ample resources. If there was a shift in the pattern of movement, communication, and interaction that accompanied the founding of new cities,
we must not think of it in terms of an irresistible imposition of new relations of domi nation and dependency, but as a change in incentives and demography to which
agrarians (as agents in and of themselves) responded in complex ways. Another way
to put this is that we allow that the agrarian base acted with tactics of their own
device in participating in economic transaction and cooperation, even if they were
compelled to play within the strategic bounds of an economic field defined by
political elites.
In order to assess the utility of this “web-like” model of economic interactions
within the Galilean network, we will look to several types of evidence. Archaeologists
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excavating sites in Galilee over the last few decades have produced important data
about economic production and consumption, infrastructure facilitating movement
and trade, and the location of relative wealth between and within settlements. The
archaeological data sadly cannot be resolved to a depth that allows us to differentiate
much within the Early Roman period. Moreover, the archaeological record leaves
only hints of trade: only non-organics survive, with few exceptions, and in many
cases we know the place of consumption but can only infer the place of origin and/or
the route of transmission. Nevertheless, those hints are incredibly valuable, especially
insofar as ceramic storage vessels may signal the trade network in foodstuffs. We will
also look to literary evidence to try to corroborate and expand upon the impression the
archaeological record gives. Sections in the writings of Josephus and the New Testa ment gospels are instructive in their depictions of movement through Galilee, even
though they do not generally depict economic interactions. The episodic and modular
nature of these narratives complicates their utility as a depiction of movement, but I
shall argue that they often depict regional travel in a way that is realistic if somewhat
incomplete and impressionistic. The movement of people depicted in these sources
may serve as a proxy, indicating the habitual tendencies of people communicating
between settlements in the region and therefore indicating natural connections for
economic interaction as well, given the highly interpersonal nature of premodern
trade.

Modeling Economy in Early Roman Galilee
In his chapter on “Town and Country,” Moses Finley defined the ancient city by its
function as a consumer: “All residents of a city who are not directly engaged in
primary production derive their food and raw materials from the producers in the
countryside.”244 Finley did not view the existence of urban craftsmen and merchants
as a threat to this model; the products of these craftsmen and tradesmen were directed
inward to the urban elite (rather than outward to the countryside), and they were
dependent for their livelihoods on the urban elites, whose wealth in turn was extracted
from the countryside through rents imposed on their tenants.245 According to the
consumer city model, therefore, this relationship between “town and country” was
characterized by the unidirectional flow of resources from country to town. Higher order goods produced in the city were directed toward the urban elite, as were handicrafts produced outside the city. The peasant population of the countryside strove for
self-sufficiency and abstained from engaging in trade even at the regional level. 246
According to this model, the ancient city’s existence was wholly dependent on the
extraction of resources from the countryside to the city rather than reciprocal
exchange with the countryside. There was minimal overland commerce since the
244
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countryside was self-sufficient and the food needs of the city were achieved through
collecting taxes and rents in kind to feed the urban proletariat, and so there was little
need or opportunity for the countryside to engage in farming as a commercial activity.

Figure 7. “Consumer City” model.

This model presumes the existence of large cities, especially the sort of Greek
poleis that came to dominate the landscape of the Hellenistic East after Alexander. 247
247

Victor A. Tcherikover made a distinction by defining polis according to a litany of institutional, structural, and architectural elements deemed “essential” to an autonomous Hellenistic city
(e.g., “Without a gymnasion, however, no city is a polis”), and deployed this definition to inquire as to
the status of Jerusalem in the Roman period (his answer: no); “Was Jerusalem a ‘Polis’?,” IEJ 14
(1964): 61–78, quote at 78. There is potential slippage in the use of polis as a scholarly technical term
referring to this class of autonomous settlement and the Greek word at its base, which is used in th e
ancient literary sources to refer to a much broader array of settlements (see n. 267 below). I will maintain a distinction, using polis to refer to the predominantly gentile cities of Palestine that roughly fit
that model—such as those that comprised the Decapolis and some of the coastal cities —and refer to
other large settlements that do not clearly fit that model as “cities.”
Application of the term polis in the technical sense to Sepphoris and Tiberias is widespread in the
scholarship of Second Temple Palestine. There is some evidence for Sepphoris and Tiberias having
certain elements of the “typical polis,” at least by the second century CE—theater buildings, municipal
governing bodies (at least at Tiberias; Life 64–66), and perpendicular main streets within a planned
urban grid (see below). Some have even claimed Sepphoris, if not Tiberias, had a chora (χώρα) of
dependent villages; see, e.g., John S. Kloppenborg, Excavating Q: The History and Setting of the
Sayings Gospel (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2000), 234–37. But Life 346, the basis for this, does not
necessarily portray a legal/political relationship between Sepphoris and the surrounding settlements ,
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The wealthy landowning elite clustered in these cities as political and cultural centers,
while drawing their resources from a surrounding territory—the chora—that was both
politically and economically subject to the city through mechanisms of city taxes and
rents to absentee landlords. Such systems continued under the Roman Empire, espe cially when cities with a pedigree as Hellenistic poleis were granted nominal “autonomous” status by the new imperial power and retained the ability to impose city taxes
and maintained direct control over a dependent chora. On the periphery of Early
Roman Galilee were a number of such cities, e.g., Scythopolis and Tyre, whose territories in part defined the bounds of Galilee.
A number of scholars of Early Roman Galilee, in particular New Testament
scholars and others working primarily with literary sources, have applied the Finley
model to understand the conditions accompanying Herod Antipas’ establishment of
Sepphoris and Tiberias as cities in the early first century CE. Richard Horsley has
characterized these as “consumer cities,” the construction of which created new impositions on the autarkic village population. He presumes that the creation of these
settlements brought with it the same conditions of unilateral extraction of resources
from the countryside by making the villages economic dependencies of the city
subject to taxes and by alienating peasants from their land and forcing them into
tenancy. The model allows Horsley to argue that erecting these cities added
substantial economic burdens to a peasant population already struggling at the
margins of subsistence, fomenting economic unrest and resentment. 248 William
Arnal,249 Douglas Oakman,250 and John Kloppenborg 251 all have argued that the
founding of Sepphoris and Tiberias put significant economic pressure on the Galilean
peasantry, seeing hints of the peasants’ deteriorating economic conditions and their
anxiety in Jesus’ messages of egalitarianism and role-reversal.252 Seán Freyne
and even Kloppenborg doubts that Tiberias—the settlement more likely to have been founded de novo
as a polis—had a dependent chora. On the dubious identification of Tiberias and Sepphoris as poleis
in the technical sense, see E. P. Sanders, “Jesus’ Galilee,” in Fair Play: Diversity and Conflicts in
Early Christianity, ed. Ismo Dunderberg, Christopher Tuckett, and Kari Syreeni (NTSup 103; Leiden:
Brill, 2002), 3–42 at 26–34.
248
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Messiahs: Popular Movements at the Time of Jesus (Harrisburg: Trinity Press International, 1985);
Horsley, Jesus and the Spiral of Violence (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1987); Horsley, Jesus and
the Politics of Roman Palestine (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 2014).
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(Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2001), 97–155. He argues in fact that the cities were found in order to
bring Galilee more into the imperial orbit and to extract greater surplus in the form of tribute, tax,
rent, interest, and loan.
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For New Testament scholars, the important evidence has been the New Testament parables —
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from the narratives. See Jonathan L. Reed, Archaeology and the Galilean Jesus: A Re-examination of
the Evidence (Harrisburg: Trinity Press International, 2000), 101–3; Seán Freyne, “Jesus and the
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perceives tensions between city and countryside, though he places greater emphasis
on social/cultural conflict than on actual economic disparities. 253 Even where the
urban–rural relationship per se is not at focus, scholars often presume it in positing a
narrative of a widening wealth gap between the elites (assumed to correlate with
Sepphorites and Tiberians) and the poor (assumed to correlate with villagers). 254
It is remarkable that scholars drawing on Finley’s work have applied the
consumer city model to the cities in Galilee with so little modification. Finley’s
model has been subject to decades of debate among Greek and Roman historians,
qualifying many aspects of it, including the notion that all ancient cities were
“consumers” and that trade was marginal. 255 One major difficulty with the consumer
city model is that it draws a clear dichotomy between city and country. There were
often settlements of various intermediary sizes, however, and their role i n the model
is unclear. Rob Witcher has demonstrated the multidimensional role of the suburbia
around Rome, which acts both as consumer and producer, and constitutes a place for
urban–rural interaction.256 Others have sought to reorganize the model into a hierarchy of settlements, with Rome at top, metropoleis below, followed by smaller cities,
towns, and villages in turn. 257 According to Greg Woolf’s model, the difference

Contexts, ed. Tord Fornberg and David Hellholm (Oslo: Scandinavian University Press, 1995), 597 –
622 at 605; Kloppenborg, Excavating Q, 258. Of course, there is no reason why we should expect that
the Gospel narratives aim to present a complete itinerary of Jesus’ Galilean ministry. This makes it
difficult to gauge the importance to grant to the absence of Sepphoris in understanding inter -settlement relations, though, as we shall discuss below, the presence of descriptions of travel to other
villages can be used to affirm strong inter-settlement interaction otherwise. It is also worth noting that
scholars have not made a similar point about Magdala, which was much closer to his base of opera tions in Capernaum than Sepphoris was, and is also not mentioned (but see n. 334 below).
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Scholars Press, 1997).
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(2005): 120–38; see also Witcher, “The Middle Tiber Valley in the Imperial Period,” in Mercator
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between settlements is that the settlements higher on the hierarchy were capable of
providing “higher order” goods and services, while “lower order” goods and services
were dispersed throughout the settlements lower in the hierarchies. The distinction,
basically, is that comestibles and everyday needs could easily have been met by going
to a town market, whereas larger cities were able to offer goods and services that were
more specialized or harder to come by, due to the “gravity” of these sites as central
places.258 Neville Morley has argued for a similar model, and also recognized that the
consumer city model fails to account for the variety of cities that existed. 259 Different
regional, geographic, and ecological factors, for instance, play a role in determining
the relationships between cities, smaller settlements, and the countryside. He also
suggested that cities should not necessarily be considered units of their own, separate
from the countryside; where they were mutually dependent on one another we do
better to conceive of them together as an “urban unit.”260
The models of Witcher, Woolf, and Morley are helpful correctives in their own
right, but even these do not seem wholly appropriate for Galilee. These scholars are
working with parts of the Roman world where there were large cities that can be
placed at the top of a hierarchical system. Even the largest cities in Galilee would
only rank as a large town if they were transplanted into Asia Minor or Italy. It is
harder to so sharply distinguish a hierarchy of settlements within Galilee, and for this
reason I suspect that the differences are of relatively minor importance.
As we shall see below, the archaeologists working in Galilee over the last few
decades have painted a very different picture. They have argued that trade was amply
attested and a common and important facet of the economy, to some extent following
the arguments of Keith Hopkins that trade and monetized economy were well-integrated aspects of the ancient Mediterranean world by the Roman period. They have
also questioned the notion that cities were entirely parasitic entities on the countryside. But while these archaeologists tend to characterize the relationship between city
and country as more mutually beneficial and engaged in inter-settlement trade, the
framing of this discussion is still often heavily indebted to Finley’s model. The reciprocal model perpetuates the notion that the urban–rural dichotomy is still productive
and meaningful, and still identifies the cities as the focal nexus for trade.
I find Douglas Edwards’ propositions about the Galilean economy a fitting
starting point. He argues that cities, towns, and villages were quite similar insofar as
they were sites of production as well as consumption, and insofar as their inhabitants
all sought to diversify, store, and redistribute their resources to achieve thei r resource
needs.261 He argues that the settlement pattern of Galilee, densely packed with
Systems in Roman Italy,” in Roman Urbanism: Beyond the Consumer City, ed. Helen Parkins
(London: Routledge, 1997).
258
Woolf, “The Roman Urbanization of the East,” 8–9.
259
Morley, “Cities in Context,” 44.
260
Morley, “Cities in Context,” 44.
261
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Attridge, and Dale B. Martin (WUNT 210; Tübingen: Mohr Seibeck, 2007), 357–74 at 373–74.
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villages and hamlets, would have allowed for a highly interconnected trade network
with a greater volume of regional trade than Finley’s model assumes. 262 And a
significant amount of this trade took place between villages, bypassing the cities
altogether.263 Since most settlements were situated within easy walking distance from
one another, it was easy for people, goods, and information to travel between
settlements fairly quickly.
What Douglas envisions is essentially
a web-like network, in which most settlements were engaged with neighboring
settlements, rather than a hub-and-spokes
network in which cities were the primary
locus for interconnection. 264 We may also
think about this in terms of “small world”
networks. In such networks, there is a
high level of “clustering,” a term that
Figure 8. Two network configurations: hub-andconnotes the high density and redundancy
spokes (A) and web-like small world (B).
of interconnections, or in other words,
the likelihood that one’s direct connections will in turn be connected to one another
(see Error! Reference source not found.B). Such networks also exhibit short
paths—i.e., the minimum number of connections—between any two given nodes in
the network.265 This differs from the hub-and-spokes model not in path length (since
the city hub is a common connection to all) but in clustering, since most interactions
are brokered through the city rather than through other varied conduits (see Figure
8A). In the following sections, we shall look at the ways that settlement patterns,
patterns of movement, and evidence of trade fit this characterization of the inter settlement network that characterized Galilee in this period.
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Settlement Density and Settlement Size
The urban–rural model is predicated on a bifurcation of the sites into two easilydistinguishable categories, and population size is one of the more crucial metrics for
making this distinction. The larger the population of a settlement, the greater the
resources needed to support it, and at a certain threshold, a settlement cannot support
itself from land directly worked by its inhabitants. We cannot estimate population
directly for Galilee or any of its sites in this period from the literary evidence in
Josephus. The numbers in Josephus’ writings are notoriously exaggerated and unreli able, as a quote from Jewish War makes clear: “The cities are so packed and the
multitude of villages are everywhere so populous due to the abundance [of produce]
that the smallest of them contains more than fifteen thousand inhabitants” (3.43).
Even the terminology used in the literary sources to differentiate settlement categories
is frustratingly imprecise. Josephus sometimes uses the words for city (πόλις) and
village (κώμα) interchangeably for the very same settlement. 266 The New Testament
gospels seem to use the term for city somewhat arbitrarily, applying it even to such a
tiny site as first-century Nazareth (Matt 2:23; Luke 1:26; 2:4, 39; 4:29). 267 The
ancient terminology is complicated by the fact that κώμα and especially πόλις sometimes indicate political status, available services, and public structures rather than
simply a difference in size. 268 The Hebrew and Aramaic terms deployed in the
rabbinic sources are more numerous and potentially offer more nuance, but as Zeʼev
Safrai has noted, these texts are often indiscriminate in their application of terminology as well, or at the very least they do not use them to solely reflect relative
size.269
In order to suss out population numbers, we are reliant on archaeological data.
The best available method for determining population figures multiplies the area of
the settlement—as determined through excavation or archaeological survey—by a
population density figure. Surface surveys give a general impression of site area from
the scatters of pottery sherds and architectural fragments visible on the surface. Exca vated sites give a firmer sense of the settlement area, but in most cases the full extent
of the site has not yet been determined or cannot be determined due to continued
occupation in later periods. Magen Broshi proposed a range of 400 to 500 residents
per hectare for the densely populated walled cities of later Roman Palestine in his
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attempt to derive a population estimate for the whole region. 270 But that multiplier is
significantly greater than the ones typically used to estimate population in other
regions, such as Greece and Egypt. As Andrew Wilson notes, multipliers ranging
from 100 to 400 for ancient cities are common. 271 Simon Price prefers a multiplier of
110 to 250 per hectare for orthogonal Greek cities, and as few at 40 to 60 per hectare
for unplanned villages and towns. 272 It seems quite unlikely that population density in
settlements of Early Roman Palestine was substantially higher than elsewhere, and we
would be wise to incline toward more conservative estimates in assessing population
in Galilee.
For an area of only about 1,500 square kilometers, Galilee was quite densely
settled. Josephus’ claim that “there are 204 cities and villages throughout Galilee”
(Life 235) accords surprisingly well with what we know of settlement density in the
eastern Galilee and western Golan from archaeological surveys undertaken over the
last few decades.273 Both Douglas Edwards and Uzi Leibner have concluded from
their use of survey data that Galilee saw a marked expansion in the number of settle ments in the Early Roman period compared to the Hellenistic and Hasmonaean
periods that preceded it. 274 But the density in the Early Roman period did not press
the land’s carrying capacity to its limits, as Galilee’s population boomed in the
Middle Roman period, in no small part due to migrations from Judaea after the two
failed revolts.275 Many of the settlements in Galilee sit upon the hilltops, leaving the
fertile valleys below open and available for cultivation (though hillsides too were
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Figure 9. Select sites in Galilee and its periphery.

used for terraced agriculture), 276 and many of them naturally cluster around springs
and along the easy transit routes of the valleys and wadis that run east–west through
the region.277
Sepphoris and Tiberias were the largest settlements in Galilee in the first century
CE. That they stood at the top of the regional administrative hierarchy under Antipas
is unquestionable—they would have been the locus for the regional collection of taxes
and tribute payments, housed the royal bank and archives, and served as palace cities
(Life 37–39). They also retained regional administrative functions as toparchies under
later Herodian kings and Roman direct rule (see ch. 1). But in terms of population and
resource demands, to imagine them as cities on par with Tyre, Ptolemais, Caesarea, or
the Decapolis cities on Galilee’s periphery would be misleading. Sepphoris and Tibe rias paled in size compared to Scythopolis or Caesarea Maritima, which may have
been as large as 100 hectares in the Early Roman period. 278 We must put Sepphoris
and Tiberias in perspective: they were minor cities whose importance was chiefly
276
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regional and whose overall resource demands would have been a fraction compared to
other cities.279
The continuous occupation and expansion of Tiberias and Sepphoris over the
course of the Roman and Byzantine periods has two unfortunate consequences for us:
(1) little evidence remains for first-century structures and (2) it is difficult to determine the extent of the earlier cities. Magen Broshi’s initial estimate of the site of
Sepphoris set the area at 60 hectares, but his estimate was based on the site in later
centuries.280 Moreover, the excavators of the Joint Sepphoris Project (JSP) have
reduced this figure to 35 hectares. 281 Even this may overestimate size in the first
century. This figure includes both the hilltop and the city grid in the plain below it.
The city grid, built around two axial streets—the cardo and decumanus—represents
an expansion of the settlement that according to the JSP probably occurred in the
second century CE. This dating was made on the basis of probes beneath the paving
stones that revealed second century coins, indicating the expansion took place well
after the First Jewish Revolt and perhaps even after the Bar Kokhba Revolt. 282 They
also identified an earlier limestone plaster street beneath the stone pavers; the pres ence of a coin minted by Archelaus would be consistent with the construction of the
earlier axis and grid under Antipas (as C. Thomas McCollough and Douglas Edwards
argue), but it only establishes the terminus post quem.283 The theater on the plain,
279
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aligned with the axial streets and covering multiple blocks, would also date from
around the time of the orthogonal city expansion. While the University of South
Florida (USF) team initially dated this theater to the first century, the JSP has
convincingly redated the theater to the post-70 period on the basis of late first-century
potsherds uncovered from probes beneath the theater’s outer wall, as well as its
general congruence with second-century building practices in the region. 284 The
development of Sepphoris by Antipas is perhaps more plausibly associated with the
Early Roman expansions on the western summit, which are not orthogonal but still
exemplify some amount of urban planning. The foundation trenches for the walls of
the domiciles there support a first-century CE dating, possibly under Antipas but
potentially under Agrippa I or the procurators. 285 As a minimalist assessment, if firstcentury CE Sepphoris were confined to the hilltop and slopes, it could have been as
modestly sized as 8 hectares. 286 The orthogonal expansion onto the plain may better
cohere with the period after the First Jewish Revolt, when Galilee’s population
dramatically expanded with the influx of refugees and settlers from Judaea and
Sepphoris was developed and renamed Diocaesarea.
The size of Tiberias in the Early Roman period is even harder to discern. Unlike
Sepphoris, Tiberias has remained an inhabited city up to the present day. As a result,
extensive excavations have only been possible in select areas of the city, supple mented by the finds uncovered in salvage excavations conducted during modern
construction projects. Most of the archaeological material that has been recovered
dates to the Byzantine period. 287 The city gate and cardo that define the orthogonal
grid of the ancient city were once dated to the first century CE, but more recent probes
beneath the paving stones indicate that the cardo was constructed sometime in the
second or third century. 288 The only major structures securely datable to the Early
certain. For the JSP/Hebrew University dating, see Zeev Weiss, “Sepphoris: From Galilean Town to
Roman City, 100 BCE–200 CE,” in Fiensy and Strange, Galilee, vol. 2, 55, 62; Zeev Weiss and Ehud
Netzer, “Architectural Development of Sepphoris during the Roman and Byzantine Periods,” in
Edwards and McCollough, Archaeology and the Galilee, 117–30 at 118.
284
James F. Strange suggests that the theater was constructed by Antipas, though again on the
basis of Antipas as a likely agent for urban development; see “Sepphoris: The Jewe l of the Galilee,”
28. For the JSP’s revised dating, see Weiss, “Sepphoris: From Galilean Town to Roman City,” 66.
Even if we understand the theater as a two-phase construction, originally built under Antipas and
expanded after 70, the pre-70 theater would have been quite modest in size.
285
Eric M. Meyers, Carol L. Meyers, and Benjamin D. Gordon, “Sepphoris: Residential Area of
the Western Summit,” in Fiensy and Strange, Galilee, vol. 2, 43–44.
286
The value given by Steve Mason, in Flavius Josephus: Translation and Commentary, vol. 9,
Life of Josephus (Leiden: Brill, 2001), 194.
287
Moreover, no official reports were ever published for the first two excavation projects led by
B. Ravan and A. Druks respectively; See Katia Cytryn-Silverman, “Tiberias, from Its Foundation to
the End of the Early Islamic Period,” in Fiensy and Edwards, Galilee, vol. 2, 188–89.
288
Yizhar Hirschfeld and Katharina Galor supported the dating of the cardo to the first century
on the basis of its axial alignment with the traces of a Herodian palace structure found beneath
remains of a later basilica; “New Excavations in Roman, Byzantine, and Early Islamic Tiberias,” in
Zangenberg, Attridge, Martin, eds., Religion, Ethnicity, and Identity in Ancient Galilee, 207–30 at
214. On the revised dating, see the archaeological note for Tiberias in Yizhar Hirschfeld and Eran

91
Roman period uncovered so far are the theater and stadium, the latter probably
outside the city proper. 289 Excavations beneath a later basilica have also revealed
fragments of an opus sectile floor and plaster painted in second Pompeian style—both
of which are consistent with Herodian palatial architecture—together with ceramic
fragments dating to the first century CE; these fragmentary remains probably came
from a wealthy mansion, quite possibly Antipas’ palace. 290 In addition to the archaeologically attested remains, we can also add to the city features a proseuche (prayer
house, or synagogue). The proseuche is a prominent setting in Josephus’ Life, where
it is depicted as the largest building in town and serves as the site of sizable commu nity gatherings (277–284). The later Byzantine walls encompass a settlement of 60
hectares, but the excavators have estimated the size of the Roman-period settlement at
about 30 hectares.291 Aside from the stadium, which is typically located near but
outside a city, the extant first-century remains are concentrated in the southeastern
part of the later walled area. Given the paucity of information, we must keep in mind
that even the 30 hectare estimate is an educated guess, and the northern areas may
represent later expansion.
On the other end of the spectrum
were villages, some of which were
Sites by Size (ha)
minuscule. According to Leibner’s 15
0.05-.3
survey of sites in southeastern
Galilee, about 95 percent of the
.4-1
settlements in eastern Lower Galilee 10
1.1-2
in the Early Roman period were 0.4
2.1-4
to 6 hectares, while the plurality of
5
4.1-6
sites were a meager 0.4 to 1 hectare
292
(see Figure 10).
Many of these
6.1-9
0
sites have not been excavated and
their size is determined primarily Figure 10. Size of sites in Leibner's survey of
from the surface scatter of pottery. In southeastern Galilee.
cases where these small villages have
been excavated, such as Shikhin (conservatively estimated at 2.3 hectares),293 they
generally consist of domestic and workshop spaces constructed in fairly simple
building techniques from local, uncut fieldstones and lack indications of central
Meir, “Tiberias—2004” ḤA-ESI 118 (2006). Katia Cytryn-Silverman notes an even more recent probe
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planning. In the Early Roman period, most of them also lack discernible monumental
public buildings, such as synagogues, which become commonplace even in very small
settlements in the Late Roman period. Among these relatively small settlements, there
is also a considerable difference in size from tiny hamlets to fairly substanti al hilltop
settlements like Yodefat. And, as we shall see below, the villages (especially larger
ones) often show signs of internal wealth stratification and differentiation in productive industries.
We can look to Capernaum as an example of a moderately large village. As with
Sepphoris and Tiberias, the long settlement history has resulted in fairly sparse
recovery of Early Roman structures and materials. Most of the site as it lies exposed
today reveals the Byzantine-period settlement, and the excavations did not generally
proceed to earlier layers. Because of this, assessing the full extent of the Early Roman
phase of the site is difficult. Reed offers a reasonable assessment of the site’s size in
this period as 6 hectares (and no more than 10 hectares), which he uses to derive a
population of 600–1,500.294 Even at the smaller end of this spectrum, we can characterize Capernaum as one of the larger villages or a small town. In terms of the layout
(organic rather than centrally planned and orthogonal), construction (unhewn local
fieldstone), and lack of built public structures (no built market stalls, no discernible
synagogue), it looks substantially different from settlements like Sepphoris. 295 But its
position on the lake and at the frontiers of two client kingdoms (in the period from 4
BCE to 39 CE) also made it an important crossroads, and the presence of a toll collection post (on the road, port, or both; Mark 2:13–14) and a royal army commander
stationed there (Matt 8:5–13; Luke 7:1–10; John 4:46–54) lend to this impression.
We can also identify a tier of sites situated somewhere between the two “cities”
and the spectrum of villages. In Leibner’s survey region, Magdala (also called Migdal
or Tarichaeae) stands out as substantially larger than the rest—over 9 hectares.296
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More recent excavations indicate that even that is an underestimate. 297 The settlement
also looks considerably different from the villages in its layout, construction tech niques, infrastructure, and public buildings. In addition to the waterworks noted by
Leibner in 2009, the Magdala Project excavations have revealed large public spaces
(e.g., a quadroporticus, area F), paved roads (including a cardo) complete with
covered sewer system, and a synagogue decorated with painted plaster, all datable to
the Early Roman period. 298 Excavations have revealed city blocks of very well-built
houses, constructed of large hewn stones tightly fitted together, in contrast to the
rough, fieldstone constructions that characterize the domiciles in the smaller s ettlements of Galilee.299 That Magdala exhibits this urban character should not be
surprising. Josephus indicates that Magdala was an administrative center, as one of
the toparchies of eastern Galilee (War 2.252), and he refers to its public entertainment
facilities, namely a hippodrome (Life 132).300 That it maintained civic officials and
regulated marketplaces—as Tiberias and surely Sepphoris did—is also indicated by
the inscribed agoranomos weights with a supposed provenance from here. 301 Though
some earlier scholars have in the past dismissed the identification of Magdala as a city
in Galilee, recent excavations confront us with a site of clearly urban nature. 302 Even
297
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if Magdala was substantially smaller than Tiberias and/or Sepphoris in the Early
Roman period—which, as noted above, we cannot be certain about—it indicates that
the pattern of settlements was more complex than a facile division of Sepphoris and
Tiberias as large, demanding settlements over a landscape of country villages.
Nor is Magdala alone. The hilltop settlement of Gamla in the southeastern Golan
Heights covered an area of about 15 hectares at the time of its destruction during the
First Jewish Revolt. 303 The site does not exhibit the same sort of orthogonal layout
seen at Magdala and (at least later) at Sepphoris and Tiberias, but this is mostly due to
the steep topography of the ridge on which the settlement rests. The conscious
construction of terrace housing and a number of east–west-oriented streets do indicate
some amount of deliberate town planning.304 Many of the houses exhibit the construction techniques of tight-fitting, hewn stones, though there is also ample use of simple
fieldstone and mud plaster. 305 The site had at least two public buildings: a synagogue
complete with attached miqveh, 306 and a large building the excavators tentatively
identified as a basilica. 307 On the basis of both its large area and the public structures,
Gamla exhibits some similarities to the larger cities and distinctions from the smaller
Galilean villages.
The size of sites in Galilee is an important factor for making inferences about
their relationships. Galilee’s settlement pattern exhibits a broader spectrum than we
might assume from a simple city–country/urban–rural model, with settlements
ranging from tiny hamlets less than a hectare in area, to villages of up to 6 hectares, to
fairly small towns and cities ranging from 9 to a still-modest 35 hectares. The effects
that the (re-)founding of Sepphoris and Tiberias had on the resource demands of the
region is dependent on an understanding of how big these settlements were and to
what extent their resource needs were obtained through command versus trade. Even
at their zenith in the later Roman and Byzantine periods, Sepphoris and Tiberias never
came close to approaching the size of the major cities of the coast and the Decaphis Galilean Context,” in Edwards and McCollough, Archaeology and the Galilee, 59. Harold Hoehner
acknowledges something of its urban character, but does not deem it a city “in the proper sense,” i.e.,
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olis.308 Accordingly, it is doubtful that either of them exhibited as strong a market
draw as did those poleis, except perhaps as a secondary market for luxury goods
imported along the main east–west highway (see below). Given their relatively small
size, it is also unlikely that Sepphoris and Tiberias exhibited the same resource
demands on the surrounding countryside that large population centers like
Scythopolis did. The relatively small population of these settlements meant that much
of the city’s food needs could be accommodated by inhabitants cultivating the
agricultural land proximate to the city, as inhabitants of other towns and villages of
the region did with the lower slopes and valleys adjacent to their settlements. And
while large poleis usually had a region of land politically attached to it from which to
draw resources in terms of tax revenue, there is hardly enough evidence to suggest
such relations of dependency were characteristic of Sepphoris and Tiberias in Galilee.
While this does not mean that the cities were on an even footing with other settle ments, in terms of the relative volume of economic transactions conducted with or
through them, it does suggest that the system was not so driven toward the cities that
it precluded strong inter-village network connections.

Wealth Stratification within Galilean Settlements
Besides population size, the allocation of wealth and landholdings has been another
important factor in the analysis of urban–rural relations in Early Roman Galilee. To a
large extent, wealth and landholding were synonymous in the ancient world; the most
secure investment of wealth was in the acquisition of real estate and the possession of
real estate in turn assured some level of agricultural self-sufficiency or income. As
indicated in the discussion above, the collocation of the wealthy, landholding elite
with the urban population is an integral component of the consumer city model,
driving the motor of resources from country tenants to city elites by means of rents.
Shimon Applebaum in the mid-1970s argued that the late Second Temple period
was a time of growing economic wealth disparity in Palestine. A population explosion
put pressure on the availability of landholdings, small-scale farmers became increasingly indebted attempting to subsist on smaller farm plots, and many were alienated
from their land altogether when they defaulted, resulting in the accumulation of land
under a small portion of the population. Together, these economic tensions stirred
popular support for revolt. 309 Though not uncontested, 310 this narrative has remained
308
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popular especially for those scholars who argue that urban–rural relations in Galilee
were exploitative and parasitic. 311 Horsley, for instance, has argued that the wealthy
landholders who amassed these lands from loan defaults resided in the newly-founded
cities of Sepphoris and Tiberias as absentee landlords to rural tenants. 312 According to
this interpretation, the large-scale landowners were located primarily in the cities,
while the villages were relatively homogeneous peasant communities with little
wealth and dwindling landholdings. In other words, the urban–rural relation that
Applebaum and Horsley present is correlated with the wealth stratification between a
binary rich and poor.
The evidence for a growing wealth gap and the consolidation of land is, however,
quite tenuous. Despite the tantalizing literary references to royal estates, landowners,
tenants, and farmers, these texts do not indicate whether or not a particular land
tenure arrangement was more prevalent than any other in a given period. 313 The New
Testament parables draw on agricultural settings that surely exhibit verisimilitude to
real landholding and land-use arrangements. The Parable of the Wicked Servants
(Matt 21:33–46; Mark 12:1–12; Luke 20:9–19) envisions an absentee landlord with a
large vineyard let out to multiple tenants. The Parable of the Workers in the Vineyard
(Matt 20:1–16) and the Parable of the Prodigal Son (Luke 15:11–32) depict the use of
hired hands in the fields of at least moderately wealthy landholders. But there may be
other reasons for the over-representation of large-scale landholders in these parables—e.g., the absentee landlord as an apt analogy for God. Several scholars have
looked to archaeological remains to support the notion of diminishing plot sizes for
small-scale landholders, using B. Golomb and Y. Kedar’s study of stonewall-bounded
farm plots.314 This study suggested that small landholdings predominated but were too
311
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small to support the average family, but the authors made no attempt to distinguish
these boundaries chronologically, and individual plot size alone is not enough to
prove the increasing poverty of the agrarian population. After all, diversifying one’s
landholdings (whether owned or rented) across multiple plots in scattered locations
was a common practice and was a useful tactic for mitigating the risks of crop failure
in any given plot.315
Sharon Mattila has looked to the documentary evidence of land registers from
Philadelphia in Egypt to argue that the generalization that agricultural land ownership
was concentrated among the urban elites is inaccurate, as is the notion that villagers’
landholdings were roughly equal and homogeneous. According to her analysis, over
92 percent of the private grain land in the village was owned by the villagers themselves, not urban absentee landlords. The registers also revealed that among villagers
there was a considerable range in field size, from meager plots incapable of
supporting a household to middling plots capable of producing a respectable surplus.
Urban ownership of orchards was significantly greater but not monopolistic—34
percent were owned by villagers, again with internal stratification in terms of landholding size.316 The data from Egypt suggests that the “peasant economy” model does
a poor job of representing the actual economic conditions of the Mediterranean
agrarian economy in antiquity. Though we lack comparable documentary evidence
from Galilee, we may cautiously suggest that the emergence of urban centers in the
landscape did not necessarily produce conditions of a countryside largely owned by
the elite members of the urban population.
Since we cannot accurately assess the allocation of wealth by looking to landholding evidence for Galilee, we may find instructive signs of wealth stratification in
the archaeological evidence for building construction and decoration. This cannot
produce for us figures to discern absolute levels of wealth, but it is a good indicator of
the relative difference in wealth and the geographic distribution of the relatively well off to the relatively poor.
Sepphoris and Tiberias, as one might expect, have revealed traces of fancy urban
residences. At Sepphoris, pieces of colored wall plaster similar to that found in
Herodian palaces found beneath a second- or third-century residence on the acropolis
suggest the decorated interior of a wealthy or even royal building, perhaps from the
first century. 317 Another structure was re-interpreted by the USF team as a villa
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urbana, an urban mansion, dating to the first century CE or even earlier. 318 At Tiberias, the excavators uncovered the remains of what they believe to be Antipas’ palace,
featuring painted and molded plaster, marble slabs, and opus sectile tiles.319 At
Magdala as well, excavators have uncovered the remains of a villa urbana with a
pictorial floor mosaic and an aqueduct-fed plaster pool.320 Other residential structures
at Magdala, even when lacking the ornate artistic accoutrements, indicate relative
wealth in the fine, hewn-stone masonry used to construct them. The presence in some
of the domiciles of private miqvaʼot may also indicate that they were wealthier resi dences, as most would have to make use of public miqvaʼot or natural bodies of water
for water purification practices. 321 All of these finds are consistent with the usual
expectation that cities contained the homes of the wealthy.
Archaeological excavations in the villages and towns of Galilee have uncovered
exciting evidence that upsets the traditional identification of the “rural” population
with the economically homogeneous peasantry. Most of the residential buildings in
these settlements were small and constructed of unhewn fieldstones, stacked to gether
without mortar into precarious-looking (but structurally sound) walls, with floors of
compacted dirt. Nestled among the poor, unadorned structures of some of the larger
villages, archaeologists have discovered homes that share some of the decorated
features of the wealthy structures found at Sepphoris, Tiberias, and Magdala. Among
the terrace houses of Yodefat, a house was discovered with stucco walls painted in
Second Pompeian-style fresco and imitation marble. 322 At Gamla, there was a whole
residential area whose houses contained the remains of colored fresco walls, along
with other evidence of wealth such as fine jewelry. 323 We can discern economic
stratification of a lesser extent at Khirbet Qana, where some houses were found with
plastered floors and walls, in contrast to the majority that lacked them, and some
private miqvaʼot were discovered. 324 These examples demonstrate that there was
social stratification within some of the larger villages, and indicates that the strict
318
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dichotomy that locates the wealthy elites in the cities is inaccurate, as is the notion of
homogeneity in the economic conditions of the supposed “peasantry” of the villages.
The strict rich–poor dichotomy fails; there were indeed people who fell in between.
We may also discern village wealth or wealth stratification in the presence or
absence of public buildings. Such structures, especially if well-build, indicate the
presence of a wealthy local patron who could donate the funds for its construction, or
enough people making a significant income from their work—agricultural or otherwise—to pool their resources to pay for the structure’s construction. Where such
public buildings have been discovered in Galilee, archaeologists have identified them
as synagogues, though we should note that they were multi-functional rather than
strictly religious spaces, as the term often connotes. 325 In addition to the aforementioned first-century synagogues at Magdala and Gamla, the excavators of Khirbet
Qana believe they have identified one at their small village site,326 and literary references suggest synagogues also for Tiberias, Nazareth, and Capernaum. 327 Such public
structures need not have been grand or well-decorated—the only ornate first-century
synagogue discovered so far is the one at Magdala—but would require that at least
some of the population produced enough means beyond their “subsistence” needs to
finance the construction of a public, non-domicile structure.328
That such internal stratification characterized Galilee should not surprise us.
Other studies of so-called peasant societies have acknowledged the existence of stratification within village settings. James C. Scott, whose work on communities in
Malaysia serves as an interlocutor for Horsely and Oakman, notes that such economic
differences were a source of contention and concern among the residents within a
community.329 Likewise, F. G. Bailey argued that competition within Western Euro-
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Yale University Press, 2005), 135–73; Levine, “The Nature and Origin of the Palestinian Synagogue
Reconsidered” JBL 115 (1996): 425–48; Seth Schwartz, Imperialism and Jewish Society, 200 BCE to
640 CE (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009), 221–25.
326
Douglas R. Edwards, “Khirbet Qana: from Jewish Village to Christian Pilgrim Site,” in
Humphreys, The Roman and Byzantine Near East, 3:101–32 at 3:111–14.
327
Tiberias: Life 277; Nazareth: Matt 13:53–58; Mark 6:1–6; Luke 4:14–30; Capernaum: Mark
1:21; Luke 4:31–33; John 6:59. The New Testament references are obviously weaker, in that they may
reflect the circumstances of these settlements in the post-Revolt period. But the archaeological
evidence for remains of synagogue structures in the second century is equally lacunose; this dearth is
in no small part due to the fact that most sites are not fully excavated.
328
Neville Morley is one of few authors I know of who has attempted to break down this notion
of “necessities” as a natural and obvious category, pointing out the social constructedness of it. He
does so in the context of distinguishing “luxury goods” from “necessities,” noting the social dimen sions that mark certain types of food as more prestigious than others, or more indispensible than
others. Neville Morley, Trade in Classical Antiquity (Cambridge University Press, 2007), 36–49. We
will return to this topic in discussing the social-defined bounding of “subsistence” needs in ch. 3.
329
James C. Scott, Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance (New Haven:
Yale University Press, 1986), 182; see Sharon Lea Matilla, “Jesus and the Middle Peasants: Problematizing a Social-Scientific Concept,” CBQ 72 (2010): 291–313 at 302.
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pean villages took place chiefly among equals or near equals. 330 This suggests that the
concern of wealth disparity between larger settlements like Sepphoris and small ones
like neighboring Shikhin probably caused less anxiety among villagers than did rela tively slight disparities between neighbors of comparable status.

Movement and Communication through Galilee
A look at the patterns of movement through the region of Galilee can help us to
conceive of the conduits along which economic interactions occurred in the region as
well. The literary sources for first century Galilee give little indication of the
networks of economic exchange directly. But there are depictions of movement for
other purposes, which we may take as an impressionistic indication of how people in
Galilee may have conducted themselves through the region. This pattern may largely,
though not wholly, overlap with the economic network by which inhabitants of these
settlements bought, sold, and traded resources with one another. Most economic inter actions in the ancient world were highly interpersonal, taking place face-to-face or
brokered through correspondence with an acquaintance. 331 Travel was often multipurpose, meaning that traveling to see a family member in the next village over might
also serve as the occasion for making a purchase or negotiating a future contract to
labor.332 Transactions in general are less risky with a “known quantity,” whether that
knowledge is derived from direct interactions with that agent in the past or from a
reputation constructed from the impressions of those who have. 333 As such, the paths
along which Galileans moved from site to site for a variety of purposes gives us a
useful starting point for understanding the paths along which economic transactions
were conducted.
330

F. G. Bailey, “Gifts and Poison,” in Gifts and Poison: The Politics of Reputation, ed. Bailey
(Oxford: Blackwell, 1971), 1–25 at 19–20.
331
This point should be obvious, but bears repeating in this digital age. Jess ica Goldberg’s study
of Medieval Jewish Mediterranean traders does a good job of illustrating the importance of personal
relationships in ancient economic transactions. She also deftly illustrated the value of written corre spondence in lieu of face-to-face contact. See Trade and Institutions in the Medieval Mediterranean:
The Geniza Merchants and Their Business World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012).
332
Catherine Hezser notes, for instance, that depictions of rabbis traveling through the region in
the following centuries often depict hospitality visits overlapping with other functions, such as busi ness or meeting with government officials; The Social Structure of the Rabbinic Movement in Roman
Palestine (TSAJ 66; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1997), 213–21. Neville Morley notes that travel to
town markets for trade could double up with other economic and social purposes; Metropolis and
Hinterland: The City of Rome and the Italian Economy, 200 BC–AD 200 (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2002), 67.
333
See Joseph E. Stiglitz, “Information and the Change in the Paradigm in Economics,” The
American Economic Review 92 (2002): 460–501; Thráinn Eggertsson, “Norms in Economics, with
Special Reference to Economic Development,” in Social Norms, ed. Michael Hechter and Karl-Dieter
Opp (New York: Russel Sage Foundation, 2001), 76–104 at 77–78; see this reasoning applied to
transaction costs of Mediterranean trade in Morley, Trade in Classical Antiquity, 30–34.
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We may begin with the region around Lake Kinneret. Boat travel sped up movement between the settlements along the shore, allowing settlements to be more closely
connected than distance would suggest. The depiction of movement in the lake region
in the synoptic gospels, and especially in the Gospel of Mark, is illustrative. For most
of Jesus’ ministry in Galilee, he is based in the town of Capernaum on the northern
part of the west lakeshore. From there he and his disciples repeatedly takes excursions
across the lake to Bethsaida (6:45–56; 8:22), Dalmanutha (8:10),334 and the Decapolis
(cf. 7:34).335 Even where the destination was distant and inland, boat travel could be
used to expedite the journey, as when Jesus and his disciples used Bethsaida as a
waypoint to Caesarea Philippi (8:22–27). The lake network also included, not surprisingly, the city of Tiberias and its neighbor Magdala. The Gospel of John portrays
residents of Tiberias crossing the lake in order reach Jesus near Capernaum (6:23).
Josephus, in recounting his strategems during his tenure in Galilee, indicates the ease
with which boat travel could be used to move back and forth between Magdala and
Tiberias (see War 2.641; Life 163), as well as from Magdala to Hippos on the eastern
shore of the lake (Life 153). Life 42 suggests that Gadara and Scythopolis were also
easily within reach.
Archaeological evidence of ancient harbors on the lake shore expands the number
of nodes of interconnectivity along the lake to include Aish, Tabgha, Gennesar,
Sennabrus, and Philoteria. 336 The short distance involved in navigating the lake made
it very easy to connect eastern Galilee to the southwestern regions of the Golan
(where most Gaulanite Jews lived) and even some of the Decapolis cities. As scholars
of the ancient Mediterranean economy have long noted, it was easier, faster, and
cheaper to move large volumes of goods across waterways than over the roads. 337
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Dalmanutha may be a reference to Magdala, in a corrupted form; see De Luca and Lena,
“Magdala/Taricheae,” 287–89. Otherwise, it is an unknown lakeside settlement.
335
Mark 5:1 (cf. Luke 8:26) refers to the Decapolis city of Gerasa, but erroneously suggests it is
near the lake rather than far inland (note 5:2, 18). There are, however, some textual problems with this
verse: while most early majuscule manuscripts read Gerasa, the fifth-century Codex Alexandrinus
reads Gadara in agreement with the Matthean parallel (8:28). It seems most likely that Mark origin ally
read Gerasa (since Luke follows in this error) and that Matthew made the correction. Gadara would,
however, make much more sense contextually, since it is near enough to the shore that its chora (τὴν
χώραν) likely reached it.
336
Mendel Nun’s initial survey of anchorages lists the following (proceeding clockwise around
the lake), though often without indications of the chronology of their usage: ʼAish, Kefar ʽAqavya,
Gergesa (Kursi), ʽEin Gofra, Susita (Hippos), Gadara, Philoteria (Beit Yeraḥ), Sennabris, Tiberias,
Magdala (Tarichaeae), Gennesar, Tabgha, and Capernaum; Sea of Galilee: Newly Discovered
Harbours from New Testament Days (rev. ed.; Kibbutz ʽEin Gev: Kinneret Sailing Co., 1989). See
more recently De Luca and Lena, “The Harbor of the City of Magdala/Taricheae,” 115 –19 and fig. 1.
337
This is a truism of ancient travel, since water travel was considerably faster and did not
require feeding an animal, if one wanted to haul more than could be car ried on one’s own body or a
handcart. Exactly how much more expensive land transport was is a matter of some debate. Neville
Morley notes, for instance, that the evidence from Diocletian’s Price Edict used to argue for prohibi tively high overland costs is misleading, and that this source exaggerates the expense of land travel
and cheapness of sea travel, as well as ignoring other pertinent factors such as the likelihood of ship -
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Even this relatively small lake would have reduced the logistical costs of conducting
goods from one settlement to another for trade, and bigger settlements such as Tibe rias and Magdala could even serve as major emporiums for the sale of goods from the
Decapolis and points east. Underwater excavations along the western shore of Lake
Kinneret have uncovered evidence of commerce across the lake. Early Roman vessels
have been found in association with stone anchors on the lake bottom, 338 including
assemblages of unused Kefar Ḥananiah pottery underwater near Magdala, 339 Capernaum,340 and Tiberias,341 suggesting some trade in cookware was conducted via port.
There are no other navigable waterways in Galilee, and so outside the lake region
trade was necessarily conducted overland. Naturally, this means that the level of
interaction between various settlements was dependent on the existence of an exten sive system of overland roads, whether paved highways, regional roads, or little dirt
paths. The major highways that sweep through Galilee were paved after 66 CE by
Roman engineers ahead of the advancing army and/or to accommodate the military
garrisoned there after the Revolt, but these highways surely overlay long-trodden
routes through the region. 342 It is doubtful, moreover, that these highways constitute
the full extent of the road system, especially when it comes to connections between
villages and cities and between villages and other villages. 343 The Mishnah notes, for
instance, a variety in the size and “ownership” of roads in Galilee in the age of the
tannaim.344 A recent article by James F. Strange has compiled data from various road
survey projects conducted in the last few decades. 345 The resulting map is a cobweb of
red lines indicating small local routes primarily constrained by the topography,
running along the valleys or atop the ridges from village to village. Dating the
unpaved roads is impossible, especially because of the long duration over which these
routes were probably in use, given the constraints of the topography and the long
wreck or the greater ability to work other functions into overland trade itiner aries; Metropolis and
Hinterland, 60–70.
338
Charles Fritsch and Immanuel Ben-Dor, “The Link Expedition to Israel, 1960,” The Biblical
Archaeologist 24 (1961): 57–58.
339
Raban, “The Boat from Migdal Nunia,” 323.
340
Ehud Galili, Uzi Dahari, and Jacob Sharvit, “Sea of Galilee Survey,” ESI 10 (1991): 161–62;
Galili and Sharvit, “Underwater Survey,” 17.
341
Galili and Sharvit, “Underwater Survey,” 17–18.
342
Strange, “First Century Galilee,” 39–41.
343
Along with Strange, Eric Meyers argues for a much more extensive road network than is
visible from the Roman paving and mile-marking projects. See Meyers, “An Archaeological
Response,” 21, a reaction to the criticisms in Horsley, “Villages of Upper Galilee,” 7. Actual evidence
for villages being connected by road exist; see for example Rafeh Abu Raya and Anastasia Shapiro,
“Yodefat, Survey,” ḤA-ESI 123 (2001).
344
See, notably, m. Peʼah 2:1, which distinguishes private roads ( ) דרך היחיד, public roads
()דרך הרבים, private paths () שביל היחיד, and public paths ()שביל הרבים. See also m. Kil 4:7; m. Bik
1:1; m. BB 6:7. The Mishnah also distinguishes between intra- and inter-settlement roads (m. Sheq
1:1).
345
James F. Strange, “The Galilean Road System,” in Fiensy and Strange, Galilee, vol. 2, 263–
71. For earlier road surveys, see Israel Roll, “Survey of Roman Roads in Lower Galilee,” ESI 14
(1995): 38–40; Zvi Ilan, “Eastern Galilee, Survey of Roman Roads,” ESI 9 (1989–1990): 14–16.
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history of settlement at many of these village locations. Many of these roads probably
served the population’s movement about Galilee from the Hellenistic period well
beyond the Late Roman period, even as the number of settlements and inhabitants
declined.346
Preferred lines of overland travel were to some extent guided—if not dictated—
by geography as well. Though he does not include any inter-village roads, Leibner’s
study of eastern Lower Galilee suggests the likely location of major local routes
according to the region’s topography, following the wadis and valleys. 347 Travel along
relatively flat terrain or gradual inclines was significantly less laborious that
traversing up and down a series of mountains, which meant that much travel in
Galilee was directed along major east–west lines through the Sakhnin, Beit Netofa,
Turʽan, and Ksulot valleys, or alternately along the ridges that separate them. North –
south travel was made easy only at a few junctures where there were passes through
the mountains. Accordingly, we should expect that this incentivized strong connec tions between settlements that fell along the same ridge or valley.
The literary sources corroborate the portrait of a highly interconnected web of
settlements. They depict travel not solely or even largely conducted between village
and city, as one might expect from the urban–rural model of inter-settlement
dynamics. Much of the movement depicted in the New Testament gospels and in the
writings of Josephus suggests the regular and commonplace nature of travel between
the smaller settlements—the villages and small towns. 348 The Gospel of Mark, for
instance, presents a fairly coherent pattern of travel—despite its episodic nature—
from a settlement like Capernaum to the villages proximate to it. When Jesus travels
to Nazareth, he goes out from there to visit the “villages all around it” (τὰς κώμας
κύκλῳ; 6:2). When Jesus and his disciples travel to the region of Caesarea Philippi,
346

On the changing configuration of settlement patterns throughout the Roman period, at least in
eastern Lower Galilee, with a surge in new settlements in the Early Roman period, expansion of those
settlements in the Middle Roman period, and general contraction of in the Late Roman and Byzantine
periods, see Leibner, Settlement and History, 331–83.
347
Leiber, Settlement and History, 14–17.
348
Many scholars have noted peculiarities in Jesus’ extra-Galilean travels in Mark, from which
they have argued that the author was unfamiliar with Palestine and therefore hailed from elsewhere.
Mark 7:31, for instance, tersely depicts Jesus travelling from Sidon north to Tyre, from there southeast
to Lake Kinneret, and thence south to the Decapolis—hardly a direct route. Mark 5:1 seems to place
Gerasa near the lake; see discussion above in n. 335. Mark 11:1 depicts Jesus’ travels from Jericho to
Jerusalem via Bethany and Bethphage, which some have seen as unlikely, but which will be under standable given our discussion about pilgrimage routes to Jerusalem in ch. 4. Despite some ge ographic
uncertainties, none of these are wholly damning, and more importantly, nothing in the depiction of
travel in Galilee and the Golan is inherently implausible. For a brief discussion of Mark and geogra phy, including possible solutions to the geographic conundrums, see Cilliers Breytenbach, “Mark and
Galilee: Text World and Historical World,” in Galilee Through the Centuries: Confluence of Cultures,
ed. Eric M. Meyers (Winona Lake: Eisenbrauns, 1999), 75–85 at 75–80; Nicoline Roskam, “The
Gospel of Mark as Polemic: Persecution of the Markan Christian Community and the Purpose of
Mark’s Gospel,” in Religious Polemics in Context, ed. Theo L. Hettema and Arie van der Kooij
(Assen: Van Gorcum, 2004), 294–302 at 295–96. Roksam places the provenance of Mark in Galilee
on the basis of her geographic arguments, which is perhaps taking matters too far.
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they bypass the city altogether in favor of performing a circuit of the villages (8:27).
In fact, in the gospels, whenever Jesus is travelling within Galilee, his journeys take
him between villages and small towns, while Tiberias, Sepphoris, and possibly even
Magdala are conspicuously absent from the narrative, despite their proximity to his
ancestral home of Nazareth and his base of operation in Capernaum. Josephus
describes some travel through Galilee during the First Jewish Revolt. Much of his
account depicts movement of characters between Magdala, Tiberias, Sepphoris, and
Gischala (see Life 95, 101, 103, 107, 163, 275–276, 280, 304, 308), usually without
much hint of the route or any stops in between. This is primarily a function of his
narrative focus in Life on his contests against rivals/opponents based in the latter
three, while Josephus was usually based in Magdala. But villages also factor
prominently, occasionally serving as Josephus’ home base (Qana in 86–90, Simonias
in 115, Chabul in 213, Yafiʽa in 270, Shikhin in 384). He describes the travels of the
Jerusalem embassy from village to village, starting in Yafiʽa and circulating outward
from there (Life 230–231). Josephus and his messengers move about from Chabul to
Yodefat to Gabara (Life 234–235), from Gabara to Sogane to Yafiʽa (266–270), and
from Bethsaida to Capernaum to Magdala (403). Josephus’ narrative too suggests the
ease through which one could move about in Galilee from settlement to settlement,
especially within Lower Galilee, where he spent most of his time.

Trade in Galilee
The Galilean economy was an agrarian economy. Most of the population was
employed to some extent in the direct production of foodstuffs, much of it for their
own household consumption needs. 349 But even if we grant that most Galileans held
self-sufficiency as an ideal to aspire to, there must nonetheless have been a consider able volume of trade in food both within settlements and between them. 350 As
Peregrine Horden and Nicholas Purcell have argued, micro-regional differences could
result in relative booms and busts in harvest yields in any given year, spurring short and medium-distance trade to effectively redistribute these resources. 351 These condi349

This not to say they were necessarily employed solely in agriculture. As Paul Erdkamp has
argued, the labor needs of agricultural cultivation were not constant over the year or over the household life cycle, leading to seasonal and structural fluctuations between underemployment and labor
deficit. One avenue for exploiting untapped labor in those off-seasons was to enlist members of the
household in non-agricultural trade work. See “Agriculture, Underemployment, and the Cost of Rural
Labour in the Roman World,” The Classical Quarterly 49 (1999): 556–72; see also Gallant, Risk and
Survival in Ancient Greece, 11–33.
350
As Michael Decker notes in his study of agriculture in the ancient Levant and Egypt, Tilling
the Hateful Earth: Agricultural Production and Trade in the Late Antique East (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2009), 229–57.
351
Peregrine Horden and Nicholas Purcell, The Corrupting Sea: A Study of Mediterranean
History (Malden: Wiley Blackwell, 2000), 53–88; cf. Morley, Trade in Classical Antiquity, 20–26,
who remarks that the homogeneity of Mediterranean ecology is entirely dependent on the scale of
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tions of imbalance could occur even without regard to the volatilities of climate: since
some soils and terrain were better suited to one crop over another, interdependence
could also be a natural strategy for resolving the problem of uneven distribution of
natural resources across the region. 352 Not all households owned or rented sufficient
land to grow enough food for themselves, and would have relied in part on trade
regardless of growing conditions. And of course, some Galileans were engaged in
non-agricultural enterprises, such as fishing, pottery production, or stone working,353
and relied on trade to sell their products and obtain their foodstuffs from others. 354 As
Sharon Lea Mattila notes, “The rhythms of the ancient agricultural calendar left
plenty of time for people to do other things.”355
Yet while most of the trade volume in Galilee was surely in agricultural products,
it can be difficult to discern in the evidence. Literary references suggest that market
transactions in foodstuffs were common. There are a few references to inter-settlement trade in Josephus and the New Testament gospels, such as John of Gischala’s
sale of oil from Upper Galilee to Jewish residents of Caesarea Philippi (Life 76; War
2.591–592) or when Jesus’ disciples suggest a crowd should be sent to the surrounding villages and countryside to buy food (Mark 6:36–37).356 The Mishnah often references sale or purchase (e.g., m. Dem and m. BM passim), but by the nature of the text
analysis, its most broad characteristic is the fragmentation and variation of the landscape at micro
scales, and the concomitant variation in quality as well as kind and quantity of produce.
352
Thus argues Agnes Choi, “Never the Two Shall Meet? Urban–Rural Interaction in Lower
Galilee,” in Fiensy and Strange, Galilee, vol. 1, 297–311. While I disagree with her assessment that
mechanisms of distribution directed these resources primarily from countryside to city, the argument
for agricultural determinism driving trade is without a doubt correct.
353
This list could be greatly expanded, but I note above only the areas of production we will
investigate below. Growing and preparing flax for linen cloth and garments was apparently a major
pursuit in Galilee as well, at least in the Middle and Late Roman periods. Galilean f lax was known
abroad, as indicated by Pausanias, Description of Greece 5.5.2, and rabbinic literature references
growing and processing flax in dozens of passages. Animal husbandry must have played some role as
well, though shepherding was probably more a marginal activity in Galilee than in Judaea. Zeʼev
Safrai, “Agriculture and Farming,” in The Oxford Handbook of Jewish Daily Life in Roman Palestine,
ed. Catherine Hezser (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 246 –63 at 256–57; Applebaum,
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Strange, Galilee, vol. 2, 146–57 at 150. Mordechai Aviam, “Yodefat—Jotapata: A Jewish Galilean
Town at the End of the Second Temple Period: The Results of an Archaeological Project,” in Fiensy
and Strange, Galilee, vol. 2, 109–26 at 113.
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From the Egyptian documentary papyri, it seems that it was quite common for households in
these agrarian communities to pursue a diverse set of productive activities simultaneously within the
family unit; see Dominic Rathbone, “The Ancient Economy and Graeco -Roman Egypt,” in The
Ancient Economy, ed. Walter Scheidel and Sitta von Reden (New York: Routledge, 2002), 155–69 at
161.
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Sharon Lea Mattila, “Inner Village Life in Galilee: A Diverse and Complex Phenomenon,” in
Fiensy and Strange, Galilee, vol. 1, 312–45 at 316.
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We may also note War 2.126–127, which suggests the commonality of trade between
members of a community by pointing out as a peculiarity the Essenes’ practice of giving and receiving
from each other according to need, rather than buying from or selling to one another.
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does not tell us much about the network along which these transactions occurred. The
context seems sometimes to be fixed stalls in permanent or temporary markets (e.g.,
m. BB 2:3; 8:6; m. Dem 5:7; m. Tah 6:3), which we might expect to occur at the
larger end of the settlement spectrum, while others could just as easily refer to direct
sale from householder’s property in any settlement (e.g., m. Peʽah 2:8; m. Dem 5:7).
Much of the reallocation of agricultural produce was probably accomplished between
kin and neighbors within a given settlement, whether through monetized exchange,
cooperative sharing or bartering agreements, or mechanisms of credit and debt.
Decker notes that such comparatively low-value goods as agricultural produce were
probably sold at village market centers, rather than just in the cities, and that most
such transactions were conducted face-to-face between buyer and seller, rather than
conducted through professional traders and other middlemen. 357
While agricultural production was omnipresent and generalized, and most trans actions likely conducted at the short distances between villages in the network, other
goods were less ubiquitous. We turn to those next.
Fishing
Fishing in this region was obviously relegated to the settlements on the lakeshore,
most prominently Tiberias, Magdala, Capernaum, and—in the Golan—Bethsaida.
Archaeologists have uncovered evidence for fishing within and near all four sites. The
most extensive infrastructure for fishing comes from Magdala, whose very name in
Greek—Ταριχείαι—means “fish preserving factories.”358 In fact, the town was noted
for its fish by Strabo (Geographica 16.2.45), suggesting a widespread reputation by
the late first century BCE as a producer of fish products, some of which may have even
made it to the coast and beyond. 359 Archaeological excavation of the site revealed not
only a breakwater harbor and wharf for boating more generally, but also a structure
connected to the lake by a water channel that appears to be a holding tank for caught
fish, and a rectangular building constructed of ashlars that may have served as a fish
market.360 More astounding was the discovery of a fishing boat dating to the Early
357

Decker, Tilling the Hateful Earth, 230–32.
In later rabbinic sources, the site is referred to as Migdal Nunayya (  ) מגדל נוניאmeans “tower
of fish,” referring probably to the lighthouse that once stood in the harbor. On the Hebrew/Aramaic
name of the site, see further De Luca and Lena, “Magdala/Taricheae,” 286–91.
359
Note, though, that he confuses Lake Kinneret and the Dead Sea. Bitumen was produced at the
Dead Sea and not Kinneret, but since fish cannot live in the high salinity of the Dead Sea, his refer ences to fish production must be referring to Lake Kinneret. For further discussion, see Silvia
Cappelletti, “Non-Jewish Authors on Galilee,” in Zangenberg, Attridge, Martin, eds., Religion,
Ethnicity, and Identity in Ancient Galilee, 70–71.
360
The identification of the fish market is more tenuous, based on the fact that (1) ashlars indi cate it was a public building and (2) the location near the shore and fish tank suggest it was somehow
associated with the fishing industry; see Raban, “The Boat from Migdal Nunia,” 322 and 326 –27. On
the harbor infrastructure more generally, see also Jürgen K. Zangenberg, “Archaeological News from
the Galilee: Tiberias, Magdala and Rural Galilee,” Early Christianity 1 (2010): 471–84; De Luca and
Lena, “The Harbor of the City of Magdala/Taricheae,” 113–63.
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Roman period in the lake near modern-day Kibbutz Ginosar, just north of Magdala. 361
At Capernaum, a number of small, manmade stone dikes in the water—interpreted as
either fish ponds or anchorages for small fishing boats—also indicate fishing
industry. 362 Fishing weights have been found at Capernaum 363 as well as off the coast
of Tiberias,364 indicating that fisherman could be found operating out of even the
largest Galilean settlements. That fishermen made up a notable population of Tiberias
may be suggested by Josephus’ reference to a faction of “sailors and poor” (τῶν
ναυτῶν καὶ τῶν ἀπόρων; Life 66), though some of those may have been engaged in
boat transport. At Bethsaida, the material assemblage in several domiciles included
fishing apparatus such as fish hooks, sinkers, and stone anchors, indicating fishing
was a common occupation among the inhabitants. 365 We may add to the archaeological remains the literary depictions of fishing in the New Testament gospels, particularly around Capernaum where much of the narrative is set (Matt 4:18–22; 17:26–27;
Mark 1:16–20; Luke 5:2–7; John 21:1–14).
K. C. Hanson has argued against the notion that fishermen constituted a sort of
middle class of entrepreneurs, and are best understood as a subset of the peasantry. 366
While I take issue with his notion of a flattened peasantry struggling for subsistence,
he is correct in noting that most fishermen were probably not what we might call a
“middle class” or “entrepreneurial class.” The boat hull found off the shore of
Kibbutz Ginosar was composed of several different types of wood, suggesting that it
was cobbled together and repaired from whatever was available. 367 If this boat is
representative, it hardly looks like fishermen were wealthy. Hanson is also correct in
seeing two tiers of fishermen, based on differential access to resources. The Gospel of
Mark depicts both household labor (Zebedee and his sons John and James) and paid
hands (τῶν μισθωτῶν) employed in one fishing boat operation (Mark 1:19–20). The
Zebedee household had greater access to material resources (boat and equipment) but
a deficit in labor, while the hired hands had excess labor but lack the capital to effectively deploy it. But one could also profitably fish without a boat; Annalisa Marzano
has recently argued that fishermen could catch substantial yields even with relatively
361
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simple and inexpensive equipment and fishing from shore. 368 Net fishing could be
performed from shore, as Simon and Andrew appear to be doing in the gospels (Matt
4:18–22; Mark 1:16–20). The Mishnah also makes reference to fish traps (m. Kel
23:5).369
Hanson follows Michael Rostovtzeff in understanding fishing industry as a state
monopoly, in which fishing rights are awarded to individuals or cooperatives through
contract, pointing to comparanda from Egypt and Asia Minor and the aforementioned
episodes in the gospels.370 In so doing, he envisions fishing as a form of production
controlled by a select few wealthy individuals or groups, profiting solely from the
labor of others, much as Horsley and other understand Galilean agricultural lands
clustered in the hands of the urban elite. But Marzano points out that the consensus
has shifted away from the notion that fishing rights were controlled by the state, and
the literary evidence for these monopoly contracts are in part a product of misreading.
Rather, individuals, groups, and communities alike fought for access, control, and
profit over fishing grounds, making use of the existing legal frameworks, which
makes fishing much more a grounds for contention than a simple government monop oly.371 While not impossible, Hanson’s readings of the relevant New Testament
passages are sometimes quite forced: he believes that “the location of Levi’s toll
office in Capernaum … probably identifies him as just such a contractor of fishing
rights,” despite the more natural understanding of him as a toll collector for portoria
at the harbor.372 He may be correct in identifying cooperative partnerships in Luke’s
version of the call of the disciples, which references two ship crews cooperating as
368
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partners (μέτοχοι, 5:7; κοινωνοί, 5:10), 373 though there is no need to understand this
as a guild that held monopoly fishing rights. It may merely exemplify cooperative
endeavors between members of the community to take advantage of a boon catch and
prevent damage to the equipment (cf. 5:6–7).
We may presume that fish was a fairly regular component of the diet for the
population living in far eastern Galilee, close to the lake. If not a fisherman, one could
easily obtain fresh fish from a nearby settlement. Both of the gospel “feeding” narratives, for instance, are situated near the lake and include fish (Matt 14:13 –21; 15:32–
16:10; Mark 6:31–44; 8:1–9; Luke 9:10–17; John 6:5–15). That fish was a regular
part of the regional diet is suggested also by the parable in Matt 7:7–12 that seems to
places fish alongside bread as staples: “Is there anyone of you who, if their child asks
for bread, will give a stone? Or if [the child] asks for a fish, will give a snake? ” (7:9–
10). We may also infer that in these shore communities many fishermen needed to
trade their excess fish (whether market transactions or other mechanisms of exchange)
in order to obtain the agricultural goods they needed. The presence of such full -time,
specialist modes of production necessitates some level of intra- or inter-community
trade in the region to obtain the necessary variety in foodstuffs.
It is harder to be certain how important or regular a foodstuff fish was to more
inland communities; most of the gospel narrative occurs in the lake region and does
not disclose meals in the Galilean heartland, and Josephus says little about the nature
of his meals in Galilee in general. The Mishnah does make several references to fish
consumption, though without geographic specificity (e.g., m. Ter 10:8; m. Beṣ 2:1; m.
Ned 6:4; m. BM 2:1). We do have some archaeological evidence for inland fish trade
to Sepphoris, though. Arlene Fradkin has analyzed fish bones collected from the
Sepphoris excavations in order to determine their species and region of origin. 374 The
mere presence of fish in inland Sepphoris indicates the settlement was a partner in the
fish trade, and the species included both freshwater catfish and tilapia and salt water
fish that indicate both local Galilean and Mediterranean imports. Because the study
does not break down the Roman–Byzantine period into smaller units, we cannot say
with certitude that this pattern began as early as the Second Temple period. 375 But if
there were trade in fish along the major highway as far inland as Sepphoris, then it
seems likely that trade in fish also connected to smaller settlements, especially those
within a few hours walk of the shore.
The range of trade in preserved fish could in fact have been quite extensive.
Preservation through pickling, salting, or curing the fish would greatly expand the
373
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fish’s “shelf life,” making it easier to transport to other settlements without fear of
spoiling, and allowing people to purchase larger amounts at a time and store them for
months.376 The extent of Magdala’s fishing processing facilities, if we are right to
interpret them as such,377 suggests that it may have been the major site for exporting
preserved fish for consumption in Galilee and perhaps beyond—to the coasts or
settlements across the lake. 378
Ceramics
Some essential craft products were also unevenly distributed in Galilee, and obtaining
them required some amount of inter-settlement trade. One such craft is ceramics,
since producing them requires access to good clay soil not available at every locale.
Because wet clay would be laborious and likely more expensive to transport than
finished products, most communities obtained them through trade rather than
producing them in the household. In fact, Galilee seems to have been largely reliant
on a handful of sites for the bulk of the region’s ceramic supply, and the major
producers left behind such voluminous waste remains that it is certain their produc tion efforts were directed toward widespread market sale with other settlements,
rather than just producing vessels to be used by residents of the village.
Ceramics were not just a onetime expense either; while the material is durable
(hence their ubiquity in archaeological remains), the vessels themselves were quite
fragile, and we must assume that households regularly needed to procure replacements. The regular need for replacement would be all the more exacerbated when
purity concerns are considered, since a ritually polluted ceramic vessel could —
according to some circles—never be rendered clean again and needed to be broken
(Lev 11:33; see discussion in ch. 3).
Because of their durability, ubiquity, and their regularity as a market commodity,
ceramics serve as a useful metric for assessing the overall bounds of Galilee’s
regional trade network. If we can determine the site of production of a vessel, then we
can roughly determine the extent of the overall system in which it was traded. The
trade in common cookware is perhaps the most straightforward, since these types of
vessels are not likely to be resold. The site of deposition is often the endpoint of a
distinct transaction—the line between start and end either represents a direct site-to376
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site transaction between producer and consumer, or a transaction at a third -site
market, or a transaction mediated by a middleman (e.g., professional trader). 379
Storage vessels—jugs and jars—have the potential to say much more as proxy
evidence for the movement of perishable goods like agricultural produce and fish, 380
though they say much less about direct transactions than about the overall bounds of
the economic network. That is because, unlike cookware, storage vessels were likely
reused over and over, and may have change hands many times before ultimately
breaking. Their sites of deposition do not tell us the full tale of their movement
through the region, masking a host of transactions that may have occurred between
point A and point B. 381 Moreover, to use storage vessels to trace movement of foodstuffs requires assuming that the vessel was filled for sale near the site of production.
While it might be the case that many jars and jugs were initially purchased full, to
presume that this was always the case would give the false (and absurd) impression
that the major storage vessel production site of Shikhin was the primary food clearinghouse for all Galilee! Storage vessels are therefore a better gauge of the bulk of
trade in foodstuffs, 382 but they only give us a picture of the overall trade network
rather than individual inter-settlement transactions.
David Adan-Bayewitz’s work on ceramics in Galilee has been incredibly
important for our understanding of regional trade in the region. 383 Using the techniques of neutron activation analysis and x-ray fluorescence, he has been able to
group pottery finds according to their clay composition and identify the source of
379
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Golan

Galilee

production by comparison with the composition of samples from the known production site of Kefar Ḥananiah, on the frontier between Upper and Lower Galilee. His
excavations there found kilns made out of fieldstones and several plastered pools
nearby for kneading clay. Adan-Bayewitz dates production at Kefar Ḥananiah from
the first century BCE through the end of the Roman period. 384 The early and Middle
Roman wasters—misfired or over-fired pottery—in the plastered pools indicate mass
production began in the Early Roman period, and the presence of Late Roman wasters
on the bottom of the kiln suggests that it went out of use around this time. 385 Unfortunately, excavations did not really extend beyond the pottery manufactory, so we do
not have a clear picture of the size or wealth of the village or the place of potting
alongside other productive enterprises conducted by its inhabitants. 386
According to his sampling of
Site
% KḤW Distance (km)
ceramic remains from archaeological
Kefar Ḥananiah
100
0
sites in northern Palestine, an overHazon
100
4.5
whelming percentage of the common
Rama
97
5.1
everyday pottery at Galilean sites
Meiron
99
9.7
were Kefar Ḥananiah wares (henceYodefat
76
23
forth, KḤW).388 In general, the perḤammath Tiberias 97
23.2
centage of KḤW in a site’s ceramic
Sepphoris
74
26.5
assemblage declines at a linear reZabdi
59
36.5
gression with distance from the proJalame
56
45.5
duction site, at least for sites within
Kanaf
12
30.3
46 kilometers of Kefar Ḥananiah
Nashut
21
41.3
(see Error! Reference source not
Gamla
11
44.5
found.).389 This pattern is best
Table 1. Percentage of KḤW at sites in Galilee and the explained as a product of the friction
Golan by distance from Kefar Hananiah. 387
of overland travel; the greater the
distance, the greater the relative cost of acquiring KḤW versus more proximate
competitors. This also fits well with the notion than much of the regional trade was
conducted directly from villages, rather than chiefly in urban hubs, since the pattern
correlates proportion of KḤW with distance from Kefar Ḥananiah rather than distance
from the cities. Kefar Ḥananiah was, after all, not very close to Tiberias, Sepphoris, or
even Magdala. Much of the trade in KḤW would have entailed buyers coming to
Kefar Ḥananiah, potters transporting their wares to nearby sites directly, or
384
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middlemen purchasing directly from the potters and circulating the region to make
sales.
This does not, of course, preclude the notion that there was some amount of
urban peddling in KḤW. Indeed, Adan-Bayewitz noted that KḤW composed an
anomalous 97 percent of the assemblage at Tiberias. This may be explained by the
small sample size collected there, but it may also be explained by its lakeside
location, which decreased the amount of overland distance necessary to reach Kefar
Ḥananiah,390 and made this port town a useful node extending the trade reach beyond
Galilee into sites on the other side of the lake. Underwater excavations near
Capernaum,391 Magdala,392 and Tiberias393 on the western lakeshore all turned up
Early Roman-period ceramic vessels (KḤW forms) in association with stone anchors.
Since Capernaum was relatively close to Kefar Ḥananiah, it is unlikely that these
offshore ceramics represent imports from the lake, but rather suggests export from a
non-urban center to other settlements around the lake. For Magdala and Tiberias,
farther south along the coast, they may indicate imports or the function of these
settlements in secondary distribution to points east and southeast along the periphe ry
of Galilee.
While KḤW constitutes the vast majority at sites in the Galilean heartland, it also
appears in smaller proportions at sites around Galilee’s periphery, such as Hippos in
the Decapolis and Ptolemais on the coast, but is absent altogether in Samaria. 394 This
gives us a sense of the maximal range of the trade network in ceramics, with high
proportions in Galilee suggesting dense clustering of the trade network there, and a
few external connections to the system with outlying settlements. Moreover, it is
notable that the predominantly gentile cities of the coast and Decapolis where KḤW
has been found had Jewish minority populations (see War 2.457–480), while there are
no signs of similar trade to the south with the Samaritans, with whom Galileans at
times had tense relations (see ch. 4).
Though Kefar Ḥananiah was undoubtedly one of the major ceramic producers for
the region, it did not have an absolute monopoly on production. Adan-Bayewitz
himself determined that many of the vessels found at sites in the southern Golan
shared the same vessel forms as KḤW but were made from local Gaulanite clays for
390
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local consumption.395 In his excavations of Yodefat, Mordechai Aviam unearthed
several first-century kilns and ceramic wasters from vessels of KḤW forms, indicating that potters at that site were producing their own versions of those vessels from
local clay that competed with KḤW at market. 396 Douglas Edwards’ excavations at
Khirbet Qana uncovered wasters of KḤW forms there as well, and even though no
kiln was found, ceramic waste materials tend not to travel far from sites of manufacture and suggest some amount of local production even in this tiny hamlet. 397 The
proportion of KḤW is densest in the eastern part of Galilee, while the known competitors of Yodefat and Khirbet Qana were located in western and southern Lower
Galilee respectively. This points to the interrelation of expense/distance of K ḤW and
the ability of more local operations to effectively compete for sales. It may be the
case that KḤW were more popular on account of their quality and durability (as later
rabbinic texts seem to suggest; cf. b. Shab 120b), and the others were regio nal
competitors or local “knockoffs.” It is also worth noting that Adan-Bayewitz’s analysis is in part based on compositional analysis (see the sites in Error! Reference
source not found.), but outside of these sampled sites he relies on form
comparison.398 It is thus worth taking the form-based conclusions with a grain of salt
until further compositional analysis can definitively determine which pottery they
came from; there may have been some other small regional competitors that competed
for sales with neighboring settlements, even if only for a relatively small market
share.399

395

Adan-Bayewitz, Common Pottery, 166–170. On the sharp distinctions in ceramic profiles of
sites in the southern and northern Hula Valley, and ethnic difference on the basis thereof, see Idan
Shaked and Dina Avshalom-Gornim “Jewish Settlement in the Southeastern Hula Valley in the First
Century CE,” in Religion and Society in Roman Palestine: Old Questions, New Approaches, ed.
Douglas R. Edwards (London: Routledge, 2004), 28–36.
396
Aviam, “Yodefat—Uncovering a Jewish City,” 92. Since a hastily built wall was constructed
over them during the siege during the Jewish Revolt, these kilns certainly went out of use at this time.
397
Edwards, “Khirbet Qana,” 117.
398
Compare the marks labeled “sampled collection” versus “collection includes examples of
Kefar Ḥananya ware,” in Adan-Bayewitz, Common Pottery, 19–20 fig. 11. As James Riley Strange
has pointed out (private communication), he sometimes slips into a conflation of form with origin,
identifying some pottery remains as products of Kefar Ḥananiah, despite not sampling them for
compositional analysis.
399
We may note in this regard the very recent discovery of a new ceramic manufactory near
modern Aḥihud in western Galilee, on the basis of a kiln and wasters of familiar Kefar Ḥananiah
forms (and possibly Shikhin forms too), though operations here date to the Middle Roman period; see
Dina Avshalom-Gorni and Anastasia Shapiro, “A Pottery Workshop at Aḥihud and Its Relationship to
the Jar Industry in the Northeastern Zevulun Valley and Western Galilee during the Roman Period,”
ʽAtiqot 83 (2015): 67–92. The authors also note a hitherto unpublished pottery manufacture site
uncovered in Idan Shaked’s survey at Yavor Junction in the same region, identified by the presence of
wasters from Shikhin-type jars (pp. 86–87); the date was not specified in the article. Clearly, there
may have been more fledgling operations as yet undiscovered that strove to compete for sales at a
more local level with Kefar Ḥananiah or Shikhin.
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The other predominant ceramic manufacturing site in Galilee was the small
village of Shikhin, located approximately 3 kilometers from Sepphoris. 400 Although
the kiln site has not yet been identified, the ancient clay beds were discovered in the
initial survey of the site 401 and five seasons of excavations have yielded hundreds of
ceramic wasters with dates indicating a boom in the Early Roman period tapering off
in the Late Roman period. 402 Whereas Kefar Ḥananiah was specialized in producing
cookware, Shikhin was specialized in storage vessels; there are signs from the wasters
that Shikhin produced familiar Galilean bowls and cookware forms in smaller
volume, and even experimented in novel forms hitherto unknown outside Shikhin and
nearby Sepphoris.403
David Adan-Bayewitz and Isadore Pearlman identified Shikhin as the production
site for the storage jar forms that are common throughout Galilee and the Golan.
Their initial compositional analysis using neutron activation analysis found that
kraters, bell-shaped bowls, and a common type of storage jar found at sites
throughout Galilee and the southern Golan share a common composition profile with
several wasters discovered during the Shikhin survey. 404 The sampled sites indicate
that vessels produced at Shikhin were distributed over a similar territory as K ḤW
over a period spanning the first and second centuries CE.405 This initial study did not
produce data about the proportion of Shikhin wares at each of these sites, nor did it
sample storage vessels from peripheral sites besides the Golan (e.g., Ptolemais or
Scythopolis), and so a full picture of the distribution of Shikhin storage vessels must
await a thorough comparative compositional analysis. 406
It will be interesting to see in coming years whether the impression of Shikhin’s
dominance of the storage vessel market endures, or whether archaeologists discover
400
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evidence for competing production at alternative sites as we saw for KḤW. If such
competition was enabled or even driven by distance from the manufactory, we should
expect such producers to be based in northeastern Lower Galilee or in Upper
Galilee.407 Then again, Shikhin’s proximity to Sepphoris and the major east–west
highway to the lake may have increased the accessibility to Shikhin wares that made
it easier for them to proliferate. And as we already suggested, their reuse could enable
them to travel farther more easily through iterations of short transactions, from
settlement to settlement, such that they gradually filtered out from Shikhin to far flung settlements.
Lamps were another everyday ceramic product that were likewise dependent on
the proximity of quality clay and were produced in a few settlements as specialist
products. There were several different types of ceramic lamps, 408 but by far the most
popular in first-century Galilee was the ubiquitous “Herodian” or “knife-pared” lamp,
the base of which was spun on a wheel and the nozzle appended and cut to make
wing-like projections at the tip. David Adan Bayewitz (et al.) performed a composi tional analysis of Herodian lamps from sites in Galilee and determined that in each
case, a striking 80 to 96 percent of the lamps belonged to the same compositional
group originating at pottery workshops in the vicinity of Jerusalem. 409 Some Herodian
lamps were produced locally in Galilee—knife-pared nozzles that have never been lit
emerged from the Shikhin excavations 410—but these apparently failed to attract much
popularity.411 This profile differs from those Herodian lamps found at the cities of
Dora and Scythopolis on Galilee’s periphery, the majority of which seem to have
been produced from local clays and a smaller proportion from Jerusalem clays.412
While Herodian lamps were ubiquitous, they were not the only types of lamps
available for purchase in Galilee. Another was the “northern collar-neck” or “boot
lamp,” but its distribution was limited to the center of Galilee and it does not make up
a large proportion of lamp assemblages even there. 413 Varda Sussman has also speculated that a number of other Galilean lamp forms were produced in northern work -
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shops and in circulation during the Early Roman period. 414 James R. Strange believes
that Shikhin was probably the site of production for two of those lamps, which
Sussman had situated near Nazareth, but the evidence for and dating of production of
these lamps at Shikhin is still mounting. 415
The strong preference among Galileans for Herodian lamps, and particularly ones
from Jerusalem, raises interesting questions about consumer preferences and the trade
connections between Galilee and Jerusalem. Why was there such a piqued interest for
the interregional import of simple lamps, especially when the distribution of common
cookware and storage vessels gives the impression of a fairly insular system restricted
to Galilee and southern Golan with weaker connections to the Decapolis and
Ptolemais? Herodian lamps were simple in design—lacking ornate decorations found
on some moldmade lamps—and could easily be replicated at any of the pottery manufactories in Galilee (as the examples from Shikhin demonstrate). But Galileans
continued to purchase Jerusalem-made lamps until the close of the Second Temple
Period. This undermines the notions that trade patterns in Galilee were wholly determined by “purely economic” factors (i.e., cost); other motivations or qualities of the
product are necessary to explain the phenomenon.
This pattern may be comprehensible if we consider Jerusalem lamps as
(quasi-)religious objects that Galilean Jews imbued with additional value by virtue of
their origin near the holy city or composition from Jerusalem soil. That lamps in
particular were valued may be explained by the practice of lamp lighting before the
onset of the Sabbath, especially if this act was understood as one imbued with reli gious imperative, not just pragmatic necessity. Lighting a fire on the Sabbath was a
prohibition of the Torah (Exod 35:3). 416 Josephus references lamp lighting as one of
the characteristic practices of the Sabbath that Jews across the Roman world perform,
alongside fasting and certain food prohibitions (Against Apion 2.282), and two
roughly contemporaneous gentile authors connect lamp lighting with Jewish Sabbatical practice (Persius, Saturae 5.176–184; Seneca, Epistulae morales 95.47).417
Traders may have transported lamps from Jerusalem for sale at secondary distribution
sites in Galilee. But many of the lamps in Galilee may have been purchased as
souvenirs while on pilgrimage in Jerusalem for the festivals and brought back home
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Strange, “Kefar Shikhin,” 102–3 identifies the relevant lamps as (1) the wheel-made “teapot”
lamp, (2) the mold-made “northern undecorated” lamp, and (3) a mold-made lamp without wings, and
(4) a mold-made lamp with wings. See Varda Sussman, Roman Period Oil Lamps in the Holy Land:
Collection of the Israel Antiquities Authority (Oxford: Archaeopress, 2012), 75–77, 92–94, 96–97.
415
Strange, “Kefar Shikhin,” 103.
416
Josephus also implicitly references this prohibition in noting how the Essenes skirt the
problem of food on the Sabbath by doing their cooking on the previous day ( War 2.147).
417
The Mishnah also understands lamp lighting as a normative religious practice conducted on
the Sabbath eve by the third century CE; m. Shab 2:6–7. For a critique of these passages as evidence
for Sabbath candle lighting as a ritual at this time, see Peter Schäfer, Judeophobia: Attitudes towards
the Jews in the Ancient World (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1997), 90–91; Benedikt
Eckhardt, Jewish Identity and Politics between the Maccabees and Bar Kokhba: Groups, Normativity,
and Rituals (JSJSup 155; Leiden: Brill, 2011), 194–97.
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for use.418 Adan-Bayewitz and his co-authors doubt that pilgrimage can explain
percentages reaching as high as 96 percent, 419 but if just one person from most Jewish
households in Galilee went to the festivals each year, that could account for a large
portion of them. We shall return to the matter of pilgrimage and connections to
Jerusalem in chapter 4.
The above discussion of ceramic production and distribution throughout Galilee
gives us a sense of the overall network in with Galileans were participating on a dayto-day and periodic basis. The sites in Galilee, especially Kefar Ḥananiah and
Shikhin, were the predominant manufacturers in the region, and produced volumes
that clearly indicate intentional production for market sale. We also noted that these
two settlements exhibited some amount of specialization (cookware and storage wares
respectively) that allowed them to complement one another on the market. But there
are also examples of competition—at least by potters at Yodefat, Khirbet Qana, and
somewhere in the southern Golan—that produced the same forms as Kefar Ḥananiah
but out of local clays. The overall impression from common cookware and storage
vessels is of an insular Galilee with a rather enclosed system of exchange, with some
weaker connections between the region’s borders and the cities along the periphery.
That these connections to major urban hubs encircling Galilee were so weak, and the
ceramic profiles of them so disjunctive, is a signal of Galileans’ desire to trade
primarily with fellow Jews rather than with major markets of gentiles. The small
amounts of characteristically Galilean ceramics that appear in these cities may best be
plausibly attributed to trade with the Jewish minority enclaves in those cities, who
were at times (especially on the eve of the First Jewish Revolt) at odds with the
gentile majority population. The proclivity for intra-ethnic trade and transactions
among Jews may be explained in part by concerns over ritual purity and other aspects
of observing the religious obligations of the Mosaic covenant, a point we shall
explore further in the next chapter. We also suggested that the peculiar dominance of
Jerusalem-made lamps in Galilee is another signal of the role religious concerns
418

Though we do not have direct references to souvenirs as a major part of Jewish pilgrimage, it
was apparently a common phenomenon among pilgrims to other sanctuaries and shrines across the
Mediterranean in antiquity. For Christians continuing such practices current in the broader Mediterra nean culture, see Georgia Frank, “Pilgrimage,” in Oxford Handbook of Early Christian Studies, ed.
Susan Ashbrook Harvey and David Hunter (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 826–43, esp.
137. David Frankfurter notes evidence for pilgrims scraping sand from the walls of Egyptian sanctu aries to take home with them in Religion in Roman Egypt: Assimilation and Resistance (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1998), 81. The statuettes and temple models produced in Ephesus referenced in Acts 19:23–27 may be interpreted as souvenirs of the famous sanctuary, votive offerings for
pilgrims to leave to the goddess, or both. For an account of the dissemination of artifacts of/from the
Ephesus Artemesion through Asia Minor and beyond, see Jaś Elsner, “The Origin of the Icon:
Pilgrimage, Religion, and Visual Culture in the Roman East as ‘Resistance’ to the Centre,” in The
Early Roman Empire in the East, ed. Susan E. Alcock (Oxford: Oxbow, 1997), 178–99 esp. 184–89;
cf. Elsner, “Viewing the Gods: The Origins of the Icon in the Visual Culture of the Roman East,” in
Elsner, Roman Eyes: Visuality & Subjectivity in Art & Text (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
2007), 225–52, esp. 235–42.
419
Adan-Bayewitz et al., “Preferential Distribution of Lamps from the Jerusalem Area,” 75.
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might play in shaping economic behavior in Galilean society. These lamps demonstrate that while everyday transaction may have been primarily oriented inward, the
connection to Jerusalem facilitated by pilgrimage travel was an important periodic
conduit for economic exchange beyond the confines of the region of Galilee.
Stone
In addition to ceramic evidence, we can
discern something of regional trade in
the products of stone working. Stone
was of course the material from which
most buildings (and all the ones we can
identify archaeologically) were constructed in Galilee, but building stones
were probably not a major item of intersettlement trade. As we noted above,
most of the buildings in Galilean settlements were composed of unhewn
fieldstones of local varieties that could
be gathered from the immediate vicinity. Figure 11. Bedrock in Galilee and its periphery
And the builders likely did not go far by type.
even for the hewn stones from which some structures in Tiberias, Sepphoris,
Magdala, and Gamla were built, as they do not differ from the local bedrock. 420 More
interesting for discerning regional trade than building stones were cut- or shapedstone products that were distributed widely but clearly produced in limited areas or
specific localities. It is to these objects that we now turn.
Stone vessels were a ubiquitous commodity at Jewish sites in this period. Stone
vessel remains have been identified at essentially every site that has undergone exca vation and some where surface surveys have been conducted in Galilee. 421 They also
appear to be evenly distributed within settlements, such as at Capernaum, indicating
that stone vessels as a class were not the preserve of the wealthy, though the rarity of
420

I.e., basalt in the lake region and Golan, and limestone in western lower Galilee (see Figure
11). That the movement of building stone from greater distance was not inherently impossible is
proved by the Late Roman/Byzantine-period synagogue at Capernaum, which is composed of a white
limestone that stands in stark contrast to the local black basalt.
421
See maps in Mordechai Aviam, “Distribution Maps of Archaeological Data from the Galilee,”
in Zangenberg, Attridge, Martin, eds., Religion, Ethnicity, and Identity in Ancient Galilee, 115–31 at
199; Edwards, “Identity and Social Location in Roman Galilean Villages,” 372; Jonathan L. Reed,
“Stone Vessels and Gospel Texts: Purity and Socio-Economics in John 2,” in Zeichen aus Text und
Stein: Studiem auf dem Weg zu einer Archäologie des Neuen Testaments, ed. Stefan Alkier and Jürgen
Zangenberg (TANZ 42; Tübingen: Francke, 2003), 381–401 at 392. Sites include Arbel, Beit Maʽon,
Bethlehem, Capernaum, Gamla, Gischala, Hazon, Iblin, Kafr Kanna, Kefar Ḥananiah, Khirbet Qana,
Meiron, Migdal Ha-ʽEmeq, Nabratein, Nazareth, Reina, Sepphoris, Tiberias, and Yodefat. Lacking
from these maps is Magdala, where recent excavations have yielded more stone vessels; see De Luca
and Lena, “Magdala/Taricheae,” 328–29.

120
large qalal kraters422 may suggest that that form was significantly more expensive. 423
Where they do not appear is just as significant: stone vessels are conspicuously absent
from Samaria, and few in predominantly gentile areas. 424 This marks stone vessels as
a particularly Jewish phenomenon, and thus production and trade in these products
was restricted to an ethnically-defined network. They first appear in first-century BCE
contexts and continued to be produced throughout the first century CE and taper out
after the First Jewish Revolt. Though some stone vessels may have been reused by
successive generations, these vessels are exceedingly rare in contexts dated after the
Bar Kokhba Revolt the 130s CE.425
Stone vessels were apparently very popular in Galilee despite the wide
availability of alternatives in ceramic. The popularity and ubiquity of stone vessels
may in part be explained by Jewish concerns over ritual purity. 426 While ceramic
422

Nahman Avigad’s identification of these stone kraters with the ὑδριάς of John 2:6–7 and the

 קללof the Mishnah (m. Par 3:3; 10:3; m. Eduy 7:5) is widely accepted; Discovering Jerusalem
(Shikmona: Israel Exploration Society, 1980), 147–52. See, e.g., Yitzhak Magen, The Stone Vessel
Industry in the Second Temple Period: Excavations at Ḥizma and the Jerusalem Temple Mount, ed.
Levana Tsfania (Jerusalem: Israel Exploration Society, 2002), 53; Shimon Gibson, “Stone Vessels of
the Early Roman Period from Jerusalem and Palestine,” in One Land—Many Cultures: Archaeological
Studies in Honor of S. Loffreda, ed. G. C. Bottini, L. Di Segni, and L. D. Chrupcala (Studium
Biblicum Franciscanum Collection Maior 41; Jerusalem: Franciscan Printing Press, 2003), 287–308 at
294.
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Reed, “Stone Vessels and Gospel Texts,” 390–94. Andrea M. Berlin believes that “in view of
the number of workshops and suppliers, the fact that stone vessels occur in settlements of every type
and class, and the availability of the stone itself, stone dishes were probably not very expensive”;
“Household Judaism,” in Fiensy and Strange, Galilee, 208–15 at 214; Andrea M. Berlin, Jewish Life
before the Revolt: The Archaeological Evidence,” JSJ 36 (2005): 417–70 at 433. This should not be
taken to mean that stone vessels were no more expensive than ceramic ones—else we might expect
them to take on a wider array of forms and be used more extensively, given their imperviousness to
impurity. But the needs for such vessels out of purity concerns could incentivize making a greater
outlay in cost for at least a small number of stone vessels for the household.
424
This is a point oft noted; Berlin references Samaria in particular in Jewish Life before the
Revolt,” 433–34.
425
Mordechai Aviam, “First-Century Jewish Galilee: An Archaeological Perspective,” in Religion and Society in Roman Palestine: Old Questions, New Approaches, ed. Douglas R. Edwards
(London: Routledge, 2004), 7–27 at 20; Magen, The Stone Vessel Industry, 162. More controversial is
the argument that stone vessels continued in use beyond the Bark Kokhba Revolt into the Late Roman
period at Jewish sites in Galilee; “The Manufacture of Stone Vessels in Jerusalem and the Galilee:
Technological, Chronological, and Typological Aspects” [Hebrew], Michmanim 22 (2010): 49–66 at
53–55, 63; Eyal Regev, “Non-Priestly Purity and Its Religious Aspects According to Historical
Sources and Archaeological Findings,” in Purity and Holiness: The Herritage of Leviticus, ed. Marcel
J. H. M. Poorthuis and J. Schwartz (Jewish and Christian Perspectives 2; Leiden: Brill, 2000), 223 –44
at 233–34.
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Views on this were surely not entirely homogeneous among Palestinian Jews. As Jodi
Magness notes, the Qumran sectarians did believe that stone vessels could incur impurity transmitted
via oil, yet they still used stone vessels; Dung and Stone, Oil and Spit: Jewish Daily Life in the Time
of Jesus (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2011), 72–74. For a summary of the stone vessel finds at Qumran,
see Robert Donceel and Pauline Donceel-Voûte, “The Archaeology of Khirbet Qumran,” in Methods
of Investigation of the Dead Sea Scrolls and the Khirbet Qumran Site: Present Realities and Future
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vessels were highly susceptible to taking on and transmitting impurity to food and
other utensils (Lev 11:33), according to the later Mishnah, stone vessels were not
(e.g., m. Kel 10:1; m. Beṣ 2:3).427 And the famous episode of the Wedding in Qana
featuring large vessels for purification suggests that such an association of stone
vessels with ritual purity goes back considerably earlier (John 2:6–7). Andrea M.
Berlin argues from the material remains at Gamla that the krater and “measuring cup”
forms lack parallels in common pottery, suggesting a different and specific use aptly
attributed to ritual washing and immersion. The more open forms—bowls, platters,
dishes—lack an obvious purpose for ritual purity concerns, and seem to mimic luxur y
fineware forms that permeated the region before the first century CE.428
These vessels were carved out of chalk limestone, which was relatively easy to
cut to produce a variety of forms for different volumes and uses—bowls, cups, mugs,
lids, and kraters. They were formed either by hand-carving with chisels, or by rotating
and cutting the stone on a lathe; alternately, some vessels evidence a combination of
the two—hand-carving the exterior and lathing the interior. 429 Yitzhak Magen’s
seminal study of stone vessel production argued that Galilean manufacturers innovated a method of coring the interior of smaller forms with a lathe, whereas Judaeans
chiseled them out, but more recent discoveries have called that dichotomy into ques tion.430 Large cores discovered at Jerusalem indicate that lathes were used to hollow
out large qalal kraters as well as some of the smaller vessels, 431 indicating this was
not a regional variation in production method. Vessels at Gamla indicate the converse
as well—that not all northern productions were lathe-cored.432 There is at present no
Prospects, ed. Michael O. Wise et al. (New York: New York Academy of Sciences, 1994), 1–38 at
10–13; note that these stone vessels share some of the ornate decorations of other Jerusalem-made
stone vessels, suggesting that even this sectarian enclave living in separation from the Jerusalem
Temple had some trade connections with the Jerusalem environs.
427
Zvi Gal, “A Stone Vessel Manufacturing Site in the Lower Galilee” [Hebrew], ʽAtiqot 20
(1991): 25*–26*; Magness, Dung and Stone, Oil and Spit,” 72–73.
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Berlin, Jewish Life before the Revolt, 430–33; Berlin, Gamla I: The Potter of the Second
Temple Period (IAA Reports 29; Jerusalem: Israel Antiquities Authority, 2006), 150.
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Amit noted that some vessels found at a production site near Nazareth exhibited both lathe and hand-carving; see “The Manufacture of Stone Vessels in Jerusalem and the Galilee,” 56–60.
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Magen, The Stone Vessel Industry, 2–3, 118. This observation is corroborated by Reed’s study
of stone vessels at Capernaum, Sepphoris, and Nabratein; “Stone Vessels and Gospel Texts,” 389.
Note, though, that Jerusalem workshops lathed the exteriors of some forms—bowls, platters, qalal
kraters, and lids—and smoothed the inside after hand-carving; see Ayala Zilberstein and Noga Nisim
Ben Efraim, “The Stone Vessels and Furniture of the Early Roman Period,” in Jerusalem: Excavations
in the Tyropoeon Valley (Givʽati Parking Lot), vol. 1, ed. D. Ben-Ami (IAA Reports 52; Jerusalem:
Israel Antiquities Authority, 2013), 213–28 at 216–22.
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Zilberstein and Ben Efraim, “The Stone Vessels and Furniture of the Early Roman Period,”
222. Moreover, these kraters constituted the plurality of stone vessels in the assemblage assessed in
this study; pp. 225, 228; David Amit, Jon Seligman, and Irina Zilberbod, “Stone Vessel Production
Caves on the Eastern Slope of Mount Scopus, Jerusalem,” in New Approaches to Old Stones: Recent
Studies of Ground Stone Artifacts, ed. Yorke M. Rowan and Jennie R. Ebeling (London: Equinox,
2008), 321–42 at 326–27.
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systematic study of the Galilean stone vessels, and much of the data on them still
exists only in summary form. 433 But it appears that at many sites in Galilee the
preponderance of vessels were lathe-turned.434 The lathing process is especially
helpful for identifying the proximity of stone vessel manufactories, since it produces
distinctive cores (ranging from disks to cylinders depending on the vessel) as a waste
material.435
The production of these vessels in Galilee was likely to be located in close
proximity to chalk deposits. Just as transporting heavy, wet clay to potteries far from
the clay pits would have added unnecessary labor to the production process, so too
would moving blocks of stone only to discard the considerable volume of the core at
the workshop. This meant that stone vessel production in Galilee was situated in the
chalk hills of interior Galilee, especially around the Nazareth mountains, rather than
in the lake region where the local bedrock is basalt—a hard, heavy, volcanic rock (see
Figure 11). In fact, our current evidence for manufacturing sites in Galilee clusters
near there. Stone cores were discovered at Kefar Reina on the Nazareth ridge and
Bethlehem on a hilltop to its west. 436 Just last year, newly begun excavations yielded
433

Gibson (“Stone Vessels of the Early Roman Period,” 300) notes that as of 2003 there had been
little evaluation of regional differences between Judaean and Galilean forms, and nobody had
performed petrographic analysis in order to discern the regional origin of the chalk used. He also
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See most recently the summary statements for sites in Fiensy and Strange, Galilee, vol. 2, for
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Gamla’s sizeable assemblage were hand-carved (Gibson, “Stone Vessels of the Early Roman Period,”
304–5).
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Capernaum, which is located in an area with basalt bedrock and a dearth of chalk deposits. It seems
highly unlikely that chalk vessels were being produced locally, since this would be considerably more
labor intensive than producing the vessel near the quarry. So me cores may therefore have moved far
from the production site to be reused for some other purpose, such as carving for lamp molds. On the
stone cores at Capernaum, see Reed, “Stone Vessels and Gospel Texts,” 391. Some cores may have
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Vessel Manufacturing Site”; Reed, “Stone Vessels and Gospel Texts,” 391.
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chalk vessels at various stages of production in a cave at ʽEinot Amitaim, just south
of Kafr Kanna on the ridge. 437 Cores have also been found at nearby Sepphoris and
Shikhin, though at least at the latter they appear in reuse for other purposes. 438 Gibson
and others have suggested that the boom of stone vessel production in Jerusalem
during the Herodian period may be connected to the major building projects, and that
quarrying for hewn-stone construction and chalk vessel carving may have gone hand
in hand.439 If the two stone-working trades were in fact linked, this may help to
explain the concentration of Galilean production in the Nazareth ridge, where there
are abundant signs of quarrying building stone, much of it likely associated with the
rebuilding at Sepphoris under Antipas and the considerable expansion in the
following century. 440
Since production seems to have been concentrated around Nazareth and around
Jerusalem, most settlements must have obtained their stone vessels through trade with
producers in one of these areas or the other. On the basis of material alone, it is clear
that the chalk vessels at sites around the lake, such as Capernaum and Magdala, and
in the Golan, such as at Bethsaida and Gamla, were obtained through trade (see
Figure 11). This is not because they could not have produced stone vessels of basalt
with similar purity-resistant properties—in fact, there are examples of basalt vessels
and tools—but they would have been more laborious to produce, and there may have
been other social forces driving a preference to conformity with the chalk vessels
used by Jews elsewhere in Palestine. 441 Because we can no longer claim a distinction
in the coring method between Galilee and Judaea, it is impossible to say with any
certitude whether the pattern of trade looked more like common pottery—produced
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This site, excavated under Yonatan Adler of Ariel University and Dennis Mizzi of the Univer sity of Malta, is the first such stone vessel manufactory in Galilee to undergo full excavations, and it
will likely yield important data as it continues over subsequent seasons. An official annual report has
not yet been published, but a summary of the findings of their inaugural season can be read at the
University of Malta’s blog: “Excavations in Galilee Reveal 2,000 Year -Old Stone Factory,”
Newspoint, August 24, 2016, https://www.um.edu.mt/newspoint/news/features/2016/08/excavationsin
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See Gibson, “Stone Vessels of the Early Roman Period,” 289.
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as well as at Migdal ha-‘Emeq and Nazareth, though they can only be roughly dated based on fill
material covering the quarry floor. See Leea Porat, “Zippori (Southeast),” HA-ESI 122 (2010), dating
to the Roman period; Nimrod Getzov, “Migdal Ha-ʽEmeq,” ESI 18 (1998): 109–110, which also
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Byzantine period. There is also abundant evidence of quarrying for ashlar building stones at Shikhin
and the adjacent hill of Jebel Qat, and many of the buildings at the site follow the axis of the quarry,
using its edges in wall construction after the quarry went out of use; Jame s Riley Strange, “Shiḥin—
2012,” HA-ESI 128 (2016); Strange, “Khefar Shikhin,” 98–99.
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Arav and Savage note the discovery of a few basalt vessels at Bethsaida, but a clear prefer ence for chalk vessels that they attribute to cultural affinities for this material and its social signals of
solidarity and common identity with Jerusalem; “Bethsaida,” 273–74.
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and consumed as a regional commodity—or like Herodian oil lamps—exhibiting a
strong preference for Jerusalemite products with potential religious significance.
At present, the archaeological record gives the impression that the operations at
Jerusalem were far more extensive than in Galilee, 442 where the few workshops we
know of all seem like fairly small operations. The work space at Reina was not even
associated with a settlement! If this view is correct, the Galilean manufactories might
best be understood as local competitors attempting to edge into the market with
lower-priced alternatives to Jerusalem imports or by making the products easier to
acquire than bringing them back from pilgrimage. This would especially be the case
for the large qalal vessels, which would have been bulky in addition to their
weight,443 and whose Galilean examples appear on average to be less ornate than
those decorated samples uncovered in Jerusalem. 444 There is also a relative paucity of
qalal vessels in comparison to Jerusalem. 445 We may reasonably suspect that a greater
proportion of the qalal finds in Galilee were locally produced, since the costs and
difficulties of transportation created a higher barrier to obtaining Judaean qalal
vessels than smaller “measuring cups.”
Basalt grinding stones also signal intraregional trade. Basalt, as a hard igneous
rock, was the preferred material for grinders in Palestine. Outside of the western
lakeshore and the Golan region (and to a lesser extent near the Dead Sea), where
basalt is the local bedrock, these grinders could only be obtained through trade.
Grinders were used for crushing olives or grain, and took several different forms,
including large rotary querns, rectangular Olynthus mills, and hand mortars. 446 O.
Willaims-Thorpe and R. S. Thorpe used x-ray fluorescence to analyze the composition of querns and mills found throughout Palestine, and determined that most could
be traced to a basalt provenance on the western shore of Lake Kinneret, though some
examples (in southern Palestine and coastal Caesarea) evidence other nearby
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“In terms of the quantity of vessels uncovered in Jerusalem and its hinterland there can be no
doubt that it was probably the largest center for production of stone vessels i n the Early Roman
period”; Gibson, “Stone Vessels of the Early Roman Period,” 300.
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See Reed, “Stone Vessels and Gospel Texts,” 394–95. Qalal kraters constituted 15 percent of
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On the first two mill types, see See O. Williams-Thorpe and R. S. Thorpe, “Geochemistry and
Trade of Eastern Mediterranean Millstones from the Neolithic to Roman Periods,” Journal of Archaeological Science 20 (1993): 263–320.
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sources.447 Local manufacture of millstones in the Galilean lakeshore region is also
evidenced by the find of a partly hewn quern at Capernaum. 448 Basalt querns and hand
mortars are ubiquitous at sites all around Galilee, including inland sites like
Shikhin.449 But unlike chalk vessels and Galilean pottery forms, basalt grinders were
distributed beyond Galilee proper to points south and even out to Cyprus. 450 The
fairly narrow region from which to get sturdy grinders of this material made it
possible for Galilee to participate to some extent in interregional trade to the coast
and beyond, though the nature of this business arrangement is of course obscured to
us. It does demonstrate that while most Galileans seem to have preferred to consume
products produced locally, they were not opposed to exporting such finished products
when there was external demand for them.

A Small World Network and Its Social Implications
In this chapter, I have argued that the regional economy of Galilee—together with the
southern Golan—should be understood as a fairly circumscribed and highly interconnected closed network. This was a region chiefly inhabited by Jews and surrounded
on the periphery by large cities dominated by gentiles and their satellite settlements.
There are strong indications that the network of movement, communication, and
exchange in this region were primarily inward-looking. Literary depictions of movement through Galilee suggest that people could travel from one settlement to the next
with ease. Most neighboring settlements—especially in Lower Galilee—were within a
few kilometers and could be reached in less than an hour. Evidence for roads between
settlements—though of indeterminable date—give the impression of a dense web of
connections within Galilee. Upper and Lower Galilee, once thought to be somewhat
regionally isolated from one another, now appear to be much more integrated into the
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same trade network. 451 From what we can discern of trade from the material remains,
Galileans exhibited strong proclivities for consuming goods produced within this
network rather than importing them from outlying areas or from abroad.
The material evidence seems to indicate, as others have suggested, that Galileans
may have made their trade decisions based in part on motives of ethnic self-identity. 452 Galilee and southern Golan shared similar ceramic forms, distinct from
surrounding regions, even if the Golan and some Galilean settlements were engaged
in competition with the two major Galilean pottery manufactories. Although trade
connections brought some of these Galilean wares to sites on the periphery—such as
the Decapolis or Ptolemais on the coast—these were in much smaller volumes and are
still probably explicable within the understanding of an ethnically-bounded trade
network that incentivized interaction with other Jews in the region. Export of basal t
grinders may have been more extensive, given the limited regional suppliers in this
material. But it is notable that connections to extra-Galilean/Gaulanite sites were
predominately in terms of export, rather than import. The exception to this is the
connection with Jerusalem, from which most lamps and perhaps many of the stone
vessels in Galilee originated; this link was, as we shall develop further in chapter 4,
established and reinforced through the periodic travel of Galileans southward for the
pilgrimage festivals. This pattern suggests that Galileans were more apt to consume
goods produced by fellow Jews, even if they were willing to sell goods to gentiles in
surrounding regions; and they generally tended to consume goods produced in Galilee
or Golan, with the startling exception of some items from Jerusalem.
We began the chapter by undermining economic models that prioritize cities by
demonstrating their inappropriateness to the settlement landscape of Early Roman
Galilee. While Sepphoris and Tiberias may have had a higher capability for
supporting “higher order” luxury goods, given their larger population and their
geographic positions along a major east–west corridor, they did not necessarily dominate everyday trade in Galilee. Certainly, they made natural market sites for
surrounding villages, but in many areas it was equally or more convenient to make
arrangements with family or acquaintances in neighboring villages than to trek to the
city. The pattern for KḤW, for instance, suggested that sales were not dependent on
the city markets but correlated with distance to the pottery workshop itself. The
pattern in the Golan likewise demonstrates that inter-settlement trade could
451
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effectively take place in lieu of a large city nearby. And in the lakeshore region, the
close proximity of a large and long-established settlement of Magdala to the new city
of Tiberias throws a wrench into the simplistic hub-and-spokes model for trade in that
vicinity. We would do well to envision a rather decentralized web of trade networks
and social interaction instead.
Settlements in Early Roman Galilee were more alike than they were different,
contrary to what we might perceive through the lens of models that emphasize an
urban–rural dynamic. Cities, as has long been recognized, were not just inhabited by
wealthy individuals, but also producers of various sorts. In the case of the relatively
small Sepphoris and Tiberias, surrounded by arable land, it is likely that a consider able portion of the population was engaged in agricultural production, as villagers
were.453 Villages were not homogeneous settlements of impoverished peasants, but
settlements that similarly exhibiting economic stratification and diversification in
productive occupations, if different in scale. While most people were engaged to
some extent in agricultural production, there were clearly some who specialized in
other trades such as fishing or potting, or who may have engaged in them in a part time capacity when the rhythms of
the agricultural labor season
allowed. All of this suggests that
rather than understanding the average Galilean struggling to meet narrowly-defined subsistence needs
through agriculturally conservative
strategies, the landscape of productive opportunities created some
room for multiple strategies by Figure 12. Schematic intrasettlement networks for a
which a household could manage small village (C) and larger city (D); brokers in the
their labor and resources within the network marked with B .
settlement and between settlements.
It is worth taking a moment to consider some of the implications of this model of
the Galilean network for social relations and the social development and policing of
both institutions.454 In our discussion of the settlement pattern in Galilee, we noted
just how small most of the settlements in Galilee were; many were less than 1 hectare
and most were less than 4 hectares, with populations of less than 40–60 and 160–240
respectively, using Price’s multipliers.455 With populations so small, it is highly likely
that everybody in these villages was connected to everyone else through only one or
453
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two degrees of separation, i.e., everybody knew everybody else personally, or through
one common connection (see Figure 12C). Moreover, these relationships were likely
multiplex—i.e., not limited to a singular interest but engaged for a range of
purposes—and tapped frequently. 456 These close-knit, small world networks could
serve as effective conduits for the rapid flow of information about others throughout
the village. They also greatly extended an individual’s access to resources, since they
could call upon their relations to participate in cooperative arrangements or to
exchange resources and/or allocate labor to more efficiently meet their needs. Joseph
Manning argued a similar situation pertained to settlements in Ptolemaic Egypt —
property movement often occurred between family members or individuals of similar
social standing within the same settlement, embedded in the same social relationships
that serve a multitude of functions. 457
Sociologists have found that such small, close-knit settlements tend to foster
behavior of communal cooperative assistance and the development of strong social
norms.458 The rapid flow of information allows members of the community to closely
monitor the behavior of their peers and develop robust reputations. 459 The multiplex
nature of these relationships also gives individuals considerable power to san ction
defectors by simply withdrawing from interactions, since a host of arrangements may
depend on the ability to enlist the cooperation of others. These conditions highly
incentivized adherence to normative behavior and widespread adherence to norms in
turn enhanced the level of trust between members of the community.
The largest “cities” in Galilee were still relatively small themselves. At their
maximal extents in the Byzantine period, both Sepphoris and Tiberias reached an esti mated 60 hectares in area,460 but were certainly much smaller in the Early Roman
period—no more than 35 hectares, and probably considerably less. If we assume an
urban density multiplier of 100 to 200 persons per hectare, 461 this yields an estimated
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urban population of 3,500 to 7,000. We may reasonably assume that intra-city
networks were considerably less dense than in smaller settlements when assessing the
network as a whole; more of the relationships may have been “single-stranded,”
meaning they were restricted to one purpose, creating personal networks that were
broad but shallow.462 But we may also identify smaller communities within the city
that coalesce around particular neighborhoods or institutions, which may exhibit the
features of a small world network within that community and allow for many of the
same social phenomena as in tight-knit villages, such as the development of strong
norms.463 The power of peer sanctions in norm enforcement of course weakens as the
density of the overall network diminishes, since information does not necessarily
spread as far or as quickly and one may find peers to interact with outside the sanc tioning group. We may expect, on this model, to find larger cities less homogeneous
in terms of the operative norms and providing greater opportunities for avoiding
compliance, though particular enclaves within the settlement may still exhibit strong
norm building and enforcement depending on the degree of their internal network
density and closure (i.e., separation from the broader city network).
Similar principles apply to the overall network of Galilean settlements. We have
argued that there was ample movement, communication, and trade between settlements in the region. Villages and towns were neither completely inward-looking and
self-sufficient, nor oriented primarily toward the more “urban” sites of Sepphoris,
Tiberias, and Magdala. Instead, they were engaged with most other nearby sites,
regardless of size, in the manner of a densely-linked small world network. As individuals travelled to neighboring settlements for social or trade reasons, they brought
news and gossip with them. Relationships forged with individuals in neighboring
communities could be very important for gathering information about economic
opportunities (trade needs, labor demands, etc.) and information that could lower the
risks involved in interaction with hitherto unknown parties in the community. One’s
established connections to individuals in adjacent communities could serve as
brokers, forging new connections by bridging acquaintances and to some extent
controlling the flow of information (see Figure 12D).464
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Obviously, at the level of the region, we are no longer looking at a scale at which
everybody knows everybody. But the level of interaction and integration between
adjacent settlements suggests that, as a system, Galilee was a relatively dense
network. It was also, as we noted, a fairly closed network, with most interactions
directed inward. It may be prudent to compare this to our discussion of the social
network of the city: as one moves outward from a small, dense cluster of connections
to a larger conglomerate of interconnected clusters, the social pressures that compel
homogeneity and conformity and norm-compliance reduce. We need not, therefore,
expect Galilee as a whole to have operated according to a singular, consistent, and
stable set of norms. But the combination of strong intra-settlement pressures to
conform with internally defined norms of behavior (at least in the villages and moderately-sized towns) with the pressures to operate according to expected norms in inter settlement interactions makes it likely that some things would become normative
across the region. And, as we shall argue in the next chapter, certain reli gious norms
concerning ritual purity and reputations of piety could play an especially important
role in shaping behaviors in trade, both within and between settlements.
In sum, the available evidence for a Galilean regional economic network suggests
a system of highly integrated settlements in a relatively closed network. People,
goods, and information could easily move through the region. Inter-settlement
exchange was in part a necessity, as certain settlements and regions produced
specialists goods desired elsewhere, and in part a strategy, as individuals could make
arrangements to more efficiently exploit their resources and labor. These conditions
facilitated the emergence of norms and strengthened mechanisms of peer policing,
especially at the settlement level but also at the regional level. In the next chapter, we
will delve further into the question of how religious norms governing agricultural
production, consumption, and exchange may have served to constrain and shape the
ways that Galileans managed their economic resources within such a world.
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CHAPTER 3—CULTIVATING PIETY
Mosaic Laws and Their Role in an Agrarian Economy
Many studies of the ancient Mediterranean economy have taken for granted the notion
of the “peasant” as a cultural type, a distinct subset of a population that can be identified cross-culturally and historically that is defined in part by their agrarian focus,
economic contingency, and adherence to a particular ethos.465 Many scholars of Early
Roman Galilee have likewise adopted this concept of peasantry, 466 especially as
filtered through the work of James C. Scott. 467 According to Scott, the primary
characteristics of the peasant ethos are (1) economic decision-making based on a
notional minimum value of resources required, (2) a general aversion to risk when it
threatens this base subsistence, and (3) evaluation of economic conditions in relation
to the ability to attain this threshold. 468 Studies of the ancient Mediterranean and
Palestine alike have deployed this model far too rigidly, especially in deploying a
narrow definition of subsistence that concentrates on food needs (often simplified to
grain needs) and obligations of taxes and rents. As a result of this fairly narrow defi nition of economic needs, analysis of the economy has barely considered the role of
“religious” factors in defining the household’s target resource needs.
We may benefit from altering the assumptions by which we seek to understand
the relationship between economic and religious concerns in Galileans’ economi c
decision-making. As we noted in the introduction to this dissertation, recent scholar465
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ship has demonstrated that the religious cannot be separated from other “spheres” of
the social world, such as the economic or the political, as though they were unrel ated
phenomena.469 The focus on evaluating “subsistence needs” according to a minimalist, lowest common denominator model of the peasant has led scholars to effectively
relegate religious obligations to a secondary concern or afterthought, fulfillment of
which was only considered once the “essential” needs were met. Needs and risk are in
part biologically and ecologically determined, of course, but these factors only define
the bare minimum.470 The definitions of “necessity” and “luxury” and the boundary
between them are not universal constants, but rather are variable and culturally
defined.471 Why, then, should we assume that Jews considered their tax dues in calculating their target for subsistence, but not those economic obligations stipulated by
God and inscribed in the Torah? If we take seriously the notion that most Jews
thought of God as a real and powerful agent in the world with whom they had inter actions and a relationship, we must also acknowledge that the covenantal constraints
and obligations that define this relationship would have factored into their decisions
about how best to allocate their resources. In the language of New Institutional
Economics, the Law may be considered a “formal institution,” the “rules of the game”
that define the human environment within which individuals cultivate tactics for
meeting household needs. 472 I work from the assumption that the Law constituted a
set of rules that Jews could not ignore with impunity, rules that fundamentally shaped
the default positions and incentives that bounded economically “rational” behavior.
As Pierre Bourdieu put it, “the economic calculation directing the agents’ strategies
takes indissociably into account profits and losses which the narrow definition of
economy unconsciously rejects as unthinkable and unnameable, i.e., as economically
irrational.”473
In this chapter, I offer an analysis of some of the Mosaic laws pertaining to agri cultural production, consumption, and exchange. These commandments helpfully
demonstrate that religious institutions are in many cases inseparable from the
economic framework that they reflect and shape. Some would place constraints on the
manner and timing of the agricultural process, limiting how crops could be sown, how
469
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they could be harvested, and when and where they could be consumed. Other
commandments would establish obligations that placed demands on the allocation of
resources. Insofar as Jews sought to adhere to the constraints and obligations laid out
in the Mosaic Covenant, these rules defined the goals of economic behavior and the
tactics appropriate to meet those goals. It is useful to begin with these laws because of
the ubiquity and essentiality of agriculture. A majority of the population in Galilee
and the Mediterranean more broadly were engaged to some extent in agricultural
production, though the amount of land they owned, rented, or worked might vary
considerably, and some of the population was engaged in non-agricultural production,
as discussed in chapter 2. Even Jews who did not produce all or any of their own
foodstuffs needed to obtain agricultural products through trade to meet their food
needs. As such, all members of society were in some way affected by the command ments pertaining to agricultural produce, even if the Law’s constraints were felt
differently by Jews of different socioeconomic positions and those positions enabled
different tactics for managing resources in compliance with the Law.
As we noted in chapter 1, the Roman state permitted the Jews to conduct them selves according to their “ancestral laws,” and at times explicitly endorsed them
through official decrees, such as those issued by Caesar and Augustus (see Ant.
14.194–195, 199, 203, 208). But the infrastructurally weak state was content to let
provincial Jews govern themselves according to these laws, and offered little if any
support in policing adherence. The Temple authorities and the priesthood were simi larly weak in their ability to enforce adherence to the Law, especially in Galilee
where few of them resided. Moreover, many of the agricultural laws would be difficult for centralized authorities to police since they would require intimate knowledge
of the minutiae of a farmer’s conduct. Since the state and cultic authorities were in no
position to effectively police adherence to the Law, observance was largely reliant on
mechanisms of self-policing and peer policing. As E. P. Sanders has argued, most
Jews in the late Second Temple period seem to have understood the Torah’s
commandments as the conditions of the covenant established between God and Israel,
observance of which brought promise of reward and violation of which brought indi vidual or even collective punishment—a concept he dubbed “covenantal nomism.”474
Assuming he is right that this ideology was prevalent in Palestinian Jewish society,
the threat of individual punishment provided additional incentive for one to police
their own behavior for fear of retribution from God, and to police peers for fear that
474
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their transgression would endanger all Israel. Moreover, as we shall see, questions of
adherence and purity could factor into the riskiness of interactions with peers, and the
interlinking of adherence to the Laws with conceptions of piety incentivized Jews to
cultivate and broadcast a reputation for adherence to the Law.
In arguing that the particularly Jewish institution of the Mosaic Law could have
profound effects on the contours of a regional agrarian economy, I am also highlight ing a key limitation in the utility of a universalizing “peasant economics” model.
While there is certainly value to be gained from the cross-cultural approach (such as
its emphasis on risk- rather than profit-based motivation), it overlooks the fundamental differences that regionally- and culturally-specific institutions can make in
economic behavior. The Torah’s agricultural laws have peculiar ramifications that
would have distinguished a Palestinian agrarian economy from the agrarian economy
of other regions in the Roman Empire. Even if climatic conditions and basic needs
were comparable to other agriculturalists in the Mediterranean basin, Galileans did
not necessarily manage their economic resources in the same way or oriented toward
the same resource targets. This chapter therefore suggests that such institutions as
sacred laws and religiously-inflected customs matter in assessing the economy in
other regions and sub-regions of the Mediterranean world as well.

Torah Observance and Interpretive Norms
It is innate in every Jew, right from birth, to regard them [the Law of Moses] as
decrees of God, to remain faithful to them and, if necessary, gladly die on their
behalf. (Against Apion 1.42)

The above quotation from Josephus is obviously hyperbolic, depicting the Jews as
born with intimate knowledge of the divinely ordained commandments and an instinctual and deep-seated drive to obey them even at the risk of death. Nevertheless, this
statement is illustrative of the seriousness with which many Jews from Second
Temple Palestine took the commandments in the Torah. Adherence to the Law is
extolled as a virtue in numerous other texts from this period, such as Ben Sira, Tobit,
and Jubilees. Jewish literature from this period is replete with exemplars of Jews who
piously observed the Law even under extreme pressure to violate it, risking life and
limb in so doing (e.g., Daniel and 2 Maccabees). 475 In 1 Maccabees and Josephus’
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narratives, Jews not only refuse to break the Law but actively fight against those who
would compel them to do so and against fellow Jews would heed that compulsion.476
The prevalence of these narratives suggests that adherence to the Law was a widely
held and long-established ideal among Palestinian Jews by the Early Roman period.
Other lines of evidence corroborate the portrait of Jews concerned to observe the
Torah. Greek and Roman authors wrote about those elements of Jewish practice that
seemed most peculiar or revolting to them or that created discord with the gentile
populations where they resided. 477 Perhaps the most widely recognized practice was
the Jewish Sabbath.478 That the observance of the Sabbath was taken seriously and
widely practiced by Jews cannot be doubted, and the extent to which Jews would go
to avoid violating it can be seen in the refusal to fight to against Pompey during his
siege of Jerusalem, as both Jewish and gentile authors record. 479 Greek and Roman
discussion in Steven Weitzman, “From Feasts into Mourning: The Violence of Early Jewish Festi vals,” Journal of Religion 79 (1999): 545–65.
476
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with gentiles. We will note examples from here where appropriate below.
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This observance—a day when they rested completely from their work, drank wine, and lit
lamps—was reviled by some as sloth and superstition (Plutarch, De superstitione 169C; Seneca, De
superstitione apud Augustinus, De civitate dei 6.11), was imitated or rationalized as a Bacchic rite by
some (Plutarch, Quaestiones convivales 6.2), and was mocked and feared by some who worried of its
influence (Ovid, Ars amatoria 1.75; Seneca, De superstitione apud Augustine, De civitate dei 6.11).
See also Persius, Saturae 5.176–184; Petronius, frag. 37; Seneca, Epistulae morales 95.47. See Peter
Schäfer, Judeophobia: Attitudes towards the Jews in the Ancient World (Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 1997), 82–92; Louis H. Feldman, Jew and Gentile in the Ancient World: Attitudes
and Interactions from Alexander to Justinian (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996), 158–67.
479
Ant. 14.64–68; Strabo, Geographica 16.2.40. See a similar statement about Sabbath rest
during the siege of Jerusalem by Vespasian in Frontinus, Strategemata 2.1.17. There was not,
however, consistent agreement on the topic of whether it was permissible to wage war on the Sabbath,
as exemplified by 1 Macc 2:31–41. For further discussion of gentile authors writing about Jewish
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authors were also quite aware that the Jews had peculiar dietary habits, particularly
their abstinence from pork, though they imagined fanciful reasons for the practice and
surely did not grasp the full extent of the Torah’s dietary laws. 480 Elements of Jewish
halakhah can also be discerned in the few extant legal documents from Roman Palestine, such as the reference to the Sabbatical Year in P. Yadin 18 or tithing in P. Mur.
24.481 As we discussed in chapter 2, archaeological remains of ritual baths and stone
vessels indicate Jewish concerns for maintenance of ritual purity, the conditions of
which were largely defined by the laws in the Torah. Together, these lines of evidence
suggest that many Jews were concerned with adherence to the strictures in the Mosaic
Covenant and strove to carry them out.
Yet some scholars have expressed doubt about the extent to which Jews actually
followed the commandments. 482 One might justly object that the literary sources, in
representing the Jews either to themselves or to others, often gloss over failures in
adherence to the Law so as to highlight the general piety of the people. Josephus’
exposition of the Law in books 3 and 4 of Jewish Antiquities gives the impression that
he is taking on the role of “native expert” (as a priest) in describing to his Roman
audience the Jewish “ancestral law” as actually practiced by Jews in first-century
Palestine, though he may at times simplify the practice or render it in terms more
easily understandable to gentiles. 483 Useful as this source is, as with any generalizing
description, we cannot state from this alone that the entire population actually adhered
to them as described. It would certainly be false to suggest that all Jews were zealous
to follow every letter of the Law, as we know that at least some Jews who ascended to
positions of authority in the Early Roman period ignored the laws of Torah or

practice of the Sabbath, including their refusal to engage in military conflict, see Feldman, Jew and
Gentile in the Ancient World, 158–62.
480
E.g., Apion apud Against Apion 2.137; Philo, Legatio ad Gaium 361; Plutarch, Quaestiones
convivales 4.4.4; Diodorus, Bibliotheca historica 34.1.4; Tacitus, Historiae 5.4.2. See Feldman, Jew
and Gentile in the Ancient World, 167–69; see Schäfer, Judeophobia, 66–81.
481
See Zeʼev Safrai, “Halakhic Observance in the Judaean Desert Documents,” in Law in the
Documents of the Judaean Desert, ed. Ranon Katzoff and David Schaps (JSJSup 96; Leiden: Brill,
2005), 205–36, which argues that the documents are consistent with the practices of later rabbinic
halakhah, though not written in a manner indicating they were derived from or written in the context
of the study hall (beit midrash).
482
E.g., Seán Freyne, “Herodian Economics in Galilee: Searching for a Suitable Model,” in
Modeling Early Christianity: Social-Scientific Studies of the New Testament in Its Context, ed. Philip
F. Esler (New York: Routledge, 1995), 23–46 at 42; Zeʼev Safrai, “Agriculture and Farming,” in The
Oxford Handbook of Jewish Daily Life in Roman Palestine, ed. Catherine Hezser (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2010), 246–63 at 260.
483
I follow Gregory E. Sterling in understanding Josephus to be simultaneously writing for
Greek, Roman, and Jewish audiences, and writing in the form of “apologetic history” as a native
informant in defense and explanation of his people; Historiography and Self-Definition: Josephos,
Luke-Acts, and Apologetic Historiography (NTSup 64; Atlanta: SBL, 1992), 1–19, 297–308. (Whether
or not any or all of them paid attention is a separate issue.)
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engaged them selectively. 484 The Mishnah may suggest attitudes of laxity toward the
Law in those it refers to as ʽamei ha-ʼaretz, though this more likely signals failure to
follow the rabbis’ particular interpretation rather than eschewing the Law alto gether.485 While some commandments recur so often that it is nigh impossible to
dispute widespread adherence to them, others have left relatively little evidence in the
textual record, positively or negatively. “Silences” on particular commandments are
ambiguous. They can be taken to mean that a commandment was not generally
observed. But they may also be a product of the text’s interests lying elsewhere, or
they may signal that a given practice was so widely followed and uncontested that it
was taken for granted as part of the society’s doxa. Where the evidence is sparse, we
are forced to make an assumption in order to move forward.
I work from the assumption that for most Jews adherence to the Law as a general
concept was not a matter of dispute; Palestinian Jews “wanted to obey the Law and
that they considered how best to do so.”486 The Torah was so deeply revered and
adherence to it so central to Jewish identity by this period that it could not be simply
ignored. What was in dispute, however, was how to interpret and implement the Law.
The commandments in the Torah were by no means unambiguous and complete. As
Bernard M. Levinson has demonstrated, even as the books that make up the Torah
were being compiled and composed, the commandments were being reinterpreted and
revised through various textual strategies of rewriting, overwriting, and re-contextualizing.487 The result muddied the waters as much as it clarified them. Even in the
Early Roman period, the text of the Law was not homogenized, and variant versions
could be deployed side by side in the same community without discomfort, as the
variety of manuscript types at Qumran attests. 488
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Most obviously, Julius Tiberius Alexander, nephew of Philo and onetime gover nor of both
Egypt and Judaea, and the Herodian rulers, who sometimes patronized foreign cults (though not in
areas of Jewish inhabitation).
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On amei ʽha-aretz, see Aaron Oppenheimer, The ‘Am Ha-Aretz: A Study in the Social History
of the Jewish People in the Hellenistic-Roman Period, trans. I. H. Levine (Leiden: Brill, 1977). In the
Mishnah and other rabbinic texts, this is a label for people who cannot be trusted with regard to
tithing, the Sabbatical Year, and ritual purity. However, as noted above, this does not mean that they
did not follow the Law altogether or even these rites in particular; they just did not do so in a way that
met the stringencies of rabbinic interpretations and the norms they adopted/adhered to. I do not make
any claims about the utility of this term as a category outside the imagination of the rabbis, since it is
they who constructed them as an “other” to the ḥaverim, and I certainly do not intend to translate them
back into the period before 70 CE. They are used here only to illustrate the role of reputation and stereotype.
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E. P. Sanders, Judaism: Practice and Belief, 63 BCE–66 CE (Philadelphia: Trinity Press
International, 1992), 153.
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Bernard M. Levinson, Deuteronomy and the Hermeneutics of Legal Innovation (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1997); Levinson, Legal Revision and Religious Renewal in Ancient Israel
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008); cf. Hindy Najman, Seconding Sinai: The Development of Mosaic Discourse in Second Temple Judaism (JSJSup 77; Leiden: Brill, 2003), 45–50.
488
See James C. VanderKam, The Dead Sea Scrolls Today (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1994),
121–26; see also David M. Carr, The Formation of the Hebrew Bible: A New Reconstruction (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2011), 153–79.
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The ambiguities and outright contradictions left considerable latitude for inter pretive difference in approaching the Law. For instance, the complicated and quite
disparate commandments to tithe sometimes indicates the tenth is given to the
Levites, sometimes consumed by the one tithing, and sometimes given over to the
poor (Lev 27:30–33; Num 18:21–30; Deut 12:11–18; 14:22–29; 26:12–13). Numerous
authors in the Second Temple period apparently resolved the problem by isolating
three separate tithes, suggesting fairly broad agreement, but this is hardly the only
possibility that the Torah’s texts allow. 489 Furthermore, some texts from this period
(such as Jubilees and the Temple Scroll) offer an alternative or supplemental account
of the sacred Law that reinterpret it using strategies similar to the inner-exegetical
strategies deployed within the Torah itself, overwriting and re-contextualizing the
laws to make a singular interpretation appear as if it were the natural, authoritative,
and incontestable rendering of the divine commandment. 490 The question of whether
or not a given Jew “adhered” to the Law is thus a matter of perspective—according to
which standard and interpretation did one judge faithfulness and deviance?
In this chapter, we will explore the ways that observance of the Torah’s agricul tural laws could have affected economic behavior, on the assumption that the majority
of Jews strove to follow the laws as they were interpreted within a social network.
Despite the seemingly open-ended possibilities allowed by the “gaps” in the Law,
individuals were not necessarily free to interpret the commandments in any way they
saw fit. The commandments were practiced within a network of family, friends, and
neighbors and could have practical effects on interactions and transactions with them.
As we argued in chapter 2, most Galilean settlements were probably fairly closed and
dense networks that made ideal conditions for the development and enforcement of
strong norms. Under such conditions, normative interpretations, as other social norms,
serve to reduce the barriers to interaction, since homogeneity in practice reduces risks
by making others’ actions more predictable and compatible. Moreover, once estab lished, normative traditions can be perpetuated by a combination of instructions and
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We may note that Jubilees explicitly distinguishes two tithes—the First Tithe consumed by the
priests, the Second Tithe by the offerers—and even discusses the animal tithe, but makes no mention
of the Third Tithe for the poor (32:10–14). This may indicate an alternate system of tithes, totaling 20
percent of the produce each year except the Sabbatical Year. But Jubilees does not polemicize against
the practice either, as it does on, say, calendrical matters. What is described is not incompatible with
the Third Tithe.
490
Hindy Najman describes Jubilees and the Temple Scroll as attempts to interpret the Law,
solving contradictions or inconsistencies in a way that simultaneously tapped into the authority of the
Torah without supplanting it. In some cases, it is clear that they presume the continued authority and
knowledge of the Torah; Seconding Sinai, 45–50. Jubilees does so in part by projecting the “correct”
interpretation onto a set of heavenly tablets, which constitute an additional and supplemental source of
legal prescriptions, without altogether replacing the Torah; see discussion in Martha Himmefarb,
“Torah, Testimony, and Heavenly Tablets: The Claim to Authority of the Book of Jubilees,” in
Himmefarb, Between Temple and Torah: Essays on Priests, Scribes, and Visionaries in the Second
Temple Period and Beyond (TSAJ 151; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2013), 49–59.
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mimesis.491 This does not altogether preclude the possibility of arriving at and
practicing idiosyncratic interpretations through exegesis as an individual, private,
cognitive exercise, but social forces weigh against it. 492
From what we can discern in the literary sources about Jewish practice in the
Second Temple period, there was a considerable amount of agreement. Even among
the Pharisees, Sadducees, and Essenes, the so-called “sects,”493 where we might
expect to see the greatest differences, halakhic differences were seemingly confined
to a handful of issues. 494 The Mishnah, too, alludes to local variations in the details of
practice, despite general congruence, in its principle of “everything according to local
491

We may postulate that as members of a community taught the Law to children or peers, they
did so through a particular interpretive filter that conflated the lette r of the Law with the interpretation, possibly accreting other traditions or local norms to the commandment and rendering a given
interpretation as the default, natural reading. Social scientists have also observed that individuals tend
to act in accordance with the behavior of their peers, meaning that normative behaviors may spread
and perpetuate through mimesis and thereby meld to one’s understanding of correct observance. Once
a particular behavior has become normative in a given community, change is d isincentivized because
there is less friction involved in continuing to act according to established norms than to break with
them. This is all the more true once peer enforcement of prevailing norms is taken into consideration.
See Duncan J. Watts, Everything is Obvious: How Common Sense Fails Us (New York: Crown
Business, 2011), 71–73; North, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance, 92–104.
492
John J. Collins seems to me correct in this regard: “The kind of halakhic analysis that we fin d
in the Temple Scroll and Jubilees cannot have developed overnight. Undoubtedly, these issues were
being discussed for some decades before these books were written, certainly before they attained their
final shape”; “The Transformation of the Torah in Second Temple Judaism,” JSJ 43 (2012) 455–74 at
473.
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Judaism in the Second Temple period is often characterized by these three “sects,” due largely
to Josephus’ extensive discussion of them together in excurses (Ant. 13.171–173; 18.11–22; War
2.119–166) and his claim to have trained with each (Life 10). We should not, however, overemphasize
the place of these groups in society. It is likely that only a minority of Jews were adherents to any one
of these, and these identity categories likely overlapped with o ther allegiances that complicate a definition even of these factions themselves. Judaism of this period was marked by variety, but also by a
number of common threads. Moreover, the use of “sect” to describe these groups is somewhat inade quate. The term carries modern connotations of a group that is self-segregating, separating itself from
the rest of “mainstream” society. Although this may aptly describe the Qumran community, it would
be inappropriate to characterize a group such as the Pharisees in this way. Where necessary, I prefer to
refer to them as “factions,” which indicates distinction and separable identities, and even allows for
conflict, without suggesting a removal from the world or a divergence from a conception of a
“common” Judaism. We must also acknowledge that there may have been many more factions than
Josephus’ tripartite schema would suggest. See Martin Goodman, “Josephus and Variety in First Century Judaism,” Proceedings of the Israel Academy of Sciences and Humanities 7 (2000): 201–13;
E. P. Sanders, Jewish Law from Jesus to the Mishnah: Five Studies (Philadelphia: Trinity Press International, 1990), 236–42.
494
See Albert I. Baumgarten, The Flourishing of Jewish Sects in the Maccabean Era: An
Interpretation (JSJSup 55; Leiden: Brill, 1997), 42–80, esp. 55–58. I also follow him in viewing
membership in the sectarian communities as “a minority activity” (42 –44). See also Anthony J.
Saldarini, Matthew’s Christian-Jewish Community (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994),
which argues that the author of Matthew and the community around him were engaged in the same
(limited) set of halakhic debates as other Jewish factions.
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custom” ()הכל כמנהג המדינה.495 We may presume, then, that while diversity of
interpretation existed on particular issues, these different interpretations functioned as
norms within certain regional sub-populations or social groups. 496 Interpretive difference on matters of proper observance created problems and even barriers to social and
economic interaction by increasing the “risk” that one may violate a commandment,
enable someone else’s violation, or appear to others as a result of the interaction to be
a lawbreaker. Differences in interpretation of proper observance also increased the
“risk” of violating piety. Such variations in interpretation add complication to the
analysis of how religious institutions shape economic behavior, but they make the
question of interaction all the more interesting.

Mosaic Constrictions on Productions
We can divide the Torah laws that would have impinged on agricultural production
into two groups: (1) ones that defined when a Jew could engage in agricultural labor,
and (2) ones that defined the manner of cultivation. In terms of temporal restrictions,
the most obvious laws are the commandment to observe the Sabbath and the festivals.
For the former, it suffices to briefly note that the command to rest from labor—
including but not limited to farming—on the seventh day left Jews with overall fewer
days in which to accomplish the work they needed to do. 497 We will return to the
matter of the festivals in chapter 4. Perhaps the most interesting temporal const raint
on production was the Sabbatical Year, which we shall treat in detail here. After wards, we shall turn to the commandment prohibiting planting a field with “mixed
species” for an example of constraints on the manner of production.
Sabbatical Year
The Sabbatical Year is a septennial practice prescribed in Exodus and Leviticus that
requires Jews living in the Land of Israel to let the farmland lie fallow:
For six years you shall sow your land and gather in its yield; but the seventh year you
shall let it rest and lie fallow, so that the poor of your people may eat; and what they
leave the wild animals may eat. You shall do the same with your vineyard, and with
your olive orchard. (Exod 23:10–11)
Six years you shall sow your field, and six years you shall prune your vineyard, and
gather in their yield; but in the seventh year there shall be a Sabbath of complete rest
495

M. Suk 3:11; m. Ket 6:4; m. BM 7:1; 9:1; m. BB 1:1; 10:1.
The Pharisees, Sadducees, and Essenes are obvious examples of this, but there were probably
very many other localized interpretive communities of a less overt and self -conscious nature.
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The loss of a day of labor would be especially critical in the harvest period, when the timing
of work was crucial and overall demands for labor were at the highest in the agricultural season. The
Sabbath practice also brought about logistical concerns, since even travel beyond a certain range was
prohibited (see Ant. 13.252; Life 159–161, 275–276), meaning people in movement around the region
had to time their travels accordingly or arrange accommodations.
496
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for the land, a Sabbath for YHWH: you shall not sow your field or prune your vine yard. You shall not reap the aftergrowth of your harvest or gather the grapes of your
unpruned vine: it shall be a year of complete rest for the land. You may eat what the
land yields during its Sabbath—you, your male and female slaves, your hired and
your bound laborers who live with you; for your livestock also, and for the wild
animals in your land all its yield shall be for food. (Lev 25:3–7)

It is not wholly clear from the text what scope is envisioned. Sowing certainly
suggests grain crops, though it may also include a variety of pulses and vegetables.
Exodus’ fields, vineyards, and olive orchards would seem to indicate the staple crops
of the “Mediterranean triad”—grain, grapes, and olives—but this may also be read as
a synecdoche for agriculture in general, tacitly including produce that composed a
much smaller portion of the diet. At least by the Second Temple period this
commandment appears to have been understood as a prohibition on cultivation altogether. Josephus refers to it as a “respite … from the plough and from planting” (Ant.
3.281), and the tannaim later refer to an extensive number of crops subject to the
prohibition (m. Shev passim). The Sabbatical Year commandment even prohibited
some maintenance projects and improvements that would have eased agricultural
work in future years, explicitly pruning grape vines (Lev 25:4). 498
The version in Leviticus specifies a provision implicit in Exodus’ rendition of the
commandment: people are permitted in the Sabbatical Year to collect food crops that
spring from the soil without the aid of human cultivation (“aftergrowth”), such as that
which grew from grain and seed dropped during the previous harvest (Lev 25:6 –7; cf.
Exod 23:11a).499 The two versions seem to have a different vision of who was entitled
to make use of aftergrowth: in Exodus it is for the benefit of the poor, while in Leviticus it seems directed at the household. The prohibition on reaping aftergrowth (Lev
25:5) could be taken as more than a statement about rest from the labors of cultiva tion, signaling that aftergrowth from one’s fields may not be treated as the private
possession of the household alone. That is how Josephus describes the commandment:
The enjoyment of those [products] brought forth of their own accord from the soil is
to be for those who wish it, both compatriots and foreigners, nothing being withheld
from them. (Ant. 3.281)

This interpretation effectively deemed all vegetation that grew on Jewish lands in the
Sabbatical Year to be available for use by all equally, combining aspects of both
passages from the Torah. On this understanding of the Sabbatical Year commandment, it constituted a leveling of social and economic status among the Jews of Israel:
it denied property owners sole rights over the produce on their farmlands and made
them functionally public. In its ideal form, the Sabbatical Year served as a great
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Mishnah Sheviʽit also prohibits a wide range of tasks during the Sabbatical Year that may be
considered improving the land for cultivation: fertilizing (2:2; 3:1 –4), clearing stones (2:3; cf. 3:5–7),
dressing young trees (2:4), grafting (2:6), and repairing terrace walls (3:8).
499
I.e., a crop that grows without the aid of cultivation from the seed and grains that fell to the
soil during the previous harvest or by natural means of seeding.
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equalizer, causing all of Israel to live a sort of communal poverty and resort to strate gies of scrounging.
Some scholars have accordingly questioned whether the Sabbatical Year was
actually observed in the Second Temple period or whether it was merely a utopian
ideal. Seán Freyne inclines to the latter, saying, “such leveling mechanisms as the
Jubilee and Sabbatical Year institutions were increasingly employed as images for the
eschatological future in the literature of the period, rather than as currently functioning institutions.”500 Zeʼev Safrai likewise doubts that the prescription was strictly
observed and believes it had only limited effects on the economic structure. 501 Indeed,
another aspect of the Sabbatical Year practice, the release of debts (Deut 15:1–11),
was apparently rendered moot in some circles by Hillel the Elder’s procedural inven tion of the prozbul in the days of Herod, which made some sorts of loans payable
even in the year of release (m. Shev 10:3–4).502 But even if we were to understand
this as a complete abrogation of the release from debts—which is surely an overreading—there are indications that the agricultural practices and obligations associ ated with the Sabbatical Year continued. The Dead Sea Scrolls understand chronology
on the sabbatical cycle and saw the seventh year as a year of rest, though the extant
documents contain no reference to specific cultivation practices. 503 The Mishnah’s
tractate on the Sabbatical Year reflects engagement with actual practices and
scenarios that cannot be credited to simple exegesis of Torah, and references to the
500

Quote from Freyne, “Herodian Economics in Galilee,” 42. I focus he re on the Sabbatical Year
and set aside the question of the Jubilee. Since scholars are more hesitant to see the Jubilee as a
continuing practice than they are the Sabbatical Year, I opt to make the case for the practice less
doubted. Because the Jubilee required the return of land to the family to whom it was originally
allotted, there were considerable barriers to implementation—given the exile and the effects on land
distribution by centuries of successive imperial powers—that the Sabbatical Year did not face. Moreover, because the Jubilee only occurred every forty-nine or fifty years (depending on counting
method), it would have had only occasional impact on the economy—once every generation or two.
On the Jubilee in Second Temple literature, see John Sietze Bergsma, The Jubilee from Leviticus to
Qumran: A History of Interpretation (VTSup 115; Leiden: Brill, 2007), 205–304, who argues that by
the late Second Temple period “the legal and ethical aspects of the jubilee are largely eclipsed by its
use as chronological unity, a division of sacred time by which to schematize the past … and the future
until the final age” (304).
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Safrai, “Agriculture and Farming,” 260.
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Hillel’s impetus for creating this workaround was ostensibly that Jews were refusing to l end to
one another just prior to the Sabbatical Year, thereby violating another part of the commandment: “Be
careful that you do not entertain a mean thought, thinking, ‘The seventh year, the year of remission, is
near,’ and therefore view your needy neighbor with hostility and give nothing” (Deut 10:9). This in
fact suggests that most Jews had been heeding the Law in practicing the release from debt, though
doing so by modifying lending practices. The procedure entailed written affirmation made before
judges and/or witnesses that the borrower allowed the lender to collect the debt whenever he/she
wished (m. Shev 10:3–4). The Mishnah goes on to specify that a prozbul could only be used for loans
secured with real estate collateral, though the rabbis offer a loophole to accomplish this if the
borrower owned no land (10:6).
503
E.g., War Scroll (1QM) 2.8–9, which conflates the year of release and the sabbatical rest
( שבת מנוח... ) ובשני השמיטה, as common throughout the Dead Sea Scrolls; see Bergsma, The Jubilee
from Leviticus to Qumran, 251–94 at 256–57.

143
Sabbatical Year also appear in a loan document from 55/56 CE found in the Judaean
Desert (P. Mur. 18) and in a series of land leases from around the time of the Bar
Kokhba Revolt (P. Mur. 24).504 There is even external attestation from Tacitus
(Historiae 5.4.1–5.4.4).505
Josephus also provides textual evidence for the sabbatical fallow in the Early
Roman period. In addition to Josephus’ depiction of it in his Mosaic discourse, he
also references the fallow in the narrative of Herod’s re-conquest of Jerusalem in 37
BCE: “the Sabbatical Year … was still going on and forced the land to lie uncultivated” (Ant. 15.7). A few years earlier, Caesar had issued a decree that granted the
Jews an exemption from tribute payments in the Sabbatical Year, which “compelled
them to leave the land uncultivated” (τὴν δὲ χώραν μένειν ἀγεώργητον … ἠνάγκαζεν;
Ant. 14.202); this decree of course made virtue of necessity: since tribute was
assessed proportionally at this time, a fallow year would yield no tribute anyway. 506
The decree suggests that the fallow was practiced in Galilee as well as Judaea, since it
remits the whole of the tribute for the Sabbatical Years, not just a portion. If Galilee
did not participate in the sabbatical fallow, it is strange that the Romans forfeited the
substantial revenues to be gained from Galilee. 507
The Sabbatical Year prohibition of cultivation would have shifted regional
patterns of resource acquisition and the deployment of human resources. In a society
where most inhabitants were to some extent engaged in agricultural production to
meet their resource needs, a year in which cultivation was prohibited created a
problem for how to allocate resources efficiently. In many ways, the Sabbatical Year
was like a famine, but because of its regularity households could plan ahead to ensure
they would have the resources they needed. Despite the difficulties that the sabbatical
fallow caused for the many who observed it, it seems not to have spelled utter doom

Although Milik initially interpreted the phrase  ושנה שמיטה דהas a formulation of the prozbul
statement (see below), Ben Zion Wacholder has argues instead for the plain reading of “in this, the
Sabbatical Year”; “The Calendar of Sabbatical Cycles during the Second Temple and the Early
Rabbinic Period,” HUCA 44 (1973): 153–96 at 171.
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Damocritus’ slanderous claim that the Jews conducted a septennial sacrifice of a foreigner
may possibly reflects knowledge of a Jewish custom taking place at this interval (Damocritus, De
Judaeis apud Suda, s.v. Damokritos).
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See ch. 1, p. 35.
507
We may also surmise that Galileans practiced it insofar as it was practiced by Judaeans under
the Hasmonaeans (cf. 1 Macc 6:49, 53; Ant. 12.378; War 1.60), and the Judaean settlers who initially
populated Galilee after it was conquered by Hyrcanus I would have brought the tradition and practice
with them. On the displacement of the gentile population of Galilee by Jewish settlers in the
Hasmonaean period, see esp. Martin Hørning Jensen, “The Political History in Galilee from the First
Century BCE to the End of the Second Century CE,” in Galilee in the Late Second Temple and
Mishnaic Periods, vol. 1: Life, Culture, and Society, ed. David A. Fiensy and James Riley Strange
(Minneapolis: Fortress, 2014), 51–77. Richard Horsley, against the archaeological evidence, argues
for continuity back to the Israelite Northern Kingdom, envisioning the Galilean peasantry as bearers of
little traditions hailing back to the First Temple period; see Jesus and the Politics of Roman Palestine,
135–44.
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for the average agrarian household. 508 In general, there are two basic tactics that Jews
could turn to meet their production needs for this year: store food in advance of the
Sabbatical Year or acquire produce at market during the Sabbatical Year.
Storage in kind was in many respects the safe strategy. 509 While one could expect
to gather some aftergrowth from the public lands in the Sabbatical Year, it was a
tactic full of uncertainty: aftergrowth would never yield as much as a cultivated
harvest, the amount that would be available was unpredictable, and one’s access to
what did spring up was not exclusive or guaranteed. Building up a reserve capable of
bringing the family through the Sabbatical Year alleviated the uncertainty and risk of
depending on aftergrowth. The storage for the sixth year would be all the more crucial
if the mishnaic prescription to burn leftover aftergrowth at the Sabbatical Year’s end
(m. Shev 9:2) was also practiced in the Early Roman period, since stores would need
to last into the next harvest season. Storage in kind guaranteed the availability of
foodstuffs when needed, without recourse to the Sabbatical Year market situation,
when the high demand and low supply could lead to higher prices. Building up an
adequate reserve required producing food crops in the years prior to the Sabbath at a
margin well above annual needs in order to stockpile a portion for the lean year to
come. This thereby incentivized practices of intensive agriculture, even engagement
in lucrative ventures in cash crop production, whose revenues could be used to buy
and stockpile staples like grains. Storage in kind was not without its impediments,
though; not all household necessarily had the space to silo an additional year’s
supply, and those who did still ran the risks of spoilage and pests destroying their
reserves. In addition to individual strategies of storage, it remains possible that some
communities engaged in collective preparations for the Sabbatical Year, as suggested
in the Tosefta, gathering produce into a collective hoard that was then rationed out
during the fallow year (t. Shev 8:1–4).510
Households who only obtained part of their food needs through their own
production, or who lacked the infrastructure to store enough excess, were reliant on
exchange with others to meet those needs. Some might be able to achieve assistance
through social capital in their interpersonal networks—accruing favors and goodwill
in the productive years that could be called in should their limited reserves or the
aftergrowth prove insufficient for their resource needs in the Sabbatical Year. But
there are also indicators that the produce markets could continue to function through 508

So too is the assessment of Gildas H. Hamel, Poverty and Charity in Roman Palestine, First
Three Centuries CE (Near Eastern Studies 23; Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990), 45 n.
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out the Sabbatical Year despite the lack of cultivation (see m. Shev 8). Craftsmen and
agriculturalists alike could sell their goods at market during the productive years and
store the value in coin to use for purchases during the Sabbatical Year. Savings in
coin had the advantage of storing value compactly and without the problems of
spoilage and infestation. But since local supply was so low and demand so high in
Sabbatical Years, the difference in price at which produce was sold in the productive
years and the price at which it was bought in the Sabbatical Year made saving in coin
a more expensive strategy, though one that would be essential to the relatively poor
and those in non-agricultural trades.
Where did the food at market come from? It is possible that Galileans solved their
market shortage problem by importing foodstuffs from the gentile and Samaritan
regions on Galilee’s periphery. 511 We argued in chapter 2, though, that the material
evidence suggests relatively limited trade with outside of Galilee itself in this period,
at least in terms of imports; we do not find the abundance of extra-Galilean ceramic
jar forms we would expect if mass imports occurred every seven years. One important
factor may have been concerns over the ritual purity of foods produced by gentiles.
There is nothing inherently ritually impure about gentiles that would cause their products to be unacceptable, but their lack of knowledge of the stringencies of the Torah’s
food and purity laws created uncertainty as to whether one might accidentally and
unknowingly transgress the Law by consuming the imports. 512 In Life 74–76, Josephus indicates that the Jews of Caesarea Philippi (Syria in War) considered the use of
“Greek” oil a violation of the Law (τὰ νόμιμα) while the parallel account in War
2.591 suggests that oil from compatriots (δι’ ὁμοφύλων) would be implicitly
trusted.513 As we shall discuss below, liquids were considered especially effective
transmitters of impurity and thus especially risky, but dry goods may have been
presumed safe, like the Egyptian grain that Herod imported for public distribution in a
time of famine (Ant. 15.314).
The bulk of the foodstuffs available at market was probably supplied by local
Jewish farmers and landowners. The Mishnah assumes at several points that
aftergrowth was sold at market (cf. m. Shev 8:3–5, 8), suggesting food gathered
511
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Galilee (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 82–83. Gaba, the cavalry outpost and veteran
colony established by Herod in the Jezreel plain (cf. Ant. 15.294; War 2.459), was on the frontier of
Galilee and may not have been considered within Galilee proper.
512
Thus following Christine E. Hayes, who convincingly argues that Jewish amixia with gentiles
was not due to any inherent ritual impurity but due to fear that interaction would lure Jews into
imitating gentile worship of idols and/or lead Jews to accidentally transgress commandments d ue to
gentile ignorance; Gentile Impurities and Jewish Identities: Intermarriage and Conversion from the
Bible to the Talmud (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 45–49.
513
Josephus frames this as John’s strategem, rather than an actual claim by the Cae sarean Jews.
Nevertheless, Josephus presumes the sale occurred, indicating the Caesarean Jews were eager to buy
it. But even if it had not actually occurred, the story depends on the believability of this statement that
the Jews consider it unlawful to use oil produced by gentiles.

146
locally rather than imported. More important were Galilean farmers who had the land
access to produce a large harvest and who had sufficient facilities to store large
volumes. For such farmers, the local scarcity in the Sabbatical Year created an ideal
opportunity to earn a considerable cash return at market. The anticipation of these
market conditions created every incentive for those who could afford to hold onto
their crops to do so in order to take advantage of the expected hike in market prices
during the Sabbatical Year. So much for the leveling ideal of the septennial fallow; it
instead created conditions whereby those who were well-off were able to maintain
their wealth because of their superior ability to hold and withhold resources,
compared to those who lacked the surplus and infrastructure to store sufficient food
and relied on the market.
The prohibition on cultivation did not just affect the productive capacity of Galilean agriculturalists. It also altered the subsistence needs of the household through the
easement of external obligations on household resources. Payments that were depend ent on a proportional assessment of the year’s harvest were obviously nullified by the
fallowing. This meant that those agriculturalists who relied in part or in whole on the
rental of arable land had no need to do so in the Sabbatical Year, and for a year at
least had no obligation to a landlord. It also meant the annual tithes were moot; there
was no tenth to be given to the priests and/or Levites, no tenth to be consumed in
Jerusalem, no tenth to the poor. 514 At least under Caesar, the obligation to pay tribute
to Rome was assessed proportionally (one-fourth of what was sown) but remitted in
the Sabbatical Year (Ant. 14.203). We lack the data to confirm whether or not sabbatical exemptions were granted at other times. But in general it seems that the Romans
were fairly accommodating to Jewish “ancestral customs,” and when tribute was
assessed proportionally, it would yield no returns to Rome in the Sabbatical Year.
Tribute under the procurators may have been assessed at a fixed value (see ch. 1),
which would have increased the needs for production in the year(s) prior if no
exemption were granted. We do not know much about the form that Herodian direct
taxation took, but given that the Herodian rulers knew the Law and generally avoided
offending Jewish religious sensibilities within the Jewish regions of Palestine, it is
likely that they would not have sought land-based agricultural revenue from their
Jewish subjects during the Sabbatical Year. 515
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This is especially the case insofar as agricultural land was treated as public holdings in the
seventh year and therefore not liable to tithes whatsoever. That the lands were considered public prop erty is clear in the Mishnah, but can also be inferred from the above-quoted passage from Josephus’
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While I have concentrated here on the Sabbatical Year’s effects on the economy
of foodstuffs, it should be noted that the fallow also affected other peripheral industries. Linen, seemingly the major textile produced in Galilee, was dependent on a crop
of flax.516 Assuming the broad understanding of the commandment as a prohibition on
all cultivation, textile manufacturers would have faced supply problems in the Sabbatical Year. They faced the same set of choices as farmers of foodstuffs—scrounge
through an unproductive year, set aside flax to continue production in the seventh
year, or acquire flax from imports or local stockpilers.
Ceramic production too was affected, at least in terms of storage wares. The
production of ceramic jars and jugs was intimately related to cultivation, since these
vessels were primarily used for the storage and shipment of agricultural goods.
Demand for such vessels would have diminished in a year without a real harvest.
Mishnah Sheviʽit 5:7 supports this assessment: “The potter may sell five oil jugs and
fifteen wine jugs, for it is typical to bring [this much produce] from ownerless property [  ;]הפקרbut if he brings more from it [ownerless property], it is forbidden.” This
passage raises the suspicion that any potter selling more than this amount to any given
individual was abetting the transgression of the Sabbatical Year commandment.
Because the majority of the population was primarily engaged in agriculture, the
Sabbatical Year also created a situation of structural underemployment. 517 Since there
was no agricultural work or even improvement of the land to be done in the Sabb atical Year, there was an abundance of labor that could be redirected to other forms of
production. For households whose members were part-time craftsmen in normal years
could expand their operations to redeploy their freed-up labor. Other agriculturalists,
who were not trained in such a craft, would find the barrier to entry harder to over come and might be able to find employment in a support capacity to a handicraft
operation, or perhaps in construction projects. In general, we may suggest that these
conditions incentivized some amount of diversification in skills and trades among the
members of the household—a tactic that also served more generally to mitigate risks
in the household’s economic resource management.
Mixed Species
One of the major risks that producers in an agrarian economy faced each year was the
threat of crop failure, whether due to natural or human causes. Agriculturalists could
mitigate these risks through strategies of crop diversification (polyculture) and mixed
516
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planting (intercropping) to spread risk over multiple types of crops, and fragmentation
of landholdings (scattered plots) to spread risk by taking advantage of micro-climatic
difference.518 The Torah, however, contains a prohibition on the “mixture of kinds”
(kilʼayim) that, if heeded, would have placed constraints on the use of these tactics.
The laws of kilʼayim apply to interbreeding of animals and interweaving of different
fibers in clothing. But we will here focus on the prohibition on planting multiple
difference species of crops on the same land, i.e., intercropping/polyculture. Produce
rendered from a field or vineyard that had been intercropped was prohibited and the
consumption of it a violation of the covenant. Did this mean that Jews did not make
use of the strategy of intercropping deployed elsewhere in the Mediterranean agrarian
regimes? We shall suggest the answer is no, though the commandment did complicate
the manner in which one could do so. 519
The two versions of the commandment in the Torah are as follows:
You shall not sow your field with two kinds. (Lev 19:19)
You shall not sow your vineyard with two kinds, lest you make the fullness of the
seed that you have sown prohibited along with the produce of the vineyard. (Deut
22:9)

Our literary sources from the late Second Temple period do not have much to say
about practice of agriculture within these covenantal constraints. But we should not
take this as testimony against its observance. The sources are largely silent on the
mundane details of agricultural processes, since agriculture in the narratives is often
incidental rather than the focus. Josephus includes the commandment in his rendering
of the Mosaic Discourse, bringing together the versions from Leviticus and Deuteron omy:
Do not sow the land that is planted with vines, for it is sufficient for it to raise this
plant and to be freed from the toils of a plough. … The seeds should be pure and
unmixed; and do not sow two or three kinds together, for nature does not rejoice in
association of dissimilar things. (Ant. 4.228)
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Josephus was under no obligation to repeat every individual prescription in the
Torah—Robert Paul Gallant’s study of Josephus’ rendering of the Law notes that he
“freely omits and modifies scriptural elements”—which suggests to me he is
repeating an ongoing practice rather than one that had fallen by the wayside. 520 References to the law among the Dead Sea scrolls also suggest continued attention to this
commandment, rather than flouting it. 4QMMT reads: “And he will not sow his field
or his vineyard with two species because they are holy [  ;קדושיםunfit to consume]”
(4Q396 4.7–8; cf. 4Q418 frag. 103 2.6–9). Another fragment, 4Q481, references
“judges of mixed species” ( ; דייני כלאים1.2), but it is too damaged to discern much
more about their nature or function. 521 The Damascus Document draws on the
prohibition to prohibit unfit mixture in marriage by analogy (4Q270 5.16–17; 4Q271
3.9–10; cf. 4Q394 4.8–11).522 This is, I believe, enough to cautiously consider that the
commandment was acknowledged and practiced, according to local norms and interpretation.
Still, the aforementioned sources do not grant us any greater detail than the rather
terse and lacunose forms of the commandment in the Torah itself. In order to suss out
some of the interpretive problems, potential solutions, and tactics facilitated within
the bounds on the commandment, we will find the discussions in Mishnah Kilʼayim
helpful. The contents of this tractate contains little that could be the result of direct
exegesis of the Torah, suggesting that much of what is said here is reflective of practiced local customs and not merely an abstract exposition on biblical text. And
because pre-industrial agricultural practices often endure over long periods, 523 it is not
unreasonable to suggest that the issues and tactics addressed by the Mishnah in an
early third-century compilation may provide useful insights for the first century as
well.
One of the gaps that Mishnah Kilʼayim draws our attention is the Torah’s vagueness on what defines a field ( )שדה. Was all contiguous land that one owned a single
520
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field, or could it be rendered into separate fields to facilitate a
polyculture/intercropping regime? Kilʼayim suggests the latter by quantifying permissible spacing between crops of different kinds and configurations of planting that
would facilitate mixed-crop regimes. To define the extent of a field, the tannaim
appeal to physical markers such as stone walls, fences, roads, and ditches as indicators of its bounds (2:8), while in other cases this judgment is a matter of common
sense—“because it seems like the end of his field” ( ;מפני שהוא נראה כסוף שדהו2:7).
They permit the configuration of a field into separate and perpendicular (lit.
“straight,”  ) משר משרplanting beds separated by the span of three plow furrows or a
Sharon yoke (2:6), or into a sort of patchwork if the crops were sufficiently spaced
and the size of a given patch sufficiently small (2:9–10). The latter especially would
seem to accommodate the sort of small garden farming by which households could
supplement the staple crops with spices and vegetables, as is common in other
agrarian cultivation regimes. 524 Above all, these passages indicate that the practice of
intercropping was in fact common; the rabbis attempted to incorporate, define, and
adjudicate the legitimacy of traditional regional practices in their discussions.
Mishnah Kilʼayim also highlights points of ambiguity in the Torah’s proscription
on sowing a vineyard. The bounds of a vineyard are subject to interpretation. The
rabbis permit planting in a bare patch of substantial size in the midst of a vineyard (m.
Kil 4:1) as well as the unplanted perimeter of the vineyard (4:2). Mishnah Kilʼayim
also discusses the tactic of creating “bare soil” through the use of arbors and trellises
to train vines off the ground, permitting in some cases a legitimate work-around to
intercropping (6:1–3). The Mishnah is strangely silent about another potential “loophole”—the use of orchard trees to train vines. This may be because only vineyards
and sown crops are explicitly forbidden in the commandment, while orchards are
unmentioned.525 The use of orchard lands for the growing of other crops is a wellattested practice elsewhere in the Mediterranean and allowed intensification of agri cultural exploitation. Training vines on orchards to make an arbustum also obviated
the need to build infrastructure to support the vines. 526 The commonality of the practice of sowing orchards is suggested, perhaps, by the nonchalant reference to plowing
orchard soil in m. Sheviʽit (cf. 1:1–2).527 Together, these “intercropping” practices
made more efficient use of the arable land and the mishnaic discussion of them
suggests that it was both common practice to intermingle different species and that it
was defensible under certain modes of interpretation and within certain constraints.
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Mosaic Constrictions on Consumption
Torah laws also constrained the allocation of agricultural products and restricted how
they could be used. Of the obligations that laid claim to agricultural resources in
Second Temple Jewish religious practice, the tithes were certainly most substantial.
But there were also a host of other obligations that pious Jew would need to attend to,
including the offering of firstfruits, first shearings from sheep and goats, and portions
from bread/dough. Altogether, this system of obligations redistributed resources from
the general population of “Israelites”—at least those with access to agricultural land
or herds—to the priesthood.
This institutional system of resource reallocation should not be strictly equated
with the extraction of wealth by the Jerusalem politico-religious elite, enriching the
wealthy at the expense of the peasantry. Not all priests were members of this elite. 528
Our literary sources for the Second Temple period over-represent the Jerusalemite
priests and especially the wealthy high-priestly families, distorting the impression of
the overall wealth of the priesthood. Many priests resided outside Jerusalem, primar ily in settlements of the Judaean hill country, and only came to the city at their time to
serve in the Temple. 529 Most priests were probably no better off than the average lay
Jew—priests, as Levites, were not supposed to own land in Israel (Num 18:20). Some
would have been largely or wholly reliant on the tithes and other priestly perquisites
for their sustenance; Josephus refers to poor priests in Ant. 20.181, and old priests
dependent on tithes for survival in Ant. 20.207.530 The commandments do not just
redistribute resources to the priests: there was an equal concern in the Torah
commandments for redistribution of wealth and ascription of certain rights for the
poor, widows, orphans, Levites, and laborers. The laws defining the redistribution of
528
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wealth granted them certain claims on the productive output of agriculturalists as
well.
The Levitical Tithe and other offerings are sometimes referred to in the scholarship as “religious taxes.”531 We should not necessarily presume, though, that Jews
perceived of the tithes and other dues prescribed in the Torah in the same manner as
tribute extracted by the Romans or taxes by their Herodian vassals, or as inherently
exploitative. While the state may have been viewed as a questionable authority, for
many God’s authority was beyond reproach. 532 These dues were not simply a tax
imposed by the Temple cult, but an integral part of the covenant governing relations
between God and Israel. Moreover, they went to support the sole cultic institution and
its functionaries, an institution necessary for fulfilling still other commandments.
Jews who strove to obey the Law would have needed to account for these obligatory
offerings in the economic calculus of how to manage their household resources,
tailoring strategies to simultaneously fulfill the obligations to tithe and reserve dues to
the poor as an integral part of what it meant to meet household “subsistence” needs.
First (Levitical) Tithe
The Torah laws pertaining to the tithe are confusing and at times seem contradictory.
The literary evidence indicates that Jews had by the late Second Temple period
harmonized these commandments and took them to refer to three distinct tithes. Tobit
(1:6–8), written in the Hellenistic period, refers to a triad of tithes. Josephus too
distinguishes three in his rendering of the Law (Ant. 4.240). Lending further credence
to the notion that a tripartite system of tithes was well established by this period is the
fact that both agree with each other and with the Mishnah in enumerating them. We
shall refer to the tithes below according to this reckoning: The First Tithe was a tenth
given to the Levites and/or priests.533 The Second Tithe was a tenth earmarked annu531
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ally for consumption in Jerusalem by the owner of the produce, along with family,
guests, and other beneficiaries. The Third Tithe was due in the third and sixth years of
the Sabbatical Year cycle, 534 designated for the poor, widows, orphans, and the
Levites.
The First Tithe applied to annual agricultural produce, but the commandments in
the Torah were unclear about how extensively this was defined. Leviticus calls it a
tithe “from the seed of the land, from the fruit of the tree” (; מזרע הארץ מפרי העץ
27:30) and Josephus’s wording is possibly more expansive: “annual fruits” (ἐπετείων
καρπῶν; Ant. 4.68). The Mishnah references a variety of specific fruits, vegetables,
and nuts in its discussion of tithing (cf. m. MSh 1:1–4), also indicating an expansive
definition. The very vagueness of the commandment’s wording left interpretive flexi bility in assessing which crops they considered obligatory for the “tax.” Surely the
staples of grains, oil, and wine were beyond doubt, but other vegetation was defined
by a combination of individual conscience and communal consensus. It was not
simply a matter of choosing the laxest halakhic interpretation even if were defensible;
piety and the social status that accompanied it depended upon communal rather than
merely self evaluation. We can see the role of social stigmatization and pressure, for
instance, in the parable in Luke 18:9–14, which depicts a Pharisee voicing his
contempt of a tax collector in his prayers, contrasting his own faithful and stringent
tithing to the presumed laxity of the tax collector. In other communities, overly-strict
interpretation might likewise be condemned by others, as in the implicit criticism of
the Pharisaic practice of tithing herbs (Matt 23:23–24; Luke 11:42).
The obligation to tithe was self-evident in the case of landowners farming their
own property, but under different land tenure arrangements, the matter of determining
who was liable to tithe could be more complicated. In the case of leased farmland,
who paid the tithes out of their portion—the landowner, the tenant, or both? Leviticus
27:30–34 does not specify which party was liable to tithe, and the Second Temple
sources do not explicitly deal with this issue either. But the Mishnah indi cates an
awareness of various possible arrangements for distributing the tithe’s burden,
without adjudicating a singular and consistent position: the tenant might tithe the
whole crop before paying rent (removing the landowner’s liability), or the tenant’s
portion alone after paying rent (making both liable) (m. Dem 6:1). 535 None of the
Mishnah examples indicate that landowners would ever take the full burden of tithing
upon themselves; the best-case scenario for the tenant was a split burden, when tithing

Caesar What Is Caesar’s: Tribute, Taxes, and Imperial Administration in Early Roman Palestine 68
BCE–70 CE (Brown Judaic Studies 343; Providence: Brown University Press, 2005), 256 –57.
534
If the commandment in Deuteronomy to give the Poor Tithe “every three years” were taken
strictly, it would overlap with the Sabbatical Year one out of every seven Poor Tithe years, making the
tithe moot as there was no produce to tithe and all produce that grew of its own accord was open to the
poor for use anyway. Interpretation “every three years” within the productive years of the sabbatical
cycle would have created greater regularity, though greater frequency, of the Poor Tithe obligation.
535
Similarly, a landowner might feed hired hands from the crop after the tithing (removing the
worker’s liability) or before tithing, leaving it to the workers to tithe (m. Dem 7:3).
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took place after the payment of rent. 536 The Mishnah suggests that the practice of
tithing could have important ramifications for quantifying the household income and
rent payments, all depending on the local norms governing the timing of tithe and the
contractual arrangements between Jewish landlord and tenant.
Finally, let us return to the matter of the scholarly depiction of the First Tithe as a
tax. Josephus presents our only depiction of tithe collection practices in the Second
Temple period. In Life 63, Josephus gives the impression it was gathered by priests
who went from village to village collecting the dues: “My fellow [priestly] ambassadors, acquiring great wealth from the tithes—which priests receive as dues owed to
them—decided to return home.” Josephus uses the tithe here as a means to boast of
his own integrity, as he goes on to claim that he denied the tithes that the Galileans
offered to him. In another episode, Josephus depicts priests forcibly exacting tithes of
grain from threshing floors at harvest time (Ant. 20.181, 205–207), but he characterizes this as an aberrant and wrongful usurpation of the tithes by wealthy priests to the
detriment of the poorer ones. 537 In general, Josephus suggests that under normal
circumstances, priests came around to collect those tithes that people brought forth by
their own volition. Even if Jews characterized the tithe alongside the taxes and
tributes to the political establishment, the religious framework of piety concerns and
the desire to uphold the covenant would have encouraged many to produce the tithe
willingly.
Third Tithe and Other Dues to the Poor
In addition to the tithe to the Levites and priests, other commandments entailed the
reallocation of portions of the crop to the poorer segments of society—“the poor,
widows, and orphans” (and often Levites) in the parlance of the Torah. There were
also laws that defined rights and privileges for hired laborers, typical during the time sensitive tasks of the harvest season. The Third Tithe (or Poor Tithe) was a tenth of
the harvest set aside for the poor, though it was an obligation only due every three
years or so.538 The other dues were less significant in volume but still limited the
extent to which agriculturalists could exercise total efficiency in their agricultural
endeavors. To the poorer elements of Galilean society, these amounted to a significant
amount of aid. Together, these laws defined rights that these poor could claim to
produce of land under others’ private ownership.
536

This should not be unexpected, given the Mishnah’s general concern for the rights of the land holder ( ;) בעל הביתsee Jacob Neusner, The Economics of the Mishnah (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1990), 51–71.
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This exemplifies the possibility that the tithes were not equally disseminated among those who
ostensibly held rights to them. Though Udoh presumes that tithes were brought back to Jerusalem for
redistribution, we do not have positive evidence for this; To Caesar What Is Caesar’s, 265–66. The
Torah’s commandments lack any specificity on how the tithe is distributed within the priestly class; it
only commands the proportion to be given from the non-priestly agrarian producers. The social capital
and prestige wielded by the high-priestly elite and their aids (or cronies) likely helped them to attain
greater portions of the tithes on average than other priests.
538
See n. 534.
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Who was eligible for these “poor dues”? The category of “the poor” is treated as
vague yet obvious in the Torah and Second Temple sources—as known when seen.
Mishnah Peʼah, on the other hand, attempts to fix a threshold for these institutions:
“Let whoever has two hundred zuz not take leqet, shikheḥah, peʼah, and Poor Tithe”
(8:8). This evaluation only considers liquid assets and specifically permits one to still
have a home and property: “They do not compel him to sell his house (in order to take
poor dues)” (8:8).539 That this threshold does not signify extreme poverty is clear
from the preceding verse, which values a loaf of bread (  ;ככרthe size and quality not
described) for the poor at a dupondium, one twelfth of a zuz (8:7). This does not of
course clarify the question of who was deemed eligible in the Early Roman period,
but it does indicate that the notion of poverty was quite flexible and the dues
commanded by the covenant might have been available to more than just the destitute.
The Poor Tithe was due only in the third and sixth year of the sabbatical cycle,
but in those years the demands of First and Third Tithes would have compounded to
20 percent of the harvest. 540 Those who could not easily absorb the loss of an additional 10 percent of the harvest for their household needs would have had to plan in
advance to compensate for it. As with the Sabbatical Year, this obligation incentiv ized storage in cash or in kind in the prior year(s) to make up for the difference in the
Poor Tithe years. For agricultural producers who cultivated land but were themselves
poor enough to be socially permitted access to poor dues, the Third Tithe was not so
problematic, since they received as well as gave. The Mishnah even suggests the
possibility of an arrangement whereby “poor” sharecroppers of similar standing reciprocally give each other their poor tithe offerings (m. Peʼah 5:5).
In addition to the Poor Tithe, the Torah also includes commandments that
prohibit the landholder or tenant from completely harvesting the produce from their
fields, vineyards, and orchards. These rules restrain the farmer’s ability to use the
fruit of their agricultural labors to meet their household needs, while allotting extra
resources to the poor. Peʼah ( )פאהrefers to the corner of the field that one must leave
unharvested so that the poor may pluck grains from it (Lev 23:22, cf. 19:9). The
plainest reading of the commandment limits the obligation to field crops, especially
grain, and Josephus’ language describing the commandment indicates as much:
“When reaping corn (ἀμῶντας) and gathering the harvest, leave handfuls of uncut
corn (δραγμάτων).” But Leviticus (19:10; cf. Deut 24:20) and Josephus (Ant. 4.231)
also adjoin to the discussion of peʼah prohibitions against picking grapevines and
olive trees clean, linking them together conceptually. 541 Mishnah Peʼah does the same,
539

This mishnah does indicate, however, that one who deploys his liquid assets in ventures of
business ( ) נושא ונותן בהםis prohibited from taking poor dues.
540
Or, on the mishnaic calculation, in which successive tithes are reckoned according to the sum
remaining after removal of the previous tithe, 19 percent. See m. Dem 7:5, which indicates this reck oning through an example giving exact values for terumah and tithes out of a specified total value.
541
The linking of peʼah with the prohibition on gleaning grapes is not Josephus’ own creation, as
the two are contiguous in Lev 19:9–10; bringing together the commandment to leave olives on the tree
for the poor is novel, though, and shows the conceptual linkage of the obli gation to leave a portion on
the plants with obligations to aid the poor.
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including alongside discussion of peʼah the obligation to leave behind portions of the
crops of legumes [ ]קטניות, grapes, olives, and a variety of other fruit-bearing trees
(1:4–5; cf. 3:5). Those portions of the crop that were missed or dropped during the
process of harvesting are called leqet ( )לקטfor grain gleanings and peret ( )פרטfor
grape (and olive) gleanings. The Covenant also designates as property for the poor the
shikheḥah ()שכחה, “the forgotten sheaf,” referring to bundles of harvested grain that
were overlooked and/or forgotten (Deut 24:19; cf. Ant. 4.231).
These poor dues have in common the fact that the Torah does not quantify the
obligations, nor do the Second Temple sources. Even the tannaim, who attempt to fix
a standard minimum for peʼah (1/60 of the field unharvested), retain variability
according to such factors as field size, the number of local poor, and the bounty of the
harvest (m. Peʼah 1:1–2). The variable nature of the obligation permitted miserly
interpretations that allowed a farmer to retain more of the harvest and maximize
profit. But the same flexibility also created conditions whereby one could accrue
social capital and a pious reputation through acts of charity and benefaction. Social
pressure to appear pious in fulfilling one’s covenantal duty not to oppress the poor
could have been an important consideration in how “efficiently” Jews decided to
harvest their agricultural produce. In other words, factors besides the loss in material
revenues would have factored into the decision of how to manage the harvest
resources, and we cannot presume that “purely economic” profit motives drove all to
maximize their harvest and minimize their leavings for the poor.
During the harvest season, many farmers would need to bring on additional labor
in order to speedily reap the grain before it went to seed or the fruit before it rotted.
This could be achieved through cooperative agreements within the community to
maximize the efficiency of the harvest and infrastructure like common presses and
threshing floors.542 But it could also be achieved through the hire of paid workers, as
exemplified in the Parable of the Laborers (Matt 20:1–16).543 Some of this seasonal
labor force would have come from underemployed members of households otherwise
engaged in other crafts and trades, but much of it would also have been composed of
the community’s poor. 544 Because the poor who were hired for harvesting were also
eligible to obtain portions of the crop that were dropped or forgotten in the harvest
process, they had every incentive to be careless in the course of harvesting in order to
ensure that there would be ample leavings to collect afterward. Mishnah Peʼah
542

See Halstead, Two Oxen Ahead, 110; Decker, Tilling the Hateful Earth, 207–8; see also
discussion on sharing resources along social networks in Pierre Bourdieu, Outline of a Theory of
Practice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), 179.
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The repeated hiring of laborers over the course of the day may also indicate the difficulty in
predicting the labor needs required to finish the task in a timely manner, though it is obviou sly also a
literary necessity to create the conflict between laborers who worked a different length of time over
the course of the day.
544
On household underemployment and agricultural strategies constructed around it, including
day labor, see Erdkamp, “Agriculture, Underemployment, and the Cost of Rural Labour in the Roman
World”; Halstead, “Traditional and Ancient Rural Economies in Mediterranean Europe,” 64 –66;
Gallant, Risk and Survival in Ancient Greece, 78–92.
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acknowledges this issue in judging a landowner liable for shikheḥah even when
contracting with a laborer on such problematic terms as “whatever I forget I myself
shall take” ( ; מה שאני שוכח אני אטל6:11). Knowing this, this mishnah also sets out to
define circumstances that justify a landholder’s claim that a bundle cannot in fact
have been forgotten: when left in a conspicuous location (6:2–3), when earmarked for
a particular purpose (6:3), when three or more are left together (6:5), when a sheaf is
of a certain, larger-than-normal size (6:6), or when it is adjacent to an unharvested
portion of the field (6:7). The cases listed are not exhaustive but are exemplary,
suggesting circumstances under which one might reasonably claim that a sheaf was
not “forgotten” and absolving one of the obligation to give up an extraordinary
amount of produce due to the actions of the landowner or his workers.
In addition to the gleaning benefits, the Torah makes other provisions for the
hired hand. Deuteronomy 24:14–15 commands that workers must be paid on the day
they labor, presuming that most hired laborers are in fact poor:
You shall not oppress a hired servant, whether poor ( )עניor destitute (  … ) אביוןyou
shall give him his wage on the same day and the sun shall not go down upon it,
because he is poor and he supports his life by means of it. 545

This required the landholder to have cash on hand before the harvest (i.e., money
from the sale of prior harvests or from other trades), or to otherwise make arrange ment for payment in kind or in prepared food or for some future reciprocation of
labor.546 Workers also had the covenantal right to freely eat of the produce while they
worked, draining further the owner’s yield. Deuteronomy 23:25 reads, “When you
come into your neighbor’s vineyard, you may eat grapes according to your will and to
your satiety, but you may not put them in your vessel” (cf. Ant. 4.235; m. MSh 2:7–8;
3:2–3). Deuteronomy 23:25 also permits the casual consumption of grains from
another’s field, so long as one does not act in the manner of harvesting—taking the
sickle to the crop and removing them from the premises to prepare. The Mishnah
attempts to curb abuse of these provisions by constraining eating to the crop in which
one is working (m. MSh 2:8; m. BM 7:2–7), but the practice of eating more generally
from the field must have been common. Similar allowances were made for travelers
walking through fields (see Ant. 4.234), as illustrated in the story of Jesus and his
disciples plucking grains while walking through a field on the Sabbath (Matt 12:1–8;
Mark 2:23–28).
Enforcement of these rights would have largely depended on the force of social
pressure. In his discussion of the poor dues, Josephus says that failure to heed them
could be punished by whipping, drawing on Deut 25:1–3.547 We do not know enough
545

This is also illustrated in the Parable of the Laborers, Matt 20:1–16 in which a landholder
hires day laborers from the market place several times over the course of the day, with a wage for the
day agreed upon in advance and paid out before nightfall.
546
M. BM 7:1 gives evidence for the practice of hiring workers on the promise of prepared meals
rather than hiring them for a wage in coin or in kind.
547
Deut 25:1–3 does not specifically connect this punishment to the agricultural laws, but rather
to an exemplary court judgment between two individuals over damages. Josephus’ linkage of poor
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about the enforcement of such laws by village leaders and Jewish judges in the
Second Temple period to know with what regularity such punishment was meted out.
Insofar as the community saw the preservation of the poor and their basic sustenance
as an obligation of religious statute, concern for personal reputation within the
community was an impetus to comply with the Law. And if oppressing the poor was
viewed as a gross violation of the covenant, peers in the community could and would
punish through the social mechanisms available—spreading gossip, publically chastising, refusing to interact with them. There were also other incentives to following
these commands, and doing so zealously; as the following passage illustrates, some
Jews understood God to play a role in rewarding such generosity to the poor:
For great wealth will not adhere to the owners through such painstaking gathering on
their part as much as gratitude will come from the needy. The Deity also will make
the earth better disposed to the growing of fruits for those who care not only for their
own advantage, but also have concern for the nourishment of others. (Ant. 4.232)

Value is earned not through “painstaking gathering,” i.e., through efficient maximization of the material crop. Rather, making the allowances for the poor earns value with
God. Given the centrality of the covenantal relationship, obedience to the Law was
essential to maintaining the all-important relationship with God, who was himself an
integral participant in the economic network through his role in determining future
agricultural bounty or calamity.
Limited Use of Consecrated Goods—Second Tithe
Some of the commandments in the Torah identified certain types and portions of the
agricultural produce as consecrated goods, subject to additional constraints on how,
when, where, and by whom they could be used. When First Tithe was separated it
became a consecrated good that only the Levites and priests could legitimately
consume (see Num 18:31; Ant. 4.75); for others, its consumption was a sin. Likewise,
the Second Tithe was a consecrated good that could be consumed only under very
particular conditions.548

dues to the punishment by forty lashes reiterates his emphasis throughout this section of his Mosaic
discourse on the requirements to aid the poor and the rewards and punishments that God meets out
depending on one’s response to the needy.
548
Many of the implications of observing the Second Tithe would also have applied to the
commandment on produce from trees in their fourth year (  ) רביעיתfrom planting, which is consecrated
and thereby limited in the conditions under which it may be used (Lev 19:23 –25). Josephus’ rendition
of the Law suggests it was only permissible for Jews to consume it in Jerusalem or to redeem it and
use the money to feast in Jerusalem (Ant. 4.226–227). An alternate interpretation in Jubilees, the Dead
Sea Scrolls, and some rabbinic texts, however, understands the fourth-year produce as a priestly
perquisite, which would render it more like firstfruit offerings ( see ch. 4, p. 218). On the interpretation
of the laws in Jubilees and the Dead Sea Scrolls, see Joseph M. Baumgarten, “The Laws of ʽOrlah and
Firstfruits in the Light of Jubilees, the Qumran Writings, and Targum Ps. Joanthan,” JJS 38 (1978):
195–202; Aharon Shemesh, Halakhah in the Making: The Development of Jewish Law from Qumran
to the Rabbis (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2009), 10–12. For reasons of space and simi-

159
Like the First Tithe, the Second Tithe entailed setting aside one-tenth549 of the
harvest each year (Deut 14:22–27), except, of course, in the Sabbatical Year, when
there was no harvest. The Mishnah understands the Third Tithe for the poor to r eplace
the Second Tithe in years three and six of the cycle, but Second Temple sources
strongly indicate that the Second Tithe was broadly considered an annual obligation.
Josephus and Tobit are particularly clear on this matter: 550
I tithed the second tenth in silver for six years and would go and spend these things
in Jerusalem each year (καθ᾿ ἕκαστον ἐνιαυτόν). (Tob 1:7)
In addition to the two tithes that I previously said were paid each year ( ἔτους
ἑκάστου)—the one for the Levites, the other for the feasts—they bring a third [tithe]
every third year. (Ant. 4.240)

If observed, this would mean that 20 percent of the harvest each year was spoken for
before Galileans’ daily household needs could even be reckoned in.
The Second Tithe was significantly different from the other two in that it was
consumed by producers, rather than given like a tax to a third party. 551 The Torah
obligates Jews to bring the tithe to Jerusalem to furnish a feast with family, friends, or
other charitable beneficiaries. Because it remained part of the family’s household
resources, it may not be obviously apparent that this would constitute an imposition
on the management of household resources. But the conditions on its use meant that
Galileans needed to consume a large portion of the annual produce in Jerusalem and
therefore could not use it for their general subsistence needs. To consume it outside
Jerusalem would be a violation of the covenant and an affront to God. Because it
could not be used for regular subsistence needs, the remaining portion of the harvest
would need to stretch further. And since it applied to all agriculturalists, and not just
priests, this tithe serves as an example of the Torah’s constraints on the use of agri cultural produce that would have directly affected most Galileans.
For Galileans, geographically distant from Jerusalem, the optimal time to fulfill
the obligation to consume Second Tithe was during the pilgrimage festivals, when
many were travelling to Jerusalem anyway (see ch. 4). Doing so avoided the logistical
costs of making additional trips between Galilee and Jerusalem, which could take at
least a week roundtrip, and depending on one’s trade and the season could entail costs
in lost work time back home. But the close interlink between Second Tithe an d the
larity to either Second Tithe or priestly perquisites like firstfruit offerings, we will not devote further
discussion to fourth-year produce.
549
According to the Mishnah’s reckoning, however, it would be 9 percent of the sum total—a
tenth of the amount remaining after First Tithe. See n. 540 above.
550
It also appears to be an annual obligation in Jub 32:11; Temple Scroll 43.1 –17.
551
As it has sometimes erroneously been rendered by scholars. Hamel, for example, grossly
mischaracterizes the obligation by claiming “it was only collected with considerable difficulty, simply
because many people could not afford to pay it;” Poverty and Charity in Roman Palestine, 217. It was
not “collected” by a third party and the impositions it caused were not from its extraction wholesale —
for it was consumed by its very cultivators—but rather from its effects on allocation of foodstuffs for
consumption over the course of the calendar year. See Sanders, Jewish Law from Jesus to the
Mishnah, who accidentally does the same in his example at pp. 47–48.
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festivals may have been so normalized by this period that using it for any other occa sion in Jerusalem would have been outside the realm of acknowledged possibilities,
and simply read into the commandment as the natural interpretation. Josephus, for
instance, presents the use of Second Tithe for “festal meals” as the default (Ant.
4.340) and glosses over other possibilities. The Temple Scroll explicitly prohibits it:
“And they shall not eat from it on non-work days for their strength because it is holy;
and it will be eaten on the holy days and will not be eaten on the work days” (43.15–
17). Since the festivals were correlated with major agricultural harvests, bringing
them at the festivals also minimized the period over which Galilean Jews needed to
guard the tithe produce against incurring impurity (rendering them unfit to consume
as a consecrated good; cf. Deut 26:14). Both the logistical calculations and risk -aversion to ritual pollution would have incentivized Galileans correlating their fulfillm ent
of the Second Tithe obligation with the pilgrimage festivals. But restricting its use to
the festival seasons also meant that the value of at least one-tenth of the annual
harvest was consumed over a mere seventeen days (the combined length of the thre e
pilgrimage festivals). 552
Most Galileans of the Early Roman period did not actually bring a tenth of their
harvest to Jerusalem in kind. Especially for large farming operations, but even for
more modest ones, the task of transporting a tenth of the harvest on the long journey
from Galilee to Jerusalem would have been difficult and expensive, and only profes sional traders would find it economical to maintain the animals and equipment needed
for such a haul. Instead, most Galileans would have appealed to the Torah’s provision
for redeeming the tithe: “If the distance is too great for you … then you shall
exchange it for money, and bind the money in your hand and go to the place that
YHWH your God chooses” (Deut 14:22–24; cf. Lev 27:30–31). In other words, the
good in kind was substituted for its equivalent value in coin. The general popularity of
redemption as a tactic for fulfilling this commandment is indicated by the fact that
Josephus completely omits the conditional nature of this provision, and renders
redemption the default: “Let there be a selection by you of a tithe of fruits … and let
it be sold in its native regions” (Ant. 4.205).553 While this does not indicate universal
redemption of the tithe (he may just be simplifying the unusual practice for his
Graeco-Roman audience), it does suggest the regularity of this practice.
Redemption deconsecrated the tithed produce, rendering it profane (  )חולand
available for mundane, everyday use and for market sale, and consecrated the
redemption money in its place to be used to buy meals in Jerusalem. In addition to the
552

We may briefly acknowledge as well that one might extend their stay in Jerusalem beyond the
holiday and continue to use these resources there, though it would not seem to be the normal practice.
When Josephus describes the Second Tithe in Ant. 4.240 it is designated the tithe “for the festivals”
(πρὸς τὰς εὐωχίας), and, as we noted above, the Temple Scroll is similarly restrictive.
553
In describing the Second Tithe, Josephus does not even note the option to bring the tithe in
kind and consume it directly and does not depict redemption as conditional on distance. See Robert
Paul Gallant, “Josephus’ Expositions of Biblical Law: An Internal Analysis” (PhD diss., Yale
University, 1988). Surely not all people redeemed their tithe, and his omission is in large part a result
of his brevity, but it may indicate this as the general practice.
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value of the tithe, redemption required the addition of a 20 percent surcharge as s tipulated in Leviticus ( ;חמישית27:31). The Torah does not define a notional value for the
redemption of consecrated crops as it does for vowed human beings or farmland (Lev
27:1–8, 16–18). And whereas the priest determined the nominal prices for other
consecrated properties should one wish to redeem them from the Temple—livestock,
houses (27:11–12, 14–15)—the priest plays no such role in reckoning the tithe value
(see 27:27, 30–32). The redemption value of a given crop was apparently variable,
dependent on prevailing prices at local markets or in brokered transactions between
associates. Since prices fluctuated seasonally and differed from region to region and
from season to season, changing with the available supply and demand (cf. m. MSh
4:1–2, 6, 8), the timing of redemption could be incredibly important in the economic
calculus.554
The Second Temple sources that reference redemption of the Second Tithe seem
to agree that this effectively constituted a sale of the tithe produce. Both Josephus and
Tobit describe redemption using Greek verbs for “to sell”: πιπράσκω (Ant. 4.205) and
ἀποπρατίζομαι (Tob 1:7). The Temple Scroll also envisions Second Tithe money
produced through direct sale: “And he will sell [the tithe] for silver and bring the
silver [to Jerusalem]” ( ;ו מכרוהו בכסף והביא את הכסף43.14). This seems to stand in
contrast to the Mishnah’s conception of consecrated property, which could not be sold
but could only be redeemed with cash on hand (as in m. MSh 1:1–2; 2:6; 4:3–4). Of
course, the fact that the Second Temple texts refer to it as sale does not necessarily
preclude the possibility of redeeming with cash on hand, and both may have been
options. The difference may seem at first to be a mere technicality, but it could make
a big difference. The time when Second Tithe would be redeemed was shortly after
the harvest, before the festival, at the time when supply was at its absolute highest
and demand at its lowest, when most were trying to sell off their tithe. These circum stances suggest that the period of redemption prior to the festival would have marked
the nadir for prices of the newly-harvested crop.
Selling the crop directly for redemption money would have yielded a small value
to spend in Jerusalem, relative to how substantial a portion of the yearly revenue was
expended. The situation would have been equally disadvantageous if one needed to
sell an equivalent portion of the harvest to produce the needed redemption money.
This also required the sale not only of 10 percent, but of 12 percent in order to obtain
the value of the 20 percent redemption surcharge. 555 The household with stored cash
554

On the existence and recognition of seasonal and regional price variations in the markets of
the ancient Mediterranean more generally, see Morley, Trade in Classical Antiquity, 29–34; Peter
Temin, The Roman Market Economy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2013), 29–52. These
price differences created information problems in ancient trade and required strategies for mitigating
these problems. We should not expect any different from Palestine. The Mishnah wrestles with the
problem of how to grapple with price variation and the potentials for gaining or lo sing additional
value in the context of Second Tithe redemption, as in m. MSh 4:1–2, 6, 8.
555
The matter here is somewhat simplified, as it has not taken into account the removal of First
Tithes, and rabbinic sources at least calculated Second Tithe on what remained after the First; see n.
540 above. The calculation here is based on the total yield. If we assumed instead it was reckoned
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resources from previous seasons, on the other hand, could retain the use of the tithed
produce for later or for market sale under better conditions, with a relatively low cash
expenditure. The combination of the conditions of redemption and its timing incentivized strategies of storing some amount of household assets in the form of money,
and hence incentivized Galileans to engage in market exchange more generally in
order to build savings in coin. Moreover, the redemption practice itself forced
Galilean agriculturalists to engage to some extent with monetized market transactions.
This stands in stark contrast to the notion of a peasantry leery of the risks of the
market.
Once in Jerusalem, whether tithe was brought in cash or in kind, the commandment restricted its use to furnishing the food and drink for feasting (Deut 14:25–26).
Since there was high demand during festival time in the Jerusalem markets, we can
expect that prices would have been relatively high and the buying power of Second
Tithe money considerably reduced compared to Galilee. But redemption was nonetheless an appealing strategy even on the consumption side. It made consuming a
tenth of the yield easier to accomplish in such a short time by converting low-value
crops like grain into more expensive goods. Moreover, crops in kind, most of which
would have been staples like grain, oil, and wine, could only fashion rather simple
meals. Redemption money could be spent on any number of food items, though. As
Deuteronomy says, “spend the money for whatever you wish—oxen, sheep, wine,
strong drink, or whatever you desire” (14:26). It effectively encouraged the diversification of diet for the festival, converting high volumes of cheaper foodstuffs suc h as
wheat and barley into relatively expensive and foods via the market. The festival
season would have marked a rare opportunity to eat meat in the annual diet of an
agrarian farmer. Josephus and the Mishnah both suggest that Jews could even use the
tithe to finance their festal peace offering, which was eaten by the offerer and his
household and hence fulfilled the requirement that the Second Tithe money must be
spent on food (Ant. 4.205; m. Ḥag 1:3). Tithe money could thereby coordinate two
ritual obligations and efficiently fulfill both. 556 We shall return to the connection
between Second Tithe and the pilgrimage festivals in chapter 4.
All of this demonstrates that if Galileans were indeed observant of the commandments in the Early Roman period the institution of tithing was not of mere peripheral
importance to the agriculturalists of Galilee, but an integral concern in the annual
budget, as it occurred at the beginning of the harvest and framed the resource allocation for the rest of the year within tighter margins. This is especially true for Gali leans, who—unlike Judaeans—lacked the ability to spread out expenditure of the

after the First Tithe was removed, Second Tithe would constitute 9 percent of the total yield, and 10.8
percent with the added fifth.
556
M. Ḥag 1:3 proscribes use of Second Tithe to fund whole-burnt offerings, as they do not serve
as a feast for the offer and doing so would thereby violate the obligations of the Second Tithe
commandment. It goes on to note a disagreement between Hillel and Shammai on the matter of the
paschal lamb and whether it was permissible to use Second Tithe money to buy it; Hillel assented,
Shammai dissented. We will discuss the use of Second Tithe for sacrifices further in chapter 4.
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Second Tithe afforded by proximity to Jerusalem and who needed to coordinate
timing with the planned festival trips.

Transaction and the Economics of Purity
In the preceding sections, we considered specific laws in the covenant that pertained
to agricultural production and consumption. These commandments were situated in
the broader context of a covenant between God and Israel, stipulating the conditions
under which a positive relationship with God would be maintained or broken. Deuter onomy 28 offers a detailed list of the sorts of rewards and punishments—individual
and communal—that Jews could expect from God depending on whether or not they
heeded the Law. Josephus echoes this at the conclusion of his own account of the
Law, and like Deuteronomy, he especially emphasizes punishment for wrongdoers:
And on the following days … [Moses] delivered blessings to them, and curses upon
those who would not live according to the laws but would transgress the things delin eated therein. (Ant. 4.302)

If we assume that most Jews in the Second Temple period took these threats seriously,
then we ought to expand the notion of “risk-aversion” to include the risks of divine
retribution.
No matter how zealously one guarded against breaking these rules, one could
never totally escape the risks of accidentally violating them. This risk was especially
endemic to interactions of various sorts because of a problem that economist term
information asymmetry.557 Human beings operate with imperfect information about
their environment and the behavior of others humans within it, meaning that nobody
has complete access to all of the data that matters in deciding whether to interact or
not. Information asymmetry describes conditions in which the parties involved have
differential access to such information. For example, the host of a feast may know
significantly more about the meal’s ingredients than the guests, who are ignorant of
these details. The application of information asymmetry to economic analysis typi cally considers questions of a product’s origins, quality, price, and other details not
discernible through personal inspection prior to purchase. 558 But we may suggest that
for pious Jews, uncertainty about whether foodstuffs were produced, processed,
stored, and consumed in accordance with the Law would have produced considerably
557

See Joseph E. Stiglitz, “Information and the Change in the Paradigm of Economics,” The
American Economic Review 92 (2002): 460–501. In Neoclassical Economics, symmetrical and
complete information is presumed and a notional “optimum price” determined by supply and demand
can thereby emerge. But Stiglitz has demonstrated that the existence of information asymmetry often
results in a market price that is substantially off from this optimum. This undermines the classical
understanding of “rational decision-making” as well as market price optimization.
558
See also Stuart Plattner, “Economic Behavior in Markets,” in Economic Anthropology, ed.
Plattner (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1989), 209–21 at 214–15, which notes the problem that
a buyer faces in assessing minute differences such as color, size, and quality, as well as other charac teristics not easy to personally discern, at least prior to actually completing the transaction.
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more anxiety. This was, after all, not a mere issue of paying more than the optimal
price or buying an inferior product; it risked damaging the relationship with God.
This should not steer us to believe that Jews were inherently autarkic for fear of
violation. We already saw in chapter 2 ample evidence that Galileans were engaged in
trade, most of which was conducted intraregionally. To some extent, exchange was
necessary to meet a household’s diverse and fluctuating needs. If the problem of
uncertainty could not be avoided, the risk could still be mitigated.
One tactic for making judgments about the riskiness of a transaction is to follow
the actions of one’s peers. As Duncan J. Watts has noted, social scientists and social
psychologists have found that in the absence of other effective metrics, people often
make decisions on the basis of how other people act—especially friends and close
associates—believing them to be operating on more or better information (even when
they in fact are not).559 If one saw a friend purchase food from a given vendor, and
one knew that friend to be scrupulous in observing the Torah’s dietary laws, one
might reasonably assume (though not be certain) that one could eat the vendor’s food
without fear of accidentally violating the covenant.
Another way that social networks may be used to mitigate uncertainty is by
considering reputation.560 Reputation is not a static quality, but one that emerges from
the impressions and experiences about an individual that are relayed between
members of a community through gossip. 561 Reputation can play a powerful role in
shaping the overall pattern of interactions in the community. Positive or negative
reports echo and cascade through the social network: reputations are reinforced as
more and more appear to shun interactions with those of dubious reputation and flock
to those who are seemingly more trustworthy. Evidence for the role of reputation and
trustworthiness can be discerned in Mishnah Demaʼi, a tractate dominated by the
question of uncertainty, where buyers’ and sellers’ reputations for properly tithing or
not are used to determine where, how, and with whom to conduct transactions in the
market.562
Another tactic people use to make decisions in lieu of sufficient information is to
rely on stereotypes. 563 Stereotypes are of course crude and often gross mischaracterizations of the groups they supposedly describe, but they may nonetheless have strong
559

On collective decision-making like this, see Duncan J. Watts, Six Degrees: The Science of a
Connected Age (New York: Norton & Co., 2004), 221–53; Watts, Everything is Obvious, 54–81.
560
On the sociology of reputation, see Kenneth H. Craink, Reputation: A Network Interpretation
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009); John Whitfield, People Will Talk: The Surprising Science of
Reputation (Hoboken, NJ: Wiley & Sons, 2012).
561
See James S. Coleman, Foundations of Social Theory, 284–84; Chris Wickham, “Gossip and
Resistance among the Medieval Peasantry,” Past & Present 160 (1998): 3–24.
562
Some pertinent examples are m. Dem 5–6; see below.
563
On collective stereotypes, their relations to norms and behavior, and their function in deter mining how to act with others in lieu of better information, see Charles Sta ngor and Mark Schaller,
“Stereotypes as Individual and Collective Representations,” in Stereotypes and Stereotyping, ed. C.
Neil Macrae, Charles Stangor, and Miles Hewstone (New York: Guilford, 1996), 3–37 at 10–14, 16–
25. There is also an alternative approach to study of stereotypes, but I am more interested in those
larger, communally wrought stereotypes and their implications here.
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effects on patterns of interaction and decision-making. The Mishnah speaks in broad
stereotypes about Samaritans and ʽamei ha-ʼaretz and their trustworthiness—or their
proclivities—with respect to the Law (see m. Dem 2:3; 3:4–5). Stereotypes especially
marked transactions with gentiles as risky. Samaritans and ʽamei ha-ʼaretz were
supposedly aware of the commandments, or at least a particular interpretation and
execution of them that the rabbis thought lax, but gentiles were assumed to be largely
ignorant of the Law and assumed not to observe it. 564 While there was nothing inherently polluting about gentiles, this stereotype for ignorance of the Law meant that a
Jew ran a high risk of accidentally violating the dietary laws in consuming food
purchased from gentiles. 565 Likewise, their propensity for making offerings to “false
gods” meant selling to gentiles certain types of goods used for sacrificial offerings ran
the risk of abetting violation of the important commandment against idolatry. 566
As Jonathan Klawans has observed, the dietary laws (Lev 11; Deut 14) occupy a
somewhat ambiguous position in the Torah, bearing characteristics of both ritual and
moral impurity laws. Ritual purity could be contracted from certain genital
discharges, childbirth, skin conditions, or corpses; this impurity was contagious, but it
was temporary and could be cleansed through ritual ablution and time. Moral impurity
was contracted through sins such as breaking the commandments against idolatry or
incest, and threatened divine punishment unless properly atoned for. 567 Certain
animals were prohibited for Jews to consume outright (e.g., various rodents and
insects), while other foodstuffs could be rendered impure through direct or even indi rect contact with the carcasses of such creatures. While the former seemingly consti tuted a moral violation, the latter only rendered one ritually unclean until sundown
after washing. The ritual purity of food and the body was of great concern for priests,
who consumed sanctified goods for their meals and had to do so in a pure state (Lev
22:4–7).568 Ritual purity of body and food was also a requirement for lay Jews eating
564

Jews may have been wary of exchange with the Samaritans as well, though, as suggested by
an explanatory remark in John 4:9: “A Samaritan woman came to draw water, and Jesus said to her,
‘Give me a drink.’ (Jews do not share things in common with Samaritans.)” The final line is omitted
from some manuscripts, including Alexandrinus and Bezae, but is characteristic of Johannine asides.
565
On the risks of incurring ritual impurity in interactions with amei ha-aretz and gentiles from
the rabbis’ perspective, see Hayes, Gentile Impurities and Jewish Identities, 47–49, 140–41. Hayes
suggests that the Dead Sea Scrolls may attribute to gentiles some inherent impurity, though they seem
unique in doing so. On this matter, see Jonathan Klawans, Impurity and Sin in Ancient Judaism
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 74–75, 80–82.
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See, e.g., m. AZ 1, which lays out guidelines for the location, timing, and context of sale that
may increase the risk of aiding gentiles in idolatry by providing them with materials for sacrificial or
festal rites, and increase the risk of accidentally procure materials that have been put to such use.
567
On the difference between ritual and moral purity, see Klawans, Impurity and Sin in Ancient
Judaism, 22–32. Rather than treating them extensively, he notes their ambiguity and exceptionality
and sets them aside to discuss ritual and moral impurity as separate c ategories (31–32).
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Cana Werman, “The Concept of Holiness and the Requirements of Purity in Second Temple
and Tannaic Literature,” in Purity and Holiness: The Heritage of Leviticus, ed. Marcel J. H. M.
Poorthus and Joshua Schwartz (Jewish and Christian Perspectives 2; Leiden: Brill, 2000), 163–80 at
163–64; Sanders, Jewish Law from Jesus to the Mishnah, 24–25. Note Josephus’ story in Ant. 3.320–
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consecrated meals in Jerusalem during pilgrimage festivals, for the person and for the
food consumed (Lev 7:19–21).569 Thus there were circumstances when being ritually
impure could lead one into sin by violating the holiness laws.
There is evidence from Second Temple sources and the archaeological record that
supports the assertion that many Jews outside the priesthood were also concerned
about maintaining ritual purity. 570 Josephus claims that Antipas had difficulty
attracting settlers to his new city of Tiberias because it had been built over a graveyard, thus putting everyone in perpetual risk of contracting corpse impurity (Ant.
18.36–38).571 Matthew’s reference to whitewashed tombstones may also suggest
measures to avoid accidental corpse impurity (23:27). The Qumran community seems
to have envisioned themselves as a temple community in exile, and thereby closely
adhered to the priestly purity regulations despite many of them not actually hailing
from Levitical lineage. 572 Although some adherents to these purity laws may be
explained as an imitation of priestly purity, it seems more that many did so out of
concern for purity for its own sake, since purity reflected a state of holiness. 573 The
321 about priests during the reign of Claudius abstaining from eating leavened bread during Passover
because it was against the Law, even though there was a famine at the time.
569
Yonatan Adler, “Second Temple Ritual Baths Adjacent to Agricultural Installations: The
Archaeological Evidence in Light of the Halakhic Sources,” JJS 59 (2008): 62–72 at 66–67; Adler,
“The Ritual Baths Near the Temple Mount and Extra-Purification Before Entering the Temple Courts:
A Reply to Eyal Regev,” IEJ 56 (2006): 209–15 at 211–13; cf. Sanders, Jewish Law from Jesus to the
Mishnah, 33.
570
See esp. Eyal Regev, “Non-Priestly Purity and Its Religious Aspects According to Historical
Sources and Archaeological Findings,” in Poorthuis and Schwartz, Purity and Holiness, 223–44;
Regev, “Pure Individualism: The Idea of Non-Priestly Purity in Ancient Judaism,” JSJ 31 (2000):
176–202; Hannah K. Harrington, “Did the Pharisees Eat Ordinary Food in a State of Ritual Purity?,”
JSJ 26 (1995): 42–54; Martin Hengel and Roland Deines, “E. P. Sanders’ ‘Common Judaism,’ Jesus,
and the Pharisees,” JTS 46 (1995): 1–70 at 41–51.
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See also Lee I. Levine, “R. Simeon and b. Yohai and the Purification of Tiberias: History and
Tradition,” HUCA 49 (1978): 143–85, in which Levine argues that a widely attested rabbinic story
corroborates the claim that Tiberias was widely considered to convey ritual impurity due to the
presence of corpses.
572
See Eric Ottenheijm, “Impurity between Intention and Deed: Purity Disputes in First Century
Judaism and in the New Testament,” in Poorthus and Schwartz, Purity and Holiness, 129–48 at 130–
34; Reed, “The Role of Food as Related to Covenant in Qumran Literature,” 132–41, 152–59; Jodi
Magness, Stone and Dung, Oil and Spit: Jewish Daily Life in the Time of Jesus (Grand Rapids:
Eerdmans, 2011), 18–20. Josephus claims that the sectarian Essenes took an oath that hindered them
from accepting food from outsiders (War 2.143), but it is unclear whether this is a reference to their
strict dietary and purity regulations or to the severity of commitment that this group required of its
members.
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For an apt summary, see Susan Haber, “Ritual and Moral Purity and Impurity in Second
Temple Judaism,” in Haber, “They Shall Purify Themselves”: Essays on Purity in Early Judaism, ed.
Adele Reinhartz (Atlanta: SBL, 2008), 31–46. The major proponents of the “imitation” theory are
Gedaliah Alon, “The Bounds of the Laws of Levitical Cleanness,” in Alon, Jews, Judaism, and the
Classical World: Studies in Jewish History in the Times of the Second Temple and Talmud , trans. I.
Abrahams (Jerusalem: Magnes, 1977), 190–234; Jacob Neusner, From Politics to Piety: The Emergence of Pharisaic Judaism (New York: KTAV, 1979), 43–47; Neusner, The Idea of Purity in Ancient
Judaism, The Haskell Lectures, 1972–1973 (Leiden: Brill, 1973). E. P. Sanders argues that Pharisaic
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New Testament gospels, for instance, attribute to the “tradition of the elders”
followed by the Pharisees the practice of washing hands before eating (Matt 15:2;
Mark 7:2–3; Luke 11:38), 574 washing produce bought at market before eating it (Mark
7:3), and washing vessels (Mark 7:4; Luke 11:39–41),575 none of which are prescribed
by the Torah at all.
The desire to maintain ritual purity may also be discerned in the phenomenon of
stone (chalk) vessels in the late Second Temple period. As we discussed in chapter 2,
there was a burgeoning stone vessel industry in Judaea and even in Galilee during this
period.576 Stone vessels are among the most common and distinctive archaeological
finds at settlements inhabited by Jews in the late Second Temple period. 577 According
to the Mishnah, stone vessels were not susceptible to the transfer of impurity, as
ceramic vessels were (Lev 11:33), making them the ideal container for the practice of
ritual hand-washing before meals and purifying contaminated instruments for reuse.
Their casual reference in the Gospel of John suggests they were commonplace and
essential to Jewish rites of purification (2:6–7). The ubiquity of these vessels suggests
that this halakhic interpretation or something like it was widely embraced in the Early
Roman period, and not just restricted to the Pharisees or the rabbis.
Another indication of concern for ritual purity among lay Jews is the distribution
of stepped ritual baths (miqvaʼot) designed for immersion, found at sites throughout

purity, at least, was not out of any desire to imitate the priesthood; Jewish Law from Jesus to the
Mishnah, 134–254, but he does so to argue that they were concerned to guard the purity of conse crated goods for the priests and the altar rather than ordinary food; see the critique in Harrington, “Did
the Pharisees Eat Ordinary Food in a State of Ritual Purity?”
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Tob 2:5 also refers to washing before eating, though in this case it is not clear whether it is
hand-washing or full immersion, and interpretation is complicated by the fact that he is washing after
touching a corpse, which renders one ritually unclean. The practice of hand -washing may have
initially been separate from concern for the purity of the food itself, as argued in Chaim Milikowsky,
“Reflections on Hand-Washing, Hand-Purity, and Holy Scripture in Rabbinic Literature,” in Poorthus
and Schwartz, Purity and Holiness, 149–62 at 150–52.
575
Including wood and bronze vessels: cups (ποτηρίων), pitchers (ξεστῶν), and copper kettles
(χαλκίων). Matt 23:25–26 contains a criticism of the scribes and Pharisees for the particulars of their
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through immersion. See Magness, Stone and Dung, Oil and Spit, 21–23.
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On stone vessels, see Yitzhak Magen, The Stone Vessel Industry in the Second Temple Period:
Excavations at Ḥizma and the Jerusalem Temple Mount, ed. Levana Tsfania (Jerusalem: Israel Exploration Society, 2002); Shimon Gibson, “Stone Vessels of the Early Roman Period from Jerusalem and
Palestine,” in One Land—Many Cultures: Archaeological Studies in Honor of S. Loffreda, ed. G. C.
Bottini, L. Di Segni, and L. D. Chrupcala (Studium Biblicum Franciscanum Collection Maior 41;
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Texts: Purity and Socio-Economics in John 2,” in Zeichen aus Text und Stein: Studiem auf dem Weg
zu einer Archäologie des Neuen Testaments, ed. Stefan Alkier and Jürgen Zangenberg (TANZ 42;
Tübingen: Francke, 2003), 381–401. See also discussion in ch. 2, p. 119–26.
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Magen, The Stone Vessel Industry, 160–61; Aviam, “Distribution Maps of Archaeological
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Galilee, 115–31 at 117.
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Galilee.578 These installations allowed an individual to conduct ritual bathing to
remove impurities in accordance with the laws in Leviticus 15, if other bodies of
water were not readily available.579 Yonatan Adler’s recent studies have found that
there were often miqvaʼot in association with olive and grape pressing installations,
especially in vicinity of Jerusalem where the priestly population centered and the
demand for ritually pure liquids was stronger. 580 The presence of miqvaʼot at treading
and pressing installations allowed a worker who incurred ritual impurity to immerse
and stave off the risk of transmitting the ritual impurity to the whole batch of oil or
wine and disqualify it from certain uses or users. While impurities endured until
nightfall, according to Leviticus (see, e.g., Lev 11:24–28, 31–32, 39–40), it seems
that cleansing was understood in some circles to have immediate effect or to at least
render impurity inert, as in the Mishnah.581 Though not as widespread, there are
examples of the collocation of miqva’ot and presses in Galilee as well, especially
where natural bodies of water were unavailable. 582 We can infer from this that some
578

Stuart S. Miller reminds us that these ritual baths were not wholly monolithic in form or use,
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Galilean Jews were concerned not only about cleansing regularly from impurities
incurred, but doing so during agricultural processing to avoid producing ritually
contaminating wine and oil.
Having made the case for the importance of the food laws and purity concerns, let
us return to examining some of the implications of conducting transactions in a society shaped by these religious institutions but characterized by imperfect information.
For Jews averse to the risk of accidentally consuming animals prohibited as unclean
in the Torah, or food that had been rendered unclean by contagious ritual impurity,
the problem of information asymmetry again raises its specter.
The concern for observing the Law discouraged Galilean Jews from obtaining
many types of foodstuffs from the gentile populations of the cities on the region’s
periphery, as we argued in chapter 2. This is best exemplified by the case of John of
Gischala’s sale of oil to the inhabitants of Caesarea Philippi, referenced above (War
2.591; Life 74–76). The reliance on stereotypes about gentiles to assess the relative
risk involved is telling. Even though they could have obtained olive oil locally from
suppliers in the upper Hula Valley of the Golan, about whom they could have been
better informed, John of Gischala depicts the Jews of Caesarea as unwilling to use
gentile oil, deeming it unlawful. Assuming the verisimilitude of John’s claim, these
Jews opted to trade with fellow Jews of the more distant Upper Galilee rather than
local pressing operations and merchants about whom they could have been better
personally informed. In the case of oil, this may signal a concern for the ritual purity
of the product, since olive oil is not prohibited by the dietary laws. Impurity was
especially transmissible through moisture (cf. Lev 11:33–34), making oil and wine
highly susceptible to ritual pollution during processing and storage, while dry goods
(unground grain, dried fruits) were at a lower risk of being contaminated. 583 Meat
from gentiles was particularly risky. The Torah requires properly draining blood from
a slaughtered animal: “You shall not eat the blood of any creature, for the life of
every creature is its blood; whoever eats it shall be cut off” (Lev 17:14). It also deems
as unclean an animal that has died of natural causes (Lev 17:15–16) or has particular
injuries/defects (Exod 22:30), and it prohibits eating certain parts of the animal (Gen
32:33; Lev 7:23). And since gentile meat (as well as wine; cf. m. AZ 2:3) may have
come from an offering to foreign gods, the use of such goods could be viewed as
participating in, or at least abetting, the violation of the first of the Ten Command ments (Exod 20:3; Deut 5:7). 584 Purity concerns also created a barrier to engaging
with gentiles in other capacities, such as participating in feasts and shared meals. That
Adan-Bayewitz and Mordechai Aviam, “Iotapata, Josephus, and the Siege of 67: Preliminary Report
on the 1992–94 Seasons,” JRA 10 (1997): 131–65 at 149–52, 163.
583
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gentiles, suggesting, for instance, that wine cannot be trusted if i t is left in the presence of a gentile
who know the Jewish owner has stepped away and left it alone (m. AZ 5:3–5).
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Jews were circumspect about dining with non-Jews was widely recognized by Greek
and Roman authors in antiquity, who levelled accusations of misanthropy and amixia
against them.585 Altogether, Jews assumed transactions and interactions with gentiles
involving food were a high risk for violating the Torah’s dietary laws.
But even in transactions among Jews, information asymmetry could be a
problem. Even if most Jews, contrary to gentiles, could be presumed to know the
Law, and though there was general agreement on a number of halakhic question, there
were some issues that sparked strong interpretive disagreements. 586 Where such
differences existed, they constituted a transaction cost, a barrier to trade that required
extra effort to overcome. 587 Knowledge of a vendor’s adherence to a particular sect or
membership in a particular community could serve as a clue to the buyer about
whether the produce would be acceptable or not.
Reputation about one’s trustworthiness with respect to the Law could help mitigate the transaction costs. As people spread information of their personal experiences
with or hearsay about a peer, they contribute to the construction of a reputation for
piety or impiety, for stringency or laxity, for adherence to one interpretation or
another. Individuals could also attempt to craft their own reputation through carefully
constructing their public image. Public demonstrations of one’s piety could contribute
to a general reputation for adherence to the Law. Deuteronomy prescribes a triennial
public declaration of proper fulfillment of the tithes and other commandments (26:12 –
19), which could serve as one such occasion: 588
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When you have finished paying all the tithe of your produce in the third year … you
shall say before YHWH your God, “I have removed the sacred portion from the
house, and I have given it to the Levites, the resident aliens, the orphans, and the
widows, in accordance with your entire commandment that you commanded me; I
have neither transgressed nor forgotten any of your commandments: I have not eaten
of it while in mourning; I have not removed any of it while I was unclean; and I have
not offered any of it to the dead. I have obeyed YHWH my God, doing just as you
commanded me. Look down from your holy habitation, from heaven, and bless your
people Israel and the ground that you have given us, as you swore to our ancestors —
a land flowing with milk and honey.” (26:12–15)

Of course, such displays were only useful insofar as one’s peers deemed them
credible and representative of one’s character; if someone attempted the oath but was
rumored to have wantonly broken the commandments, the display would only serve to
conjure accusations of hypocrisy and untrustworthiness. 589
For the sellers and vendors of ancient Galilee, the aversion to risking abrogation
of the Torah, or abetting and seemingly endorsing those who did, would have incen tivized being scrupulous about the nature of the produce marketed. Not only social
but also economic pressures thereby served to enforce halakhic adherence, as interpreted within a given locale. Mishnah Demaʼi gives us some more concrete examples
by which we can see some of these effects of piety on the market. The subject of this
tractate is demaʼi, a rabbinic term for produce when it was not certain whether or not
tithes had properly been removed. According to the rabbis’ standards, it was illegitimate to consume produce from which tithes had not been properly removed. 590 It is
not certain how many Jews in the Second Temple period held this view, but the fact
that Philo too deemed it impermissible to eat of the crop before the tithes were set
aside (De specialibus legibus 1.156–157) suggests it was not merely an anxiety of the
tannaim and their successors. Regardless, it provides a useful analogy for considering
the role of ideology and institutions in shaping economic behavior.
Proper and pious use of produce was dependent on precise knowledge as to the
status of a body of produce, whether it has been fully tithed or not. One could be
fairly certain about whether or not one’s own property had been properly tit hed
(except insofar as work was delegated to others), but not in market transactions. The
Mishnah exhibits considerable anxiety over the question of how one guards against
the accidental consumption of produce that has not been tithed, taking it to the
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extreme of suggesting that one should tithe anything one buys, sells, or eats (m. Dem
2:2)—potentially causing multiple parties to tithe the same produce! Even worse, one
could unknowingly buy produce that had itself been separated as tithe, whose use by
unauthorized persons (non-Levitical Jews for First Tithe) or outside the designated
location (Jerusalem for Second Tithe) constituted a violation and a sin for the unwitting user. To avoid this, the Mishnah suggests that it was common practice to mark
storage jars with a letter to indicate whether produce was qorban (a highly stringent
level of purity), maʽaśer (tithe), demaʼi (uncertainly tithed), ṭevel (certain untithed),
or terumah (heave-offering) (m. MSh 4:11). 591
We can see the role of reputation and trust in determining from whom to buy
foodstuffs through a couple of examples from Mishnah Demaʼi:
If one says to someone who is not trustworthy (  ) למי שאינו נאמןregarding tithes,
“Buy [produce] for me from one who is trustworthy and tithes,” he [the messenger] is
not trusted. [If one says,] “[buy] from so-and-so,” this [messenger] is trusted. If he
went to buy from him [so-and-so], but said to him [the sender], “I could not find him
and I bought for you from someone else who is trustworthy,” he [the messenger] is
not trusted. (m. Dem 4:5)

In this first case, the issue is whether the messenger can properly discern a vendor
who can be trusted to follow proper tithing procedures since the messenger himself
cannot. If, however, the buyer can direct his messenger to a particular individual of
known reputation, this reduced the risk involved. Moreover, it hints at the ability of a
particular individual to garner more customers through a positive reputation and/or
established networks of trust.
If one enters a city and does not know any person there, he says, “Who here is trustworthy (  ?) מי כאן נאמןWho here tithes?” If a person replies “I am,” he is not trusted.
If he said, “so-and-so person is trustworthy,” he is trusted. If he goes to buy from
him and says to him, “Who here sells last year’s grain (  ”?) ישןIf he replies, “The
person that sent you to me,” even though it is as if they are rendering services to each
other, they are trusted. (m. Dem 4:6)

In this second example, we catch a glimpse of some of the complications of
conducting transactions in an unfamiliar market. As Neville Morley has noted about
traders, they “sought to reduce their exposure to risk and improve their bargaining
position by gathering information.”592 But this passage clearly demonstrates that
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information gathering was essential for the buyer as well. The tactic here is to tap into
local networks of communication and reputation, while being circumspect about
believing an unfamiliar character who signals his own trustworthiness.
Given the communal nature of the covenant, maintaining piety was not solely an
individual responsibility, but a communal one, and transgression by a few could
damage the relationship between God and Israel as a nation. 593 In light of this, it is
likely that many Jews were zealous to keep their compatriots from breaking the Law
as well. As we discussed in chapter 1, social scientists have noted that people will
often go out of their way to discourage others from breaking social norms or to punish
those who violate them, a phenomenon known as altruistic punishment.594 Among the
mechanisms for punishing peers are publically chastising violators, boycotting interactions with them, and spreading gossip damaging to their reputation. Choice of how
and with whom to conduct trade could therefore be as much about punishing others as
it was about avoiding breaking the Law oneself. While many of the agricultural laws
we discussed above would not necessarily cause others to directly violate the
commandments, a reputation for laxity might nonetheless result in fewer peers willing
to trade and cooperate. These mechanisms of peer punishment could thereby have
powerful effects on the ability of individuals to make transactions necessary to meet
their needs. And to the extent that there were broadly established norms, these mech anisms of punishment encouraged homogenization of practice by reprimanding
outliers.

Conclusion
In this chapter, I have argued that we cannot properly understand the economic
system in which Galilean Jews participated without considering the obligations and
limitations that the sacred law made on Jews and their agricultural practices. Our
sources strongly suggest that many Jews in Early Roman Palestine took their religious
commitments to God and the Law quite seriously; the commandments were not
suggestions to be heeded only when convenient, or goals to strive for only once the
mechanism for acquiring information about market conditions in distant settlements, including ques tions of current price and demand (84–85).
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“strictly economic” matters of putting food on the table and paying taxes and rents
had been achieved. The commandments were the conditions that governed the covenantal relationship between God and his people Israel that ensured providence, prosperity, and security for observance, while threatening violators with calamity. Under
such conditions, there can be no discussion of economy that excerpts the production,
consumption, and exchange of goods from the social and religious framework in
which such exchanges were conducted. The very economic notions of “subsistence
needs” and “financial obligations” can only be reckoned in a social context, and for
Galilean Jews, the Law of the Torah was among the most important institutions that
defined this context.
We examined several commandments pertaining to agricultural practices to illus trate the impact of the Torah on economic behavior. We focused on agricultural laws
in part because they indicate the effects of a religious institution on a broad segment
of the largely agrarian economy, since most Galilean Jews were directly involved in
food production and the rest at least dependent on it. The selection of laws discussed
above indicate a variety of ways that the Torah could have meaningfully shaped practices of cultivation, consumption, and economic exchange in Galilee. These cases
should be understood as exemplary, but not exhaustive. We could cite many more
statutes of the Mosaic covenant that would have shaped other aspects of the agricultural economy, and many more still that pertained to other aspects of the economy
altogether (e.g., lending practices and deposits).
In the section on agricultural production, we considered the case of the Sabbatical
Year restriction on cultivations and the prohibition on “mixed kinds.” The Sabbatical
Year commandment, which compelled Jews in the Land of Israel to leave their fields
and vineyards fallow every seven years, very clearly set limits on the types of
economic activities that Galileans could engage in during the Sabbatical Year. We
also saw that the limited availability of new resources in the Sabbatical Year incen tivized advanced preparation through strategies of savings—whether in kind or in
coin—requiring advanced planning and perhaps even tactical intensification of agricultural production in the year(s) prior. 595 We also saw how the conditions of food
scarcity caused by the fallow would have incentivized certain patterns of engagement
with the marketplace depending on one’s resources and the availability of storage
infrastructure, sometimes exacerbating socioeconomic difference. The law prohibiting
“mixed kinds” also constrained agricultural production, but in a different manner: it
prohibited the planting of multiple crops in the same field, and thereby constricted the
tactics available to cope with the contingencies of the perennial risks of crop failure.
We juxtaposed this prohibition with the crop diversification strategies practiced in
other regions of the Roman Empire, indicating how the Torah’s law on kilʼayim
complicated matters. But we also saw from the discussions in the Mishnah how the
vague wording of the commandment left space for interpretations that paid heed to the
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letter of the Law while still permitting certain formulations of crop diversification
strategies that were essential safeguards against wholesale crop failure.
In the section on agricultural consumption, we examined some of the obligations
that the Mosaic covenant places on the agricultural products of Jewish farmers. The
tithes were most important in terms of quantity, since each separate tithe was a tenth
of the annual yield. The First Tithe was an annual portion that Jews were obligated to
render to Levites and priests, and the Poor Tithe a portion due every three years or so.
Jews needed to account for these obligatory dues in advance, and could not simply
ignore them without incurring the threat of divine wrath as well as social conse quences for their impious lawbreaking. Tithes acted as a mechanism of wealth redistribution, directing resources from the general body of agricultural producers to
others. It would be a mistake to simply identify the First Tithe payments to priests as
enrichment of the wealthy, as some scholars have presumed, since many priests were
not elites and depended on this produce, and the Third or Poor Tithe was entirely
directed to those of limited means. We also noted the possible effects of the tithe
obligation on land tenure agreements between tenant and landlord, since it added
another factor to the contractual arrangement of financial responsibilities and burdens
that such economic relationships entailed.
In addition to the tithes, we discussed how the Torah designates certain portions
of the agricultural crop as property of the poor. These commands would have limited
the ability of farmers to make complete and efficient use of the whole of their harvest;
they required Jewish farmers to leave a portion of the field unharvested, prohibited
the thorough picking of olives and grapes, and allotted to the poor any sheaves left
behind in the harvesting process. While these obligations to the poor were not quanti fied by the Torah, and allowed stingy interpretations, we discussed the social mecha nisms that would have discouraged a miserly attitude to these commandments. The
widespread ethical notion that to deny the poor their dues was a violation of the
divine command not to oppress the poor and the negative reputation that accompanied
such impious behavior was further incentive to give and even give generously.
We also examined the ramifications of following the Second Tithe commandment, which placed conditions on the free use of a tenth of the annual harvest. Since
this commandment obligated the consumption of the tithe or the use of its redemption
value in Jerusalem, the tithe could not be used to fulfill everyday household needs,
thus demonstrating how the constraints of the Law complicated the calculus of house hold resource management. The Second Tithe was effectively a fund earmarked for
subsidizing festal food needs and thereby structurally directed economic resources
from Galilee to Jerusalem and compelled Jews to participate in the monetized market
economy of Jerusalem as well. For Galilean Jews, far from Jerusalem, redemption
was a virtual necessity, and this incentivized and even required some amount of
monetized market transaction in Galilee. It therefore explicitly encouraged the movement of resources from the regional economy of Galilee down to Jerusalem, under mining notions that Galileans were effectively autarkic and abstained from trade and
market sale. We will return to this subject in the following chapter.
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In the last section, we looked at some of the peripheral effects of the concerns for
ritual purity, as spelled out in the Torah, and as they pertained to the production,
consumption, and exchange of agricultural goods. The problem of information asymmetry created conditions of risk for Jews careful to avoid abrogating the Law. Risk
was an unavoidable fact for all but the most self-sufficient and wealthy of landholders, who produced an abundance, could store it in kind, and could avoid market
transaction when it was disadvantageous. We discussed some of the strategies avail able to Jews to minimize the likelihood of accidental transgression of the Law or
incursion of ritual impurity, many of which are suggested in the Mishnah’s discussion
of demaʼi. Reputation and stereotyping were crude methods of decision-making,
perhaps, but nonetheless served as a guide to strategic decision-making in lieu of
access to good information about the purity status of a vendor’s product. The
important role of reputation in marketplace interactions in turn served as a powerful
incentive toward stringent observance of halakhic standards by merchants hoping to
maintain an expansive clientele. It may even have encouraged homogenization of
normative interpretation, at least at a community level, since standardization served to
reduce the transaction costs between buyer and seller by decreasing information
asymmetry.
Our investigation indicates that we need to view religion as an integral element in
understanding the economy in antiquity. The intervention of the sacred law in matters
of agricultural cultivation meant that the economic system of agrarian production in
Galilee was not simply determined by profit-maximization motives (as in Neoclassical Economics) or by strict orientation toward “subsistence” defined solely by
household nutritional needs (as in the “peasant economy” model). Religious concerns
for maintaining piety—through observance of God’s covenantal conditions, in the
case of Galilean Jews—simultaneously placed limits on certain types of behavior and
incentivized others. These practices illustrate that an accurate rendering of the Galilean economy requires an expanded notion of economic rationality that includes the
religious rather than treating it as an epiphenomenon of social and economic factors.
In this chapter, we highlighted factors that made the patterns and strategies of
economic resource management by Galilean Jews unique, operating in ways distinct
even from diaspora and Judaean Jews. But in doing so I do not intend to mark the
Jews and their economic behavior as an outlier in the ancient Mediterranean. Much to
the contrary, I believe that my findings signal that the particular cultural and religious
institutions of any given region of the Roman Empire may have fundamentally shaped
local economic behavior in distinctive ways. Religious obligations on the individual
and the household cannot be dismissed as peripheral to the analysis of the ancient
economy. In other regions, too, local cults and their sacred laws must have created
conditions that configured economic resource management at the household level, and
not solely at the level of the temple economy.
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CHAPTER 4—MAKING SACRIFICES FOR THE FESTIVALS
How the Temple and Festivals Shape Household Economic Resource Management
The heart of Jewish religious practice in Early Roman Palestine was undoubtedly the
Temple in Jerusalem. While Jewish piety was enacted on a local and regular basis
through fulfillment of Torah commandments such as the Sabbath rest, observance of
the dietary laws, and the agricultural laws discussed in the previous chapter, other
commandments could only be fulfilled in this one location. The Torah specifies Jerusalem as the sole legitimate site for the sacrificial cult, meaning that any command ment or rite requiring animal or vegetal sacrifice could only be fulfilled in Jeru salem.596 The Torah also specifies certain consecrated goods that must be consumed
in Jerusalem alone. The fact that Jerusalem was the site chosen by God “to make his
name dwell there” (cf. Deut 12:11) also meant that activities and objects connected
with the city and its cult site could carry additional symbolic capital that set Jerusalem
apart from other settlements on the map.
Jerusalem was effectively the only large “Jewish” city in the region, a fact that is
best explained by its religious cachet. Unlike the other large cities that encircled
Jewish Palestine, Jerusalem was not proximate to abundant resources or especially
fertile lands and was not strategically located along major trade routes or the coast line.597 It was not even centrally located in Jewish Palestine, situated relatively far
from Galilee and Golan and much of Peraea. And though it had long served as a seat
of government, for much of the Early Roman period in question here it was largely
supplanted as the primary political “capital” by Caesarea Maritima. All of these
factors make Jerusalem somewhat unlikely as a “center” for a broader economy of
Jewish Palestine. Yet Jerusalem flourished on account of the Second Temple, which
made the city a center of gravity for the Jewish population and drew people and
resources in every year from all over Palestine (and well beyond).
Though Galilee’s interpersonal and economic network was a largely closed,
insular system (as we argued in chapter 2), the Jerusalem cult was a notable and
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prominent exception. The commandment to attend the so-called “pilgrimage festivals”
compelled many to travel to Jerusalem at the same time every year. This confluence
of Jews from a wide geography made Jerusalem a hub for interpersonal connections,
information exchange, and economic transactions, bridging otherwise disconnected
and insular networks. This was especially true for the regions within Palestine, whose
inhabitants attended the festivals in far greater numbers and with more regularity than
diaspora Jews. The festivals brought Galileans and Judaeans together at regular intervals each year, creating good conditions for the forging, reinforcing, and perpetuation
of interpersonal connections.
The Temple cult, pilgrimage festivals, and other commandments observable
solely in Jerusalem encouraged the flow of money and resources from outlying
regions into the city. Participating in the Jerusalem cult made many demands on the
economic resources of Galilean pilgrims—there were the direct costs of sacrifices and
other offerings as well as the logistical costs of travel, lodging, and foodstuffs. In
addition to the necessities, the festivals also gave Galileans opportunity to conduct
other transactions that they might not otherwise have had they not been drawn to Jeru salem to fulfill their religious obligations. The commandments mandating pilgrimage
to Jerusalem, we will see, had the effect of periodically integrating at least some
sectors of the Galilean and Judaean economies, as pilgrims brought resources and
money from the north to spend in Jerusalem’s markets and in support of the Temple
institution.
Galilee provides us with a particularly interesting test case for considering the
ways that a temple institution and its rites interlinked with “household economies.”
To date, most scholarly discussion of economy and religion in the ancient Mediterranean has focused on “temple economies”—the production, exchange, and consumption networks that accommodate the needs of the Temple institution itself. 598 We shall
briefly touch on that topic. But the “temple economy” had little to do with Galilee,
insofar as most of the Temple’s material needs were met out of its immediate environs. Yet Galilee was in the Jerusalem Temple’s “catchment zone,”599 close enough to
realistically expect that many made the trip each year, and because of this would have
been accounted for in the ways households planned their allocation of economic
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resources. As such, the focus of this chapter is not on maintenance of the Temple but
on the economic burdens that participating in the Temple cult and fulfilling other
commandments restricted to Jerusalem had on the economic calculus of pilgrims.

Pilgrimage to Jerusalem
In the introduction to this chapter I used
the oft-deployed language of pilgrimage to refer to Galilean travel to
the Jerusalem Temple. 600 I use the term
“pilgrimage” to refer to a ritualized,
multi-day journey to a sacred site
undertaken in part for religious purposes. Pilgrimage is distinguished from
everyday, local religious practices in
that performing it requires lengthy
travel that is not undertaken on a
regular basis.601 For many Judaeans,
participation in the Temple cult would
not constitute pilgrimage, since their
proximity to Jerusalem meant they
could conduct rites there without radically interrupting their weekly routines, Figure 13. Pilgrimage Festivals on the Jewish luniwhile for Galileans the distance made solar calendar. In dark grey is a visual approximacult rites a major undertaking. While tion of the length of festivals, while the light grey is
the overt purpose of such a journey an approximation of travel time to and from the
festivals.
may be primarily religious, most sacred
travel in Antiquity was multipurpose.602 Travel to a site for the purposes of making
sacrifice did not preclude one from engaging with family and friends, from
conducting business, or making tangentially related purchases. In other words,
fulfillment of Torah commandments may have defined the timing and impetus for
travel to Jerusalem, but did not limit the pilgrims to “purely religious” activities.
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The primary occasions for Galileans to travel to Jerusalem were the three
pilgrimage festivals ( )חגים: Passover/Unleavened Bread (Nisan 14–21),603 Weeks
(Shavuʽot; Sivan 6), and Booths (Sukkot; Tishrei 15–21). These three differed from
the other festivals of the sacred calendar in that presence and participation was
mandated: “Three times a year all your males shall appear before YHWH your God at
the place that he will choose” (Deut 16:16; cf. Exod 23:14, 17; 34:23). For other festivals, the priests performed rites and sacrifices on the behalf of Israel but attendance
by lay Jews was optional. Galileans could of course come to the other festivals and
even make pilgrimage outside of festal time, but because of the distance and the
burden such travel entailed, we may presume that most Galileans concentrated their
time in Jerusalem to the seasons of the pilgrimage festivals as much as they could.
Pilgrimage to the Temple, as defined by distance, was really a phenomenon of the
later Second Temple period and especially the Early Roman period. When the Temple
was initially constructed in the Persian period, the Jewish population was concentrated around the city of Jerusalem itself, and only a relatively small number of Jews
seem to have expanded into Galilee and Peraea under the Ptolemies and Seleucids. 604
With most Jews residing proximate to Jerusalem and its Temple, it is not surprising
that there is little textual evidence for pilgrimage at this time. 605 Circumstances began
to change during the Hasmonaean period, when Hyrcanus I annexed Galilee (along
with Peraea, Samaria, and Idumaea) to the Hasmonaean realm. The marked change in
the material culture of Galilee in this period further indicates that many Jews migrated
from Judaea to settle in Galilee. 606 For those Jews who had migrated to Galilee,
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participation in the Temple cult and fulfillment of the festival obligations now
entailed a journey of several days, with all of the concomitant dangers and burdens of
travel.
Pilgrimage to the Jerusalem Temple reached its zenith In the Early Roman period.
Martin Goodman has argued that several of Herod the Great’s building projects were
intended to increase the volume of pilgrimage from the diaspora and the economic
activity this fostered in Jerusalem. 607 These projects included the renovation of the
Temple from a modest structure into an expansive and splendid complex, the
construction of a protected harbor at Caesarea Maritima, 608 and the establishment of a
fortress city called Bathyra in Batanaea to secure the pilgrimage route from Babylonia
(Ant. 17.23–26). But these improvements did not just foster pilgrimage from abroad—
they also had secondary effects on local pilgrimage: improvements in the Temple
facilities and road infrastructure and security would have made pilgrimage easier for
pilgrims within Palestine as well. It is no surprise that Josephus portrays the festivals
as well attended in this period.
We can say with certainty from our sources that the festivals drew huge crowds
of pilgrims three times a year, but this in and of itself does not necessarily demon strate that Jews appeared before God at the Temple triannually609 and consistently.
Many diaspora Jews probably conducted the pilgrimage only once or twice in their
lifetimes, since it was a considerable undertaking both in terms of the long and sometimes dangerous travels over land and sea and the great expenses involved. Even
Philo, from one of the wealthiest Jewish families in Alexandria, seems not to have
undertaken the pilgrimage often, if he even made it more than once. 610 Josephus’
description of the pilgrimage commandment indicates that by the Early Roman period
at least, this obligation was understood to be incumbent only upon people “from the
bounds of the land that the Hebrews should conquer” (Ant. 4.203), i.e., Palestine.
Some scholars have suggested that even among Palestinian Jews, few would have
appeared at all three festivals each year. Shemuel Safrai, and other following his lead,
have taken the statement in Luke that “every year Jesus’ parents went to Jerusalem for
the Festival of the Passover” (2:41) to indicate that they only went to Jerusalem for
Passovers.611 Susan Haber likewise takes Luke as evidence that Galileans prioritized
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Passover at the expense of other festivals. 612 Jeffrey Rubenstein, by contrast, has
argued that Booths, not Passover, was the most widely attended and popular of the
pilgrimage festivals, coming as it did at the end of the agricultural season. 613 E. P.
Sanders contends that “Palestinian Jews on average attended one of the three festivals
each year” and the close timing of Passover and Weeks would make it nigh impossible for Jews outside of Judaea to attend both. 614 Martin Goodman is less specific,
but likewise believes that because of the distance Galileans were less likely to attend
all the festivals than Judaeans were. 615
In all cases, these assessments are best guesses from limited evidence, and in the
case of Safrai and Haver, overly dependent on a narrow reading of Luke 2:41. Most
Second Temple textual statements about festival attendance describe it on a global
rather than familial scale, which does not allow us to make strong, positive statements
about whether any given individual attended all three festivals each year. The excep tions are Tobit, written sometime in the Hellenistic period, whose protagonist is a
Galilean whose attendance at all three pilgrimage festivals each year is noted as a
mark of piety (1:4–6),616 and the Gospel of John, in which Jesus is depicted in attendance at numerous festivals, not just Passover (2:13; 5:1; 7:10; 10:22; 11:55). The only
positive literary evidence suggesting a Galilean may have chosen to ignore the
pilgrimage obligation also comes from John. Federico Colautti argues that John 6
depicts Jesus sitting out a Passover and in John 7:6–8 stating his intention to skip
Booths.617 Both are contestable, however. John 6:4 notes that Passover was near
without ever mentioning his travel to Jerusalem, but given John’s proclivity to change
location unannounced and the episodic nature of the gospels in general, this is hardly
a statement that he (and his followers) did not go to Passover. And while Jes us states
openly his intention to sit out Booths in 7:6–8, he subsequently went in secret (7:10),
and the reason for potentially missing the festival was the imminent threat of being
killed by the Jerusalem authorities (before the proper time) (7:1, 6).
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Since the evidence for the frequency of individual attendance at the festivals is
quite limited, any assessment of the effects of pilgrimage is dependent on one’s
starting assumptions. To argue, as some have, that economic concerns precluded
many Galileans from participating in the festivals each year requires the assumption
that the commandment was treated by Jews as a secondary concern, a goal to aspire to
only if the primary “subsistence” needs were met. But this perspective errs in
importing a rather modern, secular, capitalist conception of rational choice to a social
world in which religious institutions were an integral part of society. If we take seri ously the notion that such institutions contribute to social definitions of acceptable
behavior and shape economic priorities, then many Jews would not have considered
abstaining from the pilgrimage as an option available to them in the first place. As we
noted in the previous chapter, the very narrow sense of “subsistence” (defined by
nutritional and taxation needs) often applied in evaluation of Galilean economic
conditions fails to acknowledge the social-constructedness of the notion of economic
“needs” and the possibility that other obligations may be deemed just as economically
imperative. In other words, we should explore the implications of a “bounded”
economic rationality that deems religious obligations as a component of “subsistence”
needs, rather than being in competition with and subordinate to them.
As with the agricultural laws we examined in chapter 3, the obligation to attempt
the pilgrimage festivals does not seem to have been enforced through official institu tional mechanisms of policing. The Temple lacked surveillance or registration mech anisms that would have allowed its personnel to systematically identify individuals
who, for whatever reason, shirked their obligations. So far as we know, the priests did
not register the names of individuals who showed up to the Temple to offer festal
sacrifices, and, furthermore, individuals who shared another’s festal offering did not
necessarily need to go to the Temple themselves (as we shall discuss below). Taking
roll through the city itself, given the size and mobility of the crowds, would have been
nigh impossible. The Temple as a central, authoritative institution lacked the sort of
omniscient gaze made possible by more modern mechanisms of data recording and
technology.
For many, the impulse to fulfill the pilgrimage and attend the festivals would
come from the normalization—i.e., rendering into a norm—of these obligations and
the internalization of them. 618 Children would be socialized into the practice from a
relatively young age (Jesus is a twelve-year-old child on pilgrimage in Luke 2:41–42;
children younger still are envisioned in m. Ḥag 1:1) as they conducted the trek
through accustomed roads and past familiar landmarks, trained through repetition year
after year into a regular rhythm. James B. Rives has described civic cults in the
Roman Empire in a similar fashion:
618
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To a large extent, however, the importance of civic cults lay not in the enthusiasm
that they might or might not have inspired in people, but rather in their banality, in
the familiar way that temples shaped public space and festivals shaped the year. 619

The act of going on pilgrimage, and the details of conducting the preparation and
journey, may be understood as a part of Galilean habitus, in which the norms are
embodied through a habitual set of practices collectively and regularly orchestrated
without necessary reference to rules enforceable by authorities. The structures
shaping individuals and communities into such behavior are regenerative, the product
of past iterations of the act and producers of future iterations. 620 The decision to go on
pilgrimage in this sense is not so much a decision at all as it is a naturalized sense of
what one simply does.
But pilgrimage was more than just regularized behavior, since it was also imbued
with a sense of moral obligation and socially-constructed notions of piety. The
importance of the festivals can be glimpsed in some of our literary sources, as in the
praise for the eponymous protagonist in Tobit for his regular attendance (1:6) and
Jubilees’ portrayal of pious pre-Mosaic patriarchs performing festival rites (e.g.,
6:17–20; 16:20–31; 22:1–4). If indeed the norms around making the pilgrimage were
internalized as “norms of oughtness,” and attendance of the festivals was one dimension by which one assessed one’s piety, then violating them would cause one’s
internal sanctioning system to produce feelings of guilt and shame to dissuade future
transgression.621 An affront to the conditions governing the covenant between God
and his subjects Israel might also spur feelings of anxiety, 622 as one anticipates with
uncertainty the possibility of divine sanction and the deleterious effects on one’s
standing with God. Internalization of these norms can also take the form of zeal,623 a
hypervigilant form of observance encouraging actions beyond what might be expected
of simple compliance and exhibiting a willingness to adhere to norms even at great
personal costs. For an example of zealousness to observe the festivals, we may note
the fact that a vast multitude of Jews attended the Passover in Jerusalem despite the
dangers presented by the encroaching Roman armies during the revolt, which ultimately left the celebrants trapped in an overcrowded Jerusalem during the siege in 70
624
CE (War 6.421–435).
In an earlier incident, the celebrants blithely returned to their
sacrifices after slaughtering a cohort of Archelaus’ soldiers sent to Jerusalem to
curtail sedition, returning promptly to the festival rather than making preparations for
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an almost certain reprisal from the ethnarch (War 2.10–12). These episodes also illustrated that there was sometimes an upper limit on the costs to safety that Jews were
willing to undertake, as they abandoned the festival when Archelaus sent an entire
army against them (see, e.g., War 2.13).625
Of course, there were external forces at work as well. Social pressures from peers
inside one’s community and broader social network could have exercised a powerful
constraint on the behavior of others. Conducting the pilgrimage was a highly conspic uous activity, and it was quite easy for others in the community to observe whether
their peers were making the trek or staying home. In one episode, Josephus indicates
that the large settlement of Lydda was completely devoid of men save for fifty inhab itants, since the rest had gone up to the festival in Jerusalem (War 2.515–517).626
With such large numbers vacating the city, skipping the festival would have stood
out. We should note that there may have been some norms that narrowed the defini tion of who was obligated to attend beyond gender (as specified in Deut 16:16): in the
aforementioned case of Lydda, at least some of those who remained were apparently
male,627 and the Mishnah claims exceptions for young children, slaves, elderly, and
some others (m Ḥag 1:1).628 But presuming one did not fit these conditions, staying
behind signal to others in the community that an individual was impious and a violator of the Law and the social norms around it. As with other social norms, we can
expect that those who were scrupulous about following the Law used mechanisms
such as reprimand, shunning, boycott, or gossip to sanction violators for the offence
and discourage the defector and others from subsequent violations. The act of sanc tioning also reaffirmed to others the strength of the social norm and the sanctioner’s
own status as a pious adherent to the community’s religious practices.
Sanctioning was encouraged further by the fact that the Law was framed as a
covenant between Israel as a collective and God, and widespread violation was under stood to threaten the Jews as a whole, not just the individual defector.629 Sanctioning
625
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could have important ramifications for individuals’ social and cultural capital, as well
as for their ability to make productive use of their interpersonal networks. These
social mechanisms of enforcement thus created strong incentives for Jews to comply
with the pilgrimage obligation and act in accordance with the norms of the commu nity. This is all the more so for our Galileans, most of whom resided in small settle ments with closed networks where everyone knew everyone and sanctions could be
effectively deployed (see ch. 2), and where the very small gentile population would
have left few alternative interpersonal connections available for whom the norms of
Torah adherence were inconsequential. 630
The references to pilgrimage in Josephus are consistent with the notion that
attending the festivals was normative and widely practiced, even if not universally so.
Many of his narratives in War and the later books of Antiquities are contextualized in
relation to the festivals, and depict the magnitude of attendance of the festival crowds
with evocative—if not quantifiable—language.631 Josephus speaks of festival-goers
most often as a multitude (e.g., War 1.253), but at other times as “myriads”
(μυριάδες; Ant. 14.338) or “an innumerable crowd” (λαὸς ἄπειρος; War 2.10) or an
inflated numerical estimate (e.g., 3 million; War 2.280). Josephus’ narratives abound
with references to mass movement of people from all regions of Jewish Palestine:
“out of Galilee, Idumaea, Jericho, and Peraea-over-Jordan, and the true people of
Judaea itself” (War 2.42–43).632 The mass movement of pilgrims from Galilee to Jerusalem is the launching point for a narrative of conflict between Jews and Samaritans
(Ant. 20.118; War 2.232–233). Josephus notes that the majority of Jews besieged in
Jerusalem during the First Jewish Revolt were “not native to there [οὐκ ἐπιχώριον;
i.e., not from Jerusalem or Judaea], for they were suddenly engulfed by war when
they had gathered from the entire countryside for the Festival of Unleavened Bread”
(War 6.421). The palpable threat of violence was seemingly not enough to dissuade
many from the festivals either, as when “myriads” came to the Festival of Weeks
despite the ongoing political strife between Antigonus and Herod (War 1.253; Ant.
14.338), or when festival-goers continued the paschal sacrifices despite having just
engaged Archelaus’ soldiers and thereby invited imminent retribution (War 2.11–12).
The New Testament gospels corroborate this image of widespread observance of the
festivals, especially Luke and John who explicitly refer to masses of Jews travelling
from Galilee to Jerusalem for the festivals.633 These texts corroborate our contention
630
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that Jews in Palestine—including Galileans—saw participation in the festivals as an
important act and strove to fulfill their festal obligations even in the face of danger. In
what follows, we will look at the ways that travel to Jerusalem for the festivals and
the resources required to do so would have shaped the parameters of economic deci sion-making for Galileans on the assumption that these obligations constituted reli gious norms that most strove to observe.

The Logistics of Pilgrimage
Making the pilgrimage from Galilee to Jerusalem imposed a number of costs on the
pilgrim’s economic resources. In order to make the multi-day journey, Galileans
needed to account for the expenses of travel, lodging, and food not only for the trek to
and from Jerusalem, but for their sojourn in the city as well. Because of the distance
from Jerusalem, Galileans would have felt these logistical costs more acutely than
other, more proximate regions like Peraea. Travel from Galilee to Judaea was a
considerable undertaking, though Jewish pilgrims could mitigate these costs, we shall
suggest, through planning and tactic. Because of the distance, pilgrimage also meant
time idle from one’s productive activities. Together, these costs undertaken by many
will indicate how the obligatory performance of religious rites at the Jerusalem
Temple could have a profound effect on the economic resource management of
Galileans. And, furthermore, because the pilgrimage festivals occurred according to a
regular calendrical cycle, we may surmise that they played an important role in
structuring the rhythms of movement and transaction between the regional economies
of Galilee and Judaea and accordingly the rhythms of supply, demand, and price
fluctuations.
Travel
The trip to Jerusalem was significantly more onerous than the everyday inter-village
travel conducted within Galilee, as discussed in chapter 2, where settlements were
situated very close to one another. Travel between Galilee and Jerusalem was typically conducted overland and required at least three days and perhaps a week,
depending on the route, mode of transportation, and duration of stops on the way.
Water travel was not a viable option or at least not a marked improvement in travel
time—the Jordan River was not navigable, and sailing along the coast from Ptolemais
to Jaffa still entailed at least a day’s travel to and from each port. With the exception
of Jews coming to the Temple from the diaspora, literary sources suggest that Galilean travelers used two major routes to reach Jerusalem: (A) south through the Jezreel
Valley and Samaria (e.g., Mark 10; Ant. 20.118; War 2.232–233) or (B) eastward
along the Jezreel Valley to the Jordan River valley, south through the valley to
Jericho, and from there west to Jerusalem (e.g., Luke 9:51–56).634
634

Haber suggests a third route from Kefar ʽOtnaʼi (near Megiddo) to Jerusalem via Antipat ris on
the coastal plain; Haber, “Going Up to Jerusalem,” 51. The route itself is not implausible. But it is

188
Figure 14. Approximation of the pilgrimage
routes from Nazareth to Jerusalem through Samaria
(A) and through the Jordan River Valley (B).
approximates these two routes from Nazareth to
Jerusalem on the basis of topography and the
recent maps of ancient roads and routes produced
by James F. Strange. 635 Both routes are draw to
avoid steep changes in elevation, preferring to
remain in the valley lowlands rather than ascend
and descend hills. Route A, through Samaria, was
the shorter and more direct of the two at
approximately 124 kilometers, and at a rate of 30
kilometers per day636 it could be traversed in about
four days. Route B, through the Jordan Valley, was
approximately 136 kilometers, and could be traversed in about four and a half days, perhaps slowed
by the steep uphill climb from Jericho to Jerusalem.
Which route was preferable depended on a number of factors. In terms of
distance, the Samarian route was a bit shorter and Figure 14. Approximation of the pilmore direct for those in central and western grimage routes from Nazareth to JeruGalilee. For those in the eastern lake region, a salem through Samaria (A) and
distance-based choice may have been moot. through the Jordan River Valley (B).
Josephus’ evaluation of travel from Galilee to Jerusalem plainly favors the Samarian
route for speed: “It was absolutely necessary for those who desired to go quickly to
traverse through it [Samaria], as it is possible to reach Jerusalem in this way from
Galilee in three days” (Life 269).637 This figure of three days may represent a more
tenuously inferred from John 11, in which Jesus travels from a village called Ephraim (interpreted as
in the Ephraim hill country) to Jerusalem for Passover (11:54–55). But since Jesus had most recently
come from Bethany near Jerusalem, rather than from Galilee, this tells us nothing about pilgrimage
routes, and surely not that he traveled via the coastal plain.
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strenuous trip, though, with longer travel days and perhaps the assistance of a horse.
For many travelling on foot, with or without laden asses, four to five days would be
typical.
The other important factor was whether or not a route took pilgrims through
Samaritan territory. The Gospel of Luke suggests that there were often tensions
between Jews and Samaritans. When Jesus travels from Galilee to Jerusalem, as his
party approaches a village of Samaria, Jesus sends messengers ahead in order,
presumably, to procure lodging or other provisions. The Samaritan inhabitants,
however, “did not admit him, because his face was set to go to Jerusalem” (Luke
9:51–53).638 At its worst, Samaritan hostilities could lead to physical violence against
pilgrims passing through their region:
And next there occurred a conflict between the Galileans and the Samarians; for at a
village called Gema [Ginae], which lies in the Great Plain of the Samarians, when
many Jews were going up for the festival, a certain Galilean was killed. (War 2.232–
233; cf. Ant. 20.118)

This murder of a pilgrim in 50 CE triggered an armed assault by Jews (from Galilee
and Judaea alike) against the Samaritans, even abandoning the festival itself to avenge
his death. Tacitus, in describing the same incident, depicts the animosity between
Galilee and Samaria as habitual and long-standing (Annales 12.54.2–12.54.4).
The Jordan Valley route could be regarded as the “safer” route, in that it avoided
the Samaritan heartland altogether. Susan Haber takes this to have been the default
route for Jewish pilgrims for this very reason. 639 We should remember, however, that
hostilities were not always so piqued. Josephus at other points indicates that Samari tans sometimes acted in concord with Jews. He criticizes the Samaritans for being
“fair-weather” Jews who claim Jewish identity when convenient but eschewing it in
the face of danger (Ant. 9.290–291; 11.341; 12.257), but this also indicates that there
were times of eased relations between them. It is not until after 6 CE that an incident
causes the Temple authorities to ban Samaritans from attending Passover (Ant.
18.29),640 implying that they had been welcome (or at least permitted) beforehand.
Animosity between Jews and Samaritans was not a constant; it increased and
After the last, seven days: so that he may walk home (three), he may return (three), and he may
announce (one day).’” The presumed location of “home” is not stated, though.
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decreased in response to particular events. In the aftermath of the murder at Gema,
there was probably a shift in the pattern of migration eastward to the Jordan for a few
years. But many may have reverted to traversing Samaria before the onset of the First
Jewish Revolt in 66. When Josephus signals the danger of passing through Samaria,
after all, he credits it not to the hostilities of the local inhabitants but to the presence
of the Roman military (Life 269). In the same passage, he even claim to have friends
there, perhaps signaling Samaritans with whom he was on good terms or fellow Jews
who were able to reside in Samaria without problem.
Galilean pilgrims also needed to weigh the concerns for safety against other
logistical factors. As noted, the Jordan Valley route was longer and therefore required
more provisions and entailed the costs of being away from one’s home and trade for
at least an extra day each way. It also meant, as we shall see below, more limitations
in the availability of accommodations and provisions along the route. As much as
Samaritans could be hostile, they could also be useful, in that their disconnection
from the Jerusalem Temple and its reckoning of the festal calendar meant that Samar itans were around to buy goods and services from during the festival season.
No matter which route pilgrims took, they also faced the dangers of overland
travel in antiquity. In few areas of the Roman Empire do there seem to have been
anything like police or patrolmen, and where they did exist they were stationed in
frontier zones and the major Roman highways. 641 Most roads were relatively unprotected zones, and except where they passed settlements they left travelers vulnerable
to robbery and assault. Greek and Latin literature is replete with stories of highway
robbers attacking unwary travelers. 642 Palestine was not exempt from such dangers.
The premise of the Parable of the Good Samaritan is that a traveler is robbed and
beaten on the road from Jerusalem to Jericho (Luke 10:29–37). Josephus often references bandits operating in the Herodian kingdoms, and while he often applies the
term to political opponents as a pejorative, some of the references are surely to simple
bands of highwaymen as well. 643 The pejorative would not work, of course, if bandits
were not a recognizable threat.
The tactic of travelling in groups served to mitigate these dangers. The Gospel of
Luke gives the impression that people travelled together in large caravans to and from
the festivals. Jesus’ family returned from Passover in a large group composed of
family (συγγενεῦσιν) and friends (γνωστοῖς); so large, in fact, that Jesus’ absence
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could go unnoticed for several days (2:43–45). Travelling in groups provided safety
in numbers against bandits on the road.
Traveling in groups came with trade-offs too, though. To some extent, they would
have slowed down the average speed of travel. A caravan could only collectively
move as fast as its slowest members, and if a travelling party had a large number of
children, elderly, or others for whom the long hike was challenging the trip would
take longer than for a solo traveler unencumbered by others. However, on balance it
seems that the advantages of group travel outweighed the disadvantages. And if
indeed traveling in groups was safer and less expensive for the individual, this only
reinforces the suggestion above that travel from Galilee to Jerusalem was mostly
effected during the festival season; travel outside of these periods of mass migration
subjected individuals to higher risks on the road and fewer strategies for spreading out
costs.
Pilgrimage Travel and Idle Hands
For Galileans, participation in the festivals meant that three times a year, most Jewish
men and male children 644 were absent from their homes and from their work for
significant periods of time—one to three weeks, varying with the length of the
festival, the speed of the caravan, and the route taken. 645 Fulfillment of one’s Torah
obligation to attend the festivals meant stepping away from one’s productive occupa tions—at least insofar as they were geographically bound—at certain anticipated and
regular periods of the year. These sorts of trade-offs are typically referred to as
“opportunity costs,” the costs entailed in choosing one option over another. But
“opportunity cost” is the wrong way to conceptualize how pious Galileans would have
understood the ramifications of their participation in the pilgrimage, since the very
concept presumes that non-observance was considered a legitimate and possible
choice. The religious institutions and societal norms that expanded on or further
defined these rules to some extent constrained the very set of conceivable actions; to
draw on Bourdieu’s terminology, these institutions contributed to the construction of
doxa, the set of undisputed positions taken for granted in a society, in contrast to the
realm of opinion in which choices are a matter of argument over competing possibil ities.646 We may nonetheless find it heuristically useful to compare the constraints that
pilgrimage and the festivals created against the theoretical possibility of breaking
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these commandments, in that it allows us to see how a rationality “bounded” by these
religious institutions diverges from our expectations based on neoclassical economic
notions of rationality. For even if skipping the festivals was a conceivable option to
these Jews, individuals in the tight-knit society of ancient Galilee were not free to
make the choice in a vacuum: their behavior was constrained by the expectations of
their peers. Our literary sources do not, unfortunately, convey how grave a violation
failure to participate in the festivals was—our sources primarily speak about them in
terms of attendance, rather than abstinence 647—but failure to attend could signal to
others a more systematic breach of the Law, since it was the chief occasion for Galileans to fulfill an array of obligatory offerings, thereby inviting rather severe sanc tions that would make defection costly in other ways.
Because the festivals are linked to the rhythms of the agricultural calendar, they
follow the most intensive periods of the year—the harvests.648 The fact that agricultural and festival calendars did not perfectly align (since one was solar and the other
lunisolar) meant that in some years there may have been increased pressure to
complete the harvest in a narrower timeframe. The harvests were already intensive
because of the relatively narrow window for cutting and collecting the crop and the
increase in labor required, compared against the other agricultural tasks of plowing,
sowing, and weeding. The timing of harvest could have significant impacts on both
the quality and the quantity of the produce. For instance, reaping grain when the
stalks were fully ripened and dry would yield high quality grains but risked shaking
many of them loose in the reaping process, diminishing the yield; harvesting early
would increase the total and spread labor over a longer period, but include relatively
“green” grains in the process. 649 Since the work needed to be performed quickly, agriculturalists often needed to enlist additional labor. If some members of the household
were typically engaged in non-agricultural production—e.g., handicrafts—they could
be redeployed during the harvest to agricultural duties. Harvests were also occasions
when it would be useful to cash in social capital and call in favors from kin, neigh bors, and other members in one’s interpersonal network. Paul Halstead has noted that
cooperation and labor sharing between households were important tactics that farmers
deployed to maximize the efficiency of the harvest before the age of mechanization.650 In addition to labor sharing, one could also hire hands to harvest the crop.
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There are ample literary references to paid laborers at harvest (see, e.g., Matt 20:1–
16; m. BM 7). And as we saw in chapter 3, the Torah defines some parameters around
the hiring of agricultural hands for the harvest, permitting them to eat while working
and—if “poor”—glean the leftovers afterward. Harvest was an opportune time for
households with structural oversupply of labor 651—that is, more labor than necessary
for their own fields and other industry—to make some additional money. Clearly,
strong social networks were a significant asset during the harvest, since they facilitate
strategies to maximize the allocation of labor. This also suggests the potential damage
that members of the community could inflict through peer punishment, as sanctions
for violating rules and norms could weaken the defector’s ability to get others to act
cooperatively.
The period immediately following the harvest is a relative lull, and as such is the
ideal period for a respite from the fields and travel to Jerusalem. Since the pilgrimage
obligation was only incumbent upon the men, women could stay behind to continue
maintenance tasks like weeding other crops and caring for any livestock. It seems,
though, that some women went to Jerusalem for at least some of the festival (e.g. ,
Mary in Luke 2:48), and even if they did not they may have still observed the festivals’ prohibition and/or limitation on labor. Either way, the labor force to perform
such maintenance tasks would have been greatly reduced during the length of the fes tival. The ability to call in favors from women who stayed behind or those ot herwise
normatively exempt from the pilgrimage (esp. the elderly) would be an asset. If this
was not possible, agricultural tasks like weeding could be more arduous upon return
and could have a deleterious effect on the crop yield if the weeds grew too pervasive.
Widespread absenteeism also left many settlements open to the threat of
robbery.652 Crops left exposed could be raided with little threat of resistance. Homes
could be burglarized and valuables stolen. This problem is even tacitly admitted in
Exodus’ rendition of the pilgrimage commandment: “I will drive out nations before
you and enlarge your territory, and no one will covet your land when you go up three
times each year to appear before YHWH your God” (34:23–24). Making the
pilgrimage always entailed some risk that one may discover that they had been robbed
upon return. Even though the Herodian and Roman states were infrastructurally weak,
the rulers do seem to have actively sought to curtail rampant banditry through military
intervention. As we noted in chapter 1, for instance, Herod clamped down on the
endemic violence and banditry that had characterized the early years of Roman rule
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(e.g., Ant. 14.159–160, 431–433; 15.344–348; War 1.204–205, 314–316, 398–400),
and the governor Cumanus destroyed villages in which members were suspected of
abetting robbers (Ant. 20.113–114; War 2.228–231). The presence of a military
colony at Gaba on the outskirts of Galilee probably served as some enduring deter rent.653 Many of Josephus’ reports of rampant robbery occur around periods of regime
changes.654 In periods of relative political stability (i.e., after 40 BCE), widespread
robbery was probably less a concern than isolated incidents, since the former would
likely be met with military reprisal but the latter might go unanswered entirely.
Pilgrimage could also threaten life and limb. In addition to the threats from
highway robbers and potentially hostile Samaritans during the trek, the festivals
themselves could be occasions for violence and calamity. Many of the festivals in
episodes of Josephus’ Jewish War and Jewish Antiquities are referenced as the
settings for unrest, riots, and assassinations. 655 Attending the festivals often entailed a
heightened risk of danger, since the gathering of the multitudes from all around
Palestine could lead to inter-group fighting and conflict with the authorities—especially, ironically, when gentile military forces were deployed to “keep the peace.”656
For households engaged in non-agrarian production, the effects of pilgrimage on
their productivity depended in part on the portability of the trade. For some trades,
work in transit was difficult or impossible. Some crafts were location dependent, such
as quarrying and pottery making (because of the heaviness of wet clay for transport
and the fixity of kilns). Others, such as leather working, may have been quite manage able in Jerusalem. The commandments for observing the pilgrimage festivals also
include prohibitions on labor during the opening and closing days of each festival. 657
Work on the minor festival days in between is not prohibited in the Torah, and Josephus seems to suggest that work ceased only on the days that are singled out in the
Torah for rest (Ant. 3.247). The rabbis qualify work on the minor festival days,
permitting some forms of labor required for maintenance and handiwork so long as it
653
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was not performed in the fashion that professional tradesmen do (m. MQ 1). Some
may have followed these or similar limitations, though others who performed their
regular work during the middle days of Unleavened Bread or Booths could stand on
equally justifiable halakhic ground. Clearly, certain professional activities were
necessary to the functioning of the festival and Jerusalem during the pilgrimage
season, such as traders, market vendors, and moneychangers.
Provisions
Pilgrims travelling to Jerusalem also needed to secure provisions, especially food stuffs, to sustain them on the trek southward, the sojourn in Jerusalem, and the return
trip home afterward. For the festivals, some of which were as long as eight days, this
could entail as much as eighteen days of supplies. Foodstuffs could be brought from
the household stores in Galilee, purchased from vendors at settlements along the
route, obtained as hospitality meals from relations along the way, or some combination of the above.
Pilgrims bringing resources from their own agricultural produce or household
stores were not subject to the vicissitudes of the market at the time of travel. Of
course, since the festivals occurred around the time of the harvest, the abundance of
supply meant low market prices; therefore even Galileans who did not have produce
of their own at their disposal could buy foodstuffs for the festival pilgrimage at a rela tively cheap rate back home. Transporting foodstuffs for a few days of travel may
have been feasible without infrastructural support, but transporting enough resources
for the whole duration of the pilgrimage would likely require the aid of pack animals.
So too in the case of a travelling party composed of many individuals incapable of
carrying the necessary burdens on the trek—children, the elderly, the infirm.
The trade-off of using animals, however, was that it added to the amount of
resources the pilgrim needed to haul, since the animal too needed to eat. And since
the festival period was a time of rest from occupational labor, the drain on resources
could not even be recouped by hiring the idle animal out once arriving in Jerusalem.
Using an ass to haul resources was a reasonable option if one already owned one—the
animal needed to eat anyway. But for those who did not, leasing an animal meant
taking on the fees and feeding costs of as much as eight days of idle time. This is
another instance in which traveling in a group could prove tactically advantageous.
Fellow travelers in a community could pool resources in order to collectively
transport whatever foodstuffs they wanted to bring south; one who kept draft animals
could earn social capital and the promise of reciprocal aid for assisting fellow
pilgrims in transporting their supplies. 658 Pilgrims travelling in a caravan could share
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expenses and resources in order to mitigate the logistical costs of using beasts of
burden.659
Purchasing provisions while en route to Jerusalem from vendors at settlements
along the way evaded the logistical costs of transporting goods, lightening the burden
of the pilgrim. But the high volume of travelers traversing the major pilgrimage routes
would have meant a higher demand for resources at the settlements the route passed,
allowing the residents to demand a higher price for the goods than would be the case
elsewhere during the harvest season. To take advantage of village and town produce
vendors along the route, pilgrims would also need to travel early enough that these
settlements were not themselves devoid of Jews, unless we may assume that Jewish
women who stayed behind continued to sell after the men went on pilgrimage. 660
Purchasing foodstuffs en route could be more risky in terms of ensuring that they met
the Torah’s dietary laws and Jewish ritual purity concerns (see ch. 3). Galileans were
operating outside their day-to-day transactional and informational networks that
reduced the transaction costs of buying foodstuffs back home. However, the regular
cycle of pilgrimage over accustomed routes would have allowed individuals to culti vate reliable contacts for exchange or for information about local vendors that were
suitably observant of the Law. 661
As we discussed in chapter 3, Galileans seem to have preferred to avoid trade in
foodstuffs with non-Jews, who could not necessarily be expected to know the Torah’s
rules concerning food nor Galileans’ normative interpretations of these laws. We
discussed already the stereotypes about gentiles that exacerbated their anxiety about
659
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exchanging foodstuffs with them. But in traveling south to Jerusalem, Samaritans
were more likely to be the non-Jewish community with whom pilgrims would need to
trade to obtain foodstuffs en route. A few passages from the literary sources suggest
wariness of Samaritan food. The Gospel of John’s story of the Woman at the Well
contains an explanatory note that “Jews do not share things in common with Samaritans” (John 4:9).662 Misnah Sheviʽit compares eating Samaritan food to eating pork
(9:10), a gross violation of the dietary laws. Even though Samaritans and Jews shared
the Torah, tannaitic sources remained somewhat ambivalent about whether Samari tans could be presumed to know how to prepare unleavened bread for Passover in a
manner fitting Jewish norms (t. Pes 2:3). 663 Moreover, the periods of intensified
tensions or hostilities between Jews and Samaritans may have strained or broken
those interpersonal connections that bridged the cultural divide and that might have
furnished some with the information necessary to take an informed risk in Samarian
markets. Especially for those Jews who strove to eat their ordinary meals in ritual
purity, bringing provisions from Galilee for the southbound trip was probably prefer able to the anxiety of finding a reputable and trustworthy vendor along the Samarian
route.664
In Jerusalem itself, the market during festival season would have been less favor able to the buyer. Jerusalem’s population at this time swelled with Jews from all
around Palestine and many from far beyond, all of whom required ample foodstuffs
for their daily meals and celebratory feasts. Being the period of peak demand,
produce in Jerusalem itself would have been quite expensive, despite the fact that new
crops had just been harvested. Supporting the vast flood of pilgrims required the
import of resources from Judaea more broadly and to some extent even outlying
regions.665 Yet Josephus and the Mishnah suggest that in the Second Temple period
most Jews opted not to bring large volumes of produce to Jerusalem for their provisions during the festival itself, preferring to bring coin make their requisitions in Jeru 662
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salem despite the cost. 666 As we discussed in chapter 3, the Second Tithe was generally redeemed in Galilee, and the Torah commanded the redemption money be spent
on the food for feasting in Jerusalem and incentivized purchasing foodstuffs in Jeru salem despite the steep costs. (The Second Tithe could not finance provisions for the
travel, however, since the commandment restricts its use to Jerusalem itself [Deut
14:25–26; cf. m. MSh 3:5–6].) Whether or not this was sufficient for the whole of the
festival provisions depended on the size of one’s harvest and hence one’s tithe, and
the market price at the time of redemption. Some might also benefit from the hospitality of friends, family, or other benefactors whose tithe was abundant or who were
wealthy. Otherwise, pilgrims would need to allocate extra money or bring extra
resources from home for the sojourn in Jerusalem.
Travel outside the festival season required many of the same logistical considerations, but a different calculus, since the change of travel circumstances and market
prices restructured the economic incentives. There was probably greater disincentive
to transporting bulk provisions during the “off-season.” The sojourn in Jerusalem
need not be as long as the weeklong festivals, and therefore would not require so
many provisions. And since pilgrims were more likely be travelling alone or in small
parties rather than large caravans, transporting cargo on the roads from Galilee would
make one an enticing target of thieves. This also meant less opportunity for sharing
the costs of obtaining and maintaining an ass to bear the burden, though these costs
could be mitigated by leasing the animal out for work while in Jerusalem, since the
festival prohibitions from labor did not pertain. Market conditions both along the
route and in Jerusalem would have been more favorable to the buyer than during the
festival season as well, since the volume of demand was not so high. (The prices in
Jerusalem, thought, were still probably markedly higher than elsewhere year-round
due to pilgrims to the Temple.) Off-season travel also increased the chances that
friends, family, and other acquaintances would be home and able to receive the traveler as a guest in hospitality, making it easier to acquire accommodations in this
manner as well.
Lodging
Pilgrims also needed to consider their lodging needs, both during the multiple-day
journey and during the sojourn in Jerusalem. The three main options available to
pilgrims would be camping, paying for accommodations, or receiving accommodations as hospitality.
For the large caravans traveling the roads during the festival season, camping at
night along the route was a viable option. The large numbers of a travelling party
offered relative safety against robbery, which was an even greater threat to the trav eler at night. And insofar as many groups were composed of families, friends, and
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neighbors, the internal familiarity of the group also mitigated the chances of danger
from fellow travelers. The weather during the Festival of Weeks and the Festival of
Booths was favorable to travel as they fell securely within the summer season, when
conditions were dry. Passover was more problematic in this regard; the holiday fell
near the point of transition (due to the fluctuations of a lunisolar calendar) from wet
to dry season. 667 Rain not only meant a tent or another form of shelter was needed
against the elements, but it also meant additional precautions needed to be taken in
the preparation of foodstuffs for travel to avoid spoilage, and could also lead to roads
washing out.668
Travelers who for whatever reason did not travel with a large group could rent
rooms at inns or in private residences along the route. 669 The presence of inns in
Palestine in the Early Roman period is suggested in some literary sources (see Luke
10:30–35; m. Yev 16:7) but none have yet been identified archaeologically. 670 Inns
were commercial, for-profit enterprises and could be quite varied in the services
offered; some even doubled as a tavern, serving food to lodgers and other passers -by
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M. Sheq 1:1 recognizes the problem of winter rains damaging the infrastructure necessary for
regional travel and travel to Jerusalem. Here it is claimed that road repairs are undertaken in the month
of Adar, the month before Nisan. This would provide plenty of time to do general repair o n the cumulative damage of the winter rains, but rains could continue through the month in some years and
continue to erode the smaller regional routes.
669
For more general discussion of inns in antiquity in the Mediterranean more generally, see
Olivia Remie Constable, Housing the Stranger in the Mediterranean World: Lodging, Trade, and
Travel in Late Antiquity and the Middle Ages (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004).
670
This is in part due to the fact that the architectural footprint of an inn is n ot easily discerned in
the absence of an inscription identifying the structure as such; inns were typically structurally similar
to private residences. Hezser, Jewish Travel in Antiquity, 94–95.
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for a fee.671 A traveler choosing to layover in an inn needed to account for this
expense in the travel budget and have sufficient cash on hand. For inns along the
pilgrimage routes we should expect that this would have been the busy season; the
surge in demand would mean high prices for rooms and little guarantee of vacancy.
Outside of the festival season, when there were fewer people on the roads and one
was less likely to be travelling in large groups, inns may have been a more attractive
option than during the festival season. Camping outdoors alone along the roads was
an invitation to robbers to attack, and hardly a viable option. An off-season traveler
would likely have encountered lower prices for lodging, making it relatively more
attractive an option than during peak demand.
If an inn were run by Jews, they may have been restricted in the number of days
they were in operation before the festival. Outside the immediate vicinity of Jerusalem itself (say, a few hours travel), the innkeeper would need to depart for Jerusalem
for the festival as well. Since only males were obligated to attend, inns with a female
owners or staff could remain in operation without transgression. 672 During the festival
season, inns may have been more readily available through Samaria, at least when
Jewish and Samaritan festal calendars did not coincide and in periods when Samaritan
inhabitants would abide Jewish pilgrims. Since the sacrificial meals of the festival
were supposed to be offered and eaten in a state of ritual purity (see Lev 7:19 –21),
some Jews might have been wary about lodging at an institution run by a Samaritan
(or worse, a gentile) for fear of contracting ritual pollution. The anxiety in the
Mishnah about impurity at inns does not, however, altogether preclude the possibility
that Jews made use of this institution—the references in fact suggest Jews often did
make use of these accommodations.673 Since many underwent purifications in Jerusalem upon arrival before the festival, 674 this was more of a concern for those who
strove to maintain a state of purity during everyday meals or for one’s reputation in a
community where this was the norm.
Long-distance travelers would also sometimes receive accommodations as hospitality from family, friends, and other acquaintances that lived along the route. This
was a common practice across the Mediterranean world in antiquity. As Catherine
Hezser suggests, “Hospitality towards status equals seems to have been an important
moral value in Graeco-Roman, Jewish, and Christian society.”675 Second Temple
Jewish literature contains numerous references to the provision of hospitality to
671

Constable, Housing the Stranger in the Mediterranean World, 14–18; Hezser, Jewish Travel
in Antiquity, 94.
672
A female innkeeper is referenced, for instance, in m. Yev 16:7.
673
Such passages as m. AZ 2:1; 3:1; and m. Yev 16:7 reveal anxieties about sexual impropriety
and food impurity at hostels. Amoraic sources are even more wont to present inns in this manner. See
Hezser, Jewish Travel in Antiquity 100–10.
674
See note 645 above.
675
Hezser, Jewish Travel in Antiquity, 89. She also notes reciprocal hospitality among the rabbis
visiting and lodging with one another, and between rabbis and others outside their circle in the form of
gift-giving and shared meals; Hezser, The Social Structure of the Rabbinic Movement in Roman
Palestine (TSAJ 66; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1997), 170–71, 354–57.
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friends and strangers alike.676 In the gospels, private hospitality is especially prevalent, with Jesus residing with sympathizers he gains on his travels teaching and heal ing. While the gospels present Jesus breaking norms in lodging with the “sinners” and
“unclean” (fulfilling an important ideological function in the gospels by showing
Jesus’ “boundary-crossing”), most Jews would have had greater concern for avoiding
incurring ritual impurity during a trip to Jerusalem for religious purposes. 677 In a
different travel context, Paul in Acts is depicted accepting hospitality to meet his
lodging needs while travelling through Greece and Asia Minor, often staying with
tradesmen whose network connections could also have helped him in his “profane”
work during his sojourn. 678 Having a network of friends with hospitality relationships
was especially useful when making the journey to Jerusalem outside of the festival
season, when travelling alone or in small groups made outdoor lodging inadvisable
due to the threat of robbery or worse. During the festival season, however, most
Jewish households on the route to Jerusalem would themselves be preparing to set out
on pilgrimage. Securing lodging with them would require appropriate planning and
timing, and might require building an extra day into the itinerary, as one would need
to arrive at the host’s residence prior to the host’s own departure.
Accepting hospitality meant more than attaining secure and comfortable sleeping
and dining. It was a networking opportunity. Hospitality served as a mechanism for
reinforcing existing interpersonal connections between friends and relatives that
might thereafter serve them in other ways. 679 The networks of relations could be
important in the conveyance of information or for enacting economic transactions,
bridging Galilee and points south. These network connections could be used, for
example, to enact purchases at a distance on behalf of one another, as one sees often
in Egyptian papyri as a purchasing tactic. 680 Receiving accommodations without a fee
676

See citations in Hezser, Jewish Travel in Antiquity, 110–19, including references from Letter
of Aristeas, Tobit, Ben Sira, and the New Testament gospels (e.g., Mark 6:10; 9:33). Josephus even
claims that the Essenes enacted a radically generous form of kinship hospitality with one another, such
that Essene travelers need not bring anything with them (War 2.124–125)!
677
Hezser points out that Jesus lodging and dining with sinners and other unclean people in the
New Testament gospels serves an ideological function of eroding those boundaries that excluded these
people from participating with many in Jewish society; Jewish Travel in Antiquity, 113.
678
Hezser, Jewish Travel in Antiquity, 15. See especially Acts 18:3, where Paul stays with fellow
tent makers and end up working together.
679
See Smith, “Feasts and Their Failures,” 1218: “The relationships between hosts and guests are
thus not created only at the time of the feast itself but encompass long-term networks of affiliation,
dependency, cooperation, and expectations. These long-term engagements mirror the often lengthy
stages of feast preparation and aftermath.”
680
See, for example, P. Mich. 8.467–469, three private letters from Claudius Terentianus to
Claudius Tiberianus that include acknowledgements of his receipt of goods and requests to purchase
other goods on his behalf. See, e.g., this excerpt from 8.467:
Know that everything is going well at home, through the beneficence of the gods. I
sent you two jars of olives, one in brine and one black. These jars are the same as
those … [that] I sent; from them you can identify these too. I ask and beg you, father,
to go to the Delta on a trading boat, so that you may buy and send three breeders.
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by no means came without costs—the guest thereby incurred a debt in terms of social
capital, affording the host to call later for reciprocation or some other favor. And
insofar as hosting someone strengthened that connection over other potential connec tions in guest’s interpersonal network, the host also gained power as a broker in the
network, allowing the host to steer the guest’s decision-making during the trip by
controlling the dissemination of information and suggesting other agents to interact
and transact with. For instance, the host could steer his guests to trade with certain
merchants in Jerusalem with whom the host already has business relations rather than
a rival, thereby protecting his own interests and the stability of his own interpersonal
and business networks.681
So much for lodging on the road. Once in Jerusalem, demand for accommodations was all the higher, as the festivals saw migrants not only from Galilee but also
Peraea, Idumaea, the coastal cities, Decapolis, and the diaspora. Most simply set up
camp outside the city and continued to lodge outdoors with their travelling party. 682
Others might rent a house or a room in someone’s home, whether through payment in

These and similar letters demonstrate the practice of conducting economic transactions at a distance
by means of interpersonal networks of friends and family. These letters suggest ad hoc personal
requests for goods and acts of gift-giving within a personal network. But family networks could be
important avenues for business transactions as well, as Jessica Goldberg has demonstrated for Medi eval Jewish merchants from the Cairo Geniza documents, and letters were an important mechanism for
projecting authority over others and directing their actions from a dista nce; Trade and Institutions in
the Medieval Mediterranean, 56–92.
681
As suggested by sociological research on networks. See esp. Ronald S. Burt, “The Network
Structure of Social Capital,” Research in Organizational Behaviour 22 (2000): 345–423. See also
Hezser, The Social Structure of the Rabbinic Movement, who notes that brokers are nodes who have a
greater ability to manipulate others because of their greater access to others and lack of lateral links
that could bypass them (36).
682
As suggested by Levine, Jerusalem: Portrait of the City, 250; Sanders, Judaism: Practice &
Belief, 129. Sanders oddly accords the erection of tents to the more prosperous pilgrims, but there
seems to me no good reason to limit it to the wealthy—in fact, quite the opposite, since the wealthy
could more easily afford better lodging or could call upon prosperous friends with homes in Jerusalem
to host them. The practice can also be suggested based on the fact that other festival and pilgrimage
sites in the ancient world experienced a considerable increase in the needs for shelter during set
seasons. Some Greek sanctuaries set up tents for pilgrim dining during the festivals rather than
building permanent structures; Matthew Dillon, Pilgrims and Pilgrimage in Ancient Greece (London:
Psychology Press, 1997), 160. In premodern times, travelling merchants set up tents during the Hajj to
expand the available market space in Mecca during the pilgrimage season, most of whom would be
pilgrims themselves (since the local merchants had permanent fixtures); see Suraiya Faroqhi, Pilgrims
and Sultans: The Hajj under the Ottomans (London: I. B. Tauris, 2014), 168.
The reference to camps set up during the Festival of Weeks in Ant. 17.254 and War 2.44 may
suggest that the pilgrims had at hand the equipment for pitching tents to serve as outdoor lodging.
Nevertheless, the context here is not the establishment of camps for lodging during the festival
observance but the establishment of camps for the launching of military offensives on the Romans
present. The locations given do not necessarily indicate the locations where the typical pilgrim camps
would be located, since the positions in this episode were selected for their strategic significance.
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cash or kind or as a gesture of hospitality by the owner. 683 The latter is exemplified in
the narrative of the Last Supper in the New Testament gospels, in which Jesus and his
companions obtained the right to use the upper room of a house (Matt 26:17–19;
Mark 14:12–16; Luke 22:7–13) seemingly without payment. Sacrificial and festal
meals were supposed to be conducted within the bounds of the city, but one could
spend the night lodging with friends who possessed homes outside the city itself such
as in the nearby village of Bethany (Matt 21:17; 26:6; Mark 11:11–12; 14:3; John
12:1–2). One can imagine that attaining indoor lodging in the vicinity of the city was
quite competitive, and securing such accommodations required that one had close
friends or family upon whom they could depend for hospitality, or that one was lucky
enough or early enough to be the first to inquire about a vacancy.
Some pilgrims could also find lodging in hostels. The so-called “Theodotus
inscription” found in Jerusalem attests to the existence of a hostel attached to a synagogue, directed primarily at pilgrims coming from the diaspora.684 The inscription
reads:
Theodotus son of Vettenus, priests and archisynagogos, son of an archisynagogos
and grandson of an archisynagogos, built the synagogue for reading of the Law and
for the teaching of the commandments, as well as the guest room, halls, and water
installations as an inn for those in need from abroad, which his ancestors, the elders,
and the Simonides founded. (CIJ II 1404)

The building from which this inscription came has not been found, and so we can
only speculate at the capacity of this installation. Such synagogues in the vicinity of
Jerusalem itself may have been oriented primarily to diaspora Jews on the basis of
language or provincial origins, catering to the needs of a particular diaspora commu nity. 685 If this is the case, these accommodations were not necessarily open to pilgrims
from Galilee, and even if there were other synagogues that had similar installations
for more regional pilgrims, during the festival season the demand for their lodging
space would have been incredibly high.
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On the encouragement of Jerusalemites to invite pilgrims into their homes as an act of hospitality, see Levine, Jerusalem: Portrait of the City, 250. The Tosefta contains discussion of whether
Jerusalemites could accept payments in cash or in kind from pilgrims in exchange for lodging (t. MSh
1:12–13). The payments in kind under discussion here is the fleece of a sacrificial animal. The
rabbinic prohibition should not be taken to indicate that Jerusalemites did not rent out their homes for
cash but rather suggests it was a common enough practice that the tannaim interpreted as exploiting
pilgrims.
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Despite an attempt by Howard C. Kee to redate the Theodotus inscription to the post -revolt
period on epigraphic grounds, the case for this is weak and the consensus dating to the Early Roman
period remains the strongest option; see “The Transformation of the Synagogue after 70 CE: Its Import
for Early Christianity,” NTS 36 (1990): 1–24. See the rebuttal by John S. Kloppenborg Verbin,
“Dating Theodotus (CIJ II 1404),” JJS 51 (2000): 243–80.
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Hezser, Jewish Travel in Antiquity, 96; see also David A. Fiensy, Christian Origins and the
Ancient Economy (London: James Clark & Co., 2014), 178–79.
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Implications
From the above discussion, we can see that there were many factors to account for in
simply making the journey from Galilee to the Temple, before even considering the
resource needs of participating in the Temple’s festal and cultic rites. The traveler
needed to weigh the costs and benefits of which route to take, of whether to transport
all or part of the resource needs for the road and the sojourn in Jerusalem, and of
whether to camp outdoors or seek pay or guest lodging. The mass movements of travelers during the festival season created circumstances that mitigated the perennial
threat of highway robbery and allowed communities to optimize the conveyance of
whatever resources and supplies they decided to bring through sharing. The mass
migration also had important effects on the market prices in Jerusalem and along a
couple of topographically-determined routes due to the burgeoning demand during the
festival season.
These migrations also brought Galileans out of the day-to-day insular regional
economy of Galilee into a regular, periodic engagement with vendors along the
pilgrimage routes and in Jerusalem itself. Out of concerns for the Torah’s strictures
on food consumption, many pilgrims probably brought supplies for the southbound
trek with them. Those who did not may have cultivated relationships over the years
with individuals who could be trusted to provide halakhically permissible food or to
act as information brokers to aid them in that task. Most of Galileans’ expenditures,
though, would have been in Jerusalem and its immediate environs. As we noted above
and also in chapter 3, the Second Tithe commandment—among other factors—incentivized Galilean pilgrims to buy their resources for the festival in Jerusalem itself,
creating a flow of cash from Galilee into Jerusalem. And while participation in Jeru salem’s markets was primarily spurred by the need for the basic necessities of suste nance and cult offerings, these occasions also provided opportunities for Galil eans to
procure souvenirs and commodities not readily available at home. As we suggested in
chapter 3, archaeological evidence from Early Roman oil lamps found in Galilee may
hint at this sort of behavior. Despite the fact that oil lamps could be and were made
locally in Galilee in this period, the abnormally high percentage (80–96 percent) of
Jerusalem-made Herodian lamps in Galilean assemblages indicates strong preference
for lamps from the Temple city. 686 If we are correct in assuming that a high percentage of Palestinian Jews participated in the Temple cult on a regular annual —even
triannual—basis, many if not most of these Jerusalem lamps may have been
purchased directly by pilgrims and brought back as souvenirs.
The movement of Galileans southward for the festival could create opportunities
for forging new interpersonal connections as well as maintaining and reinforcing
existing links with friends, relatives, and neighbors. Caravans, sometimes composed
of entire villages, brought together the community for the singular goal of success686

On the distribution patterns of Jerusalem-made lamps in Galilee, see David Adan-Bayewitz et
al., “Preferential Distribution of Lamps from the Jerusalem Area in the Late Second Temple Period
(Late First Century BCE–70 CE),” BASOR 350 (2008): 37–85. The three sampled sites from Galilee
were Sepphoris (80 percent from Jerusalem), Yodefat (95 percent), and Gamla (96 percent).
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fully moving everyone and their supplies to Jerusalem, facilitated through sharing.
This could have the effect of solidifying the bonds between families cooperating as
equals, or of storing up social capital in the cased of well-off individuals “generously”
sharing resources with others. Caravans that brought together whole communities also
created great conditions for putting social norms on display and policing against
defectors. The trek also allowed one to maintain network connections with people
farther from home, especially in Jerusalem and at sites along the route, through
displays of hospitality in the form of lodging, meals, and gifts. Having these more
distant connections could prove useful for acquiring the intelligence necessary to
making informed decisions about a somewhat unfamiliar marketplace. 687
Finally, we should note that the festival calendar would have had a strong effect
in structuring the temporal rhythms of market prices, flow of resources, and consumer
behavior. The festivals effectively produced “peak” and “off-peak” seasons, with
starkly different incentives and risks for the traveler to accommodate. Sometimes an
obligation (like the redemption for childbirth; see below) would compel Galileans to
travel in the off-season. But because of the opportunity cost a weeklong trip entailed,
most Galileans would have clustered their activities in Jerusalem as much as possible
to pilgrimage season. This means that Galileans much more so than Judaeans were
beholden to the state of the Jerusalem economy in the in-season, lacking the tactical
ability that Judaeans had to strategically time their obligations in Jerusalem to avoid
the often less favorable economic conditions of the festivals.

Offerings at the Temple during the Festival Season
Once in Jerusalem, participation in the festival rites entailed a number of obligatory
offerings. The most well-known offerings were of course the animal sacrifices made
at the altar by the priests, but also important were vegetal (mostly grain) offerings and
wine libations.688 The festivals were arguably structured around agricultural production, as suggested by their timing as well as prominent and central rituals involving
firstfruit offerings. In this section, I shall review the various offerings associated with
the festivals and what effects they would have had on the economic resources of Gali lean pilgrims. This is not simply a straightforward accounting of the numbers and
kinds of sacrifices needed; as we shall see, there could be considerable latitude in
interpreting what constitutes fulfillment of the festal offerings, and a variety of tactics
were available for mitigating the expenses of performing them.
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See again Burt, “The Network Structure of Social Capital”; Morley, Trade in Classical
Antiquity, 29–34; Goldberg, Trade and Institutions in the Medieval Mediterranean, 84–85.
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Kathryn McClymond offers a compelling argument for the importance of vegetal offerings
and libations in their own right, and the conception of sacrifice should not be reduced to a blood rite;
Beyond Sacred Violence: A Comparative Study of Sacrifice (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University
Press, 2010), esp. 25–44.
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Temple Offerings Made at “Public” Expense
As with most temple festivals in the ancient Mediterranean world, publically-funded
animal sacrifices were a major spectacle, and perhaps the culminating ritual, of many
of the festivals held in Jerusalem. Such public sacrifices, by which I mean those
financed and enacted by the Temple institution personnel, were also made daily,
weekly, and monthly, as prescribed in the Torah. According to Hayim Lapin’s calcu lations of the Temple’s expenditures, the total annual requirements for the public
sacrifices were quite substantial: 689
Sheep Rams Goats Cattle
1,103 41
33
115

Wine (hin)
354

Oil (hin)
354

Wheat (ʽissaron)
2,810

Table 2. Resource needed for public offerings per annum.

Most of these were whole-burnt offerings, completely destroyed on the altar fire. The
rest were sin offerings, parts of which were burnt on the altar, while other parts were
allotted as perquisites to the attending priests and their households. While at other
sanctuaries in the Roman world the festal sacrifices made at public expense or by the
benefaction of the local elite constituted a feast for all of the participants, 690 the
Jewish festivals were distinctive in not furnishing meat to its participants. Since the
Temple did not thereby subsidize pilgrims’ food needs, participants had to supply
their own foodstuffs and private sacrifices for consumption during the festival celebration.
Many temple complexes in the ancient Mediterranean and Near East had sacred
lands and sacred herds to at least partly supply the sanctuary’s sacrificial needs. 691
There is not much evidence to suggest, however, that the Jerusalem Temple either
directly or indirectly managed public property and herds for the purpose of supplying
the Temple with sacrificial resources. 692 The Mishnah explicitly refers to Temple offi689

Lapin, “Feeding the Jerusalem Temple,” table 2.
On public feasting on sacrificial meat in Greek festivals, see McInerney, The Cattle of the
Sun, 146–95; in Egypt, see David Frankfurter, Religion in Roman Egypt: Assimilation and Resistance
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998), 52–58; in the Roman Empire, see Rives, Religion in the
Roman Empire, 112–14.
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See McInerney, The Cattle of the Sun, 146–72; Peregrine Horden and Nicholas Purcell, The
Corrupting Sea: A Study of Mediterranean History (Malden: Blackwell, 2000), 429–32; Andrew
Monson, From the Ptolemies to the Romans: Political and Economic Change in Egypt (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2012), 212–27.
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Benjamin D. Gordon points out that the matter of sacred land belonging to the Jewish Temple
has barely been a matter of inquiry, except “in passing in a few studies on the ancient Judaean
economy and land tenure practices”; see “Sacred Land Endowents and Field Consecrations in Early
Judaism” (PhD diss., Duke University, 2012), 22–45, quote at 22. Philo provides our sole literary
reference to land belonging to the Temple in the Second Temple period ( De specialibus legibus 1.76),
but he may be ascribing to Jerusalem a practice familiar to him from the temples of his own contem porary Egypt. (Positive evidence for sacred herds belonging to the Jerusalem Temple is, to my
knowledge, non-existent.) The Torah certainly provides a framework for the Temple to have acquired
land through the consecration of property in the form of vows (Lev 27:16 –25). Gordon finds that the
application of the category of “temple land” to the Jerusalem Temple is inadequate; unlike other Near
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cials acquiring the resources needed for the public sacrifices through purchases at
market using Temple funds (m. Sheq 4:9). Josephus does not explicitly state how the
public sacrifices were procured, but his references to daily, weekly, monthly, and
festal offerings prescribed in the Torah as paid at “public expense” (ἐκ δὲ τοῦ
δημοσίου ἀναλώματος; Ant. 3.237) are consistent with a picture of the purchase from
the Temple treasury funds. 693 And though ostensibly a public expense, the public
sacrifices were indirectly financed by Jews through the Temple Tax and voluntary
offerings to the sanctuary.
Temple Tax
By the Hasmonaean period, the Temple Tax was an annual tax of half a sheqel
collected for the Temple offerings and upkeep. 694 According to Josephus, the Temple
Tax was incumbent upon all free male Jews between the ages of twenty and fifty (Ant.
3.196),695 and was assessed at a fixed rather than variable rate (Exod 30:15; cf. m.
Sheq 1:6). The Gospel of Matthew envisions Temple agents travelling from settle ment to settlement in Palestine in order to collect the tax 696—rather than individuals
paying the tax in Jerusalem personally—and a population generally in compliance
with the command (Matt 17:24).
The Temple Tax could only be paid “according to the sheqel of the sanctuary”
()בשקל הקדש.697 In the Second Temple period, this was taken to refer to a sacred
Eastern and Mediterranean temple complexes, fields were only consecrated in the short terms and
were limited in scope, and the beneficiaries were often the priests rather than the Temple treasury
itself; see “Sacred Land Endowments.”
693
This phrase is linked to the daily sacrifices, but presumably applies to the whole list that
follows. He contrasts this at points with other sacrifices made at the “private expen se” of the acting
priest to atone himself before performing public sacrifices; see Ant. 3.242, 257. The conceptualization
of Temple sacrifices as either private or public also appears in Philo’s discussion of the sacrifices in
De specialibus legibus 1.168.
694
The payment of a regular annual tax for the service of the Temple goes back at least to the
Persian period: “We assume the responsibility for carrying out the commands to give a third of a
sheqel each year for the service of the house of our God for … the offerings … and for all the duties
of the house of our God” (Neh 10:32–33). By the Hasmonaean period, this tax had increased to a half
sheqel, in conflation with the half-sheqel payment prescribed in Exod 30:11–16 for each male over
age twenty, seemingly as a onetime offering. See Levine, Jerusalem: Portrait of the City, 29 n. 85,
137; E. P. Sanders, Jewish Law from Jesus to the Mishnah: Five Studies (Minneapolis: Fortress,
2016), 1–134 at 49–51.
695
In Exod 30:14, no upper age limit is specified. Neh 10:32–33 does not specify who was obligated at all.
696
The Mishnah too indicates that the Temple Tax was collected locally at the settlement level
rather than centrally in Jerusalem. In m. Sheq 1:3, moneychangers’ tables are set up throughout the
countryside on Adar 15 (and in Jerusalem on Adar 25). In m. Sheq 2:1, larger volumes of half -sheqel
coins collected at the level of the village or toparchy are converted to lower -bulk gold in order to
reduce the burden of transport.
697
See, e.g., Exod 38:24–26, which specifies the measure of the sheqels “according to the Sheqel
of the Sanctuary.” In the First Temple period, the sheqel would have represented a weight alone, as
the introduction of coins minted at a fixed weight came to Palestine only in the Persian period.
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currency distinct from the common coinage of everyday transactions, and the coin
used was the Tyrian sheqel, equivalent to a silver tetradrachm or two denarii (cf. Ant.
3.193–195; 18.312; War 7.218; Matt 17:24).698 The use of a specialized currency for
payments to the sacred treasury explains in part the need for moneychangers at the
Jerusalem Temple (see Matt 21:12; Mark 11:15; John 2:14–15, cf. m. Sheq 1:3).
Mishnah Sheqalim presumes that moneychangers set up to collect the tax included
such a fee for exchanging currencies, as evidenced by claiming an exemption from
this surcharge for the poor and priests (among others) (1:6–7).699 Even if the
exemptions were a rabbinic invention in accordance with their ideological defense of
poor rights, the passage assumes that moneychanging fees in Palestine were
familiar.700
It is reasonable to believe that most Jews voluntarily paid their Temple Tax. 701
Most externally-imposed state poll taxes were only as successful as the system for
registering and documenting the population allowed, 702 but the Temple Tax would
have had more gravitas in the eyes of Jews than did an imposition from the imperial
698

This despite the iconography of these coins, featuring not only figural depictions of living
beings, but of a foreign god. The Mishnah equates the sheqel of the sanctuary with the Tyrian maneh
( ; כלם בשקל הקדש במנה צוריm. Bek 8:7). The Tyrian mint was shut down by the Romans in the late
first century BCE, but production and use seems to have continued beyond this, with the coins minted
at a different location. Yakov Meshorer argued that the minting continued at or near Jerusalem, due in
no small part to the Jews’ need to perpetuate the sacred currency; “One Hundred Ninety Years of
Tyrian Shekels,” in Festschrift für/Studies in Honor of Leo Lindenberg, ed. Arthur Houghton et al.
(Wettern, Belgium: Editions NR, 1984), 171–91. Meshorer’s thesis, however, has not been completely
accepted and introduces its own new problems; see Brooks Levy, “Tyrian Shekels and the First Jewish
War,” Proceedings of the XIth International Numismatic Congress 1 (1991): 267–74; Levy, “Tyrian
Shekels: The Myth of the Jerusalem Mint,” Journal of the Society for Ancient Numismatics 19 (1995):
33–35.
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The Mishnah claims that the following were exempted from the surcharge: priests, women,
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(m. Sheq 1:6–7). The surcharge is given at 1/24 of a sheqel (one gerah or maneh) by the sages and
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comparing with rates from other moneychangers in the area. This is but another example of the
information deficiencies and asymmetries that bedevil transactions.
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payment; see The Archaeology of Qumran and the Dead Sea Scrolls (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2002),
188–93.
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On administrative and bureaucratic protocols under the Roman Empire, and especially with
regard to census records and exaction of poll taxes, see Clifford Ando, “The Administration of the
Provinces,” in A Companion to the Roman Empire, ed. David S. Potter (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2009), 177–92, esp. pp. 178, 186–87. But these registers had to be updated regularly and
record-keeping was often dependent on the voluntary cooperation of the population; see discussion in
ch. 1, p. 60.
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administration. As a religious tax grounded in the Torah, its payment was compelled
by the internal drives of piety and patronage of the Jerusalem Temple and the external
drives of social pressure and peer policing. And unlike tribute, which left the province
to be used to unknown and unseen ends far away, the Temple Tax was spent
regionally and supported an institution that was both widely attended by its
“taxpayers” and that served through its sacrifices to maintain right relations between
God and Israel. Josephus and Philo attest to the fact that diaspora Jews from the
eastern Mediterranean and from Babylonia eagerly sent the Temple Tax to Jerusalem,
sometimes in spite of attempts by local municipal administrations to prohibit them
from doing so.703 Moreover, we may note that the value of the tax was relatively
light—one hundredth of the value the Mishnah sets as the threshold for being able to
take poor dues.704
Votive Offerings
The Temple Tax was not the only source of revenue for the sacred coffers. Individuals
could dedicate property, animals, foodstuffs, and money to the Temple as an act of
piety. The pericope of the Widow’s Mite is illustrative:
And sitting near the [Temple] treasury, [Jesus] observed how the crowd cast copper
into the treasury. And the many wealthy individuals cast many [coppers]. And one
poor widow cast in two lepta, that is, a quadrans. (Mark 12:41–44)

The Lukan parallel (21:1–4) explicitly deems the dedicated coins δῶρα—gifts, or
more aptly, votive offerings. Even non-monetary forms of property that individuals
consecrated to the Temple through vows contributed to the liquid assets that the
Temple spent furnishing the public offerings.
Animals and other goods fit for the altar were seemingly ineligible for use as
public offerings. The Torah’s discussion of votive animal offerings stipulates that
they needed to be sacrificed and then consumed in Jerusalem by the offerer (Lev 7:16;
Deut 12:11, 17), which precludes their use for public sacrifices. The Mishnah
suggests that such votive offerings could either be offered as private sacrifice or
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resold to others for use as a private sacrifice, but the possibility of deploying the
votive for the Temple’s public offerings is not even considered (m. Sheq. 4:7–8).
Vowed animals or agricultural products that were not fit for the altar due to
impurity or blemish could be redeemed by the one who donated it or even by someone
else, as could real estate such as houses and farmland (Lev 27:9–26). The redemption
price of the property was usually reckoned by the priest (Lev 27:12, 18, 22–23).705
This redemption was effectively a sales transaction with the Temple, the proceeds of
which were pooled into the Temple treasury funds. Redemption of vowed property, as
with any other property consecrated to the Temple, also required payment of an
“added fifth,” a 20 percent surcharge assessed on the property (see, e.g., Lev 27:13,
15, 19).
The Torah also allows for Jews to make vows of persons, whether oneself or
someone else, though in such cases redemption is mandatory rather than optional (Lev
27:2–8). Josephus has little to say about vows in his Mosaic discourse, but does
remark on this one (alongside the Nazirite vow), perhaps for its popularity as a form
of vow, or as a peculiarly Jewish rite of potential interest to his gentile audience (as
with the Nazirite vow) (Ant. 4.73).706 Unlike vowed property, the value of the vowed
individual was assessed at fixed, nominal values, based on age and gender, 707 though
the price could be reduced by the priests if an individual or family did not have the
means to pay the nominal price. 708
Female
Male

1 month–5 years old
30 sheqels
50 sheqels

5–20 years old
10 sheqels
20 sheqels

20–60 years old
3 sheqels
5 sheqels

Table 3. The redemption values according to Lev 27:1–8.

While individual contributions may have been generally small, the obligation to
pay the Temple Tax, let alone the individual proclivity to vow additional material
wealth to the Temple, amounted to a large net flow of monetary resources from
outlying regions to Jerusalem. Not only did this institution draw money from Galilee
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(War 2.313).
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The redemption values in Lev 27:2–8 increased with age and were higher for men than for
women. Josephus’ description, however, reduces the redemption to the two non-minor adult price
categories: women for 30 sheqels, men for 50 sheqels (Ant. 4.73). Given his terseness of description in
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as a single rule; “Josephus’ Expositions of Biblical Law,” 163. But Josephus’ omission of the others
may also be a product of his focus here on “those who call themselves (αὑτοὺς) qorban,” none of
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despite its distance from Jerusalem, it also drew vast sums from overseas and from
outside the Roman Empire. The monetary expenditure, on the other hand, was
primarily spent locally in the region of Judaea. Zooarchaeological research on bones
from the Jerusalem Temple dump indicate that the majority of sacrificial animals
came from flocks and herds in the arid Judaean desert and scrubland. 709 The “temple
economy” was a motor for the flow of money from Galilee, Golan, Peraea, and the
diaspora into the Judaean regional economy. But this redirection of revenues was, as I
suggested above, not without any return for the Galilean Jew. On the contrary, the
revenues could be understood not only as fulfilling a religious imperative unto itself,
but also as fostering the regular sacrifices that atoned for the sins of Israel as a
corporate whole and ensured right relations between God and his people. Rather than
an exaction lamented and resisted, many practitioners payment of the tax was
voluntarily performed as an act of piety, as with vows and other voluntary offerings.
Obligatory Festal Sacrifices Made at “Private” Expense
In addition to the multitude of public sacrifices made during the festivals, pilgrims
also offered their own private sacrifices at the Temple. Deuteronomy 16:16
commands that when the pilgrims arrive at Jerusalem for the festival “they shall not
appear before YHWH empty-handed.” This cryptic commandment suggests that
offerings of some sort were necessary for the proper fulfillment of the festival rites
without specifying them. The Mishnah takes this commandment to mean a
combination of “appearance” offering (—)ראיהa whole-burnt offerings—and “festal”
offering (—)חגיגהa sacrifice serving as a feast for the offerer, especially a peace
offering (( )שלמיםm. Ḥag 1:2). Josephus’ description of the festivals seems to
corroborate this picture. When Josephus references private sacrifices in his
description of the Festival of Booths, he says the participants “celebrate a festival for
eight days and at that time offer whole-burnt offerings and sacrifices of thanksgiving”
(Ant. 3.245). A few verses later, in a summary statement about the festivals in
general, he continues:
There is not one of the festivals on which they do not sacrifice whole-burnt offerings
or do not give relief from the toils involved in work, but at all of them the form of
sacrifice is prescribed by law (νόμιμον), as is the leisure of the holiday, and they
offer sacrifices with for feasts. (Ant. 3.254)

In both cases Josephus offers a bipartite description of the festal offerings as wholeburnt and thanksgiving/peace offerings, the latter of which can only refer to private
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sacrifices, since the offerers consume them in a feast. 710 This understanding of the
festal obligation may not have been universal, but the fact that Josephus as a Temple
priest describes it as such suggests that it was a widespread interpretation and practice
of the commandment in Deut 16:16.
In order to make the necessary offerings, pilgrims needed to procure the proper
type of animal for slaughter in the Temple and a prescribed set of meal offerings and
libations. Both peace offerings and whole-burnt offerings could be made from cattle,
sheep, or goats, while whole-burnt offerings alone could be made from birds—an
inexpensive option within reach of even the poorest Jews. 711 Whole-burnt offerings
could be made from males alone, while peace offerings could be either male or
female. Josephus specifies the appropriate age of sacrificial animals, whereas
Leviticus is silent on this matter: whole-burnt offerings should be a year old (oxen
can be older), while peace offerings should be older. 712 When procuring a sacrificial
animal from market, a pilgrim needed to ensure that they were buying an animal fit
for sacrifice—lacking any blemishes that would make it ritually impure for the altar—
and that met the conditions for the particular type of sacrifice desired. Here Jews
would have encountered information problems similar to what we discussed in
chapter 3 about purchasing foodstuffs: when buying an animal from a vendor, how
sure could one be that they were buying an animal truly fit for sacrifice? We can
imagine reputation playing a major role in steering pilgrims toward trustworthy
establishments and away from riskier vendors, especially when the veracity of an
animal’s ritual purity would be quickly evaluated at the Temple and unhappy
customers could quickly spread word to a dense crowd of pilgrims about acquiring a
“lemon.” It also seems that the Temple itself was engaged to some extent in selling
animals for sacrifice, which would, effectively, have been “prequalified” for sacrifice
by the Temple officials and therefore have been a safe choice. As m. Sheqalim 4:7
indicates, the Temple officials could resell to pilgrims any animals that met the
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Gallant identifies this as Josephus’ rendering of Lev 23:37–38 and Num 29:39–40, rendering
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conditions for sacrifice at the altar that had been dedicated to the Temple. The
vendors of sacrificial animals referenced in the gospel narrative of Jesus’ “Cleansing
of the Temple” (oxen, sheep, and pigeons in John 2:14–15; pigeons alone in Matt
21:12 and Mark 11:15) might be a reference to the Temple’s own resale operation, or
otherwise to vendors operating with the permission of and partial oversight by the
Temple’s own personnel.
Depending on the type of animal
Flour (ephah)
Oil (hin) Wine (hin)
sacrificed, peace offerings and whole- Lamb
1/10
1/4
1/4
burnt offerings alike required a meas- Ram
2/10
1/3
1/3
3/10
1/2
1/2
ure of dough made from fine flour and Bull
oil, a libation of oil, and a libation of Table 4. Values for grain offerings and libations
wine to be offered with it at the altar accompanying animal sacrifices (Lev 12:1–8; Ant.
3.269).
(Table 1). Peace offerings required
additional meal offerings, according to Leviticus—one each of four specific types of
baked grain-and-oil products, some leavened, some unleavened (7:12–14).713 These
dough products required the pilgrim to procure ritually pure grain—grappling with the
aforementioned risks due to information asymmetry—and prepare them in the proper
manner for sacrifice. Or, presumably, pilgrims could acquire ready-made dough,
breads, cakes, and wafers from other vendors, accepting a greater level of risk that the
products were not up to ritual specifications but with the advantage of minimizing
preparation. Oil and wine for sacrificial libations required no preparation, but as
liquids were quite susceptible to incurring ritual impurity in their agricultural
processing (see ch. 3).
The vagueness of the commandment to “not appear before YHWH emptyhanded” also leaves unspecified the conditions that constitute adequate fulfillment of
the sacrificial obligation. Does this mean that each participating individual needed to
offer a separate sacrifice, or did sharing in a sacrifice as part of a group—a household,
for example—count? The Mishnah interprets the obligation as corporate rather than
individual. The judgment that “whoever has many dependents (lit.: eaters; )אוכלים
and few assets may bring many peace offerings and fewer burnt offerings” (m. Ḥag
1:5) presumes that the sacrifices can be shared by a group, represented by a head of
household or some other benefactor. The minimum value that the rabbis suggest
fulfils one’s obligation also demonstrates that they did not understand the
commandment to require each person to make a separate offering: the combined
minimum value for whole-burnt and peace offerings is a mere three maʽot (m. Ḥag
1:3), a small fraction of the market value attached to sacrificial animals elsewhere in
the Mishnah: 600 maʽot for an ox, 120 for a calf, 48 for a ram, and a 24 for a lamb
(m. Men 13:8).714 On a pragmatic basis alone it should not surprise us that sharing the
sacrificial obligation was the norm. Even the hungriest of individuals could probably
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not consume an entire sheep or goat—let alone a bovine—in the span of a day or two
(since the meat could not be saved; Lev 7:15). We can reasonably assume that even in
the Second Temple period Jewish pilgrims understood their obligation to sacrifice a
peace offering as a corporate one.
A look at the Passover sacrifice may prove instructive on the matter of shared
sacrificial obligations. Unlike the Torah’s prescriptions for the connected Festival of
Unleavened Bread and the subsequent festivals of Weeks and Booths, the Torah spells
out the details of an obligatory private sacrifice for Passover, one shared at the level
of the household. The paschal sacrifice was a yearling, often a lamb, though a goat or
even a cow could be used. 715 This sacrifice too probably required the dough, oil, and
wine offerings that Numbers and Josephus say were required of all private, festal
sacrifices (Num 15:1–12; Ant. 3.233–234).
The Torah explicitly stipulates that this sacrifice was to be furnished and
consumed by a household, that multiple households could share a lamb if each
household were too small to consume one alone (Exod 12:3–4). While the Torah’s
language suggests comingling of households, other configurations may also have been
permissible and perhaps even likely, in the case that only the males of a family
travelled for the Passover. Josephus uses the term “fraternities” (φ[ρ]ατρίας; Ant.
2.312; 3.248; War 6.423) to describe the parties consuming a paschal offering, which
may suggest a group more expansive than a “household,” cobbled together out of
individuals sharing some other social bond. Josephus also claims that each sacrifice
was consumed by parties of at least ten and often as many as twenty people (War
6.423), though it is not clear that ten represented an official minimum rather than a
norm or rule of thumb. The Mishnah references groups as small as five for the pa schal
feast (m. Pes 9:10). 716 If a group (household or otherwise) was too large for a single
sacrifice, the head of the group would need to make additional sacrifices, though the
Mishnah suggests the meal might be supplemented by a festal (  )חגיגהrather than a
“paschal” offering:
When may one bring a festal offering with it [the paschal offering]? When he comes
on a weekday [not Shabbat], in a state of purity, and it is insufficient [too small for
the number of dependents]. (m. Pes. 6:3)

If the obligatory offerings for the other pilgrimage festivals were similarly treated as a
corporate obligation rather than an individual, we may expect that the conditions by
which the festal sacrifices were shared were similar, if not exactly the same.
The Mishnah also suggests some of the tactics for resource allocation that a
corporate interpretation of the sacrificial obligation might have enabled. Though
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pilgrims were expected to participate in both a whole-burnt offering and a festal
offering in the Second Temple period, Josephus does not indicate anything of the
proportional relationship between them. One way to offset the total cost of sacrifices
would be to offer more peace offerings than whole-burnt offerings, since the former
could be used to feed one’s party, offsetting the cost of other provisional needs, while
the latter could not. In m. Ḥagigah, the House of Shammai and House of Hillel
disagree on the proportions, with Shammai favoring a higher proportion of whole burnt offerings and Hillel favoring a higher proportion of peace offerings (1:1). The
mishnah goes on to suggest that the total assets of the offerer and the number of
dependents partaking of their festal offerings should guide the proportions:
Whoever has many dependents [lit.: eaters] and little property should bring many
peace offerings and few whole-burnt offerings. [Whoever has] much property and
few dependents should bring many whole-burnt offerings and few peace offerings. If
both [dependents and property] are few, of him it is said, “A silver maʽah [for a
whole-burnt offering] and two maʽot [for a peace offering].” If both [dependents and
property] are many, of him it is said, “Each according to his ability, according to the
blessing that the Lord your god has given you.” (1:5)

The group of consumers would presumably include any other members of the
immediate family on pilgrimage, but might also have allowed for other configurations
including more distant relatives, friends, neighbors, and beneficiaries of charity. The
Mishnah describes some of these possible relationships between offerer and
beneficiary of a sacrifice, at least in regard to Passover: a husband sacrificing for a
wife, guardians for an orphan, masters for a slave, or father for sons (m. Pes 8:1, 3).
Individuals poor in resources and unable to secure the benefaction of a person or
family able to finance the sacrifices may even have pooled resources to meet their
obligation, each person contributing the hypothetical minimum. Even small groups
might have found it prudent to pool resources, so as not to waste a sacrificial meal too
great for either party to finish alone. We cannot prove from Second Temple sources
that this kind of pooling or dependency on a “patron” was prevalent, but if the poorest
people in Jerusalem during the festival were to feast, we must posit such tactical
relationships.
Another potential tactic for mitigating the expenses of fulfilling the sacrificial
obligation was to pay for it out of Second Tithe money. As we indicated in chapter 3,
most Galileans probably redeemed their tithe and used the money for feasting in
Jerusalem, rather than bringing the tithe in kind in order to consume. Many likely
purchased their animals for the festal sacrifice in Jerusalem rather than bringing them
on the trek. Mishnah Ḥagigah suggests the possibility of using consecrated Second
Tithe money to procure the festal sacrifice:
Whole-burnt offerings on the holiday may come from ḥullin (unconsecrated things),
and peace offerings from [Second] Tithe. … Israel fulfills its obligation with vowed
offerings, freewill offerings, and tithe of the beast; the priests [fulfill their
obligations] with sin offerings, guilt offerings, firstborn [animals], and with the
breast and shoulder [the priestly perquisites from others’ peace offe rings], but not
with birds and not with meal offerings. (1:3–4)
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The passage shows that the rabbis even judged that animals vowed or designated as
freewill offerings—and even animals from the tithe of the flock (interpreted by the
rabbis as consumed by the owner of the flock, rather than the priests)—could be used
to fulfill the obligation for a “festal” sacrifice. In other words, the Mishnah allows for
a single animal to serve two purposes, so long as the sacrifice fulfilled the conditions
of each commandment individually: that the Second Tithe must be spent on food, that
the festal sacrifice must be consumed by the offerer or his beneficiaries. 717 The
Second Tithe could not be used to purchase a whole-burnt offering, which would not
properly fulfill the commandment of the Second Tithe, but a vowed thank offering
could. Using this tactic, Galilean pilgrims could avoid the predicament of needing to
procure, offer, and consume additional animals to fulfill all of the religious
obligations while in Jerusalem.
Mishnah Ḥagigah also suggests that the timing of one’s sacrifice could have been
a factor to consider. The rabbis suggest that, at least in reference to the Festival of
Booths, one was not obligated to make the sacrifice on the first day of the festival, but
could do so at any point before its conclusion on the eighth day (m. Ḥag 1:6). For the
many who purchased their sacrificial animals at the Jerusalem market, this could be
significant. We may suppose that most pilgrims attempted to perform the sacrifice at
the opening day of the festival, with the numbers of daily offerings made by pilgrims
diminishing over the course of the week. The prices for sacrificial animals probably
fell during the waning days of the festival, as market demand diminished and vendors
sought to sell off their remaining unblemished animals rather than transporting them
back, lest they incur a blemish before the next festival that disqualified them from
sacrifice. The savvy pilgrim on a budget could wait until later in the week to make the
necessary offerings. Similar conditions would have prevailed during the weeklong
Festival of Unleavened Bread, but not the one-day Festival of Weeks.
On the other end of the economic scale, the festival’s sacrificial obligations were
an opportunity to turn economic capital into forms of social capital. In other cities
across the Roman Empire, civic magistrates and priests who presided over public
festivals were wealthy individuals who financed the festivities at their own expense as
an act of euergetism that fed the masses in exchange for social prestige and
authority. 718 In Jerusalem, the festivals were financed through the Temple and the
officiants were determined by lineage, but wealthier individuals could still take on the
role of benefactor to the masses by sharing festal meals with others and generously
distributing to the needy; this would build social cachet, fulfilling the biblical ethical
ideal of generosity to the poor. Doing so was also a necessary corollary of following
the Second Tithe commandment for those with large estates: beyond a certain
threshold, the tithe itself would be too much for one’s household to consume, and
would require sharing one’s tithe more extensively with others. The multiplication of
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sacrifices at the Temple could also serve as a public display of wealth and success.
Offering many peace offerings to feast a multitude both curried goodwill and
demonstrated one’s success; making whole-burnt offerings in abundance was an act
of conspicuous consumption simultaneously displaying one’s disposable capital and
one’s piety, as these sacrifices were offered wholly to God without giving the offerer
any additional value from their flesh. Feasts thus provided opportunities to reinforce
social hierarchies and display power differentials, and to affirm networks of
affiliation, dependency, and/or cooperation. 719
Agricultural Offerings
The three pilgrimage festivals were closely associated with the agricultural cycle and
served as a communal celebration of the bounty granted by God. The timing of each
festival roughly correlated with the ripening or finishing of major agricultural
products: Unleavened Bread with the barley harvest, Weeks with the wheat harvest,
and Booths with the fruit harvest, particularly the pressing of oil and the new
vintage.720 This timing made the festivals ideal occasions for pilgrims to bring to
Jerusalem their obligatory agricultural offerings.
Second Tithe
We have already introduced the Second Tithe obligation. Jews in Palestine were
obligated to separate one tenth of their agricultural products at harvest and either
bring this produce to Jerusalem in kind to feast on there, or redeem the produce and
bring its value in coin to Jerusalem to spend on the foodstuffs to furnish meals in
Jerusalem. The logistical expenses of transporting bulk resources from Galilee to
Jerusalem incentivized most Galilean pilgrims to redeem their tithe and spend the
money in Jerusalem. The festival season would also have been the primary occasion
for fulfilling this tithe obligation, since the commandment could only be fulfilled in
Jerusalem and the costs of making the pilgrimage—both money and time—created
incentives for most Galileans to consolidate their Jerusalem-based activities to the
festival season as much as possible. This seems to have been the case despite the fact
that the coincidence of the festivals with some major agricultural harvests produced
market conditions whereby the tithe crop was redeemed for relatively little money in
Galilee while the prices of goods in Jerusalem would be at their peak due to high
volumes of demand.
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The permissibility and commonality of redeeming the Second Tithe also
contributed to the effect that the festival seasons had of linking the Galilean regional
economy to that of Jerusalem and its environs. While fulfilling the tithe obligation in
kind would simply require the pilgrim to relocate their household resources in order to
consume them in one place rather than another, fulfilling the obligation through
redemption meant spending household resources in transactions with vendors in
Jerusalem. In other words, observing the commandment would have stimulated
market activity and thereby created a flow of monetary resources from Galilee into
Jerusalem at a regular seasonal rhythm each year. And if we assume that agricultural
production constituted a major productive activity for most Galileans, fulfilling the
Second Tithe obligation through redemption meant spending at least one tenth of the
annual household revenues on the festivals. The Second Tithe could seemingly be
used to offset the most significant expenses incurred in Jerusalem: the festal sacrifices
and the other foodstuffs necessary for daily and festal meals in Jerusalem. The
logistical costs of travel and provisions along the way, the cost of whole-burnt
offerings, and the costs of other goods picked up in Jerusalem as souvenirs required
the pilgrim to tap into resources above and beyond this tenth. In sum, this represents a
significant portion of the annual household revenues of Galilean agriculturalists that
would be allocated to observance of the major religious rites in Jerusalem and
fulfillment of their obligations as commanded in the Torah and framed by the norms
of their community at the time.
Firstfruit Offerings
Another type of offering that the Torah commands Jews to bring to Jerusalem is the
firstfruit offering. This commandment appears several times in slightly different
configurations. The simplest, and vaguest, forms appear in Exodus (23:19; 34:26):
“Bring the choicest firstfruits of your land to the house of YHWH your God.”
Elsewhere, grain, oil, and wine are specified (Num 18:12; Deut 18:4). Deuteronomy
26:2 takes an all-inclusive scope, requiring firstfruit offerings from “all the fruit of
the ground” ()כל־פרי האדמה. Though Josephus devotes little space to describing the
firstfruit offerings, he seems to follow the expansive wording of Deuteronomy 26 in
claiming that firstfruits were due “from all the produce that grows from the ground”
(πάντων τῶν ἐκ τῆς φυομένων καρπῶν; Ant. 4.70). The Mishnah offers another
suggestion entirely, restricting the obligation to the “seven species” from
Deuteronomy 8:8 (see m. Bik 1:3), but no Second Temple sources seem to do so.
There was surely consensus that firstfruits were required of grain (at least barley and
wheat), grapes, and olives, but the conflicting statements in the Torah left
considerable flexibility for Jews to interpret the liability beyond these three according
to local and/or sectarian norms.
The Torah does not quantify the obligation for designating firstfruits.
Theoretically, it could be fulfilled with a token amount taken from the best and first
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of those fruits to ripen. 721 According to the Mishnah, the firstfruits were designated
and visibly marked when they first appeared on the plant (with another opinion
claiming it needed to be re-declared when harvested; m. Bik 3:1). The firstfruit
offerings were in some ways akin to a vow in that one made an oral promise to God
that one fulfilled in thanks for God’s provision of a successful crop.
The Torah does not explicitly designate the timing for all firstfruit offerings
either. To some extent, this should be expected, since crops ripen at different times
and are thus available for offering at different points in the growing season. We may
reasonably expect that especially for regions farther away from the Temple, Jewish
agriculturalists would have performed their firstfruit offerings primarily on the major
pilgrimage holidays as well. Deuteronomy 26 furnishes additional details about the
ritual surrounding the offering, commanding those with firstfruits to place them in
baskets and bring them personally to the Temple. Once there, the pilgrim would hand
the consecrated goods over to the priests, who would set the offering before the alta r
and thereafter take the firstfruits as a perquisite of the office (Deut 26:2–10) The
Mishnah develops the picture further by envisioning a procession of basket carriers
from each district capital ()מעמד, led by musicians and a bull with gilded horns (m.
Bik 3:2–6). The procession does not seem to be based in any halakhic debate or
grounded in the Torah itself, and so we may suppose that it is here reflecting norms
that developed around the firstfruit obligation. Such processions could certainly have
been integrated into the caravans of pilgrims coming from a given community.
The association of firstfruit offerings with the major pilgrimage festivals is to
some extent corroborated by the Torah. It seems that firstfruit offerings were
especially associated with the Festival of Weeks. Exodus twice identifies Booths as a
firstfruits festival: in 23:16, it is called the Festival of Reaping (  ;) חג הקצירin 34:22 it
is a celebration of the “firstfruits of the wheat harvest” () בכורי קציר חטים. The
Mishnah also identifies this festival as the start of the period in which it is permissib le
for Jews to make their firstfruit offerings (m. Bik 1:3). The same passage also
designates the closing of the firstfruits season with the following pilgrimage festival,
Booths. This festival is called the Festival of the Ingathering (  ) חג האסיףin the
aforementioned verses from Exodus; this refers to the coordination of this festival
with the conclusion of the major agricultural harvests for the growing season, and so a
reasonable time for the conclusion of the year’s firstfruit offerings. Though
theoretically permissible to bring firstfruits any time in between, the distance would
have dissuaded most Galileans from doing so, and the existence of a tradition of
procession and the desire to participate in it with the rest of one’s community served
as a positive incentive to coordinating the offering with others during the festivals.
The Festival of Unleavened Bread also included as one of its central rites a public
firstfruit offering. This was the waiving of the ʽomer, a sheaf of newly reaped barley,

721

On the opposite end of the spectrum, since there was no fixed quantity to the obliga tory
offering, one could designate an entire field as a firstfruit offering, as noted in m. Bik 2:4.
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on the second day of the festival. 722 The ʽomer was then brought to the altar, where a
token portion of it was burned and offered alongside a whole-burnt lamb sacrifice
(Lev 23:10–12; Ant. 3.250–251). While it is clear that this ritual is a firstfruit offering
of sorts,723 it is not so clear whether the ritual was performed individually—each with
a sheaf from their field and a sacrifice—or as a public sacrifice—an agent of the
Temple preparing and making the offering on behalf of the whole community. Both
Leviticus and Josephus seem to distinguish the plural agents bringing sheaves for the
offering from the attending priests:
When you enter the land that I am giving you (pl.) and you (pl.) reap its
harvest, bring to the priest a sheaf of the first grain you (pl.) harvest. (Lev 23:10)
They bring to the altar an assaron for God; and having thrown one handful from it,
they leave the rest for the priests for their use. (Ant. 3.251)

But the Mishnah offers a very different vision of the ritual in m. Menaḥot 10. There,
an agent of the beit din harvests a pre-selected sheaf of barley from a field, preferably
near Jerusalem, on the eve of the festival in a public ceremony; the sheaf is th en
prepared in the Temple and offered as instructed in Leviticus (10:1–4).724 Menaḥot
distinguishes the ʽomer from firstfruit offerings, seeing it instead as the public
offering that initiates the window when people can make firstfruit offerings (m. Men
10:6; this seemingly contradicting the window depicted in m. Bik). In either case, this
suggests that the Festival of Unleavened Bread was the occasion for barley firstfruits,
whether in the form of the ʽomer sheaf or in the manner of other firstfruit offerings
subsequent to the ʽomer ceremony.
Another facet of the ʽomer offering and the Unleavened Bread festival is of
import: Leviticus prohibits the consumption of food products made from the new
year’s grain before the rite was performed (23:14). This prohibition on using the new
crop before the festival is reiterated by Josephus:
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Lev 23:11 reads “on the day after Shabbat.” This leads to some ambiguity over the date of this
ritual: is the day after the Sabbath day meant, or the day after the rest that is prescribed for the first
(and last) day of the celebration (23:7–8)? I here follow Josephus’ reckoning of the calendar, which
places it on “the second day of Unleavened Bread, that is, the sixteenth [of Nisan].” Since he was a
priest who operated in the Temple, he seems a reliable source for the calendar on which the Temple
actually operated near the end of the Second Temple period. Texts from Qumran show allegiance to
the alternative interpretation, that the sheaf should always be o ffered on a Sunday, rather than a fixed
calendar day. See discussion in Colautti, Passover in the Works of Josephus, 38–40.
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Note that besides Josephus’ explicit statement that the ʽomer was a barley firstfruit offering,
he also omits discussion of the ritual waving of the ʽomer and instead focuses on preparation of the
sheaf in the manner that Lev 2:14–16 specifies for all firstfruit offerings of grain.
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The Temple Scroll too depicts the ʽomer as an offering brought by the priests (col. 18). On
this, see Cana Werman, “The First-Fruit Festivals According to the Temple Scroll” [Hebrew],
in Zaphenath-Paneah: Linguistic Studies Presented to Elisha Qimron on the Occasion of His Sixty Fifth Birthday, ed. Danial Sivan, David Talshir, and Chaim Cohen (Beer-Sheva: Ben-Gurion
University of the Negev Press, 2009), 177–95 at 177–79.
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On the second day of Unleavened Bread, that is, the sixteenth, they partake of the
crops that they have reaped, for they had not been touched before that time. ( Ant.
3.250)725

The Mishnah suggests that the conclusion of this rite brought a flood of new crops to
the market, as food vendors began to sell processed and cooked grains for
consumption:
Once the ʽomer was offered, they used to go out and find the market of Jerusalem full
of flour and parched grain [of the new produce]. … Once the ʽomer was offered, the
new grain was permitted immediately, but for those that lived far off it was
permitted only after midday. (m. Men 10:5) 726

This rite “released” barley specifically or cereals broadly for general use. While
harvest and even sale of the new crop was perhaps permissible before Unleavened
Bread (again, m. Men 10:6–8 prohibits harvest before the ʽomer, while Leviticus and
Josephus presume it), consumption patterns were fixed to the festal calendar, and
proper observance meant managing resources so that one would not need to tap into
the new year’s crop too early. The Temple Scroll from Qumran takes this rati onale a
step further by envisioning separate festivals for the firstfruits of olive oil and wine
respectively, authorizing the use of the new produce through the appropriate token
offerings of the crop to God. 727 Though there is no evidence that an official,
independent firstfruits festival for either crop took place in the Second Temple, this
did not necessarily prevent those whole held to such a calendar from coordinating to
offer their firstfruits together at the same time. If it was the firstfruit offering itself
that was understood to initiate the permitted use of new produce, then for most
Galileans who came to the Temple primarily during the holidays, the use of the new
crop was attached de facto to the official festival calendar.
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Josephus’ use of the verb to harvest (θερίζειν) in the next line is somewhat confusing in this
light: “Then [after the ʽomer offering] it is permitted to all—both publicly and privately—to harvest
the rest” (Ant 3.251). He indicates in 3.250 that the barley crop has already been harvested but not yet
used. It may be that Josephus means here to indicate that after the ʽomer allowed people to begin
harvest of other grain crops (e.g., wheat), and to do so before this festival was prohibited. By contrast,
the Mishnah, which envisions the ʽomer as a public offering, claims that even barley was not to be
harvested before Passover (m. Men 10:6).
726
In the ellipsis is a disagreement between Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Judah whether this was the
position of the sages or in opposition to the sages.
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These festivals occurred seven weeks and fourteen weeks respectively after Weeks, creating
an orderly calendar of firstfruit festivals at regular fifty-day intervals (cols. 13–22). In Jubilees,
similar periods were designated as the cutoff dates for consuming the Second Tithe from these types
of produce. See discussion by Lawrence H. Schiffman, “The Sacrificial System of the Temple Scroll
and the Book of Jubilees,” in Schiffman, The Courtyards of the House of the Lord: Studies on the
Temple Scroll, ed. F. García Martínez (STDJ 75; Leiden: Brill, 2008), 97–122 at 112–14. See also the
discussion by Warman, who notes that the firstfruit festivals for oil and wine in the Temple Scroll
mimic the Festival of Weeks in their timing: each occurs seven weeks after the previous firstfruit
festival in schematic fashion; “Firstfruits Festivals,” 179. But note that Warman believes that the
Temple Scroll treats the ʽomer not as a firstfruit offering but an atonement offering (195).
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The coincidence of the festivals and the obligatory agricultural offerings with
harvest time also had implications for the agricultural work of harvesting itself, both
in terms of timeframe and manpower. If firstfruits were to be offered before the altar
at the festival, the would-be pilgrim would need to reap or pick at least the designated
firstfruits before setting off for the festivals. And if one expected to use the Second
Tithe to finance their festal obligations in Jerusalem, the whole crop would need to be
harvested with enough time allotted to complete the calculation of the amount
harvested and the amount to be separated as First and Second Tithe. Since the Temple
operated on a lunisolar calendar, the harvest and festival varied annual in the degree
to which they were coordinated. In some years, the task of completing the harvest in
time to make most efficient use of the tithe or fulfill the firstfruit obligations would
put the pilgrim under pressure to accomplish this work more quickly than in other
years. This would have been even truer for Galileans than for Judaeans, since the
former had at least three fewer days during which to accomplish the task. Galileans
would thereby have been under greater pressure to hire as much additional labor as
they could or to call in favors from friend and neighbors in order to ensure the harvest
was reaped or picked in time. Cooperative arrangements between neighbors could
increase the overall efficiency by which members of the community could complete
their harvest, but it might be necessary to enlist the aid of more non-agricultural
laborers to help with the harvest than normal.

Conclusion
All of the obligations discussed in this chapter linked the Galilean households into the
economic network of Jerusalem and its environs. The Torah mandated the physical
presence of male Jews at the festivals of Passover/Unleavened Bread, Weeks, and
Booths, and most of the other offerings could only be made at the Jerusalem Temple.
This brought thousands to Jerusalem three times each year, mostly from Palestine but
some even from far away in the diaspora. In the pilgrimage season, Jerusalem’s role
as the hub for the transregional Jewish community was amplified, as people from
many different and generally distinct regional networks came into interaction en
masse.728 Josephus even depicts the networking effect of the festivals as one of the
reasons God institutes the pilgrimage commandment in the first place:
Three times a year, let the [people] come together from the bounds of the land that
the Hebrews should conquer into the city in which they should establish the Temple ,
in order that they may thank [or: give thank offerings to] God for the benefits they
have received and entreat him for benefits for the future, and that by gathering and
feasting together they may be dear to one another. For it is good that those who are
of the same stock (ὁμοφύλους) and have the same practices in common should not be
ignorant of one another—and this will come about through their intermingling,
instilling memory of them through sight and association. For if they do not mingle
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As Rives notes for religious rituals throughout the Roman Empire, they can often serve as a
locus for civic identity construction and maintenance; Religion in the Roman Empire, 114.
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with one another they will continue to be regarded as utterly foreign to one another.
(Ant. 4.203–204)

Pilgrims comingled in the city markets, at the purification pools, in the Temple
courts, in the crowds participating in the practices of the festival rites, and in festal
meals shared with one another. Many also had opportunity to reinforce more local
network bonds over the multi-day trek from their hometowns to Jerusalem, as friends,
family, and neighbors in the caravan shared information and resources. The festival
occasions served to reinforce a sense of unity in practice among Jews across regional
lines. But they also created an occasion for putting differences on display, as regional
or sectarian differences in norms of practice were juxtaposed. This could have the
double effect of reinforcing a sense of allegiance to the norms that one embraced and
participated in, and flagging certain interactions with the adherents to different norms
as a risk to the maintenance of proper piety as one understood it. 729
The festivals were important in defining the temporal rhythms of the economy in
Palestine. Since the festivals generally coincided with the harvest season, the price
markets in both Galilee and Jerusalem were shaped not only by the factors of relative
supply and demand, but also by the logistical considerations of meeting the needs of
the Torah commandments. The need for money to redeem the tithe or to otherwise
spend in Jerusalem might entail selling at a time of low prices rather than holding
onto resources until a more lucrative price could be achieved. Or the compressed
interval between the ripening and the pilgrimage some years might lead farmers to
seek out more hired hands than would otherwise be necessary. The timing of firstfruit
offerings made at the festivals, or at least the timing of the ʽomer offered at the
Festival of Unleavened Bread, set limitations on the timeframe during which crops of
the new year’s harvest could be eaten, thereby structuring the schedule around which
Law-abiding households assessed how and when to ration their stored foodstuffs. The
festival schedule also meant that villages would be relatively unpopulated and
unguarded at predictable times of the year, creating a risk of robbery—whether by
fellow Jews or by non-Jews who populated Galilee’s periphery. 730 Galileans may have
been confident enough that widespread robbery would not go unanswered by the
Herodians and Roman governors who generally strove against brigdandry as a matter
of policy, though isolated acts of robbery might find no redress and was simply the
risk of piety.
As the people flowed south from Galilee to Jerusalem, so did a significant
quantity of their resources. Fulfilling the obligatory sacrifices meant tapping into the
household resources to procure animals fit for the altar and ritually pure grain, oil,
wine, and baked goods. Most Galileans would have purchased the resources for
sacrifice and meals—both everyday meals and celebratory feasts—in the Jerusalem
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730
And to some small extent the interior. Josephus references, for example, Greek inhabitants of
Tiberias at Life 67.
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marketplace, drawing to some extent on sanctified redemption money from their
Second Tithes that could only be spent on food and drink in Jerusalem itself. In
fulfilling the Second Tithe commandment, and doing so by means of redemption,
meant that Galilean agriculturalists infused the equivalent of 12 percent 731 of their
harvest income (including the “added fifth”) into the Jerusalem economy.
Although the Torah’s definition of these obligatory offerings was sometimes
quite specific—enumerating and designating the types of breads and crackers and
cakes to accompany a certain type of offering—it was at other times incredibly vague.
In such cases, the gaps opened up space for interpretation and permitted an array of
tactics for mitigating the resource demands of piety. The nebulous commandment to
“not appear empty-handed” at the festival seems to have spawned a normative
interpretation entailing a combination of peace offerings and whole-burnt offerings,
but even this still permitted—and sometimes required!—tactics of sharing resources
in meals with family, friends, and others. Since most immediate families were
probably too small to finish a sacrifice themselves, the festal meals would have
compelled pilgrims to invite others to share in the meal and thereby created
opportunities for Galilean Jews to affirm network bonds outside the household and
perhaps even transregionally. Large-scale landholders who produced a harvest and
hence a Second Tithe too abundant to consume within the household would also be
compelled to share meals with others, or give food away as charity, in order to fulfill
the Second Tithe commandment. The geographic and temporal limitations of these
obligations created conditions for some amount of wealth redistribution from those
with overabundant resources to those with significantly less. This too can be
understood in network terms as the forging or reinforcing of certain connections, and
the creation of obligations for reciprocation or other forms of social and cultural
capital that the benefactor could “cash in” later.
The economic demands of the festivals on the average Jewish household were not
limited to the private sacrifices that pilgrims made at the Temple. Even the public
sacrifices offered at the Temple were in effect paid by the general populace, financed
through a combination of the fixed-rate Temple tax and the various voluntary
offerings that many Jews dedicated to the Temple year-round. The burden of the
public sacrifices was therefore not evenly distributed, since those who vowed and
redeemed large tracts of land contributed much more to the fund than did the widow
offering her lepta. Paying the Temple Tax in the midst of one’s village or town
community and making voluntary offerings in view of the crowds at the Temple
offered individuals an opportunity to put their piety and wealth on display through the
eagerness and generosity of their contribution to the continuing operation of the cult.
The above discussion of the direct and indirect costs of participating in the
Temple cult during the festivals is not exhaustive. I have focused on the sacrifices and
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offerings because they were probably considered by most to be the central and most
important expenditures of the sojourn in Jerusalem. But the festival rites sometimes
made other demands of their participants, whether requiring that they construct,
dwell, and dine in special structures during the festival (as in the eponymous Festival
of Booths) or place additional restrictions on the types of food permissible (as with
the prohibition of leavened foods for the span of Passover and Unleavened Bread). In
other ways not examined here, the Torah’s prescriptions for performance of the
holidays surely made additional demands on the household’s resources and defined
the parameters by which the demands could be filled. And in the gaps of the text or in
supplement to it, there were surely traditions that are no longer discernible that
defined the normative practice of the festivals and their rites.
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CONCLUSION—REAPING WHAT HAS BEEN SOWN
I set out in this dissertation to formulate an alternative framework for thinking about
the economy in Early Roman Galilee. Rather than granting a privileged role to either
the state or the city, I argued that such centralized authorities played a more modest
role in shaping the economic system in Galilee. I have followed Michael Mann in
seeing political power as concentrated but limited in its effectiveness outside the thin
ranks that composed the bureaucracy, capable of penetrating civil society only in
occasional autocratic exercises of violence rather than in any sustained, systemic
sense.732 In place of center–periphery models, I advocated for the considerably less
hierarchical “small world” network as a more fitting framework for considering
economic and social interactions within Galilee.
Drawing on the insights of New Institutional Economics and social-scientific
research on social norms and behavior, I have sought middle ground between the
“modernist” and “primitivist” poles of contemporary research on the Ancient
Economy. 733 NIE carves out a position that simultaneously denies the “modernist”
conceptualization of the economy as a separable and discrete sphere of activity, and
denies the “primitivist” view that the economy’s embeddedness requires us to
understand economic activity as wholly subsumed within social forms of exchange
like reciprocity and patronage. It does so by instituting a more complex definition of
economic rationality that does not privilege the patently modern, western, capitalist
values of profit maximization as in Neoclassical Economics, one that is structured and
bounded by the social world in which the agents conduct their economic pursuits.
This approach has led us to question the use of a cross-cultural “peasant model”
in analysis of Galilee’s agrarian base, particularly the tendency to treat “subsistence”
as a fixed universal category rather than a socially-constructed one. The minimalist
starvation definition offers a floor for “subsistence” needs, but I argued that this is
rarely the operative understanding by which a household assessed its needs. The “bare
minimum” may include a host of social and religious obligations generally ignored or
relegated to an afterthought in the neoclassical economic approach. Religious Studies
scholars have recognized for some time now that the religious, political, and
economic are inextricably intertwined with one another. By treating “subsistence” as
a malleable and socially-constructed concept, we offer an approach that allows us to
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consider the interlinking of the religious and the economic without making the former
a mere epiphenomenon of the latter.
Given the incomplete, uneven, and disjointed nature of our evidence, we
inevitably rely on such models in order to fill in the gaps and create a coherent whole.
In the course of this dissertation, I have found several of the analytic frameworks
previously deployed in assessments of socioeconomic conditions in Galilee to be
wanting, either on the basis of flawed assumptions or a poor coherence with the data.
Every model or approach is built on fundamental assumptions, though, and has its
own set of limitations. I have tried to be as transparent as possible about my own
assumptions, laying them out in the introduction and in the course of my analysis. In
particular, I have asked the reader to share my assumption that most Jews in Galilee
strove to adhere to the Law as they understood it, rather than considering the
commandments as optional or secondary in importance. I hope the heuristic value in
setting aside prevailing assumptions in order to explore the consequences of operating
under alternative ones has been clear. Even if I have been too optimistic and produced
an idealized portrait, by exploring the economic implications of following the Law, I
will have produced a useful counterpoint to the pessimistic stance derived from
neoclassical economic assumptions, and thereby opened up new avenues for thinking
about economic behavior.

Summary of Findings
We began this study by considering the role of the state in Early Roman Galilee. The
state has enjoyed a central role in analyses of the ancient economy in the Mediterranean and Palestine alike. But the nature of Roman rule in this period was hardly
homogenous across the burgeoning empire, and unless one is attempting a macro scopic study—which I am not—it behooves us to consider the conditions of governance and institutions of the state on a more regional level. 734
I argued that Roman governance over Palestine was despotically strong but
infrastructurally weak: the Romans had the capability to intervene unilaterally
through force, but lacked the capacity to penetrate civil society and implement political decisions through the whole of the province. The Romans governed directly with a
very small staff or indirectly through vassals, in both cases relinquishing considerable
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control to native elites and local institutions. The rulers generally allowed their
subjects to govern themselves in day-to-day matters according to local laws and
customs when it did not otherwise represent a threat to the peace or to the govern ment’s nominal control. Except during the reign of Antipas, Galilee was a backwater
region, far from Jerusalem (less so from Caesarea) and rarely visited by rulers.
Distance from power was double-edged—the administration rarely interfered, but
there were barriers to external mechanisms of justice and redress. The lack of a
developed bureaucracy suggests that the flow of information to the state was poor and
uneven, reducing the efficacy of institutions of taxation and administration, especially
in regions far from the power center. Our data for Roman taxation and its collection is
spotty, but it seems that as elsewhere in the Empire, the Romans were more
concerned to procure a steady stream of revenue at little infrastructural cost than to
maximize their extraction from the provinces.
If the state ever played an important role in economic conditions, it was under
Antipas. Antipas’ tetrarchy was concentrated in Galilee and Peraea, meaning the ruler
and his court were proximate, and he developed first Sepphoris and then Tiberias to
function as his royal capitals in Galilee. Antipas was the first and only ruler in this
period to engage in major construction projects in Galilee (discounting Herod’s
founding of Gaba at Galilee’s frontiers). I argued that these cities did not disrupt or
impact the economy as dramatically as scholars often credit them with doing. Neither
was an elaborate or expansive city prior to 70 CE, and these city-building projects
were probably more modest than often assumed—certainly more so than Herod’s
constructions at Caesarea, for instance. The need for building resources and laborers
re-circulated Galilean tax revenues locally, rather than drawing them out of the region
as under Herod and Agrippa I, moderating any tax increases that may have been
levied to construct them. The refounding of Sepphoris probably produced little
change in the extant regional network, since Sepphoris had been a comparatively
large settlement and an administrative sub-center long before Antipas. Tiberias was
founded de novo, but its proximity to another long-established urban center, Magdala,
means it probably did not shift patterns too dramatically, except, perhaps, in pitting
Tiberias and Magdala against each other in competition and rivalry.
I argued that this interpretation of the inter-settlement dynamics of Galilee has
given undeserved attention to the role of the cities in defining patterns of economic
transaction. Scholars have drawn on Finley’s “consumer city” model of urban–rural
relations as the primary lens through which to evaluate socioeconomic conditions of
this region in the Early Roman period. Some have done so in a particularly extreme
fashion, painting the cities as parasites extracting wealth from the countryside and
forcing rural peasants into a spiral of debt. Others have tempered this view, seeing in
the evidence of trade signs that relations were more reciprocal and balanced, but often
retaining the same dichotomy. The evidence for socioeconomic stratification even in
village settlements undermines the binary division of wealth locked up in the cities
and a homogeneously impoverished rural peasantry. Rather than a hub-and-spokes
model of inter-settlement interaction, with exchange mediated through the city
centers, I offered the alternative of a “small world” network in which most settle-
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ments interacted directly with all other nearby settlements. Given the close proximity
of settlements, the relatively small size of cities, and the ease of regional travel as
suggested by anecdotes from the literary sources and (admittedly hard-to-date) road
evidence, I proffer this model as a more appropriate fit for the data.
There is also significant evidence for regional trade in Galilee. As much as
autarky may have been the peasant ideal, few if any households were completely self sufficient. The contingencies of the climate could lead to considerable variability year
to year, and even create microclimates across relatively small distances. While trade
in foodstuffs probably comprised the bulk of regional exchange, it is discernible
archaeologically only through the proxy data of storage containers. These vessels, I
argued, give us a sense of the outer contours of the network of exchange. The distinc tiveness of the Galilean material evidence suggests a relatively closed system of trade.
I suggested that the Jewish dietary laws and purity concerns likely steered Jews away
from trade in foodstuffs with the Samaritans and especially the gentiles on Galilee’s
periphery. The distribution patterns of Kefar Ḥananiah cookware suggest direct transactions with the potters rather than marketing through secondary distribution centers
in Sepphoris and Tiberias. I suggested that the small volumes of these wares at
Decapolis sites may be best explained by trade with the Jewish minority communities
there. I also noted the signs of trade in worked stone products—basalt grinders and
chalk vessels—between the lakeshore and inland Galilee on the basis of local
bedrock.
In order to support my contention that trade was conducted between proximate
sites and not just through central hubs, I considered the depiction of travel through
Galilee in the literary sources. Although few of those depictions reflect the movement
of trade goods through the region, I proposed that many exchanges were conducted
along familiar network connections, such that movement of people may serve as a
crude proxy for trade. The literary sources suggest the ease of movement through the
region from settlement to settlement, sometimes bypassing cities altogether in order to
travel from village to village. Especially in Lower Galilee, neighboring settlements
could be as close as a few kilometers away, making for easy daytrips to forge and
maintain social connections and conduct exchanges in neighboring villages. Even if
the villages did not have built permanent marketplaces, this did not preclude
exchange at weekly/seasonal markets or through person-to-person arrangements. This
is not to deny that cities were privileged marketplaces for certain types of goods,
especially expensive “luxury” items, infrequent purchases, or specialty services. But
the trade that happened most often and that most engaged in was a more local affair
along these network connections in villages and towns.
In the second half of the dissertation, I turned my focus to consider the Torah as a
religious institution and the ways that observing it would have shaped economic deci sion-making. Since the Roman and Herodian states were infrastructurally weak and
changes at the top largely left local institutions in place, it seems inappropriate to
place great weight on the state institutions as a force shaping economic decision making in Galilee. Although non-state institutional structures would still be worth
consideration in a society with robust state institutions, their relative weakness only
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highlights the importance that deeply revered religious institutions of Torah and
Temple could have had in defining the parameters and incentives of economic
behavior. Though the Temple authorities and priests had little capacity to enforce
observance of the commandments in Galilee, I suggested that adherence could be
compelled by a combination of internalization and self-enforcement, peer policing
through altruistic punishment, and threat of punishment by God as the enforcer par
excellence in the social network.
I considered several of the Torah’s agricultural laws and how they could have
affected economic decisions regarding agricultural production and consumption,
defining the obligations that constituted household needs and the permissible tactics
to meet them. The Sabbatical Year prohibited cultivation every seven years, and the
prohibition on “mixed kinds” complicated the use of crop diversification and intercropping strategies to mitigate the perennial risk of crop failure. There were also a
number of obligatory offerings to the priests and to the poor that were an integral part
of the subsistence calculus. The Second Tithe remained part of the household
resources, but because it could only be used in Jerusalem, the Law precluded its use
for day-to-day consumption.
I also considered the pilgrimage commandment, which required annual attendance at the three pilgrimage festivals—Passover/Unleavened Bread, Weeks, and
Booths. Once in Jerusalem, pilgrims were obligated to participate in sacrificial offer ings and feasts, among other rites. Because of the distance to Jerusalem, Galileans
would need to travel considerable distances in order to observe this commandment.
Travel to Jerusalem could be dangerous, time-consuming, and costly, and it required
consideration of a number of logistical choices; nevertheless, it seems Palestinian
Jews participated en masse each year. I argued that the burdens of travel incentivized
Galilean to consolidate a number of cultic and ritual obligations during the festival
season. I also suggested a number of ways that pilgrims could mitigate the risks and
costs of fulfilling this commandment through cooperation and resource sharing.
If most Jews indeed strove to abide by these commandments, they would have
had a profound effect on the temporal rhythms of agricultural practice in Galilee. The
Sabbatical Year effectively simulated the conditions of a famine every seven years,
with relatively little growth due to the lack of cultivation. Unlike normal famines, it
occurred predictably and households could prepare for it in the year(s) prior by
storing away extra foodstuffs for the fallow year. Within the seven years of the
sabbatical cycle, there were the two Third Tithe years. Observing this commandment
meant devoting an additional 10 percent of the harvest to the poor every three years,
including the year prior to the sabbatical fallow, requiring similar strategies of storage
and perhaps agricultural intensification to meet household resource targets.
On an annual basis, the festivals played a major role in shaping the temporal
rhythms of economic behavior. The festivals themselves were times of rest from
labor—it was specifically prohibited on certain festivals days, and the trek between
Galilee and Jerusalem precluded work for several days before and after. With some
flux due to the lunisolar nature of the calendar, the agricultural harvests and
processing roughly coincided with the three major festivals, requiring a compressed
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harvest schedule in some years to accomplish the tasks before setting out. The festival
seasons were the optimal times for Galileans to fulfill a number of obligatory offer ings that could only be made in Jerusalem: bringing firstfruit offerings and other
perquisites for the priests, consuming the consecrated Second Tithe and produce from
four-year-old trees or spending their redemption money on food, making voluntary
offerings, etc. In some cases, multiple obligations could be met simultaneously, such
as using the Second Tithe money to purchase a sacrificial animal to meet the require ments to make a festal offering and provide the meat for a festal meal. Because of the
agglomeration of obligations onto the festival season, the important temporal effects
of the festal calendar were compounded. And because of the interlinking of the festi val seasons and agricultural harvests, the festival time also correlated in interesting
ways with the seasonal flux of market prices and would have produced regional price
differentials.
While the primarily function of travel to Jerusalem was to perform the rites of the
festival at the Temple, it was also an optimal occasion to reinforce social connections
with friends or acquaintances at stops along the pilgrimage route or in Jerusalem
itself. One could tap these connections later in order to conduct transactions or to
expand one’s access to resources in times of need through accrued social capital. The
festivals could also serve as occasions to purchase goods from the holy city a few
times a year, such as the all-popular Herodian oil lamps of Jerusalem manufacture
that were ubiquitous in Early Roman Galilee.
I also noted the difference that one’s socioeconomic positions could make in the
available tactics for conducting economic transactions in fulfillment of these
commandments. Those with the ability to produce and store ample resources both in
kind and in coin had considerably greater freedom to take advantage of the market
effects of the seasonal/festal economic rhythms than those who lacked the capacity.
The ability to produce and store a substantial surplus in foodstuffs made the Sabbat ical Year less a difficulty to overcome than an opportunity to make a profit, since one
could sell goods to a needy market at prices higher than other years. Those of more
modest means, those lacking ample storage facilities, or those engaged in non -agricultural trades would find themselves more reliant on purchases at market to supple ment whatever they could gather from aftergrowth, expending resources stored in coin
with considerably less buying power than in other years. Redemption of the Second
Tithe too enabled different tactical options depending on wealth. Those able to earn
and save value in coin throughout the year had the advantage of being able to redeem
the tithe at harvest at low cost, reserving it for private use or sale under more
favorable prices, while those without had to sell the tithe to produce the redemption
money and were compelled by circumstances to do so at the least favorable prices of
the year. This difference was felt all the more upon arrival in Jerusalem, where the
throngs rushing in from around the world created high demands and likely high
prices. In some ways, therefore, the obligations of the Torah would have reinforced
some of the socioeconomic hierarchies of Galilean society.
Other obligations served to redistribute resources. The First Tithe and firstfruit
offerings, among others, moved resources to members of the priesthood from l ay
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Galileans. While some have read this as the transfer of wealth from poor peasants to
the wealthy elite, I contested this by pointing out that many of the priests were of
modest means or even impoverished. According to the ideal in the Torah, the priests
were supposed to live off their perquisites since they were give no inheritance in the
land; we do not know how many priests owned or rented land, but many of them
probably relied in part on these offerings for their livelihood. The Third Tithe moved
agricultural foodstuffs to the poorer segment of society. It is unclear how many would
have been liable to receive this tithe, since poverty is not defined in the command ment and later attempts to do so suggest a relatively generous upper limit. Although
this obligation would seem at first glance a burden on the small-scale farmer, the
possibility of giving as well as receiving the tithe would have nullified any delete rious effects. There were also commandments prohibiting the landholder from
scrupulously removing every bit of produce from his field, vineyard, and orchard—an
unspecified amount was to be left behind for the poor to eat. The vagueness of the
Torah certainly allowed for stinginess in the poor dues, but it also created opportuni ties to turn excess agricultural produce into social capital and prestige through
generous allotment to the poor. Likewise, the festivals and the associated feasts were
ideal occasions for well-off members of society to create and reinforce hierarchies of
dependence through redistribution of their resources, and thereby earn the respect and
admiration of others that might prove valuable in the future. The festivals offered a
wide audience for public display of piety through abundant sacrifices, charity to the
needy, and public professions through oaths and prayers.
I also considered how concern to observe the Torah could have affected exchange
within Galilee. The problem of information asymmetry meant that trade always
carried a risk of accidentally violating the dietary laws or attaining ritual impurity.
Ritual impurity was especially difficult to discern through physical inspection of the
product. In order to overcome the information problems, Jews could use gossip,
reputation, and stereotype as mechanisms to gauge the relative riskiness of a transaction. This is partially borne out in the material culture pattern we observed,
suggesting that Jews of Galilee and Golan primarily engaged in trade with one
another rather than with the gentile and Samaritan populations on their periphery. But
even transactions with other Jews could be risky, if they did not follow the Law as
stringently or according to the same interpretations as you. Discussion in the Mishnah
suggests that patterns of transactional behavior could be guided by reputation and that
buyers sought to tap into local informational networks to reduce risks when operating
in unfamiliar markets. Discrimination in interaction was not solely a matter of
avoiding breaking the Law oneself, though. I suggested that boycotting or frequenting
a vendor could serve as mechanisms for peer policing, punishing those who were
known or rumored to be lax in observance or outright violators of the Law, and
rewarding those with reputations for piety. Overall, these social pressures may have
incentivized greater homogeneity in local normative interpretations and practices,
since standardization lowers transaction costs, and may even have driven venders to
be scrupulous in guarding the ritual purity of their goods so as to tap into a wider
market.
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End of an Era
I have chosen in this study to focus on the period before 70 CE, when the First Jewish
Revolt came to a close. While conditions in the Early Roman period were not wholly
stable or homogenous, 70 CE marked a break with important consequences for this
analysis. Many of the patterns I discussed in this dissertation would have been
disrupted by the siege of Jerusalem, the destruction of its Temple, and the consider able demographic shifts that followed the revolt. Initially, many Jews probably saw
this as a temporary rupture and anticipated the restoration of the Temple, much as the
Temple had been rebuilt after the Babylonian conquest in 587 CE.735 Josephus at the
end of the first century CE speaks of the festal and cultic laws as if he expects a return
to the status quo ante in the near future, and other texts from the same period, like 4
Ezra, seem to hold similar expectations. But after the failed Bar Kokhba Revolt (132 –
135 CE) in Judaea, these hopes seem to have been dashed. New solutions and new
interpretations of the Law were required for a Temple-less age.
The two revolts led to major shifts in settlement patterns. A few settlements in
Galilee and Golan were destroyed during the First Revolt, never to be resettled (e.g.,
Yodefat and Gamla). The Romans left behind the Legio X Fretensis in Jerusalem and
Legio VI Ferrata in Caesarea as a permanent military presence in the province. 736
Perhaps prior to the Bar Kokhba Revolt, but certainly after it, Jerusalem was
refounded as Aelia Capitolina and the Jewish population in and around the holy city
dwindled.737 Many of the Judaeans who survived the conflicts relocated to the north,
including, presumably, a considerable number of priests. 738 As Uzi Leibner’s survey
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has shown, there was considerable expansion of settlements in at least eastern Lower
Galilee during the Middle Roman period, and I argued that this was also a period of
great expansion for the city of Sepphoris—which emerged from the First Revolt
unscathed—and perhaps Tiberias as well. 739 After the First Revolt and certainly by
the end of the Second, Galilee had transformed from a backwater territory far from
the focal point of Judaism—Jerusalem—into the new Jewish heartland of Palestine.
The Temple had constituted one of the pillars of the “common Judaism” of
Palestine in the Second Temple period and its destruction certainly disrupted religious
practice, but it did not mark an end to Judaism. Many of the commandments,
including most of the agricultural laws, continued to be operable even without a functioning Temple. Much of what we discussed in chapter 3 could pertain to the Middle
Roman period as well, albeit with some modifications. For example, the First Tithe
and most other priestly perquisites such as firstfruit offerings could still be given to
the priests, but with priests now in Galilee, the timing of these offerings did not need
to be structured around the pilgrimage festivals. More substantial changes were
necessary in order to adapt the Jerusalem rites to a Temple-less age. The sacrifices,
both public and private, could not be offered outside of Jerusalem and the Temple.
Rabbinic sources grant considerably more emphasis to non-sacrificial rites in their
descriptions of the festivals than Second Temple sources had, indicating the pragmatic shifts in ritual practice for their contemporary society. 740 Second Tithe, when
set aside, could no longer be eaten in Jerusalem as part of the festival celebration, yet
it was still a consecrated good that could not be consumed elsewhere: a new conundrum that rendered the tithe altogether unusable. No longer was there so steep a price
differential between Galilee and Jerusalem to take into account, nor was the timing of
sale and redemption necessarily linked as strongly to the harvest festivals as it had
been. Pilgrimage to Jerusalem was effectively brought to a close, at least pilgrimage
conducted along the regularized triennial pattern that had long defined the rhythms of
movement back and forth between Galilee and Jerusalem. The economic calculus
would surely have been different under a system without the motor of the festivals
driving the system in the particular way it did during the Second Temple period.
An altogether separate analysis would be necessary to consider the role of reli gious institutions in shaping the dynamics of economic decision-making in Galilee
2002), 60–61. The movement of priests northward after the Bar Kokhba Revolt is often discussed in
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after 70 CE. Especially after the Bar Kokhba Revolt in 135 CE, the fundamental
assumptions I have made about widespread concern for adherence to the Law and
normative interpretive practices may have weakened considerably. Seth Schwartz
envisions a particularly dramatic shift in Judaism in the Middle Roman period as
follows:
I suggest that under the combined impact of the Destruction and the failure of the
two revolts, the deconstitution of the Jewish “nation,” and the annexation of Palestine by an empire under its power and prosperity, Judaism shattered. Its shards were
preserved in altered but recognizable form by the rabbis, who certainly had some
residual prestige and thus small numbers of close adherents and probably larger
numbers of occasional supporters. But for most Jews, Judaism may have been little
more than a vestigial identity, bits and pieces of which they were happy to incorpo rate into a religious and cultural system that was essentially Greco-Roman and
pagan.741

If Schwartz is correct in reading the fading distinctiveness of Jewish material culture
in this period as a sign that the majority was largely unconcerned with the Law and
was less reticent about assimilating into generic Graeco-Roman culture, then the new
social dynamics and the non-state institutions may also have changed the “rules of the
game” dramatically. And if not, the reorientation of practice toward the community
and household levels would have its own consequences for the institutional and
normative landscape within which Galileans conducted their economic pursuits. 742

New Horizons
This project is but a first step toward a more thoroughgoing investigation of the ways
the economic decision-making was shaped by the constraints and incentives of institutional structures such as the Torah laws. It hardly constitutes a comprehensive
account of economy in Early Roman Galilee. I have been selective in my choices for
analysis, focusing on those laws that would have had strong or interesting implications for bounding economically “rational” behavior. Even some of these I have
omitted based on my focus on production, consumption, and trade, and due to consid erations of space and variety. I have barely dealt, for instance, with the topics of
lending and debt, or with the Torah’s laws concerning damages. Many more laws
without readily obvious economic implications are worth closer examination, too; my
discussion of the prohibition on “mixed kinds” should be exemplary of this.
741
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I have opted for a qualitative rather than quantitative approach in this study. It
was not feasible for me to undertake the task of building such a quantitative model for
this project, and I have considerable reservations about attempting it given the
number of unknowns.743 To construct this model would require determining minimal
nutritional food needs, average agricultural landholdings, average seed-to-yield ratios,
and the amount due to the state in taxes. Good, reliable quantitative data in the ancient
sources are hard to come by. We cannot glean plot sizes from our literary sources, and
attempts to determine them from aerial photography neglect the common practice of
owning and/or renting multiple scattered plots. The harvest yield could vary wildly
from year to year depending on climatic conditions. Paul Halstead has argued that
even modern proxies from pre-industrial farming may mislead us; yields could also
vary depending on the methods of sowing (broadcast versus drill), timing of planting
and harvest, and other tactical decisions. 744 This is not to dismiss the possibility that
one could construct such a model and do so in a way that was convincing. A quantita tive study could of course lend support to my assumption that most Jews strove to
adhere to the commandments by demonstrating the feasibility of producing enough
surplus to meet the tithe obligations as well as the requirements for nutrition and
taxation. But to follow that path responsibly would have considerably lengthened this
project and must be reserved for future inquiry.
While this study focused on Galilee, similar analysis could be deployed for
Judaea or Peraea. Some aspects of the analysis would remain the same or quite
similar. But the differences in proximity to Jerusalem, settlement patterns, population
compositions (e.g., presence of priests), and ecology, among other factors, could
produce quite different assessments of the social networks in which Jews in those
regions operated and of the ways religious institutions shaped economic decisi onmaking. I presume, in fact, that the socioeconomic world of Judaea was substantially
different from that of Galilee, despite the shared aspects of a “common Judaism.” It
would also be very interesting to see the results of a similar analysis on the Samaritan
community of Palestine: to what extent did their particular interpretation of the Torah
laws and their regional network in Samaria shape economic behavior among
Samaritans and with outsider groups?
Beyond the historical study of ancient Judaism and early Christianity, I hope that
my project will serve as the starting point for similar regional investigations in the
study of the Ancient Economy of the ancient Mediterranean world. I have drawn
heavily on insights from study in this field, but have also made my own advances. My
analysis contributes to the variety of models that scholars have constructed for
thinking about inter-settlement economic relationships. In response to Finley’s use of
the “consumer city” model, others have offered alternative configurations for urban–
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rural relations, such as the “producer city,” the “organizer city,” or the urban–rural as
an inseparably integrated unit. 745 All of these models presume the city as the axis
around which the economy revolved. I contribute to this list by offering a center-less
framework for thinking of inter-settlement relations that may prove useful for those
areas of the empire lacking in large, dominant urban centers such as Rome’s western
provinces.
Perhaps more importantly, while I have followed a recent turn toward NIE, I have
deployed a more expansive approach to it. Most scholarship deploying NIE has
centered on the role of state institutions of administration, taxation, and law (espe cially property rights), but the role of non-state institutions and norms has barely been
considered. Regional and even highly local religious traditions could have been quite
important in shaping economic behavior in regionally specific ways across Rome’s
diverse empire. As James B. Rives reminds us,
Imperial authorities not only tolerated variety in local religious traditions, they even
expected and, within limits, supported it. … Although for the sake of convenience I
will talk of “regional religious traditions,” there was in reality almost as much variety
within these regions as between them. 746

As a result, we should not expect the economic calculus of the “peasant” populations
in all regions to be homogenous; rather, religious institutions of sacred law, temple
offerings, vows, and other rites would have contributed to socially-constructed definitions of economic needs and shaped the social world in which normative behavior
and acceptable tactics for reaching those needs were determined.
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